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1835-1853

EDITOR

PENELOPE TUSON

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Edited by
Penelope Tuson

VOLUME 2
1835–1853

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Introduction

The documents in Volume 2 have been arranged in four sections. The first, the Trucial System, covers the successive maritime truces which gave their name to the coast for over a century. The second section, historical summaries and travellers' accounts, includes some of the papers published by the Bombay Government as a handbook for British officials in India and the Gulf (*Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, 1856*); also included here are accounts by Indian Navy officers of their travels in eastern Arabia. Section three, regional relations, consists of internal developments within and between the shaikhdoms and their response to the influence in the area of both Egyptian and Wahhabi forces. Section four deals with the slave trade. There is considerable overlap between the first three sections, mainly because of the administrative practice whereby Gulf officers and administrators in Bombay reported on local affairs in the form of lengthy general despatches covering a wide range of subjects. These have been reproduced in full in the most convenient place rather than in small extracts according to specific topics.

The trucial system [2.01–2.07]

Between 1835 and 1853 a succession of maritime truces, arranged by the British but willingly accepted by the maritime shaikhs, gradually brought an end to large-scale warfare at sea and to the economic impoverishment which resulted from repeated interruptions to the pearling season and to Gulf trade generally. At the same time the British were inevitably drawn further into Gulf politics.

Britain's position was summarised for the Government of Bombay by Lieutenant A. B. Kemball in 1844 [2.01]. Kemball became British Resident in the Gulf in 1852 but had already served for ten years as Assistant at Bushire to Samuel Hennell, in a remarkably successful partnership which set standards of diplomacy not often equalled in future years. In 1835 Captain Hennell, as Assistant in charge of the Gulf Residency, arranged the first six-month truce with Shaikh Khalifah b.

Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi, Shaikh Sultan b. Saqr of Sharjah, Ubaid b. Sa'id of Dubai and Rashib b. Hamad of Ajman [2.02]. He also negotiated compensation from Khalifah b. Shakhbut for the plunder of the *Daria Dowlut* and verbally agreed a neutral zone in Gulf waters within which vessels of war would not cruise [2.03].

The Truce was renewed every year between 1835 and 1843 [2.04] and its renewals provided an opportunity for the Resident, or his Assistant, to visit the coast, meet the shaikhs, expound British policy and report on local affairs. In 1843 Lieutenant Kemball toured the shaikhdoms and negotiated a ten-year maritime truce [2.05]. While at Abu Dhabi he talked to Khalifah b. Shakhbut about his relations with 'Isa b. Tarif; at Ras al-Khaimah he told Sultan b. Saqr that Britain would not intervene in his war with 'Abullah b. Rashid of Umm al-Qaiwain, and at Umm al-Qaiwain he talked to 'Abdullah b. Rashid about the destruction of his towers. In May 1844 Kemball again used his visit to discuss with the shaikhs the interpretation of the 1820 treaty and to re-iterate the policy of British non-intervention on land [2.06]. During these official tours, the shaikhs became accustomed to expressing their own views on a wide range of subjects and the details were reported back to the Government in Bombay at great length and sometimes with colourful additions. In May 1853 Kemball notified the government of the conclusion of the Treaty of maritime peace in perpetuity [2.07]. In the same despatch he reported on his talks with Sultan b. Saqr about Buraimi and about the slave trade and then described how at Abu Dhabi he met Hamdan b Tahnun (in the absence of his brother Sa'id) who came aboard the *Clive:* 'finding that my visitor suffered severely from sea-sickness, I did not detain him longer than sufficed to explain the objects of the proposed Treaty, and to prepare a provisional document for his signature vouching for his brother's acceptance of its obligations, a precaution the necessity for which was however superseded by the latter's arriving in person yesterday'.

Historical summaries and travellers' accounts [2.08–2.10]

As the British became more involved in the affairs of eastern Arabia, Bombay government administrators continued to collect information on the Gulf. Lieutenant Kemball, while Assistant Resident at Bushire, compiled a general survey of the coastal shaikhdoms together with more detailed historical sketches of the Al Bu Falasah and Ajman which were later up-dated by H. F. Disbrowe. Disbrowe submitted a sketch of Umm al-Qaiwain [2.08].

The Persian Gulf survey carried out by Lieutenants Guy and Brucks in the 1820s (*see* volume 1) was followed by a similar survey of the southern coast of Arabia (1833–48) by Lieutenants S. B. Haines, J. R. Wellsted and Charles Cruttenden during which Wellsted travlled extensively in Oman accompanied by Lieutenant F. Whitelock. In 1835–36 Wellsted and Whitelock journeyed to Nizwa and Tanuf then into the Hajar mountains with the intention of reaching Buraimi and even Najd. When they reached

Ibri they found it occupied by a Wahhabi raiding party under Sa'ad bin Mutlaq who had been appointed *naib* at Buraimi in 1835. The pair returned to Shinas for another unsuccessful attempt and Whitelock tried yet again to go to Buraimi via Sharjah but failed. Both described their journeys, Wellsted in his *Travels in Arabia* and Whitelock in the first volume of the Transactions of the Bombay Geographical Society, 1836 [2.09], which coincidentally also published an account of the coastal shaikhdoms by his brother (Lieutenant H. H.) who had been a member of the earlier Gulf survey [2.10]

Regional relations [2.11–2.20]

In 1835 the Qubaisat section of the Bani Yas defected to Khaur al 'Udaid to avoid paying their part of the damages which were being recovered by the British after the outbreak of piracy in the Gulf [see 2.01 above]. In May 1837 Khalifah b. Shakhbut, having failed to persuade them to return, destroyed the settlement [2.11]. Some of the Qubaisat fled to Doha and others to Dubai although eventually they were to return to Abu Dhabi. Another separate act of secession in 1835 involving Abu Dhabi, was the migration there of the Al bin 'Ali shaikh 'Isa bin Tarif and the Al Bu 'Ainain from Bahrain. In a later agreement with 'Abdullah b. Ahmad of Bahrain, Khalifah b. Shakhbut undertook not to shelter 'Isa any more and he departed to Qais island [2.12]. 'Isa b. Tarif's activities during these years are regularly included in reports on other subjects [eg, 2.13]

While changes of political allegiance were disturbing life on the coast, a much more serious threat to regional stability had appeared inland in the form of the Egyptian army, which in 1837 invaded Najd and by 1838 had added Hasa and Qatif to its conquests. The Saudi Amir Faisal b. Turki, having surrendered to the Egyptian commander, Kurshid Pasha, was sent to Cairo as a prisoner, Najd was declared an appendage of Egypt and Faisal's brother Khalid set up as a puppet Wahhabi amir. British Indian government policy was now coloured much more by European considerations and efforts were concentrated on counteracting the Egyptian advance rather than regarding it as a useful brake on the Wahhabis. The Egyptians sent Sa'ad b. Mutlaq, the former Wahhabi lieutenant at Buraimi, to try to persuade the shaikhs to acknowledge the puppet amir Khalid. The British sent Rear-Admiral Sir Frederick Maitland, Commander-in-Chief, East Indies station, to make a show of British strength, deliver a warning letter to Kurshid Pasha and rally the shaikhs [2.13]. Maitland sailed from Kharaq on 17 April 1839 with the Assistant Resident, Lieutenant Edmunds, and Commodore G. B. Brucks, the officer commanding the Gulf station. They sailed first to Bahrain where Shaikh Sultan b. Shakhbut the brother of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi came on board, then to Lingah, Ras al-Khaimah and Dubai. Lieutenant Edmunds stayed on to arrange the truce for the coming year, received the shaikhs on board ship and heard about arrival of Sa'ad b. Mutlaq at Sharjah.

In June Mulla Husain, the Residency Agent at Sharjah reported that Sa'ad was still at Sharjah and welcomed by Sultan b. Saqr. Hennell set

off immediately on the Hugh Lindsay calling at Abu Dhabi to question Khalifah b. Shakhbut about reports of his correspondence with the Egyptian Agent and then to the other ports to obtain written assurances of loyalty from the shaikhs, including the Na'im [2.14]. At the same time he despatched another warning letter to Kurshid Pasha and in a reversal of former British policy of non-interference in inland politics, promised to send arms and ammunition as well as a British Agent to support the Na'im at Buraimi. A month later the Agent Mulla Husain reported the departure of Sa'ad b. Mutlaq [2.15] and at the same time Shaikh Khalifah b. Shakhbut's attack on Buraimi.

The growing prominence of Buraimi in developments taking place in the Gulf convinced the British of the need for more information about the oasis. In November 1839 Captain Atkins Hamerton of the 15th Bombay Native infantry stationed at Kharaq (the temporary site of the British Residency) was ordered to sail for Sharjah and make his way from there to Buraimi [2.16]. At Sharjah Hamerton was prevented from leaving for the interior by Sultan b. Saqr but in the meantime he met the Na'im shaikhs with Hennell at Ajman on 11 January when Hennell defined to them the limits of British involvement [2.16, letter of 1 February]. Hennell also negotiated an agreement between the Na'im and Dhawahir and Hamerton finally left Sharjah on 21 January to reach Buraimi four days later. He stayed until 28 January, the first European known to have visited Buraimi from Sharjah, and on his return submitted his diary to the Resident. Four months later, in May 1840, the Egyptians evacuated Najd, providing a three-year interim before the next Wahhabi resurgence and a period in which local rather than external tribal conflicts and allegiances were resolved both at Buraimi and on the coast [2.17].

In June 1843 the Wahhabi Amir Faisal b. Turki Al Saud returned from captivity in Cairo and sent letters to the Trucial Coast announcing his intention to reimpose Wahhabi rule [2.18]. In 1845 the Saudis re-appeared in Buraimi for the third time but met with increasingly strong resistance culminating in the re-taking of the forts in 1848 by the Abu Dhabi Shaikh Sa'id b. Tahnun who had succeeded his uncle, Khalifah b. Shakhbut in 1845.

The Wahhabi relief force under Sa'ad ibn Mutlaq was driven to take refuge in Sharjah while Shaikh Sa'id maintained his position in Buraimi. In February 1849 peace was arranged by an emissary of the Sharif of Mecca who persuaded Sa'id to withdraw his forces and make way for the brief re-establishment of Sa'ad b. Mutlaq at Buraimi. Before his final departure in May 1850 the Wahhani *naib* was involved with Shaikh Maktum b. Buti of Dubai in a plan to rebuild 'Udaid. However, it was effectively stopped by Shaikh Sa'id b. Tahnun who sent a boat load of dying donkeys to be thrown into the wells [2.19].

The slave trade [2.21–2.25]

In the early 19th century Muscat (and later Sur) was the major clearing house of the East African slave traffic to the Gulf, Persia, Iraq and India. Occasionally Qasimi vessels traded direct but generally the maritime shaikhdoms simply shared in the carrying trade from Muscat. Most of the slaves were sold within Oman but the remainder were bought by dealers from the Trucial Coast, especially by the Qawasim who were the principal operators within the Gulf.

British moral indignation at the traffic in slaves brought the first significant clash in cultural values with the Gulf shaikhdoms. Slavery was a way of life in the Gulf, entrenched in the social structure and necessary to the economy. An anti-slavery clause had been included in the General Treaty but is was not regarded with enthusiasm by the Government of Bombay or by successive Gulf Residents who were reluctant to irritate the shaikhs on such a delicate matter when their co-operation was needed on other more pressing political affairs [2.21]. Lieutenant A. B. Kemball's paper, summarising developments relating to the slave trade between 1820 and 1844, draws heavily on the detailed reports he submitted to Bushire after the regular tours of the coastal shaikhdoms carried out as part of his duties as Assistant Resident in the Gulf (1842–52) during which time he became something of an expert on the slave trade.

In 1837 the case of a group of Somali girls alleged to have been abducted by Qasimi vessels served to concentrate the minds of the British on the involvement of the Gulf shaikhs in the trade and the Resident at Bushire, Samuel Hennell, was instructed to investigate the case. His sensitive report [2.22] pointed out the ambiguous nature of Article IX of the General Treaty and his own doubts about the wisdom or indeed the efficacy of measures to enforce it, while hinting at what would now be described as the 'Eurocentric' nature of the British attitude: 'we must I fear confess that the actual treatment of slaves has been the reproach rather of European than of Eastern nations'. However, Shaikh Sultan b. Saqr readily agreed to a formal agreement conceding the British right to search [2.23], as did Rashid b. Hamad of Ajman, Maktum b. Buti of Dubai and Khalifah b. Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi. In the following year the same rulers, together with 'Abdullah b. Rashid of Umm al-Qaiwain signed a further agreement re-inforcing the right to search and confining the trade within a well-defined line [2.23].

In the 1840s the British policy initiative passed to the Foreign Office, whose attitude on abolition was much more hawkish than that of the British administrations in India and the Gulf where the realities of the local situation were more clearly recognised [2.24]. Nevertheless, after the way was paved in 1845 by an Agreement with the Sultan of Muscat and a *firman* concluded with Turkey in January 1847, Hennell visited the coast and obtained an agreement from Sultan b. Saqr prohibiting the export of slaves from Africa in his vessels and those of his subjects and again granting British ships the right of search and seizure. Similar agreements were concluded with the shaikhs of Ajman, Dubai, Umm al-Qaiwain and Abu Dhabi [2.25].

NOTE ON SOURCES

Material in this volume has been drawn largely from four India Office Records series: the correspondence and files of the Resident at Bushire

and the Agent at Sharjah (*IOR: R/15/1*), correspondence of the East India Company and Board of Control's Secret Department (*IOR: L/P&S/5*), the Board's Collections (*IOR: F/4*), and Bombay Political and Secret Proceedings (*IOR: P/SEC/BOM*). As in volume one, the poor physical condition of some of the material, particularly the correspondence with Mulla Husain at Sharjah, has prevented it from being successfully reproduced and printed versions have been substituted. The most notable example is Captain Hamerton's diary of his proceedings at Sharjah [2.16] which exists in original in only very faded copy and has been reproduced here from the transcribed version used in the Buraimi Memorials. Hamerton's diary of his proceedings at Sharjah has, however, been reproduced from the original.

The Trucial system

2.01
British policy towards the Arab tribes of the Gulf, 1820–1844

OBSERVATIONS

ON THE

PAST POLICY OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

TOWARDS THE

ARAB TRIBES OF THE PERSIAN GULF.

BY

LIEUTENANT A. B. KEMBALL,

ASSISTANT RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

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BRITISH POLICY IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

The general policy of the British Government in relation with the Arab States is fully apparent from the annexed Treaties. It remains but to be shown how far the course adopted by Government has proved adequate to the attainment of the one great and principal end,—the entire suppression of piracy, and consequent security to the trade and traders of all nations. The measures pursued in the support of this line of policy have ever been mild and conciliatory; but a constant surveillance, and an unremitting vigilance, aided by the occasional demonstration of power (without, however, its actual exercise since 1820, one instance in 1835 alone excepted), have nevertheless been essentially necessary to render it of avail.

The gradually improving civilization and increased commercial interests of the inhabitants of the maritime Arab States, induced by these restraints to war and piracy, creating to a certain degree a desire on their own part for *perfect* tranquillity on the seas, have removed many great difficulties which at first existed, and enabled the Government of late years to diminish the great annual expenditure on account of the naval establishment employed in their watch and observation, by its reduction to the complement of one sloop of war, one brig, one schooner, and the Resident's yacht, without at the same time lessening its influence, or incurring any great danger of a renewal of former disorders.

It must nevertheless be borne in mind,—when the poverty, habits of rapine, and interminable blood feuds (the heir-loom of the Arab); and when the enticing prospects of rich booty to be obtained from a course of piracy, are considered,—that the Arabs have been so long restrained and impelled to the faithful observance, with few exceptions, of their engagements with the Government, by the dread of its power alone, and the assurance that punishment would immediately follow their slightest breach. The disorders and irregularities arising out of the blood feuds existing on land afford a pretty good proof of what would occur at sea, were it not for the restraining power of the British Government.

Experience has shown that the most solemn engagements between

these chieftains themselves, formed without the guarantee of the Government, are no security whatever for the maintenance of peace: present prospects of temporary advantage or gain are quite sufficient grounds for their being set aside and disregarded. The complete and voluntary abandonment of lawless habits, therefore, if ever to be anticipated, must be looked for in a future generation: at present it is sufficient that the presence of our naval force, aided by a firm but mild supervision, have already been attended with such good effects, and are in a fair way of promoting a radical change.

Previous to the expedition of 1820,* under the command of Sir William Grant Keir, which had for its object the complete destruction of the forts and boats† of the piratical tribes, notwithstanding the merited chastisement which had been inflicted upon them by a naval expedition in 1809, no vessel, whether carrying a British pass and British colours, or those of any other nation, was safe; and the only effect of repeated remonstrances, and threats of retaliation, was to elicit from them the promise, while still openly avowing their determination otherwise to continue their depredations, to respect the British flag,—an engagement which they nevertheless seldom observed, and for the violation of which they invariably failed to afford redress when called upon. The slight and temporary impression which had been made by the first expedition, in 1809, in consequence of its not having been fittingly followed up by measures of precaution and general supervision, led, therefore, in the expedition of 1819-20, to the imposition of a general Treaty, consisting of eleven Articles, upon the Arab Chieftains, and the appointment of a Political Resident at Bushire, whose duty it now became to insist upon the full and strict observance of its conditions on the part of the subscribers; for which purpose the services of a naval and military force were placed at his disposal. The latter arm was at first stationed at Ras-ool-Khyma, but was thence, after a short period, for obvious reasons, removed in the first instance to Kishm, on the island of that name, a dependency of the Imaum of Muskat, and afterwards to Deristan, opposite the island of Angaum; but, in consequence of the insalubrity of the climate of those two places, was finally transferred and fixed at Bassadore,‡ a portion of the same island. Three or four

* During a short period subsequent to the departure of this Expedition, the right was assumed of preventing the restoration of the forts and towers, which had been dismantled and destroyed; but as it was founded on no pledge on the part of the chiefs not to rebuild, it was resigned.

† The boats belonging to Lingah, Mogoo, Aseeloo, and Congoon, on the Persian Coast, were also destroyed; but, on the remonstrance of the Persian Minister, compensation was afforded by the Indian Government.

‡ Vide Report on Bassadore, at page 50 of this Selection.

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years sufficed to show that a respectable naval force was fully competent to all the objects in view, and the military detachment was therefore withdrawn to Bombay; and the head quarters of the Indian Naval Squadron, after continuing some time at Mogoo, was, in consequence of the jealousy of the Persian Government, removed to Bassadore, a more unhealthy station, but possessing the superior advantage of a spacious and excellent harbour.

During the first few years subsequent to the date of the formation of this Treaty,* it was not considered advisable or expedient to hold its conditions so strictly binding as their import and wording admitted. War at sea, if previously proclaimed, was consequently not precluded to the subscribers.

The sentiments of Government on this point were at the time thus expressed:—"Our relations to the Arab States afforded no grounds for interference to restrain their mutual attacks. It is true that Article IV. of Sir W. Grant Keir's Treaty mentions peace among themselves as one of the alterations in the condition of the Arabs introduced by that engagement, but this appears to have been rather an explanation of the intention of the flag, than any distinct stipulation; and it was explained by Sir W. Grant Keir, in the 7th paragraph of his letter accompanying the Treaty, to have been designed, among other purposes, to demonstrate our determination not to interfere with the petty feuds of the subscribing powers, while they continued to observe the stipulations of the Treaty. In these circumstances, Government could scarcely pretend to the power of imposing any restraint on the motions of vessels intended for a purpose of lawful warfare."

The total cessation of warfare at sea was nevertheless anxiously desired by most of the chieftains, and many indeed themselves entertained the belief that it was thus provided in Article IV. of the Treaty.

From the foregoing extract, however, it is seen that the Government was not prepared at that time to take upon itself the responsibility which such a line of policy must have entailed, in the investigation and settlement of such endless complaints and claims, and the redress of such grievances as must in that case have been referred to it for arbitration and decision; and the following explanation of this Article was accordingly given by Major Wilson to Shaikhs Sultan bin Suggur, Abdoolla bin Ahmed, and others, on their expressing their conviction that it involved a total prohibition of hostilities.

* The irregular habits of the Arabs rendered it necessary, in the opinion of Sir W. Grant Keir, that the Treaty concluded by him should not be strictly enforced for a considerable period after it was concluded. The numerous petty wars between the different Chiefs of the Gulf rendered it at all times difficult to distinguish in that sea between acts of piracy and operations of lawful warfare.

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"Piratical war being in existence previous to the conclusion of this Treaty with the pacificated Arabs, it was necessary, for the purpose of introducing the new order of things which the Treaty announces in Article I.,* that these piratical wars should be brought to a termination: with this view Article IV. of the Treaty was inserted.

"The meaning of this Article, when taken in conjunction with the definition of acknowledged war to be found in Article II., becomes perfectly apparent, and it may be thus developed:—

"The pacificated Arabs shall all of them continue in their former political relations with each other, with the exception that as all piratical wars shall henceforward cease, they shall be at peace with the British Government, and shall not fight with each other in the same piratical manner; and the flag is a symbol of this, viz. that piratical wars have ceased, and of nothing further.†

"It is not, and therefore never can be called, with propriety, the British flag; it is only the flag of certain friends of the British, who may, by the adoption of this flag, be desirous to avoid the risk of being confounded with pirates. There is nothing in these Articles which prevents the Arabs declaring war; but whenever they do so, they are required to fight after the manner of acknowledged war, which Article II. defines to be that which is proclaimed, avowed, and ordered, by Government against Government.' The British Government has always said that it will consider all wars that are not acknowledged as piratical, and treat whoever may be engaged in them accordingly; and the latter part of Article II. states that the killing of men, and taking of goods, without proclamation, avowal, and the order of a Government, is plunder and piracy.

"The British Government being most desirous to maintain to the whole of the Arab Tribes inhabiting the shores of this Gulf the blessings of peace and tranquillity, is most ready on all occasions to offer its mediation where disputes may exist, and will always rejoice at their peaceable and happy termination; whilst it avows most distinctly its absolute determination not to tolerate for a moment any piratical practices, and it will look to the different chieftains for the maintenance of due order among all their subjects."

With reference to Article V., the irregular habits of the Arabs, who could never be brought to understand the meaning and aim of the papers required, very shortly proved the futility of the attempt to

* ARTICLE I.—There shall be a cessation of plunder and piracy, by land and sea, on the part of the Arabs who are parties to this contract, for ever.

† The true version:—The pacificated Arabs shall all of them continue in their former relations, with the exception that they shall be at peace with the British Government, and shall not fight with each other; and the flag shall be a symbol of this only, and of nothing further.

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enforce adherence to the provisions it contained, from the great trouble and difficulty attending it, and the irritation and ill feeling it excited.*

No occasion has even arisen for calling into operation Articles VI. and VII.

The contending chiefs have been occasionally reminded of the existence of such an Article as the eighth, and that it may be enforced; but it has always been considered desirable to avoid all minute inquiries regarding the treatment of people who may have been captured in the course of hostilities, from the extreme difficulty of substantiating the facts, which would be invariably denied, and the destruction of an enemy palliated or accounted for by the excuse of self-defence, the ardour of the combat, or the obstinacy of the opponent.

The enterprise and resources of the piratical tribes having once been directed into a legitimate channel, and gradually given rise to habits of honest industry, and the more lawful and peaceable pursuits of civilized life, it became a great desideratum to prevent the occurrence of any accidents, such as petty wars among themselves, which, from affording an opening and pretext to the evil disposed, have a decided tendency to degenerate into piracy, and a general plunder of all defenceless vessels.

Towards the attainment of this end, it was in May 1835, immediately subsequent to the outbreak of the Beniyas Tribes in that year, suggested, that a material check might be given to this evil, were the several tribes prohibited from cruising with their war-boats in the track of the Gulf trade, lying between the Persian Coast and the islands of Surdy and Bomosa, and thus a neutral ground established, upon which the maritime Arabs would be precluded from carrying on hostilities under any circumstances.

In January 1836 it was personally intimated by the Resident, under authority from Government, to the several chiefs from Debaye to Ras-ool-Khyma, that the excursions of their war-boats must be thenceforth strictly confined within a line drawn from Shaum to within ten miles south of Bomosa, and thence onward through the island of Seir Aboneid; and that the commanders of the vessels of the Gulf squadron had been instructed to seize any of the boats found on the hither side, or

* Moreover, the refusal to grant registers would have produced no good effect, but, on the contrary, have tended to confound ships employed in authorised hostilities with those engaged in piratical depredations; and the non-observance of the conditions considered as a check to piracy was of no great importance, for piracies, since the formation of this Treaty, have usually been committed in boats of the class employed in the fishery, which did not require passes, and usually escaped to the creeks,—at all events avoided our cruisers,—leaving the infliction of their punishment to be sought at the hands of the chief who acknowledged them as subjects, from whose territory they had last set out, or in whose territory they had taken refuge.

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neutral ground, which, from their want of cargo, or their being manned or armed in such a way, admitted no doubt of their objects not being peaceful. Sultan bin Suggur having represented that he had sometimes occasion to send his war-boats round Cape Musseldom for purposes connected with the protection of his territories on the coast of Khor Fukaun,* he was informed that previous to his doing so he must make known his wishes to, and obtain the sanction of, the Commodore at Bassadore, who was at the same time instructed that it was desirable,† if possible, that the prescribed limits should be enforced upon the Joasmee Chief, in common with others, especially from the month of October to July, the period of the great commercial intercourse between the Gulf and India.

In consideration of the late excesses of the Beniyas, it was judged expedient to limit, for a period, the cruising of *their* armed boats to within sight of their own coast; and this was officially intimated to their chief.

The only chief absolutely requiring an establishment of war-vessels is the Shaikh of Bahrein, whose independence, from his vicinity to the Wahabee power, to which he has been long opposed, must in a great measure hinge upon his superiority at sea; yet the cruising of his armed boats could at the same time easily be confined to the limits of the isolated part of the Gulf in which his principal territory is situated.

On the occasion, therefore, of some irregularities and piratical acts, committed on the Persian Coast by the sons of the Bahrein Chief whilst in rebellion against their father, this restrictive line was subsequently made applicable to Huailah and Bahrein, by being extended from Hawlool, ten miles north of Ras Reccan, through the island of El Kraan to Ras Zoor, on the main, a measure which was assented to by the Uttoobee Chief in a letter dated the 26th March 1836.

Although the entire limits thus laid down were sufficiently defined for all the required objects, and the concurrence of the Arabian Chiefs in the establishment of the restrictive line had been by implication afforded, yet, with the exception of the letter from Abdoolla bin Ahmed at Bahrein, no formal intimation of their consent in writing had been obtained. It was therefore resolved by the Indian and Home Governments, at the suggestion of the Resident, Captain Hennell, that

* Acquired by his taking advantage of the disturbed state of the Imaum's affairs in 1832, when he was only prevented from making further encroachments upon His Highness' dominions by the active interference of the British Government.

† Not only as guarding against the long-established predatory spirit of the Joasmee Tribe upon the most exposed point of the Gulf, but as at least affording a negative protection to our ancient ally the Imaum, against any further sudden act of aggression by sea on the part of Sultan bin Suggur.

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previous to any application from the Arabian Chiefs to be permitted to declare war against each other at any future period being acceded to, they should be required to furnish a written and formal recognition of the restrictive line,*—instructions which have since been carefully attended to.

At this period, also, (May 1835,) a favourable opportunity offering for the establishment of a peace between the hostile chieftains, by the presence at Bassadore of Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, the Joasmee Chief, and Shaikh Shakboot, the father of the Beniyas Chief, and his plenipotentiary in the adjustment of the claims arising out of the late piracies of the tribe, a vessel of war was despatched to Debaye, with an invitation to Obed bin Saeed, one of the Shaikhs of that place, to join the conference. This chief promptly attended to the summons, and was immediately followed by Rashid bin Humeed, the Shaikh of Ejman, and head of the Al Naeem Tribe.

Every argument and endeavour to reconcile their jarring interests, or adjust their conflicting claims for reparation and satisfaction on account of past injuries, were entirely thrown away, especially as they deemed the guarantee of the British to any sort of arrangement a *sine quâ non*.

The proposition of a Maritime Truce for six months was, however, favourably received, and the agreement having been drawn out, was duly signed and sealed by the respective parties, upon whom it was at the same time fully impressed, that any infraction would be treated as a case of piracy, without any reference to inland disputes. To this arrangement they expressed their perfect approval and consent.†

* One slight exception may here be mentioned. While war threatened in 1838 to take place between Bahrein and the Al Ali Tribe (under its Chief Esai bin Tarif), Shaikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed most unaccountably and unexpectedly objected to hostilities being confined within any limits, under the impression (it was with justice supposed) that the British Government was prepared to do anything rather than see hostilities break out between himself and Aboothabee (where the seceded tribe resided), and in the hope, therefore, that hostilities would be forbidden, and his fugitive subjects compelled to return to their allegiance. Although this chief ought to have made his objections upon the establishment of the restrictive line three years previously, yet, as he was an independent chief, who had generally observed the conditions of the Treaty of 1820 more carefully than any other person in the Gulf, he was informed that it would not be held binding upon him. On its objects being, however, at the time made known to him, and its being further explained that he had everything to lose and nothing to gain by its being suspended, he tacitly withdrew his dissent.

† Of the great importance attached by the maritime Arabs to an uninterrupted pearl fishery an idea may be formed, from the circumstance that some of the principal merchants of Shargah, in a private communication with the Agent at that place, offered to guarantee to the Indian Government the sum of twenty dollars per annum for each boat that went out to the pearl banks, provided they were taken under its immediate protection, and a vessel of war especially deputed to guard them from aggression. Such a proposition of course could not be entertained, but it shows the desire of the mercantile part of the maritime Arabs for peace,

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The season of the pearl fishery having, owing to the establishment of the truce,* passed over with unusual peace and tranquillity, it was renewed for eight months on the 13th April 1836, with undisguised satisfaction by the respective chiefs, and again on the 15th April of the following year. In September of the same year the Joasmee Chief despatched a confidential Agent, by name Mahomed bin Imuz, to wait upon the Resident, for the purpose of intimating his desire that there should be a total cessation of fighting at sea, and that a general agreement should be entered into by the chiefs on the Arabian Coast to confine their wars upon each other entirely to the land, with the understanding that any aggression at sea should be immediately treated by the British Government as an act of piracy, and redress enforced accordingly ; in fact that the truce, instead of being established for six months, should be made perpetual.

The Shaikh's Agent explained that his master was led to make this request from the apprehension that on the lapse of the term of the truce, the Beniyas (who were little employed in trading pursuits) would take advantage of his vessels being scattered, in the prosecution of their trading voyages, to attack them individually, and unprepared. The Resident replied to this communication that the British Government could not, for reasons which were explained to the Agent, without its special sanction and authority, be made a party to an agreement which would cast upon it the onus and responsibility of being the arbiter in every dispute, and settlement of endless claims; moreover, the conflicting interests of the other parties appeared to offer an insuperable bar to their concurrence, and it was at all events necessary, in the first instance, to learn their sentiments upon the subject. In 1838, on the Resident's making a tour of the Arabian Coast, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur not only expressed his earnest desire for a renewal of the truce, but added that it would afford him sincere pleasure if it could be

and is strongly corroborative of the reports, which came in from all quarters, of the joy and satisfaction diffused among the inhabitants of the whole line of the Arabian Coast of this Gulf, on the intelligence reaching them of the establishment of the truce.

* Among the parties to this truce the Chief of Bahrein was not included. He was too tangible, and too well convinced how deeply his interests would be affected by any collision with British authority and influence in this quarter to render it probable that he would risk any deviation from that commendable and peaceable line of conduct which had previously distinguished him, at least as far as his general maritime pursuits had been concerned. Independently of the above considerations, other reasons existed for the Bahrein Chief not being invited to join the truce. It was known at the time that His Highness the Imaum entertained hostile intentions against the island, and it was feared, as a member of the truce, the Shaikh might have claimed the interposition of the British Government to prevent his being attacked. Afterwards arose the irreconcileable feud between himself and Esai bin Tarif, and subsequently the family quarrels, all of which rendered it expedient that the British Government should keep itself aloof from interference as much as possible.

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changed into the establishment of a permanent peace upon the seas. On certain objections* being adduced to this proposition, he urged the extension of the truce, and suspension of hostilities, for twelve instead of eight months, and Shaikh Khaleefa and the other parties consenting to this arrangement, the truce was drawn out accordingly, and duly signed by each. It was again renewed for the same period in the years 1839, 1840, 1841, and 1842 successively, without the slightest demur or objection.

Immediately, however, on the expiration of that for the year ending in April 1840, and before time and opportunity had been allowed to the Resident to make arrangements for its renewal, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur attacked Amulgavine by sea (as well as land), and had nearly succeeded in taking the place,† when the opportune arrival of the Resident permitted of his successfully using his endeavours towards a reconciliation, and the blockading force having been withdrawn, the Maritime Truce was again established and subscribed to by all parties for another year.

Government had long deemed it advisable that the suspension of hostilities should be rendered obligatory upon the several parties for a more extended period than hitherto embraced within the *annual* truce.

In 1843, it became necessary to address strong and threatening language to the Shaikh of Amulgavine, in order to induce him to fulfil the agreement which had been entered into between himself and Sultan bin Suggur, at the interposition and mediation of the British Resident, in 1840, and make the requisite *amendé*, by the destruction of certain fortified works which he had by its terms been precluded from adding to or erecting. One inducement to this chief to concede to this just

* In reply, it was pointed out to him the little prospect there existed of the maintenance of a perpetual peace, with reference to the peculiar habits and dispositions of the Arabs: that when a definite period was assigned, as in a truce, the several tribes were contented to allow their feuds and animosities to remain in abeyance, under the idea that after a specified date it would always be in their power to indulge their deeply rooted feelings of animosity, should they feel disposed to do so. On the contrary, the circumstance alone of finding themselves precluded, by the conditions of a treaty putting an end to all future hostilities by sea, from avenging insults, or taking satisfaction for wrongs, whether real or imaginary, would so embitter the sentiments of hatred entertained towards each other, that a series of aggressions and retaliations would speedily arise, which would only tend to defeat the very object for which the peace had been negotiated.—(Extract of letter No. 11, Political Department, from Captain Hennell to Government, dated 19th April 1830.)

† "The Joasmee Chief was guilty of deception and cunning in thus taking advantage of the interim which had been unavoidably allowed to ensue between the lapse of the truce for 1839-40 and its renewal for 1840-41, as he had replied in the affirmative to a communication from the Resident, requesting to be informed whether he was willing to renew the truce for the period of the ensuing pearl fishery." He was, moreover, guilty of an infraction of one of the conditions of the Treaty of 1820, which forbade any chief engaging in hostilities without the previous knowledge and sanction of the Resident, to whom he was thereby bound to make application.

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demand, and to his opponent to acquiesce,—the total removal of the obligations of the treaty thenceforward from all parties,—appeared to exhibit itself in carrying into effect the Government suggestion of lengthening the term of the truce, inasmuch as it obviated, at least during the period thus extended, the necessity he (of Amulgavine) at the time urged for the erection of any sea defences, and all parties consenting (the continuation of the annual gifts being secured to them), a Maritime Truce of *ten years* was accordingly, under the special authority of Government, entered into on the 1st June 1843.*

These various restraints and checks to irregularities cannot be sufficiently appreciated, although the system may at first sight be viewed as exercising too great and arbitrary an influence and control over positively independent States. Thus precluded from the illicit profits to be derived from piratical depredations at sea, it became a matter of vital importance to secure to all the tribes, in common, peace and tranquillity, while engaged in the practice of their vocation on the pearl banks, and the prosecution of their carrying trade, the only means which (the barrenness and infertility of the soil of their country, producing not sufficient for the maintenance of the inhabitants, being called to mind) nature has placed within their reach for gaining a livelihood, and upon the success of which must depend the extent of commerce and degree of prosperity and happiness among them. The interests, moreover, of humanity and good policy dictate the prevention of outrage and aggression on these seas, by every precautionary measure, rather than the punishment and coercion of such when perpetrated by the rude and uncivilized tribes in these quarters.

By submitting to the Maritime Truce,† the parties have bound themselves not to engage in hostilities *on the sea* under any circumstances. On the occurrence of disputes of such a nature as not to be amicably arranged by mediation and mutual concession, but to render necessary a recourse to arms, the struggle must be held on land; but should these disputes have had their origin in depredations and unprovoked aggressions by sea, and at sea, then the aggrieved chief is entitled to

* A copy of this Maritime Truce will be found at page 86 of this Selection. A few days before the expiration of this truce (1st June 1853) a "Perpetual Treaty of Peace," dated the 4th May 1853, was agreed upon by the Chiefs of the Arabian Coast. A copy of this Treaty is also annexed.—*Editor.*

† The nature of our connection with the Arabs who were parties to the Treaty (previous to the conclusion of the Maritime Truce), and the import of Article IV. of that Treaty, no doubt gave great weight to endeavours to prevent hostilities by means of explanation and mediation, and entitled us to demand from each chief an explicit declaration of his intention to go to war with any other power in the Gulf; but that war once announced, we had no further control over the proceedings of the belligerents than might be necessary to prevent a renewal of the system of general depredation.—(Government letter No. 329, 15th March 1823.)

demand redress at the hands of the third party, or guarantee for the maintenance of the conditions of the truce inviolate; and these conditions are, with the perfect knowledge of all, only held to apply to aggressions on the sea by one boat upon another, and not to those cases where boats, drawing up on shore in the creeks and backwaters, are attacked and robbed by the Bedouins. The interference of the Resident towards redress in such cannot be claimed. Circumstances may possibly arise, calling for the temporary suspension of the operation of the restrictive line, and this contingency forms the only objection to imposing any restraint of this nature on the Arabs with whom we have treaties, arising out of the impossibility of exerting a similar control over other States not so bound, the settlement of whose disputes with the former would be involved in intricacy and difficulty.

In cases where lawless and unprovoked aggressions have been made at sea by such a power, not authorised by open war, and the remonstrances and mediatory interposition of the British authority have failed to procure redress for the injured and aggravated chief, justice and good policy would demand that the latter should be permitted to have recourse to his own means to exact it; and further, that the British authorities, having exerted their influence without effect to bring his opponent to a proper sense of his injustice, should restrain any of the other chiefs, subscribers to the truce, from interfering in any way, but certainly from affording his assistance to that opponent.

Such a precedent has not up to the present date occurred, and permission* has, on the other hand, ever been denied to any chief,

* Two examples may here be cited. In the middle of the year 1835, when the Shaikh of Amulgavine expressed his wish to assist the people of Charak, it was assumed as a point with him, that whatever claims of superiority he might formerly have possessed over the Charak people, now they had located themselves in Persia they had become Persian subjects, and consequently he could not, situated as he was, have any right to interfere actively in their quarrels. And again, in October 1843, when three of the Shaikhs of the Coast of Oman (Sultan bin Suggur, Suggur bin Sultan, and Muktoom bin Butye) applied for permission to afford aid to the ex-Chief Abdoolla bin Ahmed of Bahrein, in regaining his lost authority over that island, it was well known at the time that overtures had been made by the latter's opponents, Mahomed bin Khaleefa and his colleagues, to the Shaikhs of Aboothabee (Khaleefa bin Shakboot) and Amulgavine (Abdoolla bin Rashid), and that these chiefs were prepared to join them. A positive refusal was therefore imperatively called for, and was made in the following terms to the ex-chief through whom the application had been made :—" It is not hidden from you that Mahomed bin Khaleefa, Esai bin Tarif, and their colleagues, being heads of tribes inhabiting Bahrein, the British Government could not interfere in their quarrel with you; but Sultan bin Suggur and the other chiefs mentioned have no connection or interest in the war, and you are aware that if they become your active allies, Mahomed bin Khaleefa and Esai bin Tarif would undoubtedly immediately crave the assistance of Khaleefa bin Shakboot and other chiefs. The result would be confusion throughout the Gulf, and enmity between all the tribes; moreover, no benefit would accrue to yourself.

" For these reasons, it is not possible that I should grant my concurrence to the interference in any way of the chiefs of the Coast of Oman, who are intimately connected with the British Government by agreements, and a truce among themselves made its guarantee."

It may be here remarked that in the latter case the applicants, although considering themselves in honour bound to evince at least the pretence of exertion in favour of their ancient friend and ally, yet experienced great satisfaction at having it in their power to adduce the unanswerable argument of the restraining power of the British Government, contrary to whose wishes they were not prepared to act. It must be remembered, too, and to this they were fully alive, that by assisting the ex-chief they would have given umbrage to the Wahabee ruler, Ameer Fysul, the powerful ally of his opponent, and that, moreover, they had everything to lose and nothing to gain by engaging in a profitless warfare, to the prejudice of their trade, and the interruption of the pearl fishery.

a party to the truce, incited by avarice and a prospect of booty, and desiring without just cause to mix himself up in the quarrels of others, not subscribers to the truce, in the result of which he has no immediate interest or concern, on the grounds that if granted it would afford a plea to those bound, equally with himself, not to wage war at sea, whereon to base a similar right to espouse the cause of the opponent with whom he proposes to ally himself, and thus cause in the first instance an indirect violation of the restrictive line and Maritime Truce, whose obligations would be very shortly entirely forgotten and set aside by the allies themselves on either side necessarily becoming principals.

Piracies are now of rare occurrence in these seas. Slight cases of aggression, unattended with bloodshed, have almost annually occurred, and must ever be expected occasionally to occur, upon the pearl banks.

Their origin is almost invariably to be traced to the practice of debtors avoiding the settlement of claims against them,* on account of advances of money (for the purchase of provisions during the unemployed portion of the year, considered as a remuneration beforehand for services to be hereafter rendered on the pearl banks), by deserting their own chief, and taking refuge with another; and the subsequent attempts of their lawful head, or of their creditors, forcibly to recover possession of their persons, or of the amount due by them, or its equivalent from the boat in which they sail, belonging to the tribe they may have joined. For such aggressions and irregularities at sea, it is incumbent upon the British Resident, by the terms and spirit of the Maritime Truce, to exact redress.

Attempts have been made to induce the several chiefs to enter into a mutual agreement among themselves, without British guarantee, to refuse refuge to such fugitives; but these have ever been rendered nugatory by Arab pride and sense of honour, as the prospect of the advantage which each chief (forming his own, and therefore of course the most favourable estimate of the popularity and attractiveness of his particular

* For an accurate and interesting description of the pearl fishery, and an account of the system of loans and advances to pearl divers, vide Welsted's Travels, Vol. I. Chap. VI. page 114.

BRITISH POLICY IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

Government and territory, whether on the grounds of leniency and indulgence in the exaction of more moderate taxes, superior military prowess and renown, or greater commercial advantages) anticipates from a numerical increase to his subjects, and consequent improved revenue and influence.

The first principle of our policy enjoining, for obvious reasons, a total non-interference in local matters concerning only themselves, and the false position in which the assumption of the right of insisting upon every fugitive being given up to his own chief would evidently place us, as being calculated to remove the only check at present existing to the tyranny and oppression of the chief over his subjects, constitute powerful arguments against affording the required guarantee, or independently striking a blow at the root of the evil, however much it may be desirable to remedy it.

The piratical Arab Chiefs, satisfied of the advantages obtained by the establishment of the Maritime Truce, which, by common consent, precluding hostilities with each other, removes the chance of a relapse into a system of general depredations, and unprovoked aggressions, are now quite as much interested in its maintenance as ourselves; and of this they exhibited ample proof in their united readiness to renew it for so long a period as ten years, or even more, had such been desired or deemed expedient. As before observed, however, it would be too much to suppose that so radical a change has been or will for a length of time to come be effected, as to admit of the total withdrawal of that influence and political control which have, from their wise and mild exercise, rendered this Gulf, whose coasts are inhabited by a brave, rapacious, and cruel people, brought up and nurtured from their childhood among scenes of bloodshed, and licentious and treacherous warfare on land, comparatively as safe and open to the trade and navigation of vessels of all nations, as the seas of any other portion of the world.

2.02
British action against maritime warfare and the Bani Yas, 1835

237.

From, Captain S. Hennell &c. &c. 18[illegible]
Asst. in charge of the Resy in the Persian Gulf.

To,

W. A. Macnaghten Esquire.
Chief Secretary to the Government of India

Dated 21st May 1835.

Sir,

It is with feelings of sincere gratification that I have the honor to report for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor General of India in Council, the full attainment of the objects for which

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the Squadron of the Indian Navy under the Command of Captain Pepper of the H. C. S. Amherst was despatched to Aboothabee / as communicated in my letters Nos 24 and 26 in this Department under date the 5th and 12th Instant / without the necessity of proceeding to actual hostilities against that place. -

2 The inclosed Copy of a report from the Commanding Officer of the Squadron / which returned to this Station on the 16th Instant / will place the (the) Government of India in possession of the details of the measures taken by him subsequently to his report of the 9th May. From this document it will be observed that Captain Pepper left Aboothabee with the Vessels of War under his Command prior to the receipt of the Commodores instructions founded upon my letter of the 12th Instant, and consequently a small balance still remains to be adjusted

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adjusted. For the settlement of this amount however Shaik Shackboot the father of the Beniyas Chief / who accompanied the Squadron to Bassadore with full powers from his Son / is now making arrangements. -

3 In the accompanying inclosure the acts of piracy and aggression committed by the Beniyas Tribe between the 24th March and the 20th April / the commencement and termination of their nefarious proceedings / are detailed. This list differs in some respects from the one already forwarded to Government subsequent enquiries having enabled me to correct a few of the items which had been inserted upon inaccurate information / As a Summary however of the depredation afforded by the Beniyas, it may be stated that one Brig seven Buglas, two Batcels, five Bugarahs, and the greater part of the goods on board the Dowlat Dowlut

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have been recovered, together with upwards of ten thousand German crowns in cash and property besides an engagement for sixteen hundred more on the termination of the Pearl Fishery, towards the liquidation of the claims for the cargoes of the Vessels, destroyed and plundered. In addition to these, all the prisoners have been given up, the persons of the two Pirates who headed the outrages upon the the British Flag surrendered, and the three principal Vessels of the Beniyas concerned in the late piracies put into our possession as pledges for the Settlement of the balance due on account of the English Buglas. When to these items the punishment inflicted upon Shaik Rulecfas fleet by the H. C. S. Elphinstone the seizure in Muscat of an Abosthabee Baleed with a valuable Cargo as a compensation for the plunder of a Bugla belonging to that Port, and finally the engage=

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ments offered by Shaik Shackboot for the gradual liquidation of the Value of the deficient Cargo of the Diriah Dowlut, are added, I venture to hope that the Right Honorable the Governor General of India in Council will consider, that sufficient reparation has been made by the offending tribe, and that effectual measures have been taken for the complete suppression of the lawless and piratical spirit lately manifested.

By a fortunate coincidence Shaik Sultan bin Suggur the Jassimee Chief with three of his sons and many of the heads of his Tribe accompanied by about three hundred followers, arrived at Bassadore for the purpose of meeting me, only the day before the return of the Squadron from Abosthabee. The appearance of the fleet of recovered Vessels the sight of the surrendered pirate Bugla and Baleels and above all the knowledge

that

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that the two individuals principally concerned in the late insults towards the British Flag were actually prisoners on board the Ships of War made a most powerful impression upon the minds of the Shaik, and his dependents, an impression which was not a little heightened by the arrival of Shaik Shackbut in person, and the unqualified offers of submission, and professions of repentance for past misconduct publicly made by him on all occasions. So that I entertain sanguine hopes that the salutary effect of the measures carried into operation during the late crises, and the renewed conviction of our power and termination to put down all proceedings of a piratical tendency, will not be easily eradicated from the minds of the maritime inhabitants of this Gulf, and that by the adoption of due precautions and the exercise of a vigilant superintendance we

may

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may reasonably look forward to a long period of quietness and tranquillity. —

6. Notwithstanding however these gratifying prospects it is obvious that the general excitement produced by the irregular conduct of the Beniyas (as) is not likely to subside immediately, and that consequently we must expect to hear of occasional cases of piracy. Under these circumstances it is necessary that a strict surveillance be maintained at least for some time, and as this cannot be done with fewer than three Vessels of War I respectfully hope that arrangements may be made for the maintenance of a force of that strength in this Gulf for the present.

6. Owing to the unsettled nature and turbulent dispositions of the Joasmee and Beniyas Tribes, no sense of their own interests will prevent their becoming involved in

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constant feuds and quarrels with each other and as
late events have rendered sufficiently evident it is equally
difficult to prevent these disputes from taking
the form of general aggressions upon the lives
and properties of others who have no concern with
them. It appears to me however that a material
check might be given to this evil, were these Tribes
and their dependents prohibited from cruizing with
their War boats on the track of the trade of this
Gulf, which lies between the Persian Coast and
the Islands of Ormuz and Bomosa. By such a
prohibition I would by no means desire to throw
any interruptions or impediments in the way of
of their trading Vessels proceeding to the different
ports belonging to Persia for Mercantile purposes
but I would have the grand commercial route
considered as neutral ground upon the same
principle that hostilities were forbidden upon
the Banks during the season of the Pearl Fishery

by

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by the late Sir John Malcolms Government
adverting therefore to the expediency of our Vessels
of War cruizing for some time between Bassadore
and the Island of Bushcal, I would solicit
the permission of His Excellency in Council
to issue instructions for the detention and
subsequent examination either in Bushire or
Bassadore of all Buggalas, or Grasmee Vessels,
which after due warning may be found cruizing
within the limits above mentioned, without Cargoes
and carrying such a complement of armed men
as may leave no doubt that their objects are not
pacific. The annoyance and inconvenience
attendant upon such a detention would I
conceive be sufficient to give effect to the
proposition now submitted, but should it be
found on subsequent trial that means of
greater severity were required to enforce the
prohibition, the confiscation of one or two

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of the offending Vessels would be effectually satisfied place matters upon a proper footing and prevent the necessity of any repetition of this punishment. This measure may perhaps be considered a strong one but I venture to think that it is not more so, than the experience of late events calls for, and that taking into consideration the heavy expenditure incurred by the British Government with a view to the suppression of plunder and piracy in this Gulf it has every right to make, and enforce such regulations as may appear best adapted for the attainment of the objects proposed, as well as the promotion of the general interests. —

7 I cannot close this despatch without bringing to the favorable notice of the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council the very able assistance and support afforded me by Commodore Elwon throughout this

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this trying period. To Captain Pepper, Commander Sawyer, and Lieutenant Cooke, commanding the H. C. S.s of War Ambherst, Clyphinstone, & Fernate, I feel greatly indebted for the zeal and alacrity with which my instructions were carried into effect. Indeed I may justly say that to the decisions and energy displayed by these Officers is to be, in a great measure attributed the rapid and successful termination of a state of affairs which at one time threatened the most disastrous consequences to our interests in the Persian Gulf.

8 In doing myself the honor of enclosing for the information of the Government of India a translation of the engagement entered into by Shaik Saacklook as the accredited Wakeel of the Beniyas Tribes, and in intimating that a subsequent report will be made regarding the distribution of the Cash and property now recovered

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recovered I venture to express a hope that the measures taken by me during the late alarming crises with a view to the restoration of tranquillity and peace in this Gulf will meet the approbation of the Right Honorable the Governor General of India in Council –

I have the honor etc:
Signed/ S. Hennell.
Assistant in charge of the Resy in the Persian Gulf.

Residency in the Persian Gulf
Bassadore 21st May 1835.

Enclosure No 1 Copy of a letter from Commodore Elwon to Captain Hennell Acting Resident in the Persian Gulf.

From, Commodore Thomas Elwon.
To,
Captain S. Hennell.
Assistant and Acting Resd Persian Gulf.

Dated 19th May 1835.

Sir,

I have the honor to forward you

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a Copy of Captain Peppers report dated the 16th Instant.

I have the honor etc:
Signed/ Thomas Elwon
Commodore.

Bassadore,
19th May 1835.

From, Captain John Pepper.
To,
Commodore Thomas Elwon.
Commanding H. M. Squadron Gulf of Persia.

Dated 16th May 1835.

Sir,

As connected with the important duties of the Squadron entrusted to my command off Aboothabee I have the honor to report the details since my last under date the 9th Instant.

On the afternoon of the same day the H. C. S. of war Fernate joined the Squadron

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Squadron Lieutenant Poole in Command, and having handed me your despatches was directed to take up his position accordingly. The time I allowed to the inhabitants of Aboothabee to comply with the demands made from the Political Resident's letter and consented to with such reluctance indeed almost to a denial in the first instances until informed by the Company's Agent (Moollah Rupsein) unless immediate arrangements were made on their part for their past offences no alternative was left but the utter annihilation of Aboothabee its boats etc etc for which purpose Captain Pepper would on his return to the Anherst run the Ships of War &c in under the walls of their Forts &c. The Agent however finding argument of no avail with Rulleefa bin Shackboot left him to return to the Ship, observing no further than this consequences were now on his (Rulleefas) head

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head, but before the Agent got to the Ship I was happy to find the Chief of the Port Shaik Shackboot alongside and who had with several other principal residents at this place succeeded in convincing the obstinate Rulleefa of his folly in persevering against the demands or advice, to his own word of so noble and powerful a nation as the English, and that he, Shaik Shackboot was deputed by Rulleefa to wait on me and adjust the unfortunate occurrence which had unhappily befallen them of late at the same time requesting four days for its performance, that every thing they possessed should be at my command, as this request appeared not unreasonable, and the Government of Aboothabee now evincing a different tone of spirit to that so conspicuous a few hours back, that I consented to them and furnishing Rulleefa bin Shackboot thro' his father (Shaik Shackboot)

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a list of the Political Residents' demands I required from his Government, and it is with considerable pleasure I have to communicate the old Shaick was punctual to promises and time. —

From the general character of the State of affairs at Aboothabee and the decisive blow struck in this particular instance in depriving them of the means of carrying on their piratical intentions upon the open seas, by the surrender of their favorite Vessels the Mombasa Shanomee and Bellaty the swiftest and best built Boats perhaps in the Gulf of Persia & added to the restoration of twelve other Mercantile Vessels with considerable quantities of Cargo of various items captured at different times besides specie Jewels &c. to the amount of 10112.5 Dollars as per accompanying list. —

Beg to State in consequence of the peculiar situation I am in from ignorance of the real value of the various Articles Vizt. in the

the list under the head of Jewels and ornaments, the distress which now prevails at Aboothabee the difficulty of raising Cash induced me to receive conditionally the Pearls ornaments &c. to be redeemed in one Month if satisfactory to the Political Resident / Captain Hennell / and as a further proof of the sincerity of the Aboothabee Government Shaick Shackbook and Shaick Soudon are deputed by Rulefa bin Shackbook and accompany the Squadron to Bafsadore for the purpose of entering voluntarily into any further demands the Resident may think proper to make on them. —

Finding such a disposition on the part of the Aboothabee Government, and some fears existing that they might be attacked by the Debaye people during the absence of the Old Shaick / Shaick Shackbook / to Bafsadore for a few days, he requested me to write to Shaick Muckhtoom at Debaye, desiring him

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him if his intentions were to interrupt the peace of the inhabitants while in their usual pursuits on the Fishing Banks that he must desist from any thing of the kind until the return of the old Shaik from the interview with the Resident.

In my anxiety to perform these important duties in which this Squadron has been employed at Aboothabee before the N. Westers set in, I feel it incumbent to State for the information of authorities the ready assistance I have had at all times during the negociations going on from Commander Sawyer of the Clyfinstone and Lieutenant Pirie of the Fernate nor can I omit the exertions of the Company's Agent Moollah Hussein who has not been less zealous in this instance than on former occasions, which I have the honor to report on. —

It is with satisfaction I have to State for the Political Resident's information that the important part of his desires has been

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been overcome, and which from the religious prejudice of the Arabs makes it particularly so, by the giving up their relation Mahomed bin Suggur bin Zeab and Mahomed bin Meegid both Beniyas subjects and principles in the late piratical transactions for any punishment the Resident may think adequate to their guilt. —

Having thus far completed the above I sincerely hope and trust all may be received favorably by the Resident in the Persian Gulf. —

I have the honor etc.
Signed/ John Pepper
Captain

Bassadore roads
16th May 1835.

True copy.
Signed/ Thomas Elwon.
Commodore.

True copy.
Signed/ S. Hennell.
Asst in Charge of the Resy in the Persian Gulf.

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No. 3 Account of Cash, Jewels, Ornaments, &c. received at Muscat

1835	In whose Cash, Jewels etc.	Exchange	Omanee Coomes.	Persian Rupees	Sahib Kerroons	Remarks
			3 Roomies for 1 G.t Box			
May 1st	In Cash	375 Sahib Kerroons to 100 G.t Box	256	27	956	3907
2d	In Cash	323 Rupees to 100 G.t Box	36⅓	47	1774	35
11th	In Cash		13/3	55	3831⅓	304
	Swords 16 / Six in No.					
	Dirks 24 / Twenty four in No.					
	One Box containing ornaments of Gold & Silver	Imposed Value	4817			
	Four Bags — Ditto — Ditto					
	One Bag small Pearls and a piece of Cloth with larger Pearls					
	Total Persian Rupees equal to				39⅓	
	4 Sahib Kerroons				17⅓⅓	
	1 Roomies				1⅓⅓	
					6112⅔	

Five thousand, one hundred and twelve & two thirds

Bassadore
16th May 1835

Signed John Pepper
Captain

True Copy
Signed Thomas Elwon
Commodore

True Copy
Signed S. Bennell
Asst in Charge of the Resy in the Persian Gulf

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Enclosure No 2/

General Statement of the Vessels detained, or piratically seized by the Beniyas Tribe and subsequently recovered by the Squadron of the Indian Navy under the Command of Captain Pepper of the Ship of War Amherst.

Description of Vessel	How disposed of	Remarks.
Brig Cutter belonging to H.H. the Imaum of Muscat	Sent to Muscat	This Vessel was forcibly detained at Abaccee.
English Bugla Dunrah Dowlut		Now in Bassadore waiting for a Cargo to take her up to Bussora.
Congoon Bugla Nasiry	Restored to the owner.	This Vessel was retaken by the Captain & is now at Bassadore waiting for a Cargo
Muscat Bugla		Now in Bassadore waiting for a Cargo
Lingah Bugla	Restored to the owner.	
Bostanah Bugla	Do Do	
Coong Bugla	Do Do	
Karrack Bugla		Now in Bassadore waiting for a Cargo
Bahrein Bateel		Do Do Do
Left Bateel	Ownership to this Vessel was received from the owner of Bugla — yls in lieu of a small Bugla	
Lingah Buggarah	Restored to the owner.	sunk by the Pirates
Lingah Buggarah	Do Do	
Lingah Buggarah	Do Do	
Shinas Buggarah	Do Do	
Moollah Rupsin's Buggarah	Do Do	
Lingah Ghoonchs		Value of, paid to the owners
Salim bin Sindabad Bateel		Value of paid to the owners

Signed S. Bennell
Asst in Charge Resy in the Persian Gulf

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Enclosure No 3/

Translation of an agreement entered into with Captain Bennell the acting Resident in the Persian Gulf by Shaik Shackboot on the part and behalf of Shaik Rulleefa bin Shackboot Chief of Aboothabee dated the 22nd Mohurrum A. H. 1251 or 21st May 1835 A.D.

I Shackboot professing full powers from Rulleefa bin Shackboot the Chief of the Beniyas, do hereby engage and promise, that I will proceed over to Aboothabee on board the Batee Bullaty, and that on my arrival there I will collect the Sums of one thousand /1000/ German Crowns to make up the balance of the amount Staked to Captain Pepper as the value of the ornaments &c. &c. given in pledge to that Officer which Sum together with the Batee Bullaty shall be given over to the Commander of the Vessel of War which is to be despatched to Aboothabee for the purpose of receiving charge, five days after my departure. —

I do

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2 I do likewise engage and promise on behalf of Shaik Rulleefa, that the balance of the claims remaining due on account of the aggressions upon the peaceable Arabs, Viz^t one thousand six hundred /1600/ German Crowns, shall be sent over to the Commodore at Bussadore on the termination of the Pearl Fishery to wit on the 29th Rujub A. H. 1251 /21st November 1835 A. D.

3 As a considerable quantity of the Cargo of the English Bugla Durrah Dowlut taken by Mahommed bin Suggur bin Zeah has been lost and destroyed, and as no precise amount can be fixed for what is thus deficient until the receipt of information from the Bombay Government, I do hereby engage and promise on behalf of Shaik Rulleefa bin Shackboot, that an annual Sum of five thousand /5000/ German Crowns shall be paid on the termination of each Pearl Fishing season, until the whole amount due be liquidated.

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liquidated; when the Bugla 'Mombassa' and the Baleels 'Ghaniny' and 'Bullaly' now given in pledge, shall be restored to the Abothabee Government. The time fixed for the payment of the first instalment of 5000/ German Browns is the first Ramzan A.H. 1251/21st December 1835 A.D. and in the event of this amount not being sent over to the Commodore at Bassadore within three days after the date fixed, the Bugla 'Mombassa' and the Baleels 'Ghaniny' and 'Bullaly' are held to be forfeited. –

Witnessed/ Sultan bin Suggur (L.S.)
Hajee Ahmed (L.S.)
Moollah Hussein (L.S.)

The undersigned agrees on the part of the British Government to restore the Bugla 'Mombassa' and the Baleels 'Ghaniny' and 'Bullaly' to Shaik Hulleefa bin Shaekboot whenever the amount due on account of the deficient bags of the English Bugla

'Dunah

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'Dunah Dowlut' be liquidated, under the express proviso that should any delay take place in the payment of the annual instalments of 5000 German Browns these Vessels shall in such case be held to be forfeited to the British Government, and steps forthwith taken to compel an immediate settlement of the balance remaining due. –

Signed S. Hennell.
Asst in charge of the Resy
in the Persian Gulf.

True Translation.
Signed S. Hennell
Asst in charge of the Residency
in the Persian Gulf.

From Wm. Chief Secretary Norris. Bo. 1840

To,
The Acting Resident in the Persian Gulf.
Dated 17th July 1835.

Sir,

I am directed to acknowledge

the

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the receipt of your despatch to the address of the Secretary to the Government of India under date the 21st May last No 97 reporting the favourable termination of the proceedings against the Sheikh of Aboothabee on account of the Piracies committed by his subjects. –

In reply I am instructed to signify to you that it is a source of much gratification to Government that the serious disturbances in the Gulf should have been so successfully put down and matters brought to the favorable issue reported by you. For this result Government is much indebted to your zeal, activity and judgment, and to the cordial cooperation of the Squadron in the Gulf. –

The Governor in Council desires me to signify to you that nothing can be more proper than the instructions under which you propose to establish with respect to

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to the War Vessels of the Beniyas and Joasmee tribes for a time, at least, indeed if there be any error in your proceeding, the Governor in Council is inclined to think that is on the side of leniency to the Pirates. –

A copy of your despatch and of this letter will be forwarded to the Government of India. –

I have the honor etc.
Signed C. Norris.
Chief Secy

Bombay Castle,
17th July 1835.

499 299

From the Assistant in-Charge of the
Residency in the Persian Gulf
To, The Chief Secretary to the Government
of India
2099 Dated 26th May 1835.
Sir,

I have the honor to report for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor General of India in Council that Laung brought our discussion with the Benuyas Tribe regarding their late nefarious proceedings to a favorable termination, I conceived that the chances of the recurrence of any similar series of outrages would be greatly diminished if all pretences of aggression were removed by the establishment of a peace between the hostile Chieftains of the Arabian Coast accordingly availing myself of the presence in Bassadore of Shaik Sultan bin Sugger the Chief of the Joasmees, and Shaik Shaikoot the father and plenipotentiary of the Chief of Aboothalle I dispatched a Vessel of War once to Debaye, with an invitation to Obed bin Saeed one of the Shaiks of that place to meet me here

for

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for the purpose of discussing some matters connected with the general welfare. My request was promptly attended to, and in the course of a few days this Chief arrived at Bassadore, and was shortly afterwards followed by Rashid bin Humeed the Shaik of Ejman and Head of the Amaseen Tribe.

3 Having made the best arrangements in my power for the reception and entertainment of these Chieftains, I took every opportunity in my private interviews to impress upon their minds, the folly and imprudence of their remaining in a state of rebellion with each other which so far from being advantageous to themselves or subjects, only tended to involve the latter in ruin and misery by cutting them off from the Pearl Fishery, and thus depriving them of their principal means of subsistence. My arguments were not without effect, and a general disposition was manifested to come to some accommodation of their differences. On endeavouring however to ascertain the terms upon which they were willing to base the establishment of peace, I found that any attempt to reconcile their jarring interests, or to adjust their conflicting claims for reparation and satisfaction on account of past injuries was entirely out of the question. And that even had it been expedient to make any such

of

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of arrangement regarding the settlement of their demands the guarantee of the British Government for the fulfilment of the conditions was considered by the contending parties as a sine qua non. This of course I had no hesitation in refusing, but immediately after the exertions I had made to restore a good understanding among the Heads of the Maritime Arabs that they should separate from each other upon their old terms of enmity, I sounded them upon the subject of a truce, and finding the idea met with a favorable reception, I drew out a paper (of which the accompanying is a translation) and sent a copy to each of the Shaiks for their perusal and consideration. In reply they all expressed their satisfaction at the prospect of an arrangement which involved no sacrifice of what they considered as their just rights, and yet enabled them to afford to their subjects the inestimable advantages of a tranquil Pearl Fishery.

3 Finding that my proposition had been so well received, I invited the Shaiks to a general meeting at my Residence and accordingly on the 21st Instant they all assembled. After briefly impressing upon them the advantages attending the measure suggested and explaining that when once agreed to an infraction would be treated as a case of piracy

piracy without any reference being made to their inland disputes, they replied, that such an arrangement was precisely what they were most desirous of, and that they all fully and cordially agreed to the terms proposed. The separate Copies of the Truce which had been prepared having been sealed and withsigned one was returned by each of the contracting parties, and on the 23d Instant they all took their departure for their respective territories, in order that no time might be lost in affording to their Subjects the requisite permission to proceed to the Pearl Banks.

4th / Of the great importance attached by the Maritime Arabs to an uninterrupted pearl Fishery an idea may be formed from the circumstance that some of the principal Merchants of Shargah in a private communication with the British Agent at that place offered to guarantee to the Indian Government the sum of 20 dollars per annum for each boat that went out to the Pearl Banks, provided they were taken under its immediate protection, and a Vessel of War specially deputed to guard them from aggression—such a proposition of course could not be entertained, but it shews the desire of the

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the mercantile part of the Maritime Arabs for peace, also is strongly corroborative of the reports which come in from all quarters of the joy and satisfaction diffused amongst the inhabitants of the whole line of the Arabian coast of this Gulf on the intelligence reaching them of the establishment of the Truce.

5th Notwithstanding however the interests of these people are so closely bound up in the maintenance of peace and tranquility during the pearl season and that perhaps fairer prospects of its permanency are now opened than have existed for many years past, yet I fully expect that occasional acts of aggression will occur, I trust however that by the injured party abstaining from retaliation, and appealing to us for satisfaction and redress, these isolated cases may be settled without much difficulty by a prompt interference on our part. Should the season fortunately pass over with a moderate degree of quietness, it is to be hoped that the members of the Truce may be so far satisfied of its advantages as to come to a permanent settlement of their differences, or at all events be induced to seek our mediation with a view to the cessation of hostilities during each returning Pearl season.

Residency in the Pr. Gulf
Bassadore 25th May 1835.

I have the honor to be &c.
Signd/ J. Bennell
Agt in Charge of the Residency
in the Pr. Gulf

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Translation of the terms of a truce for six months agreed upon by the Chiefs of the Arabian Coast in the presence of Captain Bennell the Acting Resident in the Persian Gulf dated Bassadore the 21st May 1835.

We whose Seals are hereunto attached Viz.t Sultan bin Suggur Shaik of the Joasmee Tribe, Shackboot the father and plenipotentiary of Shaik Khuleefa Chief of the Beneyas, Obeid bin Saeed the Chief of the Bin Ialasa Tribe and Bedaye, and Rashid bin Humed the Shaik of Eyman, being fully impressed with a sense of the evils suffered by our Subjects and dependents in consequence of their being debarred from carrying on the Pearl Fishery on the Banks during the present state of hostilities among ourselves, and duly appreciating the general advantages that would be derived from the establishment of a Truce during the Fishing Season, do hereby agree to and bind ourselves down to observe the following conditions.

1st That from the 22d of Mohurrum A.H. 1251 (or 21st May 1835) there shall be a cessation of hostilities at sea between our respective Subjects, and dependents, and that from the above date until the 29th Rujub A. H. 1251 (21st November 1835) an inviolable

505 ~~382~~

inviolable truce shall be established, during which period our several claims upon each other shall rest in abeyance.

2d That in the event of any one of our Subjects or dependents committing an act of aggression by sea upon those of the parties to this engagement we will immediately afford full redress upon the same being brought to our notice.

3d That in the event of an act of aggression being committed at sea upon any one of our subjects or dependents who are parties to the truce we will not proceed to immediately retaliate, but will inform the Resd.t at Bushire, or the Commodore at Bassadore, who will forthwith take the necessary steps for obtaining reparation for the injury inflicted, upon its being satisfactorily proved.

4 That on the 30.th Jumadee-ool-Akhir 1357, by the blessing of Providence, we will endeavour to arrange either an extension of this truce, or a firm and lasting peace, but in the event of our not being able to come to a satisfactory arrangement regarding our respective claims among ourselves, we hereby bind ourselves to give notice on, or about the above date to the Resident of Bushire of our intention to review hostilities after the expiration of the term now fixed upon

for

~~380~~

for this Truce, Viz.t the 29.th Rujub 1357.

(L.S) Seal of Sultan bin Suggur

(L.S) Seal of Obeid bin Saeed

(L.S) Seal of Rasheed bin Humeid

(L.S) Seal of Hajie Ahmed } as witnesses for

(L.S) Seal of Moollah Hoseein } Shackhoot

True translation

Signed/ A. Hennell

Assist.t in Charge of the Resy.cy Gulf

2.03
The modification of the restrictive line, January 1836

(ii) Restriction of the sphere of Maritime War, 1835—1837.

346. In the course of the interview which Major Hennell held with the principal Maritime Arabian Sheikhs at Bassadore in May 1835, he fully explained to them that the recent outbreak of the Baniyas tribe of Abuthabi had sufficiently proved the necessity of further measures being adopted for the preservation of the general tranquillity, as well as for the protection of the trade of the Gulf. With this view it was, he added, his intention to recommend to the Government that a certain distance from the Persian shore should be considered as neutral ground, and that no war vessels, even during the period of open hostilities, should be allowed to cruise within the space formed by the coast on one side, and the Islands of *Surdy* and *Bomosa* on the other. To this intimation no objection whatever was raised by the assembled Chiefs, who all expressed their readiness to give their assent to any arrangements the British Government might consider best adapted to meet the objects proposed. As he could not then, however, be aware of the light in which the proposition above referred to might be viewed by the Government, he did not ask for the consent of the respective Sheikhs in writing, considering that, as a truce for six months had just been established, there would be sufficient time afforded to receive the instructions of the Government upon the subject, before a renewal of hostilities among the belligerent tribes was likely to take place.

347. Shortly subsequent to this meeting the state of Captain Hennell's health obliged him to leave the Gulf, but his suggestions on the above subject were approved of by the Governor in Council.

348. Major Morison therefore carried out the orders with certain modifications on the proposed restrictive line as explained in his letter No. 2, dated 21st January 1836:—

Volume 55—755 of 1836, p. 258.

Adverting to Mr. Secretary Norris' despatch dated 17th July last, I have the honor to report having taken the opportunity of my late visit to the Arab Coast, to impose the restriction authorized in regard to war boats, by the instructions conveyed in the 3rd paragraph of that communication, and I now beg leave to forward copy of a letter addressed in consequence to the Officer Commanding the Squadron in these seas.

2nd.—In explanation of having taken upon myself to still further contract the limits proposed in Captain Hennell's report of 21st May 1835, I beg to mention that having ascertained the Island of Surdy to have been notorious as a place of pirate rendezvous, and from its proximity to the Persian Coast, and central situation, calculated to afford facilities for annoying the trade of India, most desirable to be guarded against, I considered it more expedient that the Island of *Seir-Aboneid* should be laid down instead, as a point of the restrictive line; and as Bomosa seemed liable to the same objections, though in a lesser degree, I trust my having also excluded it as a resort for boats of a doubtful character, will meet with the approval of Government, under the spirit of the instructions above referred to.

3rd.—I have every hope that this decisive measure will be attended with most beneficial effects in restoring confidence among the peaceable and well disposed, in regard to our determination not only to punish, but to guard against such scenes of bloodshed and outrage as occurred during the course of last season; while it cannot fail to impress upon all others that the British Government are ready to enforce such measures as may tend to the attainment of these objects. Indeed, under our present active surveillance for the suppression of piratical, or unprovoked acts of aggression in these seas, I must further beg to offer it as my conviction that nothing would tend so much towards the general peace, and amelioration in the habits of the people in this quarter, as the employment of war boats being altogether prohibited in the open seas; for so long as every petty Chief is allowed to possess, and use such means of hostility, there can be no security even for those who really feel disposed to turn their views to more peaceful pursuits; but by providing for their safety and defence, by maintaining similar establishments; and it is already before Government, how difficult it is to prevent such vessels from being occasionally employed for purposes of more general aggression, as well as in prosecution of their own more immediate feuds and animosities.

4th.—With reference to the representation made by Sultan Bin Suggur as to the necessity of his war boats occasionally passing round Cape Musseldom, for purposes connected with the protection of his territories upon the coast of *Khorfacan*, I must bring to the notice of Government that these territories were only acquired by his taking advantage of the disturbed state of His Highness the Imam's affairs in 1832, and on which occasion he was only prevented from making further encroachments upon His Highness's dominions, by our active interference, as will be observed on advertence to Captain Hennell's despatch dated 30th May of that year.

5th.—As the Chief of Ras-el-Khimah's operations in that quarter are still more likely to assume an offensive form, than to be required for the protection of these acquisitions, under our present altered and neutral policy, as connected with the affairs of Muscat more especially, I have to hope that the arrangement proposed in the 2nd paragraph of my letter to Commodore Pepper will meet with the sanction of the Right Hon'ble the Governor in Council, not only as guarding against the long established predatory spirit of the Joasmee tribe, upon the most

exposed point of the Gulf, but as at least affording a negative protection to our ancient ally the Imam, against any sudden act of aggression by sea, on the part of Sultan Bin Suggur.

6th.—The only Chief absolutely requiring an establishment of war-vessels is the Sheik of Bahrein, whose independence, from his vicinity to the Wahabee power, to which he has been long opposed, must in a great measure hinge upon his superiority at sea, but the cruising of his armed boats could easily be confined within the limits of the isolated part of the Gulf in which his principal territory is situated; though this chief is too tangible, and too well convinced how deeply his interests would be affected by any collision with British authority and influence in this quarter, to render it probable he will risk any deviation from that commendable and peaceable line of conduct, which have lately distinguished him, at least in as far as his general maritime pursuits have been concerned.

7th.—Adverting to the still more limited restriction imposed upon the armed boats of the Beniyas Chief of Aboothabee, I have to explain that in the present divided and unsettled state of the tribe, and with advertence to their late excesses, it appeared extremely desirable that their excursions into the open sea should at least for a time be confined to the narrowest bounds; more especially, as it was only a few days before my arrival upon the opposite coast that the Shaik's brothers "Sultan ben Shakboot" (so deeply implicated in the late piracies) proceeded down the Gulf towards Muscat, with three vessels, said to contain a great number of armed followers: to the annoyance and dismay of the people on both sides the Gulf, who are either at feud with the tribe to which he belongs, or have reason from past experience to dread such a force being abroad in these seas. I trust therefore the precaution now adopted, to confine the offensive means of this restless and daring race to their own immediate coast, will be honored with the further approval of Government.

349. These arrangements were sanctioned by the Bombay Government in their letter No. 763, dated 30th April 1836.

350. Having concluded his arrangements on the Arabian Coast, Major Morison on the 19th January 1836 addressed a letter to Commodore Pepper, requesting him to issue instructions to the naval force in the Gulf to carry them into effect. In consequence of some irregular proceedings on the part of the relations of Sheikh Abdullah bin Ahmed, the restrictive line was subsequently made applicable to *Howillah* and *Bahrein*, by being extended from *Hawlul*, ten miles north of Ras Rucan, through the Island of Kraing, to Raszur on the main, a measure which was assented to by the Uttubi Chief, in a letter dated the 26th March 1836, and which as far as related to the vessels from Howillah, received the sanction of Government conveyed in their communication No. 573 under date the 13th April of the same year.

351. Upon the whole, the restrictive line, under its several modifications as above detailed, and passing through a number of fixed points, was considered as sufficiently defined for our objects. From the preceding statement, however, it will be observed, that although the concurrence of the Arabian Chiefs in its establishment may be considered by implication to have been afforded, yet that, with the exception of a letter from Sheikh Abdullah bin Ahmed of Bahrein, we hold no written documents in which their consent has been formally given. The absence of hostilities by sea for several years prevented any occasion for our vessels of war using coercive measures for maintaining the neutrality of the principal line of traffic in the Gulf, while the establishment of a truce for the ensuing twelve months, the Resident hoped, would continue to render their interference unnecessary. He, however, suggested in the event of the Arabian Chiefs applying for permission to declare war against each other at any future period, that a written and formal recognition of the restrictive line, and neutral ground, be required from each Sheikh, preparatory to the authority requested being afforded.

352. The Government of Bombay in their letter No. 1356, dated 11th July 1838, expressed approval of the last suggestion of the Resident.

353. Among the parties to this truce the Chief of Bahrein was not included. He was too tangible and too well convinced how deeply his interest would be affected by any collision with British authority and influence in this quarter to render it probable that he would risk any deviation from that commendable and peaceable line of conduct which had previously distinguished him, at least as far as his general maritime pursuits had been concerned. Independently of the above considerations, other reasons existed for the Bahrein Chief not being invited to join the truce. It was known at the time that His Highness the Imaom entertained hostile intentions against the island, and it was feared, as a member of the truce, the Sheikh might have claimed the interposition of the British Government to prevent his being attacked. Afterwards arose the irreconcileable feud between himself and Essa bin Traif, and subsequently the family quarrels, all of which rendered it expedient that the British Government should keep itself aloof from interference as much as possible.

2.04
Renewals of the Maritime Truce, 1836–1843

(iii) Maritime Truce, 1835—1843.

354. The season of the pearl fishery having, owing to the establishment of the truce, passed over with unusual peace and tranquillity, it was renewed for eight months on the 13th April 1836, with undisguised satisfaction by the respective Chiefs, and again on the 15th April of the following year. In September of the same year the Joasmi Chief despatched a confidential Agent by name Mahomed bin Imuz, to wait upon the Resident, for the purpose of intimating his desire that there should be a total cessation of fighting at sea, and that a general agreement should be entered into by the Chiefs on the Arabian Coast to confine their wars upon each other entirely to the land, with the understanding that any aggression at sea should be immediately treated by the British Government as an act of piracy, and redress enforced accordingly ; in fact that the truce, instead of being established for six months, should be made perpetual.

355. The Sheikh's Agent explained that his master was led to make the request from the apprehension that on the lapse of the term of the truce, the Beniyas (who were little employed in trading pursuits) would take advantage of his vessels being scattered, in the prosecution of their trading voyages, to attack them individually, and unprepared. The Resident replied to this communication that the British Government could not, for reasons which were explained to the Agent, without its special sanction and authority, be made a party to an agreement which would cast upon it the onus and responsibility of being the arbiter in every dispute, and settlement of endless claims ; moreover, the conflicting interests of the other parties appeared to offer an insuperable bar to their concurrence, and it was at all events necessary, in the first instance, to learn their sentiment upon the subject. In 1838, on the Resident's making a tour of the Arbian Coast, Sheikh Sultan bin Saggar not only expressed his earnest desire for a renewal of the truce, but added that it would afford him sincere pleasure if it could be changed into the establishment of a permanent peace upon the seas.

356. In reply, it was pointed out to him the little prospect there existed of the maintenance of a perpetual peace, with reference to the peculiar habits and dispositions of the Arabs : that when a definite period was assigned, as in a truce, the several tribes were contented to allow their feuds and animosities to remain in abeyance, under the idea that after a specified date it would always be in their power to indulge their deeply rooted feelings of animosity, should they feel disposed to do so. On the contrary, the circumstance alone of finding themselves precluded, by the conditions of a treaty putting an end to all future hostilities by sea, from avenging insults, or taking satisfaction for wrongs, whether real or imaginary, would so embitter the sentiments of hatred entertained towards each other, that a series of aggressions and retaliations would speedily arise, which would only tend to defeat the very object for which the peace had been negotiated. (Extract of letter No. 11, Political Department, from Captain Hennell to Government, dated 19th April 1840.)

357. The Sheikh then urged the extension of the truce, and suspension of hostilities, for twelve instead of eight months, and the other parties consenting to this arrangement, the truce was drawn out accordingly, and duly signed by each. It was again renewed for the same period in the years 1839, 1840, 1841 and 1842 successively, without the slightest demur or objection.

358. Immediately, however, on the expiration of that for the year ending in April 1840, and before time and opportunity had been allowed to the Resident

to make arrangements for its renewal, Sheikh Sultan bin Saggar attacked Amulgavine by sea (as well as land), and had nearly succeeded in taking the place,* when the opportune arrival of the Resident permitted of his successfully using his endeavours towards a reconciliation, and the blockading force having been withdrawn, the Maritime Truce was again established and subscribed to by all parties for another year.

359. Government had long deemed it advisable that the suspension of hostilities should be rendered obligatory upon the several parties for a more extended period than hitherto embraced within the *annual* truce.

360. In their letter Nos. 1020-A. and 2383, dated 13th July and 21st August 1841, the Bombay Government expressed a wish that the maritime truce might be extended beyond the period of twelve months. In his reply, dated 19th October 1841, Captain Hennell stated that he was inclined to the belief that the inclinations of the Chiefs of the Maritime Arabs of the Gulf were rather in favor of an extension of the period of the truce than otherwise, and that on the termination of the engagement now existing, that he did not anticipate any material opposition would be offered to the proposition of extending it for two or even five years.

Volume 68—1283 of 1841-42, p. 185.

361. The Resident however explained the reasons which had hitherto influenced him in mediating an engagement to abstain from hostilities for only one year instead of for a longer period.

362. The line of coast from the southernmost part of the Gulf to its entrance was occupied by the Beniyas and Joasmi tribes. Of these the former was powerful by land, while the strength of the latter lay in its naval resources. Sheikh Khalifa, the Chief of the Beniyas, being a man of restless and ambitious disposition, availed himself of his numerous adherents and dependants in land, continually to foray the districts of his hereditary enemies the Joasmis. These aggressions Sheikh Sultan bin Saggar, the Joasmi Chief, in consequence of his inferiority by land, was barely able to oppose, and naturally looked to his superiority by sea, as the means of retaliating upon the marine of his enemy, the aggressions he was exposed to on shore. Such however had been the advantages derived by his subjects and himself, from their being enabled to carry on the pearl fishery in peace and quietness, in consequence of the establishment of the Maritime Truce, that hitherto Sheikh Sultan bin Saggar had sacrificed his resentment to his interests, and had been a cordial supporter of this engagement, although for the period it remained in force he was precluded from avenging the numerous insults and losses inflicted on himself and dependents by the Beniyas Chief. Still however Sheikh Sultan was an Arab, and could not witness his subjects being exposed to such aggressions, without feeling all an Arab's desire for revenge, a desire which was doubtless greatly aggravated by the loud and indignant complaints of his tribe. On such occasions the Sheikh moderated his own anger and that of his followers by a determination of taking full revenge upon the Beniyas by sea, immediately on the termination of the truce. Time rolled on; the smart created by the forays of Sheikh Khalifa was diminished, and when the period for renewing the truce came round, the pressure of immediate interest overpowered the remaining promptings of indignation, and the Arab pride being satisfied that no obstacles existed to their retaliating the injuries they had received, if such a measure be desired, all parties readily united in a renewal of the Maritime Truce. Such had been the working of the Engagement since first introduced by me in 1835, from which date to the present a profound peace had, with one or two trifling and momentary interruptions, existed throughout the Persian Gulf, although the usual spirit of rapine and bloodshed had exercised its influence uncontrolled in land. So long a period of maritime tranquillity was unknown in the former annals of this part of the world. Under the present arrangement the reply to frequent complaints made to the Resident regarding the injuries and losses sustained by the aggressions of the Beniyas Chief was that on the termination of the truce, Sheikh Sultan would be a free agent in respect to taking measures for redress

* The Joasmi Chief was guilty of deception and cunning in thus taking advantage of the interim which had been unavoidably allowed to ensue between the lapse of the truce for 1839-40, and its renewal for 1840-41, as he had replied in the affirmative to a communication from the Resident, requesting to be informed whether he was willing to renew the truce for the period of the ensuing pearl fishery. He was, moreover, guilty of an infraction of one of the conditions of the Treaty of 1820, which forbade any Chief engaging in hostilities without the previous knowledge and sanction of the Resident, to whom he was thereby bound to make application.

by sea. This answer was received as satisfactory, but were the Engagement in question established for an unlimited or any long time, the feelings of disgrace and anger at having no prospect open for revenging the insults they had sustained, would rankle in the minds of the Joasmi Chief and his followers, and would probably in the end lead to an explosion, which might inflict a serious and lasting injury upon the peaceful policy which has hitherto been so successful.

363. The Bombay Government thought some weight should be attached to these reasons urged by Captain Hennell for a short in preference to an extended Maritime Truce. They therefore deemed it proper to vest Captain Hennell with a discretionary authority to act as his local knowledge and experience might induce him to consider most expedient and best calculated to ensure the object Government had in view, namely, the preservation of tranquillity in the Gulf. The Government of India concurred in their views (Government of India's letter to the Government of Bengal, dated 17th January 1842).

364. In 1843, it became necessary to address strong and threatening language to the Sheikh of Amulgavine, in order to induce him to fulfil the agreement which had been entered into between himself and Sultan bin Saggar at the interposition and mediation of the British Resident in 1840, and make the a *amendé* by the destruction of certain fortified works which he had by its terms been precluded from adding to or erecting. One inducement to this chief to concede to this just demand, and to his opponent to acquiesce,—the total removal of the obligations of the treaty thenceforward from all parties,—appeared to exhibit itself in carrying into effect the Government suggestion of lengthening the term of the truce, inasmuch as it obviated, at least during the period thus extended, the necessity he (Chief of Amulgavine) at the time urged for the erection of any sea defences, and all parties consenting (the continuation of the annual gifts being secured to them), a Maritime Truce of *ten years* was accordingly, under the special authority of Government, entered into on the 1st June 1843.

2.05
The Maritime Truce, June 1843

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Offce. N° 243 of 1843

Pol^l Depart^t

From Lieut^t A.B. Kemball

Assist^t Resident in the Persian Gulf
in Charge

To J. P. Willoughby Esquire

Secretary to Government
Bombay

Dated 26^th March 1843.

Sir

In continuation of my letter N°
66 in this Department, dated Bahrein
the 19^th Instant, I have the honor to detail
for the information of Government, my
further proceedings on the Arabian Coast.

2. Leaving that island, on the after-
noon of the following day, I reached Aba-
thabee on the morning of the 23^rd and was
immediately visited by its Chief. —

3. After some general conversa-
tion referring to the state of Bahrein
and its chiefs, and the prospect this
season of a successful Pearl Fishery,
with the expression on my part of the
satisfaction that I felt assured the
British

British Government would experience on learning the tenor of the answer, which I had understood him to have given to Sultan bin Salameh, the emissary of Esai bin Tarif; also at the peaceable disposition he had evinced by his late proceedings at Debaie; I introduced the subject of the Maritime Truce, saying that Govern^t perceiving the benefit arising from it to all parties, being desirous for the extension of its Term, I should wish himself, if approving, to decide the number of years, hinting not under five or six, to which the same should be prolonged. He answered that the arrangement was most agreeable to him, and it remained but for me to state the wishes of Government upon the subject. Upon this the several copies of the Truce having been filled in for ten years, he attached his seal to them.

4. This business being concluded

concluded, The Sheikh directed his attendants to leave the Cabin as he had some thing to communicate to me of a private nature, which he did as follows. When Sultan bin Sulameh came on the part of Esai bin Tarif to solicit my assistance against Abdulla bin Ahmed, I declined granting it, unless the permission of the President were obtained, believing that the British Government neither approved nor would allow of his proceeding to carry on War at Bahrein. I perceive, however, that it did not disapprove; or if so, that it has taken no measures to restrain him. There interrupted, observing that the parties not being subscribers to the annual Truce, had asked and obtained the Resident's permission to wage war, in which, the same being open and proclaimed, The British Government, however much it foresaw

and

and regretted the consequences which had been to reduce Bahrein late so thriving to a state of anarchy and confusion; it could not interfere that it was my intention to touch on my way back at Kerm, for the purpose of meeting Essai bin Tarif, and endeavouring to induce him to refrain at least while I remained on that island, from further interference in the affairs of the arabian Coast.—

5. The Sheikh said that Essai bin Tarif he was assured purposed bringing over, and settling his tribe at Biddah, whence should he instigate any of the influential men of Aboothabee to secede with their followers from his rule, he trusted I would exercise my authority to prevent their doing so, I replied that it was impossible until I had met or communicated with Essai bin Tarif, to tell what were his intentions; but in the event of

of the occurrence of such a case, as he seemed to anticipate, I could only act, on learning the circumstances, according to the prescribed rules and policy of the British Government which were well known to him.—

6. The sheik concluded by saying that he had troubled me with the above remarks, his object being to shew the sincerity of his desire to conform to the wishes of the British Government, and to avoid war, and having received the present intended for him took his leave.—

7. Making Debaik the following morning the Sheikh came on board conversation of a general and complimentary nature ensued. He attached his seal to the prolonged Truce, received his present and left.—

8. Shortly after reaching Sharjah

Shargah, where I met with our intelligent agent Inaollah Hoassein, from whom I learnt with much satisfaction that, peace and quietness reigned around as well on land as on the sea; I was visited by the Chief of Rasel Khyma who had come here some days previous to meet his Son, lately returned from Singah, where he had proceeded, as before reported, to receive in marriage the Sister of Syed bin Ghureeb, its Sheikh.

9. Beyond some trivial expense, which was made by almost all the Sheikhs on agreeing to the prolonged Truce, such as the probability of the parties subscribing to it forgetting during so long a period and acting contrary to their engagements, for the sole purpose, as appeared to me, of ascertaining whether the new arrangement would cause

cause the cessation of the annual presents; and which I set aside by stating that, these would continue to be made to all who faithfully acted up to its conditions. This Chief did not hesitate to attach his Seal to the several Copies.

10. I now remarked that War at Sea being at an end for a period, and Government having determined upon compelling Abdullah bin Rashid to fulfil the articles of the Treaty formed between them through the mediation of Captain Kennell I trusted he had no objection to that agreements being considered null and void, and to that Chief's being at liberty to build hereafter any towers or fortifications he pleased. The Sheikh, contrary to my expectation, made no demur, saying that he was now on good terms

terms with Abdulla bin Rachid, and would willingly conform to the wishes of Government on this as in all other matters. I then drew out and signed a paper, receiving a corresponding one from him, translations of which are enclosed, stating that Government was relieved from any further obligations or interference with regard to their Treaty; and that he had been made aware of the same.—

11. Sultan bin Suggur now brought forward several suppositions cases in which he requested my opinion and decision, as to how he was to act. Two of these only and my answers are, I conceive, worthy of being brought to the notice of Government

1st Whether any party to the Truce would be permitted to transport by

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by sea, arms, ammunition, &c. from one part of the Coast to another, where it was desirous of carrying on operations against an Enemy.—

2d In the event of any of his people seceding from his authority, to the Territory of some other Chief, who might give them asylum and protection, and his wishing to compel their return vi et armis. I answered that both his Questions, were fully provided for by the spirit, indeed terms of the Truce. as to the first, it was evident the proceeding it considered could not be permitted; for the opposite party would be fully justified in thwarting, the plans of the aggressor, which it could only do by attacking his boats on sea, with regard to the second, that he might act as he saw fit on land, but on the sea he was bound by his engagements not

no the wage War.—

12. The Sheikh of Shargah being unwell and unable to come off. I sent him his present by the agent with a note.—

13. Having to off Ejmaun, I received a/c
the visit of Abdull azeez bin Rashid, who was accompanied by Aumed bin Suroor one of the chiefs of Brymee after the interchange of compts. etc. The former attached his seal to the new Truce, and received the usual present. to the latter also I made a small present, consisting of 1 Bag of Shot and 1 Canister of Powder.—

14 At night we anchored off amulgamine. Early the following morning a its Chief came on board. Having learnt from me the desire of Government, for the extension of the period of the Truce. He expressed

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his willingness to become a party to it.—

15. The case of breach of faith on his part to one of the articles of the Treaty entered into between himself and Sheikh Sultan bin Suggur through the mediation of Captain Kennell, was fully discussed, and its circumstances recapitulated by me. I informed him that the Question had been referred for decision to Government, and its answer received; and I now hoped he was prepared totally to destroy the Tower etc that, having done so, the Government would wash their hands of the business; and he be at liberty to erect what buildings he pleased.

16. The Chief, without once accusing the opposite party of breach of faith, made numberless excuses for the non performance of his part of the

the compact. that without fortifications he would be powerless and his Country at the mercy of his Enemies, who were many; that his subjects were about to start for the Pearl Fishery &c &c concluding by saying that his territory was at the disposal of the British Government which might destroy the tower, or act as it saw fit; but that he could not do so unless he was guaranteed protection from attacks by land as well as by sea. - All this (and it may be as well to remark that the proscribed tower intended and situated as a defence towards the sea only, is unfinished and therefore perfectly useless) convinced me that nothing but the strongest tone would bring the Sheikh to reason, and induce him to attach his seal to a paper stating his intention to comply with my demand. - I therefore told him that the British Govern^t felt

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felt itself in justice bound to make the quarrel its own, and compel the entire fulfilment on his part of the Articles of the treaty entered into through the mediation. It was necessary therefore that I should obtain a final answer from him. This he gave by plainly expressing his determination not himself to destroy the Tower. I replied that, such being the case, our conference was at an end, and I was unwillingly compelled to consider him an Enemy to the British Government and should request the commadore to treat him accordingly. The Sheikh was evidently not prepared for so earnest and active an interference on my part, and said that he was not, nor desired to be our enemy; and, since the Tower &c must be destroyed, he would stay no longer at Amulgavine, which would

would be ordered defenceless, but would
quit with his tribe for some other
Country, mentioning particularly
Tars; wishing to know whether I would
give him permission to collect
his followers and boats and leave.
Perceiving that this was a mere ruse
to try its effect upon me, and whether
my resolution would be shaken; I
answered that I should deeply regret
his adopting such a plan, but of
course would not interfere provided
before his departure he met my
wishes and destroyed the towers etc
as until he did so it would be my
duty to consider him as an Enemy
and use the power at my disposal
against him- He then expressed his
hope that as the Pearl Fishery was
about to commence, sufficient time
would be allowed him to complete
the destruction of the Towers, at
least

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least one year- I told him that I had
myself six months before prepared
him to expect the demand I had
just made- it was now impossible
to accede to his request that Moollah
Hoosein / to whom written instruc-
tions were furnished / would be di-
-rected to remain one month or
one month and a half at Amulga-
-vine for the purpose of reporting
to me every ten days the progress
that should have been made-

17. After some conversation
apart with his manager he again
adduced every argument by which
he thought to induce me to waive
altogether or at least put off for
a time my demand- Finding however
that I would yield nothing he attach-
-ed his seal to the paper before re-
-ferred to, receiving one from me in
return / translations of which are
enclosed

enclosed / shewing that on the destruc-
tion of the Tower &c. and consequent
fulfilment of the Treaty, the same
would thenceforth be considered
null & void and himself at liberty
to erect any buildings he pleased
on giving him his present and his
leave I warned him that any hesita-
tion or trifling on his part would
assuredly oblige me to place his
case, without further parley, in the
hands of Commodore.—

18. I beg here to remark that
though firm, having once made the
demand, in adhering to it my man-
ner towards the Sheikh was partic-
ularly studied, to avoid any ap-
pearance of harshness.—

19 Previous to abdulla bin
Rashids coming on board I received
a visit from the Sheikh of Shargah
who, after excusing himself for not
having

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having waited upon me yesterday, presented
a note from his father to my address in
which he begged to remind me, no mention
having been made of the same in the
paper furnished to him yesterday, of
another tower which had been added
to by Abdullah bin Rashid also in
contravention of the Treaty, and the
destruction of which he hoped I would
require. In answer I referred him to
his son, to whom I stated in general
terms that Government would always
require from the parties subscribing
the full performance of the condi-
tions of any treaty entered into
through their mediation.

20. With reference to the 6th
para of this letter, I would venture
to suggest the advisability, in
the event of Ebn bin Jarif's estab-
lishing himself at Biddah, and
acknowledging no superior authority
of

of his being requested to become a party to the new Truce.

21. In conclusion I beg respectfully to solicit the approval of His Honor in Council to my proceedings, as above detailed, in carrying out the instructions communicated in your letter and its enclosures No 624 dated 8th March.—

22. In reporting my arrival here this day and intention to start tomorrow for Bushire touching en route at Kharak and Kerm.—

I have the honor to be &c

/Sigd/ A. B. Kemball

assist. Resident in the Persian Gulf in charge

On board Honble Company's Brig of War Euphrates Bassidore Road 26th March 1843.

Translated substance of a document furnished by Lieutenant A. B. Kemball assist. Resident in the Persian Gulf in charge to Sheikh

Sheikh Sultan bin Suggur bearing date 24th May 1843.

Since a Truce has been established between the several Sheiks for a period of ten years and Abdulla bin Rashid, Sheikh of Umulgavine has been directed to act up to the articles of the agreement, formed between you and him, through the mediation of Captain Kennell—by destroying the tower built by him in contravention of the same—Be it known to you that from this day that agreement and the obligations of Govert. with regard to it, is at an end.

Since you are agreeable to this arrangement, I have written this paper.

True Translated Substance

/Signed/ A. B. Kemball

Asst. Resident in charge

Translated substance of a document

document furnished by Sheik Sultan bin Suggur of Ruse l Khyma to Lieut.t A. B. Kemball assist.t Resident in the Persian Gulf in charge. dated 24.th May 1843.

Since the truce between the Sheiks has been established for a term of ten years and the British Government has directed the fulfilment on the part of Abdullah bin Rashid of the treaty entered into between myself and him through the mediation of Captain Hennell Viz.t the destruction of the Tower built by that chief in contravention of the same. It has become known to me that from this day that agreement is null and void and the obligations of Government with regard to it at an end.—

Since this is agreeable to me I have written this paper.

L.S.

L. S. ex Sultan bin Sugr 21

True Translated Substance

/signed/ A. B. Kemball

Asst. Resid.t in charge

True Copies

/Sig.d/ A. B. Kemball

Assistant Resid.t in charge

Translated substance of a document furnished by Abdulla bin Rashid of Amulgavine to Lieutenant A.B. Kemball Assistant Resident in the Persian Gulf in charge dated 25.th May 1843.

Since you have directed the destruction of the Tower built by me in contravention of the treaty entered into by me with Sheikh Sultan bin Suggur of Ruse l Khyma through the mediation of Capt.n Hennell Agreement, and will entirely destroy the same. and it has become known to me that from this day that agreement

greement is null and void and the in-
terference of Government ~~is null and~~
~~void and the interference of Govt.~~
with regard to it at an end also that
after the destruction of the above I
am at liberty to build as I please. Sul.
so agree to pull down that portion of
a tower which was built after the
formation of the Treaty.—

L. S. of Abdulla bin
Rashid

True Translated Substance
/Signed/ A. B. Kemball
Asst. Resident in charge

Translated Substance of a document
furnished by Lieut. A. B. Kemball
Assistt. Resident in the Persian
Gulf in charge to Abdulla bin
Rashid Sheikh of Amulgamine dated
25th May 1843.

On the subject of the
tower built by you in contraven-
tion

contravention of the Treaty entered into
by you with Sultan bin Suggur Shiek
of Rasel Khyma through the mediation
of Captain Kennell. It is necessary
that in fulfilment of the articles of
the same You should entirely destroy
it as also that portion built in add-
tion to another tower and Be it
known to you that from this day that
agreement is null and void and the
interference of Government with
regard to it at an end. I have there-
fore written this that you may know
that from this day and after the des-
truction of the Tower &c. you are at
liberty to build as it may please you.—

True Translated substance
/Sigd/ A. B. Kemball
asst. Resident

True Copies
/Sigd/ A. B. Kemball
asst. Resident in charge

Copied by
Nusserwanjee H.
Compd by
N. Sanchia

Minute by the Honorable the Governor.
Subscribed to by the Board dated 29th
June 1843. These proceedings may be
entirely approved.—

The extension of the maritime
truce from one to ten years is an ob-
ject of great importance obtained by
Lieutenant Kemball.—

His proceedings at amulgava
also are marked with firmness and
decision, without unnecessary harsh
ness.—

Copy should be sent to the
Governor General and Honble the
Court of Directors.—

(Signed) J. Arthur
" G. W. Anderson
" J. A. Crawford

Copy
Nujeermanjee &c.
Compared by
A Sauctree

No. XXII.

TERMS of a MARITIME TRUCE for TEN YEARS agreed upon by the CHIEFS of the ARABIAN COAST, under the mediation of the RESIDENT in the PERSIAN GULF, dated 1st June 1843.

We, whose seals are hereunto affixed, *viz*, Sultan bin Suggur, Chief of the Joasmee tribe, Khuleefa bin Shakbout, Chief of the Beniyas, Muktoom bin Butye, Chief of the Boo Falasa, Abdoolah bin Rashed, Chief of Ummool-Keiweyn, Abdool Azeez bin Rashed, Chief of Ejman, being fully impressed with a sense of the evil consequences arising from our subjects and dependants being prevented carrying on the pearl fishery without interruption on the banks, owing to the various feuds existing amongst ourselves, and, moreover, duly appreciating the general advantage to be derived from the establishment of a truce, do hereby agree to bind ourselves down to observe the following conditions:—

ARTICLE 1.

That from the 1st June A. D. 1843 (the corresponding Mahomedan date 2nd Jemmadee-ool-Awul Hegira 1259), there shall be a cessation of hostilities at sea between our respective subjects and dependants, and that from the above date until the termination of the month of May A. D. 1853, an inviolable truce shall be established, during which period our several claims upon each other shall rest in abeyance.

ARTICLE 2.

That in the event of any of our subjects or dependants committing any acts of aggression at sea upon those of any of the parties to this agreement, we will immediately afford full redress upon the same being brought to our notice.

ARTICLE 3.

That in the event of any acts of aggression being committed at sea upon any of our subjects or dependants, we will not proceed immediately to retaliate, but will inform the British Resident or the Commodore at Bassidore, who will forthwith take the necessary steps for obtaining reparation for the injury inflicted, provided that its occurrence can be satisfactorily proved.

ARTICLE 4.

That on the termination of the month of May 1853, by God's blessing we will endeavour to arrange either an extension of this truce, or a firm and lasting peace but in the event of our being unable to come to a satisfactory adjustment regarding our respective claims, we hereby bind ourselves to give notice, on or about the above date to the British Resident, of our intention to renew hostilities after the expiration of the term now fixed upon for this truce, *viz.*, the end of the month of (May) 1853.

Signed as in the preamble.

2.06
Lieutenant A. B. Kemball's tour of the Trucial shaikhdoms, May 1844

(7)

To,

Captain Kennell,
Resident in the Persian Gulf
Bushire.

Sir,

Adverting to the last para of my letter to your address of the 9th Instant, I have the honor to report that I left Bassidore in the morning of the day following that therein fixed upon, and reached Ras ul Khymah on the afternoon of the 13th, when, the vessel hearing to received a visit from Sheik Sultaun bin Suggur who lost no time in coming on board.

2 Some brief complimentary Conversation having passed, he expressed a wish to Consult me in private upon what he Considered a very important subject, and dismissing from the Cabin his Son Abdollah with the rest of his attendants, except his Confidential Moonshee commenced by calling my attention to the rapidly increasing power of the Wahabees, whose head he said desiring to subjugate the whole

Univ.-Bibl.
Bamberg

whole of the Coast of Oman had opened a correspondence with its Leading Chiefs and intimated his intention of shortly despatching forces under the Command of his General Syed Seen Mookhuk, to whom he enjoined a speedy advance and submission on the part of those disposed to favor his views.

3 After dilating upon the numerous happy changes to be anticipated from the establishment of the influence of the Wahabees, he remarked that although rather than Love Independence he had resolved, when the Sloop arrived afrow adopting the only alternative left him, of Removing with his Troops to some Situation beyond their reach the other Chiefs over whom owing to the policy of the British Government he has no longer possessed any Controul, having tendered their Submission he had deemed it his best course for the present at least lest their united forces should be immediately employed against him to

frame

frame his replies to the Communications of Ameer Feysul with a view to the maintenance of a friendly understanding, without however giving his Countenance to his prospects of aggrandizement.

4 Adding that Bymee was the first point threatened and that the possession of this central Fortress forming the Key to the territories of the Imaum of Muscat would render resistance from every Quarter of no avail. He concluded by requesting that since his letters to you treating fully on the subject had preceded by no reply, I would make him acquainted with the intentions of the British Govt and the degree of interference it would exercise in the event of the Contingency he feared.

5 I replied that he was with myself fully aware of the principles by which the Govt had ever been guided in their relations with the Arab States, from the date of the first treaty; and that I could conjecture no possible case calling for the violation of the first of these principles, which forbad interference with internal affairs that with reference to

to his authority over Amulgavine, Ajmaun, and Debaee, the British Govt. had since Captain Mc Leods Agency, acknowledged that of the Chiefs of those towns respectively, attaching to each the responsibility, due to the acts of his adherents, a line of policy which had in fact formed no innovation or encroachment upon his rights, but was rendered absolutely necessary by that he had adopted, since when on the commission of a piracy many years ago by the inhabitants of the Ajmaun
of the places alluded to he had been called upon to make redress, he had disowned the authority and power to do so, and referred the Resident to their immediate Chief

6 In acknowledging the above the Sheikh observed that he still wished each Chief to be held responsible to the Govt. for any irregularities committed by his dependants on the seas but that he should be considered on land supreme among

(7)

among them, meaning literally, I conclude if meaning he has that communication with them should be had only through him except when having committed acts obnoxious to our interests or in contravention of treaties, coercion might become necessary in urging our just demands upon them a point which it is hardly necessary to remark once conceded and enforced; for it is certain the parties concerned would never willingly consent to that which in the outset they had manifested a determination not to admit by their denial of all knowledge of the statement produced by him shortly after the formation of Sir H. Grant Keen's treaty viz 1820 as having been drawn out by them, acknowledging submission to his authority, would probably annihilate the fruits of 24 years surveillance maintained at so much trouble and expence inasmuch as he would be enabled to profit by the illicit gains of piracy perpetrated at his

his own or the instigation of the Wahabas and yet screen himself from merited punishment by exposing the less guilty Agents.

7. In this idea I answered that the Policy of Govt. would not be changed and did not admit of its considering their independence as partial while so long a period preserved it unimpaired.

Referring to the principle of non interference Sheikh Sultan reminded me of the designs of the late Egyptian Agent, Rodshid Pasha and the opposition brought into play by the British Government

8 These I admitted but endeavoured to impress him with the wide difference in the example he had cited, that the Govt. in inviting the several tribes to unite against a common oppressor had acted disinterestedly in encouraging and assisting them in the maintenance of their own independence but had in no way altered their relations there with the other

9

9. I have no hesitation in expressing (10) my belief, that sheik Sultan bin Suggur has practised his habitual cunning and deceit in his communications to me relative to the Wahabees; for so far from viewing their approach with dissapprobation and dread, He and his bro Suggur of Khayah, Moollah Hussein our Zealous & intelligent Agent, informs me upon the authority of the latter have actually written to Ameer Syud to hasten the despatch of his Agents and requesting that a Mutowa or Priest to inculcate the precepts of the Sect. may be permitted to accompany them. It is object however I am at a loss to conjecture unless it be, indeed, that he has termed the hope, which judging by his unprovoked attempts upon Amul Quaine &c. he can scarcely be said to have abandoned of re-establishing his supremacy over the Coast extending from Rumps

to

to Debaie inclusive, and that justly
assured of the inadequacy of his own
means, and finding that by dwelling
upon the probability of a renewal
of piracy on the restoration of Wahabee
influence, he cannot excite the
fears of the British Govt. to such a
degree as to induce it to aid his
views he is anxious to be foremost
in securing their good will, their
consequent acknowledgment of
his supremacy and their assistance
and countenance in establishing
and maintaining it
10 With reference to the letter
he declared to have addressed to
you, I informed him that it had
certainly not reached previous to my
leaving Bushire; but that as he wished
it the subject would be referred
for your decision, altho' I ventured
to assure him he might expect no
other reply
11 Making Amulgamation on the Morning
of the 16th I was visited by Sheik Abdoolah
bin

bin Rashid who after the usual interchange
of Compliments informed me that he early
expected the arrival of Sheik Tom bin Butti
of Debaie and Abdool Azeez bin Rashid
of Ejmaun and shortly after his leaving the
vessel they came on board in Company.
12 The tenor of my Conversations with these
Chiefs was in every respect similar they
did not attempt to disguise the unfriendly
feelings existing between their own and
the Joasme tribes and that hostile encoun-
ters on land would in all probability be
the result
13 After discanting fully upon the
advantages of a Perfect Peace which should
not fail to be of great benefit to themselves as
admitting of a greater proportion of their
dependents engaging in the Pearl Fishery
and in the trade with the Ports of India
Africa &c. without any feeling of anxiety
lest the opportunity of their absence
might be seized by their enemies to
inflict injury upon their homes and
families I observed that however
much the British Govt. regretted those
quarrels and would rejoice at their
cessation

cessation It had no intention of deviating from its usual policy by the exertion of any actual interference so long as they were confined to the land and were not extended to the Sea in which it had planned for all security and free intercourse by guaranteeing the observance of the conditions of the Maritime Truce, last June renewed for a period of ten years.

4 Sheikh Mubkhoom now put forward had done Sheikh Abdullah bin Rashid before him the identical Questions as below detailed which had evidently formed a subject of previous discussion between the three Chiefs on which my decision had been requested by Sheikh Sultan bin Suggur on my visiting the Arabian Coast last year to which I returned the same replies remarking with reference to the second that he afforded in his own person a case in point since he and his tribe had at one time been subject to the Beni Yas Chief

5 Whether the terms of the Maritime Truce precluded the transport of men

men and Military Stores in small boats along the shore from one port to another for the purpose of facilitating the operations of forces attacking by land the boats being otherwise not actually engaged

6 How far force could be exerted at Sea to compel the return of fugitives debtors or others deciding from the authority of one Chief to that of another?

15. The wish to have all doubts on the above points set at rest arose it appeared, from their having understood that the measure involved by the former was contemplated on the termination of the Pearl Fishery by their enemies the Joasmees and with reference to the latter that the tribe of al Bou Mukair settled at Sharjah having quarrelled with Sheikh Sugger bin Sultan on account of the oppressive taxes imposed upon them had threatened to establish themselves elsewhere with their families & property

16 The Sheikh of Ajman complained of a small boat belonging to his town having been boarded & Armaments & Ammunition

(Jos since territory) while fishing for pearls, by some of the inhabitants of that place who had beaten the Arabs and broken their mast asserting that the right of fishing on that ground belonged only to themselves.

17 I in reply gave him great credit for having withheld his subjects from any act of retaliation observing that in taking redress in such cases at the hands of the Resh. It was indispensable that no guilt could be attributed to the Party applying and declared my intention of investigating and laying the matter before you.

18. In the afternoon when at anchor off Sharjah Sheikh Sugger bin Sultan paid me a visit.

19. This Chief like his father freely admitted the unfriendly terms existing between himself and the three Sheikhs I had seen in the morning but refrained from being communicative on the subject I recommended him as I did all, of his engagements

engagements and expressed a hope that they would not be on the slightest degree violated by his dependents.

20. He denied all knowledge of the attack upon the Ajmanee boat off Hemreah but promised at my request to make strict enquiries.

21. I may here remark that considering the animosity borne by one party towards the other the facts of the case which is in itself trifling may have been somewhat exaggerated.

22. The Sheikh on taking leave put into my hands an original letter to his address from Ameer Syud which contained however merely a summary account of his proceedings at Dumaum and referred in no way to the affairs of Oman or the Arabs he appears to be farming with it.

23. On the morning of the 16 we reached Abothabee it was not however till late in the evening nor till I had despatched on shore the Native Agent to invite him to meet me that Sheikh Khuleefa bin Shiklout came off.

24. It appeared from his apologies that the haze had prevented his [illegible] coming

ceiving the vessel or rather perhaps your Distinguishing Flag and the distance of the anchorage his hearing the Guns.

25. With the exception of a complaint preferred by the Sheikh against the people of Biddah the conversation which ensued was upon general topics.

26. That place he informed me was now inhabited by the two tribes of Abdulle and Abu Kowamah under the Controul of Essai ben Tariff and Mahomed ben Saeed between whom and themselves a mutual agreement had been entered into to the effect that neither party should receive under his protection Seceders from the authority of the other that the act of aggression for which he sought redress at the hands of the Resident had been committed at sea by some of the latter tribe who in three Buggarahs had boarded a boat belonging to his town and forcably taken therefrom a person whom they alleged to be their debtor inflicting a wound on his arm in the scuffle.

27.

27. Bearing in mind the difficulty of approach to Biddah for Ships of War and considering the delay and probable inefficiency of a communication by letter with Mahomed ben Saeed by means of Native Boats which might on the contrary tend merely to complicate matters & create further ill feeling and with a view also to avoid hastily involving you in this petty dispute I recommended Sheikh Khuleefa upon the strength of his long friendship with Essai ben Tariff and the existence of the agreement alluded to, try the effect of a personal remonstrance and defer a reference to you until he had seen the result. In this he acquiesced promising at the same time to refrain from any acts of retaliation

28. I made the subject of the 4th Para of your letter of instructions one of particular enquiry with Sheikh Sugger bin Sultan and Khuleefa bin Shakboot but finding that these petty retaliating measures had been carried into effect on both sides and that of the two cases one had been amicably arranged by the mutual

mutual restoration of the boats Sails which had been seized: while the only obstacle to the settlement of the other consisting of the detention on one side of a slave on the other of a quantity of dates was reluctance from a feeling of pride on the part of either to be the first to Concede ——"——"——"——
——I confined myself to an intimation that these differences had reached your ears and that you had made me the medium of expressing your earnest hope that the parties would shortly come to a friendly understanding

29. In addition to the present with the delivery of which I am charged by you I took the liberty of presenting a few trifling articles as per margin to three of the re. latives of the different Chiefs for which I beg to solicit your sanction and approval

To Abdulrak the son of Sultan late Governor of Ras ul Khyma
To Ahmed the son of Abdullah late Kashef 10 Pr. of Scissors.
To Mahomed D. D. 1 Cask of Gunpowder.
To Sultan the brother of Khuleefa late Shaikh 1 Cask of Gunpowder
To the son of Khuleefa late Shaikh of Ras ul Khyma 1 pair of Scissors.
To Abdoon agent late Kashef on his first visit 1 Cask of Gunpowder.

30. Scarcely had Sheikh Khuleefa left the vessel when a N. Westerly wind with heavy swell setting in compelled Capt. Porter to weigh and put to sea with all haste and this day to take shelter at anchor under the lee of this Island.

Thanks the honor to be

Sir,

Your very Obed. humble Servant.

H. C. Hay Major
Political Resident
Persian Gulf.

Ghunnatone
off the Island of
Ras al Khyma 1st. March 1836.

2.07
The Treaty of Maritime Peace in Perpetuity, May 1853

Office No: 126 of 1853.-
Comm: No: 35 of 1853.-

From

Captain A. B. Kemball.
Resident in the Persian Gulf.

To

A. Malet, Esqre
Chief Secy to Govt Bombay.

Pol. Depart.

By H.M. Steam Ship "Clive"
at Sea near Abushehr.

Sir,

Having this day completed the terms of the Peace of Emaun in prosecution of which I left Bussidore on the 3rd inst. I have the honour to report for the information of Govt the — particulars of my interviews with the Persian Chiefs on the occasion of concluding the General Treaty of Peace, which is referred to in your instruction No 447 of 31st Decr last.

An arabic draft of this engagement duly authenticated by the Seals of the Contracting Parties, as also an English Version, are herewith transmitted —

2. On the 4th Inst. the "Clive" arrived off Shuggah & in the course of the day I received the visit of Sheikh Sultan bin Suggur — after reproaching this Chief with the detention to which his predecessor Sheyk Abymee had subjected

me,

me, I observed that having already
apprized him by letter of the light in which
his proceedings would be viewed by the British
Govt. I had only now to rejoice that the apparent
efficacy of my remonstrances should have
obviated a recourse to more serious measures
in order to vindicate its Policy & to support the
interests of our old & faithful Ally. This
allusion to his schemes my visitor in
the first instance repudiated, asserting on
the contrary the friendship he had always
entertained for the Imaum: In proceeding to
Bryuee, he said, he had only followed the
example of Sheikh Saeed the Nahaum and the
other Maritime Chieftains, & was prompted thereto
merely by the desire to counteract intrigues
which he apprehended, they might set on foot to
injure him; but on my remarking that if
such were the case the fact of his exclusion
from the subsequent negotiations and the
ascendancy gained by his rival Saeed bin
Tahnoon in the councils of Abdullah bin
Tyeul would be inexplicable, he admitted
that the ill treatment he had experienced
at the hands of the Imaum had certainly
provoked him to espouse afresh the cause
of Syed Bin bin Ayed in furtherance of his
objects to avail himself of the co-operation of

a

a party whose power was adequate to the
control of the other Tribes: — Mis Highness, he de-
-clared, when persuading him on the last occa-
-sion to join his side, had promised him an
annual Donation of 3,000 Dollars, but no sooner
were his views accomplished than he withdrew
from his engagements; In acting therefore, as
he did, he had sought only to obtain what he
conceived to be his right, and that his inten-
-tions extended no further I must myself be
sufficiently convinced, when I considered
that it would be quite as hurtful to his inter-
-ests as to those of the A. that the Wahabees ac-
-cupied Lohur: — Here I thought proper to re-
-mark that altho' the British Govt as a rule,
did not interfere in the internal concerns
of the rival Tribes so long as their differences
were confined to themselves, still, if a third
party interposed to disturb its arrangements,
it could not be denied the privilege of as-
-serting its views: The Sheikh then assured me
that on receiving my letter he had immedi-
-ately disbanded his followers & relinquish-
-ed absolutely the designs to which he had
before lent himself; So distinct an avowall
I said, was at least satisfactory in that
it might serve to qualify the displeasure
which the Govt must have felt at his pre-
-vious

previous conduct:-

3. The subject of the new Treaty being now introduced I was agreeably surprized to find that my visitor affected no disinclination to the arrangement, but on the contrary animadverted upon the little respect which he alleged, had been paid to the former Maritime Truce in the repeated conveyance of Troops & warlike stores from one Port to another in violation of it's conditions:- as his remarks however were to the same effect precisely as those contained in his letter to my address of 28th Augt last, and were again answered in the terms of my reply, translations of both of which documents were submitted to you in my despatch No. 335/69 under date 2d Octr 1952, they need not be here recapitulated.- I was either ignorant of, or could explain the several instances he enumerated, but I could assure him that whatever may have occurred in the past, nothing of the kind would be tolerated for the future.-

4. An additional question on this subject, as illustrating the views so lately entertained by the Joasmee Chief, is perhaps worthy of mention:- He asked whether if the Imaum's Party attacked by sea his possessions on the Batinah Coast, he would be at

at liberty to retaliate in like manner, I was informed that under a contingency so very unlikely of occurrence in the event of his opponent's refusing to attend to the mediation or remonstrances of the British Government. I could not suppose he would be withheld from retorting any injuries they might inflict upon him, but it would be obviously necessary in such case, that he should give me timely notice before proceeding to extremity. He then affixed his seal to the several Drafts of the Treaty prescribed to him.-

5. The next matter brought under discussion was the alleged exportation of slaves from Rasel Khyma by one Abdool Rahman Boo-Shait in the Summer of last year, being the case referred to in your Despatch No. 3560/52, on which I invited his explanation. Sheik Sultan said he had nothing further to advance beyond what he had stated in his reply to my written remonstrance to the effect that the Legend in the affair, being the known of the Wahabee Chief, was too influential a person to be interfered with, & the apprehended

that

that the confiscation of his property could have drawn reprisals upon his own dependents located within the power of the latter.

6. On my answering that such an excuse appeared to me rather to aggravate than extenuate his offence, seeing he had been already explicitly informed that Government could admit no external influence or controul whatever to excuse the infraction of a solemn engagement, & that, with reference to the Party implicated, every Chief was liable for the acts of individuals residing within his jurisdiction, he observed that he had fully anticipated the motives of my objection, the slaves in fact had been carried beyond his reach, & he confidently assured me that, if the present instances were overlooked, he would take care it should not recur.

7. With respect to the plunder of the Zanzibar Vessel by his dependent Yedeedee, the Seamen Chief said, "he would be prepared to comply with my requisition so soon as the Amount of Compensation could be decided upon."

8. On the following day (5th) I was visited

visited successively by the Sheikhs of Debaie, Ejmaein & Ramulgaweir. My interviews with these Chiefs were characterised chiefly by the readiness which each displayed to subscribe the new Treaty, & with the first of these only were any topics discussed other than those of a general nature.

9. On meeting the Sheikh Saeed bin Butye I hastened to express my satisfaction at the promptitude which he was said to have exercised in punishing an act of irregularity committed by one of his dependents in the interval since my first arrival: the particulars of the case were briefly as follow— An inhabitant of Debaie having forcibly removed a slave from a Shargah boat at sea, a complaint was immediately lodged with Sheikh Saeed by the British Agent & reparation demanded; the delinquent being summoned denied the fact, but was called upon to take oath of his innocence in the most solemn form observed among Arabs "by the divorce of the wife?"— On his declining to do so he was tied to a gun & subjected to corporal punishment until induced to make confession, when he was required to furnish security for the surrender

surrender of his Captive - This individual who, it appeared, had been secreted at Abusthabee, was then recovered & made over to the rightful owner - In acknowledging my remarks the Sheikh observed that his motives in the transaction must be self evident since the parties aggrieved were at the time at open feud with his tribe -

10. My Visitor then calling my attention to an aggression which had been lately committed by a plundering party from Ghargah upon some of his people engaged in fishing in one of the numerous backwaters situated between Debaie & Abusthabee, called "Khore Ghurabee," wished to be informed whether the occurrence was one coming properly within my jurisdiction & of a nature to entitle him to redress at my hands - The circumstances having been previously investigated, I replied that, as the assailants had operated entirely from the land, which indeed he could not deny, their proceedings violated no condition of the maritime truce, & further, that as unlicensed boats dared not in creeks & backwaters & were attacked from the shore by persons, it might be, who were not accountable to any of the Parties to that Agreement, the Govt had never yet exercised a right of interference - He said that my answer was not altogether unexpected & briefly mentioned the grievances (having previously addressed me in writing on the subject) in order to prepare me for complaints of retaliation since a similar

737

similar form which might be practised by his followers: He informed me that in the affray two Debaie men had been wounded and their property carried off, and that one of the crew of an Abusthabee boat fishing in company had been likewise killed on the occasion -

It is proper I should mention here that on the previous day I had brought the above matter to the serious notice of Sheikh Sultan bin Suggur. The result, I said, constituting a case for my authoritative interference, yet it bordered so closely upon maritime irregularity, that I hoped the respect he entertained for the favorable opinion of Government, to say nothing of motives of good Policy, would prompt him to afford all the redress in his power - The Joasmee Chief was earnest in his promises of acquiescence pt from the general tenor of the excuses by which they were precluded, to the effect that, as members of an inimical tribe, the sufferers had no claim upon his sympathy, and moreover that the aggressors were for the most part Bedouins, not subject to his authority, I could encourage little hope of their fulfilment -

11. On the advent of the Wahabee Force under Abdullah bin Saoud being referred to, Sheikh Saeed bin Bulye observed that their presence

presence in Oman in such strength was opposed to the best interests of the Maritime Tribes, and could not fail, sooner or later, to be productive of much embarrassment to the British Government. Nothing was easier, he added, than for the Government to defeat their schemes by declaring the whole line of Coast from Abothabee to Muscat under its protection. With much more to the same purpose all tending to the query with which he concluded. Whether, if the Wahabees attacked his territories, or offered to cooperate with either of his ambitious neighbours in such an enterprise, he might count upon its support and assistance. 12.– To this I replied the neutrality generally observed by Government in inland affairs seemed to suggest a sufficient answer. The Maritime Chiefs, whether united or singly, might always assure themselves of its sympathy and even its good offices when struggling for their independence, but I could at present contemplate no contingency which should move it to deviate from its declared Policy. All I could promise him was that, as heretofore, he should be safe from attacks from this side of the sea, or from any hostile demonstration whatever upon that element; the above considerations, he answered, had been

two of his principal sources of anxiety), but being now satisfied that no change was intended in this respect by the new Treaty, he did not despair by judiciously availing himself of the jealousies of the Benigas and Joasmee Chiefs of counteracting any plans which might be formed for his subjection.–

12.– The language and demeanour of Sheikh Saeed bin Butye impressed me with his character for activity and intelligence. The wanting perhaps the abilities of the late Sheikh Muktoom he is said to possess all his energy and will probably meet with equal success in maintaining his position. In his relations with Government, I am happy to observe that he has as yet exhibited the same readiness to fulfil his engagements, which distinguished his brother during the latter years of his life.–

13. On the 8th the "Lohia" reached Abothabee, when, at my invitation, and in the absence of his brother, Hamdan bin Zaheroon came off to meet me. He informed me that Sheikh Saeed bin Tahnoon's return might be looked for daily, but that, as his representative and vested by him with full powers, if I did not choose to await his coming, he was himself prepared to transact business

business on his behalf. Finding that my visitor suffered severely from sea-sickness, I did not detain him longer than sufficed to explain the objects of the proposed Treaty, and to prepare a provisional document for his signature, reserving for his brother's acceptance of its obligations, as precaution the necessity for which was however superseded by the latter's arriving in person yesterday, and by his visiting me this morning to affix his seal to the new Engagement. Which he did without hesitation and without any allusion to his previously avowed designs for the reduction of Dhaid, on which subject his silence was to be accounted for by his having lately resumed friendly relations with the Chief of that place.—

14. With the exception of a complaint of the affair at "Khore Ghuraluee", to which I have referred in Para 10 of this report, the rest of our conversation was entirely engrossed by the proceedings of the Wahabees at Brymee: (On arriving, he said, in their Camp he found that Abdullah bin Yusuf, being correctly informed of the defenceless state of Dalmah, had made up his mind to invade the district and had accordingly pitched his demands upon Syed Sowynee at so high a rate, including therein a requisition for his present attendance, as apparently to close the door to an accommodation

(signed) Joseph Wilkinson Missionary
Sir Claud

accommodation.— The approach of the Joasmee Chief was then only awaited, & a day had been fixed for the march of the co-alesced Forces.— Matters having gone thus far he wrote to Syed Sowynee recommending him to proceed himself and to despatch all his available Troops to Dhaid, and to assume at least an attitude of resistance, in order to give weight to his mediation.— He could see, he told me, that both the Joasmee Chief and the Wahabee Lieutenant were employing Syed Sowynee, Agent as the instrument to subserve their own ends, and he felt therefore that by holding a bold language towards the latter, while he tendered his personal security for a reasonable amount of tribute, it might be possible to divert him from extreme measures. Much negotiation thereon ensued, but it was not until he declared his adherence to the Imaum's party & begged, if the expedition were finally determined upon, to be permitted to withdraw that his remonstrances seemed to make any impression. The result as already known to me, was the deputation of himself and Command. of Judgree to Dhaid for the purpose

purpose of effecting an amicable arrange-
ment. — He regretted to add that, in
spite of all his efforts, he was unable
to obtain more favorable terms than
payment of arrears of tribute to the
amount of 60000 Dollars as the price
of a Treaty of Alliance offensive and
Defensive, between the Parties, where-
by His Highness Syed Saeyyeed bound
himself to a liability of 12000 Dollars
annually, and was on his side secured
in the possession of all the terri-
tory now under his rule, including
the districts both of Soham and
Muscat. — When I commented upon
the magnitude of this exaction Sheikh
Saeed replied that circumstances ad-
mitted of no alternative. It was no
longer a question of purchasing the
forbearance of the Wahabee Commun-
der with a view to deter him from
ravaging Batinah, but the object now
virtually was to gain his support in
order to prevent the dismemberment
of the Imaum's dominions — the whole
country had shewn itself disaffected
to His Highness' authority and my
visitor had himself become aware
of overtures made to Syed Ser Bin Azan
not only by the most influential
dependents

dependents of his deceased brother,
but by the Chiefs of considerable Tribes
both within and without His Highness
own frontiers. — So sensible was Syed
Saeyyeed of the want of internal sup-
port that even after the withdrawal
of Sheikh Sultan bin Suggar, when it
was proposed to him to defy the
Wahabees and defend himself to the
last, His Highness declared that
such a course would be hopeless;
the Garrison even of Soham could not
be depended upon, and he would
rather pay the whole amount origi-
nally demanded than risk the
issue of a contest. On my referring
to the Wahabees having been per-
mitted to prosecute their march into
Oman unobstructed, Sheikh Saeed
observed that in this respect too his
efforts had been paralyzed by the
same causes, for when he invited
the Muscat Authorities to occupy
his enemies in the rear, while he
encountered the Invaders, his pro-
posal had not been responded to.
15. The heavy sacrifice which
the Muscat Authorities have been
called upon to make may be re-
garded perhaps as a just penalty
for

for the unfortunate policy they pursued towards the late Hamood bin Ayan, but it is to be feared that their disregard of the advice of Government on that occasion has placed them in a position to deprive them for the future of the full benefit of its intervention. The fear of its resentment would doubtless suffice to secure the ostensible neutrality of the Joasmee Chief, but such a motive could hardly operate in the same degree to check the progress of tribes less amenable to its influence, or to induce Syed Ibn, when in the ascendant to accept of any accommodation short of a special guarantee for his complete and permanent restoration to his hereditary rights.—

16. Under these circumstances it seems certain that a more direct interference on my part could hardly have averted their humiliation, whereas failure might have necessitated the adoption of such extraordinary measures as I should suppose, the nature of the case could hardly justify.—

Although the predominance hopefully

of

of the Wahabees in Oman must be generally prejudicial to the views of the British Government I cannot learn that their Chief has as yet evinced a disposition to disturb the mutual relations of the Maritime Chiefs as at present existing.— Abdullah bin Feysul, I am told, will return to Nedjid as soon as the season opens, leaving an Officer as heretofore with a small garrison to represent his authority at Bryman, and to collect arrears of tribute.

17. The concentration of the Squadron at the town end of the Gulf appearing to be no longer necessary, I beg herewith to enclose copies of letters addressed by me to Commodore Robinson relative to the future disposal of the "Tigris" and "Constance".—

And trusting that the instructions therein conveyed for the guidance of the Officers commanding those vessels may meet with the approval of Government.—

I have the honor to be &c.

(Sig'd) A. B. Kemball
Resident in the Persian Gulf

Transcription of previous document

Office No 126 of 1853
Cons: No 35 of 1853

From

Captain A. B. Kemball
Resident in the Persian Gulf

To

A. Malet, Esq.
Chief Sec. to Govt.
Bombay

Pol. Depart.

D/ 11th of May 1853 H.C's Sloop "Clive"
at sea near Aboothabee.

Sir

Having this day completed the tour of the Ports of Oman in prosecution of which I left Bassidore on the 3rd Inst I have the honor to report for the information of Govt. the particulars of my interviews with the Maritime Chiefs on the ocasion of concluding the General Treaty of Peace, which is referred to in your instruction No 447 of 31st Dec last. An Arabic draft of this engagement duly authenticated by the Seals of the Contracting Parties, as also an English Version, are herewith transmitted.

2. On the 4th inst. the "Clive" arrived off Shargah and in the course of the day I received the visit of Sheikh Sultan bin Suggur. After reproaching this Chief with the detention to which his protracted stay at Brymee had subjected me, I observed that having already apprized him by letter of the light in which his proceedings would be viewed by the British Govt. I had only now to rejoice that the apparent efficiency of my remonstrances should have obviated a recourse to more serious measures in order to vindicate its Policy and to support the interests of an old and faithful ally. This allusion to his schemes my visitor in the first instance repudiated, asserting on the contrary the friendship he had always entertained for the Imaum. In proceeding to Brymee, he said, he had only followed the example of Sheikh Saeed bin Thanoon and the other Maritime Chieftains, and was prompted thereto merely by the desire to counteract intrigues which he apprehended, they might set on foot to injure him, but on my remarking that if such were the case the fact of his exclusion from the subsequent negotiations and the ascendancy gained by

his rival Saeed bin Tahnoon in the councils of Abdullah bin Fysal would be inexplicable, he admitted that the faithless treatment he had experienced at the hands of the Imaum had certainly provoked him to expose afresh the cause of Syed Ges bin Azan and in furtherance of his objects to avail himself of the co-operation of a party whose power was adequate to the control of the other tribes. His Highness, he declared, when persuading him on the last occasion to join his side, had promised him an annual donation of 3,000 Dollars, but no sooner were his aims accomplished then he withdrew from his engagements. In acting therefore, as he did, he had sought only to obtain what he conceived to be his right, and that his intentions extended no further I must myself be sufficiently convinced, when I considered that it would be quite as hurtful to his interests as to those of H.H. that the Wahabees occupied Sohar. Here I thought proper to remark that altho' the British Govt. as a rule, did not interfere in the internal concerns of the Arab Tribes so long as their differences were confined to themselves, still, if a third party interposed to disturb its arrangements it could not be denied the privilege of asserting its views. The Sheikh then assured me that on receiving my letter he had immediately disbanded his followers and relinquished absolutely the designs to which he had before lent himself, so distinct an avowal, I said, was at least satisfactory in that it might serve to qualify the displeasure which the Govt. must have felt at his previous conduct.

3. The subject of the new Treaty being now introduced I was agreeably surprised to find that my visitor affected no disinclination to the arrangement, but on the contrary animadverted upon the little respect which he alleged, had been paid to the former Maritime Truce in the repeated conveyance of troops and warlike stores from one fort to another in violation of its conditions. As his remarks however were to the same effect precisely as those contained in his letter to my address of 20th Aug. last, and were again answered in the terms of my reply, translations of both of which documents were submitted to you in my despatch No 335/69 under date 2nd Oct 1852, they need not be here recapitulated. I was either ignorant of, or could explain the several instances he enumerated, but I could assure him that whatever may have occurred in the past, nothing of the kind would be tolerated for the future.

4. An additional question on this subject, as illustrating the views so lately entertained by the Joasmee Chief, is perhaps worthy of mention. He asked whether if the Imaum's Party attacked by sea his possessions on the Batinah Coast, he would be at liberty to retaliate in like manner, and was informed that under a contingency so very unlikely of occurrence in the event of his opponent's refusing to attend to the mediation or remonstrances of the British Government I could not suppose he would be withheld from retorting any injuries they might inflict upon him, but it would be obviously necessary in such case that he should give me timely notice before proceeding to extremity. He then affixed his seal to the several Drafts of the Treaty presented to him.

5. The next matter brought under discussion was the alleged exportation of slaves from Rasel Khymah by one Abdool Rahman boo-Sheit in the summer of last year, being the case referred to in your despatch No 5560/52, on which I invited his explanation. Sheikh Sultan said he had nothing further to advance beyond what he had stated in his reply to my written remonstance to the effect that the Agent in the affair, being the Envoy of the Wahabee Ameer, was too influential a person to be meddled with, and he apprehended that the confiscation of his property would have drawn reprisals upon his own dependents located within the power of the latter.

6. On my answering that such an excuse appeared to me rather to aggravate than extricate his offence, seeing he had been already explicitly informed that Government could admit no external influence or control whatever to excuse the infraction of a solemn engagement, and that, with reference to the Party implicated, every Chief was liable for the acts of individuals residing within his jurisdiction, he observed that he had fully anticipated the nature of my objections the slaves in fact had been carried beyond his reach, and he could only assure me that, if the present instance were overlooked, he would take care it should not recur.

7. With respect to the plunder of the Zanzibar vessel by his dependent Yedeedee, the Joasmee Chief said "he would be prepared to comply with my requisition so soon as the amount of compensation could be decided upon."

8. On the following day (5th) I was visited successively by the Sheikhs of Debaie, Ej Maun and Amulgavine. My interviews with these Chiefs were characterised chiefly by the readiness which each displayed to subscribe the new Treaty, and with the

first of these only were any topics discussed other than those of a general nature.

9. On meeting Sheikh Saeed bin Butye I hastened to express my satisfaction at the promptitude which he was said to have exercised in punishing an act of irregularity committed by one of his dependents in the interval since my first arrival. The particulars of the case were briefly as follow: An inhabitant of Debaiehaving forcibly removed a slave from a Shargah boat at sea, a complaint was immediately lodged with Sheikh Saeed by the British Agent and reparation demanded; the delinquent being summoned denied the fact, but was called upon to take oath of his innocence in the most solemn form observed among Arabs "by the divorce of the wife". On his declining to do so he was tied to a gun and subjected to corporal punishment until induced to make confession, when he was required to furnish security for the surrender of his captive. This individual who it appeared had been secreted at Aboothabee, was then recovered and made over to the rightful owner. In acknowledging my remarks the Sheikh observed that his motives in the transaction must be self evident since the parties aggrieved were at the time at open feud with his tribe.

10. My visitor then calling my attention to an aggression which had been lately committed by a plundering party from Shargah upon some of his people engaged in fishing in one of the numerous back-waters situated between Debaie and Aboothabee, called "Khore Ghurabee", wished to be informed whether the occurrence was one coming properly within my jurisdiction and of a nature to entitle him to redress at my hands the circumstances having been previously investigated, I replied that, as the assailants had operated entirely from the land, which indeed he could not deny, their proceedings violated no condition of the maritime Truce, and, further, that as a rule when boats drew up in creeks and back-waters and were attacked from the shore by persons, it might be, who were not accountable to any of the Parties to that Agreement, the Govt. had never yet exercised a right of interference. He said that my answer was not altogether unexpected and he only mentioned the grievance (having previously addressed me in writing on the subject) in order to prepare me for complaints of retaliation in a similar form which might be practised by his followers. He informed me that in the affray two Debaie men had been wounded and their property carried off, and that one of the crew of an Aboothabee boat fishing in company had been likewise killed on the occasion.

It is proper I should mention here that on the previous day I had brought the above matter to the serious notice of Sheikh Sultan bin Suggur. Tho' not, I said, constituting a case for my authoritative interference, yet it bordered so closely upon maritime irregularity, that I hoped the respect he entertained for the favorable opinion of Government, to say nothing of motives of good Policy, would prompt him to afford all the redress in his power. The Joasmee Chief was earnest in his promises of acquiescence but from the general tenor of the excuses by which they were preluded, to the effect that, as members of an inimical tribe, the sufferers had no claim upon his sympathy, and moreover, that the aggressors were for the most part Bedouins, not subject to his authority, I could encourage little hope of their fulfilment.

11. The advent of the Wahabee Force under Abdullah bin Faysul being referred to, Sheikh Saeed bin Butye observed that their presence in Oman in such strength was opposed to the best interests of the Maritime Tribes, and could not fail, sooner or later, to be productive of much embarrassment to the British Government. Nothing was easier, he added, than for the Government to defeat their schemes by declaring the whole line of coast from Aboothabee to Mussendom under its protection, with much more to the same purpose all tending to the query with which he concluded - Whether, if the Wahabees attacked his territories, or offered to cooperate with either of his ambitious neighbours in such an enterprise, he might count upon its support and assistance? To this I replied "the neutrality generally observed by Government in inland affairs seemed to suggest a sufficient answer. The Maritime Chiefs whether united or singly, might always assure themselves of its sympathy and even its good offices when struggling for their independence, but I could at present contemplate no contingency which should move it to deviate from its declared Policy. All I could promise him was that, as heretofore, he should be safe from attacks from the side of the sea, or from any hostile demonstration whatever upon that element, the above consideration, he answered, had been one of his principal sources of anxiety, but being now satisfied that no change was intended in this respect by the new Treaty, he did not despair by judiciously availing himself of the jealousies of the Beniyas and Joasmee Chiefs of counteracting any plans which might be formed for his subjection.

12. The language and demeanour of Sheikh Saeed bin Butye impressed me with his character for activity and intelligence. Tho' wanting perhaps the abilities of the late Sheikh Muktoom

he is said to possess all his energy and will probably meet with equal success in maintaining his position. In his relations with Government, I am happy to observe that he has as yet exhibited the same readiness to fulfil his engagements, which distinguished his brother during the latter years of his life.

13. On the 8th the "Clive" reached Aboothabee, when, at my invitation, and in the absence of his brother, Humdan bin Tahnoon came off to meet me. He informed me that Sheikh Saeed bin Tahnoon's return might be looked for daily, but that, as his representative and vested by him with full powers, if I did not choose to await his coming, he was himself prepared to transact business in his behalf. Finding that my visitor suffered severely from sea-sickness, I did not detain him longer than sufficed to explain the object of the proposed Treaty, and to prepare a provisional document for his signature vouching for his brother's acceptance of its obligations, a precaution the necessity for which was however superseded by the latter's arriving in person yesterday, and by his visiting me this morning to affex his seal to the new Engagement. This he did without hesitation and without any allusion to his previously avowed designs for the reduction of Debaie, on which subject his silence was to be accounted for by his having lately resumed friendly relations with the Chief of that place.

14. With the exception of a complaint of the affair at "Khore Ghurabee", to which I have referred in para 10 of this report, the rest of our conversation was entirely engrossed by the proceedings of the Wahabees at Brymee. On arriving, he said, in their camp he found that Abdullah bin Fysul, being correctly informed of the defenceless state of Batinah, had made up his mind to invade the district and had accordingly pitched his demands upon Syed Soweynee at so high a rate, including therein a requisition for his present attendance, as apparently to close the door to accommodation. The approach of the Joasmee Chief was then only awaited, and a day had been fixed for the march of the co-alesceed forces. Matters having gone thus far he wrote to Syed Soweynee recommending him to proceed himself and to despatch all his available troops to Sohar, and to assume at least an attitude of resistance, in order to give weight to his meditation. He could see, he told me, that both the Joasmee Chief and the Wahabee Lieutenant were employing Syed Ges bin Azan as the instrument to subserve their own ends, and he felt therefore that by holding a bold language towards

the latter, while he tendered his personal security for a reasonable amount of tribute, it might he possible to divert him from extreme measures. Much negotiation thereon ensued, but it was not until he declared his adherence to the Imaum's party and begged, if the expedition were finally determined upon, to be permitted to withdraw, that his remonstrances seemed to make any impression, the result, as already known to me, was the deputation of himself and Ahmed el Sudeynee to Sohar for the purpose of effecting an amicable arrangement. He regretted to add that, in spite of all his efforts, he was unable to obtain more favorable terms than payment of arrears of tribute to the amount of 60000 Dollars as the price of a Treaty of Alliance, offensive and defensive, between the parties, whereby His Highness Syed Soweynee bound himself to a liability of 12000 Dollars annually, and was on his side secured in the possession of all the territory now under his rule, including the districts both of Sohar and Muscat. When I commented upon the magnitude of this exaction Sheikh Saeed replied that circumstances admitted of no alternative. It was no longer a question of Purchasing the forbearance of the Wahabee Commander with a view to deter him from ravaging Batinah, but the object now virtually was to gain his support in order to prevent the dismemberment of the Imaum's dominions. The whole country had shown itself disaffected to His Highness' authority and my visitor had himself become aware of overtures made to Syed Ges bin Azan not only by the most influential dependents of his deceased brother, but by the Chiefs of considerable tribes, both within and without His Highness' frontiers. So sensible was Syed Soweynee of the want of internal support that even after the withdrawal of Sheikh Sultan bin Suggar, when it was proposed to him to defy the Wahabees and defend himself to the last, His Highness declared that such a course would be hopeless, the garrison even of Sohar could not be depended upon, and he would rather pay the whole amount originally demanded than risk the issue of a contest. On my referring to the Wahabees having been permitted to prosecute their march into Oman unobstructed, Sheikh Saeed observed that in this respect too his efforts had been paralyzed by the same causes, for when he invited the Muscat Authorities to occupy his enemies in the rear, while he encountered the invaders, his proposal had not been responded to.

15. The heavy sacrifice which the Muscat Authorities have been called upon to make may be regarded perhaps as a just penalty for the unfortunate policy they pursued towards

the late Humood ben Azan but it is to be feared that their disregard of the advice of Government on that occasion has placed them in a position to deprive them for the future of the full benefit of its intervention. The fear of its resentment would doubtless suffice to secure the ostensible neutrality of the Joasmee Chief, but such a motive could hardly operate in the same degree to check the progress of tribes less amenable to its influence, or to induce Syed Ges, when in the ascendant to accept of any accommodation short of a special guarantee for his complete and permanent restoration to his hereditary rights.

16. Under these circumstances it seems certain that a more direct interference on my part could hardly have averted their humiliation, whereas failure might have necessitated the adoption of such extraordinary measures as I should suppose, the nature of the case could hardly justify.

Altho' the predominance of the Wahabees in Oman must be generally prejudicial to the views of the British Government I cannot learn that their Chief has as yet evinced a disposition to disturb the mutual relations of the Maritime Sheikhs as at present existing. Abdullah bin Fysal, I am told, will return to Nedjd as soon as the season opens, leaving an officer as heretofore with a small garrison to represent his authority at Brymee, and to collect arrears of tribute.

17. The concentration of the Squadron at the town end of the Gulf appearing to be no longer necessary, I beg herewith to enclose copies of letters addressed by me to Commodore Robinson relative to the future disposal of the "Tigris" and "Constance".

And trusting that the instructions therein conveyed for the guidance of the Officers Commanding those vessels may meet with the approval of Government.

I have the honor to be

(Signed) A. B. Kemball

Resident in the Persian Gulf

قد وقع قرار الصلح الدائم المستمر بيننا وبين المشايخ المرقومين
حسبما تضمنته هذه الورقة الذي قطعان بكتبه اكابر خليج فارس

حيث انا نحن يا سلطان ابن صقر شيخ القواسم وسعيد ابن حمد بن شيخ بني ياس اهل ابو ظبي
وعبد الله بن راشد شيخ ام القيوين ومحمد بن راشد شيخ عجمان وسعيد ابن بطي شيخ دبي
الذي مهرنا في هذه الورقة قد جرينا سنينا عديدة الفوايد والمنافع التي حصلت
لنا من اجراء الهدنة البحرية فيما بين بعضنا ببعض بواسطة سنياب العجاه
ذو الشوكة والاجلال الاهم الاشهر بايالة خليج فارس وتجديدها الكائن
انا بعد آن الى هذا اليوم فلاجل ذلك قد اثر بخواطرنا النتايج الفاسدة
التي كانت تحصل وجود الحاربات البحرية فيما بين بعضنا بعض في البحر التي هي
الامتناع رعايانا والمتعاقدين علينا عن الغوص في الامان والمعارضة والزام
في الترداد للاكتساب فلاجل ذلك انا نحن المذكورين قد تعهدنا
باجراء الصلح التام المستمر لنا ولمن يعقبنا من الامور الذي سيذكر في ما بعد
ولذا قد قبلنا هذا القرار والقبول بالشرايط التي هي باقي ببيان ذكرها
والتزمنا بالقيام لامضائها الشرط الاولى انه من تاريخ غرة الخامس والعشرين
من شهر رجب سنة ١٢٦٩ هجري مطابق الرابع من شهر مي سنة ١٨٥٣ عيسوي الى ما بعد ينقطع
الحرب والجدال في البحر فيما بين رعايانا والمتعاقدين علينا ولمستقيم بين الجميع منا
ومن يعقبنا صلح تام في البحر على الدوام الشرط الثاني متى كان قد الله تعالى
صدر امر من الغلبي والتعرض في البحر احد رعايانا والمتعاقدين علينا في مال او روح
على احد من الطايفين معنا في سلك الصلح فحاربي الفاعل والقوم بالقصاص

للمفعول فيه يجوز الخيار لينا الشرط الثالث متى ما صدر امر من التعدي
والتعرض في البحر من الطايفين معنا في سلك الصلح على احد رعايانا والمتعاقدين
علينا فلا يكون فورا نقوم باخذ القصاص من الفاعل على بل نلزم برفع
الامر بجناب ذو الشوكة والاجلال الاهم الاشهر بايالة خليج فارس ام
جناب العجاه الاهم الاشهر للكمدوصا الذي في باسدو حتى يكون فورا
اذا تحقق الخبر بفعل الذي يجب يلزم الاستمرار واخذ القصاص
ولقد قبلنا الصلح الذي تقرر بهذا النوع ان يكون جناب الشكار
ذي الافتخار مناظرا وواقفا على اجرام ومراقبا الاستقامة
شروطه كما ينبغي موافق القانون والقاعدة في كل آن والله على ما
شاهدا وكيل

True Copy

Agency Translator

ما بالخط

[11]

Treaty of Peace in perpetuity agreed upon by the Chiefs of the Arabian Coast in behalf of themselves, their heirs and successors, under the mediation of the Resident in the Persian Gulf, 1853.

We, whose seals are hereunto affixed, Sheikh Sultan bin Suggur, Chief of Ras-ool-Kheimah Sheikh Saeed bin Tahnoon, Chief of Aboo Dhebee, Sheikh Saeed bin Butye, Chief of Debay, Sheikh Hamid bin Rashed, Chief of Ejman, Sheikh Abdoolla bin Rashed, Chief of Umm-ool-Keiweyn, having experienced for series of years the benefits and advantages resulting from a maritime truce contracted amongst ourselves under the mediation of the Resident in the Persian Gulf and renewed from time to time up to the present period, and being fully impressed therefore, with a sense of the evil consequence formerly arising, from the prosecution of our feuds at sea, whereby our subjects and dependents were prevented from carrying on the pearl-fishery in security, and were exposed to interruption and molestation when passing on their lawful occasions, accordingly, we, as aforesaid, have determined for ourselves, our heirs and successors, to conclude together a lasting and inviolable peace from this time forth in perpetuity, and do hereby agree to bind ourselves down to observe the following conditions:—

Article 1.

That from this date, *viz.*, 25th Rujjub 1269, 4th May 1853, and hereafter, there shall be a complete cessation of hostilities

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at sea between our respective subjects and dependents, and a perfect maritime truce shall endure between ourselves and between our successors, respectively, for evermore.

Article 2.

That in the event (which God forbid) of any of our subjects or dependents committing an act of aggression at sea upon the lives or property of those of any of the parties to this agreement, we will immediately punish the assailants and proceed to afford full redress upon the same being brought to our notice.

Article 3.

That in the event of an act of aggression being committed at sea by any of those who are subscribers with us to this engagement upon any of our subjects or dependents, we will not proceed immediately to retaliate, but will inform the British Resident or the Commodore at Bassidore, who will forthwith take the necessary steps for obtaining reparation for the injury inflicted, provided that its occurrence can be satisfactorily proved.

We further agree that the maintenance of the peace now concluded amongst us shall be watched over by the British Government, who will take steps to ensure at all times the due observance of the above Articles, and God of this is the best witness and guarantee.

L. S.	(Sd.)	Abdoolla bin Rashed, *Chief of Umm-ool-Keiweyn.*
L. S.	(Sd.)	Hamid bin Rashed, *Chief of Ejman.*
L. S.	(Sd.)	Saeed bin Butye, *Chief of Debay*
L. S.	(Sd.)	Saeed bin Tahnoon, *Chief of Beniyas.*
L. S.	(Sd.)	Sultan bin Suggur, *Chief of the Joasmee*

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المعاهدة الصلح الدايمة سنه ١٢٦٩ هجريه مطابق سنه ١٨٥٣ ع -

قد وقع قرار الصلح التام المستقيم فى البحر بين المشايخ المزبورة حسبما تضمنته هذه الورقة لدى قبطان كنبل باليوز خيلج فارس-

ارشد كنبل

حيث اننا نحن يا سلطان ابن صقر شيخ القواسم و سعيد ابن طحنون شيخ بنى ياس اهل ابي ظبي و عبدالله ابن راشد شيخ ام القيوين و حميد ابن راشد شيخ عجمان و سعيد ابن بطي شيخ دبي الذين ممهرنا في هذه الورقة قد جربنا سنيناً عديده الفوايد و المنافع التي حصلت لنا من اجراء المهادنة البحريه فيمابين بعضنا ببعض بواسطة جناب عالى الجاه ذي الشوكة والاجلال الافخم الاشيم باليوز خليج فارس و تجديدها الكائن آناً بعد آن الى هذا اليوم فلا جل ذلك قد اثّر بخواطرنا النتايج الفاسدة التي كانت تلحق من وجود المحاربات الجارية فيمابين بعضنا ببعض فى البحر التي هى موجبة الامتناع رعايانا والمتعلقين علينامن الغوص فى الامان و المعارضته و التزاحم فى التردد للاكتساب فلاجل ذالك اننا نحن المذكورين قد تعهدنا باجرآء الصلح التام المستقيم لنا ولمن يعقبنا من اليوم الذي سيُذكر الى مابعد و لذا قد تقبلنا هذا القرار والقول بالشرائط التي ياتى بيان ذكرها و التزمنا بالقيام بمضائها -

الشرط الاول - انه من تاريخ يوم الخامس و العشرين من شهر رجب سنه ١٢٦٩ هجرى مطابق الرابع من شهر مى سنه ١٨٥٣ عيسوي الى مابعد ينقطع الحرب و الجدال

(١٢)

فى البحر فيمابين رعايانا و المتعلقين علينا وليستقيم بين الجميع منا و من يعقبنا صلح تام فى البحر على الدوام -

الشرط الثاني - متى ما قدّرالله تعالى صدر امر من التعدى و التعرض فى البحر من احد رعايانا و المتعلقين علينا فى مال او روح على احد من الداخلين معنا فى سلك الصلح فنجازى الفاعل و نقوم بالقصاص للمفعول فيه بمجرد وصول الخبر الينا -

الشرط الثالث - متى ما صدر امر من التعدى و التعرض فى البحر من الداخلين معنا فى سلك الصلح على احد رعايانا و المتعلقين علينا فلا يكون فوراً نقوم باخذ القصاص من الفاعل بل نلتزم برفع الامر لجناب ذى الشوكة و الاجلال الافخم الاشيم باليوز خليج فارس ام عالي الجاه الافخم الاشيم الكمدور صاحب الذي فى باسيدوه حتي يكون فوراً اذا تحقق الخبر يفعل الذى يجب ويلزم من الاسترداد و اخذ القصاص ولقد تقبلنا الصلح نقرره بهذا النوع ان يكون جناب حضرة السركار ذى الافتخار مناظراً و واقفاً على اجرائه و مراقباً لاستقامة شروط المزبورة موافق القانون والقاعده في كل آن والله على ذالك خير شاهد و وكيل -

نعم رضينا به و انا سلطان ابن مقر

بن راشد سلطان ابن صقر

نعم رضيت و قبلت به و انا حميد بن راشد

الواثق بالله عبده حميد بن راشد

نعم رضيت و قبلت به و انا سعيد بن بطي

سعيد عبد بن بطي

نعم رضيت و قبلت به عبدالله بن راشد

عبدالله عبده بن راشد

نعم رضيت و قبلت به و انا سعيد بن طحنون

الواثق بالله عبده سعيد بن طحنون

Historical summaries and travellers' accounts

2.08
Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, 1856

MEMORANDA

ON THE

RESOURCES, LOCALITIES, AND RELATIONS

OF THE

TRIBES INHABITING THE ARABIAN SHORES OF THE PERSIAN GULF.

BY

LIEUTENANT A. B. KEMBALL,
BOMBAY ARTILLERY,
ASSISTANT RESIDENT AT BUSHIRE.

Submitted to Government on the 6th January 1845.

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MEMORANDA

ON THE

RESOURCES, LOCALITIES, AND RELATIONS OF THE TRIBES INHABITING THE ARABIAN SHORES OF THE PERSIAN GULF.

The total non-interference in the internal disputes and affairs of the piratical Arabian Chieftains, wisely enjoined as the first principle of the Government policy, added to the absence of any intercourse, commercial or otherwise, with their ports, by individuals and vessels of any nation, have precluded the attainment of any specific and accurate knowledge of inland localities, and extent of population and territory.

To fix the limits, therefore, of the lands actually belonging to, or claimed by, each tribe respectively, would, with our present information, be impossible ; nor, indeed, do these often form the grounds of any great altercations or hostilities among themselves, owing to the barrenness and infertility of the soil ; which being, moreover, very imperfectly cultivated, in consequence, probably, of the absence of the means or labour of irrigation, does not yield sufficient for the support* of its inhabitants in even their common article of food,—dates,—the fruit of a tree which may be said to be generally indigenous to Arabia alone, and renders its possession, accordingly, of no worth.

Upon the success of the pearl fishery, and the profits of the carrying trade which it brings into operation, must, under these disadvantages, depend the means of obtaining the positive necessaries of life, and those trifling luxuries desirable to an Arab.† It is needless to observe how

* The Arabian ports, particularly Aboothabee, are consequently dependent upon other places for supplies of provisions, and are soon reduced to great distress by anything like an effective blockade.

† Captain McLeod, in reporting upon the Joasmee Tribe in 1823, stated as follows :— " The Joasmees procure all their materials for building, as well as their warlike stores, from Muskat, Bahrein, and the Persian ports in the lower part of the Gulf. In the construction of their vessels they use no other wood than Indian teak, and, in respect to arms, those principally of Persian manufacture. They possess no articles of export, since their pearls are generally purchased by merchants on the spot, and the produce of their country is not even sufficient for their maintenance. Their only employment is fishing, diving for pearls, and importing

CHARACTER AND SUBDIVISION OF THE TRIBES.

materially their own condition, and, by an easily deduced corollary, the safety of the Gulf, might be affected by the failure of a single season. The attention with which this point has been considered by the Government, in framing its policy, marks the anxiety and care, attended with great expense, which have been devoted to the maintenance of perfect tranquillity and security on the pearl banks to the subjects of the several petty chieftains who, however inimically disposed, are bound there to forget their quarrels, or suffer them to rest in abeyance.

The manners and religion of the Arabs of the piratical coast, being those appertaining to the Soonee sect of Mahomedans, are already too well and generally known to call for any further description in this paper.

Of a character deceitful, vindictive, and treacherous, but brave and independent withal, they hold in utter contempt all other *nations*, professing whatever creed ; the conviction of the irresistible power of the British Government, whose weight they have in two instances been collectively brought to feel, together with its subsequent occasional exercise or demonstration in individual cases, have alone reduced them to succumb to its will, and restrained them from acts of piracy. They do not at the present time hesitate to admit, that the restraints imposed upon them once withdrawn, their boats, now, in their own phraseology, ignobly employed as beasts of burthen, to carry about dates and merchandize, would again, as in former days, overrun this Gulf and the Indian Seas in search of booty.

The inhabitants are divided into a number of large tribes, acknowledging each its feudal superior, which are, again, sub-divided into branches or clans, composed of the relatives and dependents of some connexion of the general head, or of a powerful and wealthy individual.

The superior of the tribe collectively has the general control of all; possesses the right of claiming at his pleasure their military services ; and appropriates the small taxes that are levied.

dates, grain, and other necessaries of life, which they purchase with the price of those pearls. Their dates are chiefly brought from Bahrein and Bussora, grain and cloth from Muskat and the Persian ports. They are very poor, and, perhaps, can never find much employment in commerce, unless in carrying for others, although it is said they at one time possessed a very extensive trade." The same holds good for the tribes in general to the present day, except that their own boats are now engaged in the Indian trade.

Such was the original object of the Maritime Truce, guaranteed by Government, and entered into for the six months including the season of the pearl fishery.

At the request of some, and with the concurrence of all the Chiefs, its time was extended to eight and twelve months, and finally to ten years, during which all hostilities at sea are forbidden.

CHARACTER AND RELATIONSHIP OF THE TRIBES.

The Kazee, or Ecclesiastical Judge, constitutes the only tribunal, and decides upon all cases according to the Mahomedan law.

It is by no means uncommon for one of the branches of a tribe, to the number sometimes of several hundred individuals, in order to escape excessive taxation and oppression, or with a view to secure to themselves greater immunities and advantages, to secede from the authority and territory of their lawful and acknowledged chief into that of another,* or to establish themselves and build a fort on some other spot,† and assert and maintain independence; nor is it a matter of great moment that the chief they are about to join, or whose friendship and countenance they must in the first place command, is a rival at implacable feud with their own: the advantages attending any numerical increase of subjects ensure them welcome asylum and protection. It will not escape observation, that the facilities thus mutually offered to seceders on the one hand, and the loss of authority and revenue consequent on their secession on the other, act, *vice versâ*, as a salutary check to the tyranny and oppression of the respective chiefs.

The Arabs of the coast are more or less connected with the Bedouin tribes of the interior, either by ties of relationship, or from consideration of mutual interests and defence.

Of so great importance is their alliance or forbearance considered by the maritime chieftains, that these, particularly Sultan bin Suggur, who is especially interested in maintaining a sort of balance of power, find it their best policy to conciliate them by repeated and considerable presents.

To go over from one chief to another, with whom they may be or have been at feud, and even to plunder the territories and subjects of their patron, should he not coincide in, and follow out their views of ambition, honour, or revenge, or withhold the usual payment of blackmail, are shown by the sketches of the Arab tribes to be of constant occurrence with these fickle allies.

Khaleefa bin Shakboot may be said to possess the greater influence inland, and to command the services of the greater number of Bedouin auxiliaries.

* The Boo Muhair, at Shargah, are an example of the former.

† The Boo Felasa, of Debaye, of the latter.

DESCRIPTION OF THE ARABIAN COAST.

DESCRIPTION OF THE ARABIAN COAST.

Memoranda, collected from living Native authorities, descriptive of the Coast of Arabia from the mouth of the River Euphrates to the Ports of the Beniyas; by Colonel R. Taylor, Political Agent, Turkish Arabia. February, 1836.

From Koweit to Dhabran, a ruined position, four Furseekhs north of Kateef, the country bears the name of Adan. It is generally void of towns, but in the summer, some of the Beni Khalid Arabs, as the Amayir and Sobaik, inhabit Fantas and Fanaitis, two positions on the coast, a day's distance south of Koweit. Three days further on, in the same direction, is the island Balbul, slightly separated from the shore during the time of flood. Two days south-east of Balbul is the island of Jinnah, similar to the last. South of this, three days, is the island Boo Ali, with a long point running into the sea, and a flat shallow between it and the shore, as the island last mentioned. Further south-eastward, by one day, is Ras Tannurah; a day south-east of this is Kateef. The whole country just traced is called Adan. Kateef, however, and its district southward to Ojair, together with the territory of Bahrein and Al Ahsa, and the country between the last and Ojair,—all this tract is denominated Hajar. Kateef, though, is also peculiarly named Al Khah; Bahrein, Awal; and Al Ahsa, Haajar. From Ojair to the ports of the Beniyas, the country is named Qatar, and is so called from the greater fall of rain therein than in the other portions of the Beni Khalid territory. Ojair is about four Furseekhs south-east of Bahrein; on the coast, half a day south-east of this, is a tract of land inhabited by the Beni Khalid Arabs in the spring and autumn, and containing shallow wells, or springs of water. Two days hence is Zabara, a place forty years past of some note, and considerable population and trade. One Furseekh south of this is Ras Ashairij; three Furseekhs hence north-east Khor Hassan, the residence of the Yalahermah, a division of the Atul Arabs; hence, a day north-east, is Huailah. Two Furseekhs onwards is Yusafiah; then four Furseekhs to Rowaidhah; two days south of this station is Fuwairit; south-east hence, a day, is Matbakh. Two hours south of Matbakh commences a tract of land, composed of sandy hillocks, and uninhabited for an extent of four days in length from north to south; from this, south-eastward, lie the ports of the Beniyas, the commencement of the province of Oman, and the end of that of Hajar. The whole of these districts, Adan, Hajar, and Qatar, from Koweit to the ports of the Beniyas, belong to the Beni Khalid.

A day to the westward of Koweit is Jahrah, situated two Furseekhs south-eastward of the angle of a bay. Its site is elevated, and gives a view of all vessels passing in the Gulf near Koweit, and the island of

DESCRIPTION OF THE ARABIAN COAST.

Pheleechi. In the ages previous to Islam, it was extremely populous, as its very extensive existing remains evince; in which ancient coins also are occasionally found. These occupy a space of ground two Furseekhs in length from north to south, by one in breadth from east to west. The soil is saline and sandy to a great extent all around, but the water is sweet in wells at a fathom deep.

To the north-east of Jahrah fourteen Furseekhs, towards the sea, is situated the town of Sabbeyyah, anciently well peopled, as here also its ruins declare. It derives its name, as is said, from the Sabeans, and is supposed to be the remains of one of their cities, built after the destruction of Babel. Moslem historians declare that it continued flourishing down to the age of the Dhurmiad Khaliphs, when it fell, and its population dispersed; some of whom are, it is asserted, still living in Khujistan. The Arabs dwell in this spot during summer, invited by its cooler temperature.

The extent of the Beni Khalid territory, inland, varies at different points: from Koweit to Dehna, the frontier of Nujd, is a distance of ten days; from Adan to the same point eight days; the same from the vicinity of the Balbul and Boo Ali districts; from Kateef thither nine days; and from Zobara to Dehna thirteen days.

On clearing the mouth of the Euphrates, bound for the Arab shore, you reach the bay or Dohat of Hajee Silo; south-east of which is the anchorage, or Khore Mughanwee; and to the south-west Khore Abdallah. Between this last and Bubean is the rocky shallow or Dieh Ras-al-Kaid, which lies off the eastern point of the island of Bubean; whence are formed two anchorages, the southern one termed Warbah, and the northern Rabac-iyyah; both which extend to the inlets or channels Khuair and Sabbeyyah.

The next point is Duwairah, the port of the Zobier, situated on the Khuair, which is interposed between Duwairah and Dohat Hajee Silo. Along the Khuair there are several islands and Khores.

Of the more remarkable positions, however, are Al Haddamah, a closed Khore; Kasr Ash Shatan-iyyah; Al Bahaith; Khuar Ath Tha-a-alil; Dohat-al-Bagar, opposite to which, on Bubean, is the closed Khore Rawaishid, and Al Maghasil.

Next is Sabbeyyah, a building at the outlet of the Khuair, and opposite to Birshah, the south-eastern point of Bubean. South of this is the island of Mashkan; eastward of Mashkan is the rocky shallow Aich-al-Holaibe; and northward those of the Sabbeyyah channel. Between this island and the shallows there is a passage for smaller boats; and to the south of it is the island of Pheleechi; south of this, Ohah; and eastward of Ohah a Gussar, or shallow flat.

DESCRIPTION OF THE ARABIAN COAST.

Next, Ras-al-Gussar; then Dohat Khawaitir; opposite which is the bank, or Rigadh Dharub, formed entirely of mud.

Ghodhai, opposite to Koweit, with the sea between them.

Dohat Kadhimah; opposite to which, in the sea, is a shallow flat; and above this last a heap of ruins, called Kasir Yasin, in the midst of the bay.

Dohat Jaharah; Dohat Abu Talk; Dohat-om-il-Namil; opposite to which, to the eastward, is the island of the same name.

Dohat-om-il-Gashed; Dohat-as-Salaibikhat; Dohat-ash-Shuaik, the port of Koweit, to the northward of which is an island called Garain Dehdar.

Dohat-al-Fijaimah; opposite to which, on the north, in the midst of the sea, is a small shoal, on which the lesser boats do not ground; north of the shoal is Towainah, the anchorage of Koweit, and north of Towainah a shoal, called Al Akkaz.

Al Koweit; Ras Ajuzah; Benaid-al-Gar; Ash Shi-il; Ras-al-Ardh; Bidi; Finaitis; Abu Faterrah; Al Fantas; opposite to which is a bank close to the shore.

Abu Holaifah; Al Fihaihil; Ash-shi-Acbah; Aj Jiraibah; Naga Ghallab; Azaifian; opposite to which, to the eastward, is a bank; and to the east of this last the island of Kabbar.

Ras-al-Holaifah; and within its bay, opposite, and to the north, a bank called Omad Dakh Khair.

Ras-az-Zur; Dohat Soulah; Khore-ul-Benarja; Ad Dirjud; opposite to which, eastward, is a shoal termed Hid-il-Hamarah.

Al Famisi; Bard Half; opposite to which, eastward, is a shallow flat, with five fathoms on it; eastward of this is the island Um-il-Maradim, with fifteen fathoms.

Khore Khafje; opposite and eastward of this is the island of Garah, with fifteen fathoms.

Albihaith; between this and Amudah, the next station, there is, in the sea to the eastward, the shoal Om-as-Sahal.

Al Amudah; eastward of this is the island Al Magta-ah; and eastward of this, Halat-il-Mish-aab; and further eastward, an hour and a half run, in seven fathoms, are two shoals, called Ki-taa-ebn-Omran.

Adh Dhuluf; opposite to this a shoal, stretching from the land, and an anchorage between it and Amudah; to the eastward there is, in the sea, a shoal with three fathoms water, called Maitamah; east of this is another, called Sufan; north-east of this is another, named Khalaloh, with seven fathoms; eastward again is the Aridh, or tongue, termed Aridh Khalaloh; and between Khalaloh and Al Mansi is a shoal called Abu Isaiyyah; with also a prong or tongue to the eastward, having seven fathoms on it.

As Saffanaiyyah; to the eastward is a shoal patch, or Gussar, near the shore, called Fir-in; and eastward of this a shoal termed Hidhar-is-Saffanaiyyah; east of this, in seven fathoms, the bank Al Mansi; and further east a shoal called Aridh.

Al Mafarig; east of this is a Hid, or shoal, called Abu-Ta-am; south of it another, termed Al Khat; east of this last are several shoals, with shallow, impassable divisions between them, called Mafradh, ultimately reaching the point of Ras Bildani; east of Bildani is the island of Hargose; and east of this, in a low group, are the islands of Farsi and Arabi.

Ras Tanajib; north of this point are seven small contiguous shoals, to the east of it a bank, and eastward of this a channel: all these are connected with Bildani.

Khore Balbul; to the north of this, near the shore, are several small nameless shoals.

Merrifah; opposite this, near the land, a shoal, and south of it the bank, or Rig-el-Menilah.

Al Ghar; to the eastward is an anchorage or Khore; here is also the track for vessels called Al Telil; to the east of which are seven distinct shoals, called Kit-al-Ghar.

Musai-ni; Musallim-iyyah; opposite to this is the island of Jinnah; north of which is a shoal, termed Hidhar Jinnah.

Al Baidhah; seaward, to the east, is the rocky shoal named Al Kash.

Ras Abu Ali; opposite and eastward are the two islands, Karan and Karain, with several rocky patches between them, on most of which vessels do not strike; the passage at the point is close in shore.

Dohat Baranij; to the south, and opposite, is a long hard shoal.

Jebail-al-Hajarah; Jebail-ar-Ramal; to the east, and near the shore, is the shoal called Abu Jerjurah.

Al Ji-aill-iyyah; Om Rahim; eastward, in the sea, are the islands Al Jeraid and Al Jenna; east of these is Abu Sarafah, and many rocky patches, between Fasht-au-Najwah, and a bank termed Sayyah.

Dohat-ar-Raham-iyyah; opposite to this is the island of Tar-ut; and to the south is the bank Chashchush.

Al Kateef; Saihat; opposite to which is a bank called Al Khali.

Adh Dhahran; opposite this is the island Al Damaum; against which is the bank As Safafir; to the east of which is that of Al Jarim; south of which is that of Khirfasht; and south of this the shoal Mirwadah.

Ain-as-Seh; east of this is the shoal Al Libainah; eastward still the island Om Naasan; more easterly, the bank Ar Rihaiyyat; and hence, south-easterly towards Bahrein, comes Rasz-il-Ijair; this is the port of Lahsa; to the east is the Jazirah-il-Ijair; and to the south that of Zakhunniyyah; then follow Khashur-az-Zinah, Howar, and Salwa.

FORTIFICATIONS.

A square fort, with flanking round towers, built of rough stone and coarse lime, capable of containing, in case of siege, from four to six hundred men; with detached round towers for the defence of the creek and landing-place, and to cover the wells that supply the inhabitants with water* (situated usually at some short distance), make up the general features of Arab fortifications. The town consists of cadjan huts, constructed of date sticks and mats, around the fort on every side. Stone dwelling-houses are rare, and Shargah and Ras-ool-Khyma can alone boast of them.

PIRATICAL PORTS.

The Piratical Ports one and all have their sites near a backwater, on the spit of land formed by it and the sea.

Ras Reccan to Cassaab.

These backwaters afford perfect security to their largest boats (unladen) during the stormy season. The line of coast on which they are situated possesses no harbour of any description, and is, moreover, uniformly exposed to the prevailing winds, which blow from the north-west. The anchorage, too, is bad.

From Ras Reccan to Aboothabee is crowded with shoals, and other obstacles to safe navigation.

A steamer may anchor off the several ports at a very short distance from the shore, from three-quarters to a quarter of a mile, but a sailing vessel could not take up such a position without considerable risk.

Aboothabee.

At Aboothabee it was ascertained by sounding that the *Hugh Lindsay* (in July 1839) could have lain within pistol-shot of the shore.

Amulgavine.

The *Hugh Lindsay*, during the same cruise, anchored at Amulgavine in six and a half fathoms, sand, three-quarters of a mile off the western tower, south-western rocky point bearing SSE.; town fort south. Appears quite safe, having six, five and a half, five, and four and a half fathoms in shore of the vessel. The best anchorage is with the fort SSE., in five fathoms, as from thence a vessel may slip or weigh, and stand to the northward or southward, with a beaming wind. The soundings

* The water of the wells throughout the line of coast, with very few exceptions, is exceedingly brackish, and unpalatable.

on the chart are laid too far out, as there are three fathoms within three hundred yards of the beach.

Debaye.

There is good anchorage at Debaye, with the large fort E. ½ S., close in to the beach, in about four or three and a half fathoms, with shelter from the north-west if the reef is kept close on board, the shoal water of which is quite distinguishable from the channel. A vessel anchoring within *two hundred* yards of the beach would require to slip her cable in case of a north-wester coming on, but by doing this, with a spring to cast her to the southward, might stand off with ease.

Statement of the Maritime Resources of the Piratical Ports *on the Arabian Coast.*

Ports.	Buggalows engaged in the Indian and African Trades.	Their Tonnage in Morahs.	Smaller Vessels for Gulf Trade, from 500 to 1,000 Morahs.	Pearl Boats.	Remarks.
Ras-ool-Khyma ..	11	24,000	15	15	
Ramse	1	1,000	5	..	Pays revenue 80 dollars annually to Ras-[ool-Khyma.
Jazirat-ool-Hamrah	..	..	6	35	Ditto 900 to 1,000 ditto ditto.
Himreeah.....	..	..	..	30	Ditto 200 ditto ditto.
Shargah	6	14,750	25	400	Ditto 1,500 ditto ditto.
Heyrah.....	..	..	..	25	Ditto 50 to 75 ditto to Shargah.
Fasht	..	..	..	25	Ditto 100 ditto ditto.
Khan	1	2,000	5	50	Ditto 100 ditto ditto.
Total....	19	41,750	56	580	In addition to the places here enumerated as Joasmee territory, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur possesses several small places on this as well as Coomza, Dibah, and Khorefacaun, and others on the other side of Cape Musseldom, which yield him a small revenue. His supremacy over Cassaab is merely nominal.
Amulgavine.....	3	9,500	10	60	
Ejman	4	6,000	10	50	
Debaye.....	..	..	4	90	
Aboothabee.....	2	4,000	10	600	

The tax levied upon each diver and his attendant varies, under the different Arab Chieftains, from one and a half to seven dollars. The amount, too, fluctuates each season, at the will of the Shaikh.

The large Buggalows of *Ras-ool-Khyma* belong,—

Three to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, from 2,000 to 3,000 Morahs each.		
One to Soleyman bin Shekur	3,000	,,
One to Ahmed Migran	2,500	,,
One to Mahomed Masood	2,000	,,
One to Abdoolla bin Hussein.....	3,000	,,
One to Mahomed Soonee	2,000	,,

One to Yabur Chaabee	3,000	Morahs.
One to Moobaruk bin Hussein	2,500	,,
One to Bin Joobeib	1,500	,,
Eleven	24,000	,,
Of *Ramse*,—		
One to Eusuf	1,000	Morahs.
Of *Shargah*,—		
One to Saleh bin Suggur	2,500	Morahs.
One to Mitfah	2,500	,,
One to Rashid bin Oosman	2,750	,,
One to Ahmed bin Abdool Rahman	2,500	,,
One to Mahomed bin Khulfan	2,500	,,
One to Bin Fimah	2,000	,,
Six	14,750	,,
Of *Khan*,—		
One to Mahomed bin Khumees	2,000	Morahs.
Of *Amulgavine*,—		
One to Abdoolla bin Rashid.....	7,000	Morahs.
One (Buteel) to ditto	1,500	,,
One to Syud bin Rashid.....	1,000	,,
Three	9,500	,,
Of *Ejman*,—		
One to Ali bin Rashid.....	1,500	Morahs.
One to Ali bin Jalim	2,000	,,
One (Buteel) to Humeed bin Rashid.....	1,500	,,
One to Khulfan.....	1,000	,,
Four	6,000	,,
Of *Aboothabee*,—		
Two to Shaikh Khaleefa bin Shakboot.....	4,000	Morahs.

POPULATION AND CHIEFS.

The population of the several Arab towns is constantly varying, for reasons which have been before adverted to. Those of the first class—Aboothabee, Shargah, and Ras-ool-Khyma—may be said to contain from 2,000 to 3,500 houses. Of the second class, Amulgavine, Ejman, Debaye, and Jazirat-ool-Hamrah, from 1,000 to 1,500 houses; and the smaller, such as Khan, Heyrah, Fasht, &c., from 500 to 800 houses.

CHIEFS—JOASMEES.

JOASMEES.

The Joasmee Chief, previous to the expedition under Sir W. Grant Keir in 1820, or rather, perhaps, previous to his confinement by the Wahabees in 1811, held supremacy over Amulgavine and Ejman, and exacted tribute from the chiefs of those towns. Since that period, however, and up to the present day, these have enjoyed virtual independence, notwithstanding his repeated attempts, principally by intrigue, and on one or two occasions by actual force, to re-establish his lost authority. They have, it is true, once or twice acknowledged his general supremacy, but this was merely nominal, and lasted so long only as the danger of an attack with his superior means appeared to threaten them. Sultan bin Suggur, on the other hand, has been obliged publicly to disclaim authority over these places, and to decline responsibility for the proceedings of their inhabitants.

The following was remarked by Captain MacLeod in 1823 :—

"Sultan bin Suggur is ambitious of reducing the tribes to complete and absolute subjection, and to be considered answerable for the whole of the coast. It is impossible for us to recognise his authority any further than it is obeyed by the other chiefs, nor can we lend the influence of our name in any way to aid his views ; at the same time, we cannot directly interfere to prevent him from recovering that authority which he regards as his birthright."

Such would appear to have been the sole aim of his ambition since that period ; nor have any obstacles been opposed by the British Government to his lawful exertions towards its attainment, beyond such as are involved in the terms of the Maritime Truce.

Sultan bin Suggur, Chief of the Joasmees, aged between sixty and sixty-five years, succeeded to the Shaikhdom of the tribe in 1803, upon the death of his father, Suggur, who had assumed the chief authority in 1777, upon his father Rashid bin Muttur's retiring from public life, and resigning the office.

Invited to Deriah in 1809, he proceeded to that capital, and was detained and imprisoned by the Wahabee Chief, one Hussein bin Ali, a Joasmee, being appointed in his room Wahabee vicegerent in the Seer principality. He contrived to escape from prison, and, finding his way to Yemen, embarked at Mocha, and proceeded to Muskat, and, through the Imaum's influence and protection, was established at Shargah. It was not, however, till 1813, that by the same instrumentality he recovered his lost position at Ras-ool-Khyma, when the Governor, Hussein bin Ramah, his relative, but born of a concubine, continued to exercise general control.

Sultan bin Suggur had three brothers, the one Saleh (of a slave girl), still alive, the other two, Mahomed and Muttur, deceased.

CHIEFS—JOASMEES—ABOOTHABEE—BENIYAS—DEBAYE.

His family of sons are as follows :—

Suggur ; appointed Governor of Shargah in 1838 (vice Saleh bin Suggur) ; about thirty years of age ; his mother from the Joasmee tribe.

Majid ; about thirty years of age ; Hubshee mother.

Abdoolla ; about twenty-three years of age ; mother from the tribe of Towanah Al Ali.

Ibrahim ; about twenty-three years of age ; mother the daughter of Ibrahim Moolla Ali Murzoogee.

Khelid ; about seven years of age ; mother from the Joasmee tribe.

Rashid (deceased) ; mother from the Beniyas.

Syud ; own brother to Suggur.

Suggur bin Sultan has issue,—

Seif (since deceased) ; mother the daughter of his uncle, Mahomed bin Suggur.

Mahomed ; three or four years of age.

ABOOTHABEE—BENIYAS.

The present Chief, Khaleefa bin Shakboot, aged about thirty years, having, with the assistance of his own brother, Sultan, killed the elder brother, Tahnoon, in 1833, succeeded to the chieftainship.

The father, Shaikh Shakboot bin Zheab, succeeded in 1793-94 in establishing himself in the chief authority over the tribe, which was, however, usurped in 1816 by his eldest son, Mahomed, who was in his turn deposed two years after by his brother, Shaikh Tahnoon, through the assistance of His Highness the Imaum.

Shaikh Shakboot, the father, and Shaikh Sultan the brother, continue to reside at Aboothabee, but enjoy no power or share in the Government.

Shaikh Shakboot had seven sons :

Tahnoon (murdered)	Of one mother.
Mahomed	
Hullal	
Yafoor	
Khaleefa (present Chief)	
Sultan	
Syud (deceased)	

Shaikh Khaleefa bin Shakboot has two sons, of whom the elder, Zaeed, is nine years of age.

DEBAYE.

Shaikh Muktoom bin Butye succeeded Obed bin Saeed in 1836, two years after that Chief, with the Boo Felasa (a branch of the Beniyas Tribe from Aboothabee), seceding from the main body, and asserting

CHIEFS—LOCALITIES OF TRIBES.

their independence, had made good their position at Debaye, a port of the Beniyas territory.

Shaikh Muktoom has one brother, Syud, of the same mother, and three sons, of whom Asher, the eldest, is ten or twelve years of age.

EJMAN.

Shaikh Abdool Azeez bin Rashid Naimee usurped the chief authority in 1841 from his brother Hamed, who had succeeded to it upon the death of his father, Rashid bin Humeed, in 1838.

Shaikh Abdool Azeez has two sons, the elder of whom is nine or ten years of age.

AMULGAVINE.

Shaikh Abdoolla bin Rashid-al-Ali, (has one brother, Syud,) independent chieftain since 1820, has three sons,—Ali, seventeen or eighteen years old, mother from the Naeem Tribe, of Heyrah; Mahomed, sixteen years, and Ahmed, seventeen years, mother from the Al Ali Tribe.

HISTORICAL SKETCH

OF THE

BOO FELASA TRIBE OF ARABS,

(DEBAYE,)

FROM THE YEAR 1834 TO 1841,

PREPARED BY

LIEUTENANT A. B. KEMBALL;

WITH

CONTINUATION OF THE SAME,

FROM THE LATTER PERIOD TO THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1853,

BY LIEUTENANT H. F. DISBROWE;

SUCCESSIVE ASSISTANTS TO THE RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

BOO FELASA (DEBAYE).

THE secession of the Boo Felasa branch, under Obed bin Syud and Muktoom bin Butye, from the body of the Beniyas Tribe at Aboothabee, in which originated the war between the latter and the Joasmees; its settlement at Debaye, and existence thenceforth in virtual independence; require that its subsequent history and proceedings should be separately treated, as being totally unconnected with that of the main tribe, with which it was frequently engaged in hostilities. Suddenly freed from the control of a firm and vigorous chief, on the establishment of peace between the great rival tribes, parties of the Boo Felasa commenced depredations upon the general trade of the Gulf, and had committed the acts of piracy below detailed before measures could be taken to check them :—

A. D. 1834.

1*st*.—The plunder of a Nabend Buteel by the Debaye fleet.

2*nd*.—The attack and plunder of a Muskat vessel, and murder of five of the crew, by a Debaye boat, under the command of Abdool Mowajea, having with him twelve men.

3*rd*.—The plunder of a village on the Coast of Batinah, not far from Muskat, and the attack and plunder of a Nabend Buggarah by a Debaye boat, under Syf bin Dulmooj.

4*th*.—The attack and seizure of a boat belonging to Bahrein, by a boat under the command of Abdoolla bin Buddur, inhabitant of Debaye.

In the last case, the Chief of Bahrein adopted his own means of obtaining redress; and placing an embargo on all Debaye boats present at the time in that harbour, further compelled a merchant of that town, then on the island, to pay to the injured party the sum of 300 dollars in lieu of the amount plundered by his countrymen.

Any necessity for interference on our part in the first case was also obviated by the release of the Nakhoda, and the restoration of the property taken from his vessel. With reference to the second and third,

however, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur having disclaimed the possession of any control or authority over Debaye, and remonstrances having failed to bring the Shaikh of that town to afford ample reparation, it became requisite to resort to demonstrations of force, and threats of coercive measures, which had the desired effect, and secured the payment of 920 dollars, the amount of the value of the property plundered.

The death of Obed bin Syud, the principal, on the 9th June, left the supreme and undivided authority at Debaye in the hands of Muktoom bin Butye, a young, haughty, and inexperienced character.

A. D. 1836.

From the date of the secession of the tribe, and its defeat in the attack on Aboothabee, when co-operating with the Joasmees, it had not failed to offer every annoyance to the Beniyas Chief, by offering asylum to his discontented subjects, and shelter to his enemies, as well as occasionally plundering his boats.

The latter, fully alive to the injuries thus inflicted upon him, was only waiting his opportunity to retaliate. During the year 1838 he succeeded in surprising and capturing the sea tower of Debaye, but was very shortly compelled to vacate it.

A. D. 1838.

Early in the year, a piracy was committed by a Debaye Buggarah upon one belonging to Khaboora. The former, having on board a Nakhoda and eight men, proceeded to Khassa, and thence to the Batinah Coast, on its way to Muskat. When off Burka, observing a Buggarah at anchor, the crew waited until night, and attacked her, with the intention of plundering. Her crew, however, were on the alert, and offered resistance, until six of their number having been wounded, the remaining three jumped into the sea. These were afterwards permitted to regain their vessel, but two of the wounded having subsequently died, the aggressors were, through their Chief Muktoom, called upon to pay the Deeah, or price of blood, and to make good the property plundered.

An individual named Bin Asker, one of the Gubeysat Tribe (that which had seceded to Adeed, but was subsequently compelled by its Shaikh, Khaleefa bin Shakboot, to return to Aboothabee), upon whom that chief's brother had claims for money advanced previous to his going to the pearl banks, quitting Aboothabee, plundered on his way two Buggarahs belonging to the Beniyas Tribe, of pearls to a large amount, and took refuge at Debaye, the chief of which place granted him asylum. He was, however, called upon to surrender Bin Asker to his own chief, and to pay the sum of 200 dollars as the value of the property subsequently plundered by his dependents from the three Aboothabee boats in Belor Shat's affair,* a

A. D. 1840.

* Vide page 482 of this Selection.

BOO FELASA.

reparation which he persisted in refusing to afford, until coercion was employed. He however compelled the return of twenty of the Gubeysat Tribe who had accompanied Bin Asker. The Debaye Buggarah, in which these were sent, landed them on the coast near Aboothabee, without provisions, and stripped of their arms. As they were proceeding towards Aboothabee, they observed a Debaye Buggarah fishing near the shore, and going on board, seized her in retaliation, and prosecuted their journey by sea. Their chief, however, on their arrival at Aboothabee, deprived them of their capture, and sent it to the British Agent at Shargah, with a request that it might be delivered over to the Chief of Debaye, who however in the first instance refused to receive it, his object being really to have it in his power to urge some cause of complaint to the Resident against the Beniyas.

In retaliation for a foray upon the cattle of Debaye made by the Aboothabee men, under the personal command of their chief, some men of the former, joined by about twenty Bedouins, commenced to search the Beniyas creeks, but finding nothing, a portion of their number embarked in a small Buggarah, and discovering one belonging to Aboothabee, at a place called Inzeerah Sadiat, with three slaves in her, belonging to the chief of the former place, engaged in cutting wood, seized the slaves, and whatever property was in the Buggarah; then, breaking her up, returned to their homes. This being a decidedly piratical act, and a breach of the Maritime Truce, Shaikh Muktoom was held responsible for the amount of the value of the boat and property, estimated at 200 dollars.

After a repeated evasion of these accumulated just demands upon him, his port was visited by the squadron, which had just completed the object of its mission to Biddah, by exacting satisfaction from the chief of that place for the piracies committed by Rugragee's gang; and he was peremptorily called upon to pay the sum of 400 dollars, or their equivalent in goods, valuables, &c., and further to surrender the two Buggarahs, with their masts, sails, &c. brought over from Aboothabee by Bin Asker. After some little delay, taken up in frivolous and unavailing excuses, and on two shells being at a long interval fired over his town, he was induced to afford compliance.

A. D. 1841.

Shaikh Muktoom obtained permission from the Joasmee Chief to erect a fort at Derah, a spot between Shargah and Debaye, with a view to afford a secure residence to his people, who, leaving only a small guard, had entirely deserted their town, in consequence of the severe fever which still continued to prevail there, the dreadful mortality arising from which had prompted them to cross the creek, and raise their huts on the spot selected for the tower in question. He was however required to furnish a written document, duly signed and sealed, setting forth that the ground to be occupied belonged to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, and that the tower was to remain there only so long as he thought proper, and to be destroyed upon his requisition to that effect. This occurred at a time, too, when a division had arisen among the Debaye people, which had led to the secession of five hundred of the Boo Muhair to Shargah, owing to their disgust at Muktoom's usurped and severe authority,—an occurrence which afforded unfeigned satisfaction and delight to the Joasmee Chief, as diminishing the power and influence of one whose former encouragement and support of his son Suggur, when in open rebellion, still evidently rankled in his breast.

BOO FELASA.

The absence of the Debaye people from their tower, the only guard left therein being twenty-five men from the Persian Coast, and the men of the tribe being themselves for the most part engaged in the pearl fishery, afforded to Shaikh Khaleefa bin Shakboot a further opportunity of prosecuting his revenge upon the Boo Felasa. Having made up matters with the Beni Kuttub and other inland tribes, and secured himself from any opposition on their part, the Beniyas Chief issued secretly from Aboothabee, with a party of one hundred and fifty men, for Debaye, which he reached in two days. After doing much injury to the date groves, the party succeeded in surprising and gaining possession of the town and fort, plundered the market and houses, and burned all the stores of rice and dates that could be found, as also the Buteel* which had been presented to Shaikh Muktoom by the Chief of Bahrein, killing two men who happened to be on board.

Muktoom, immediately on gaining intelligence of the above, solicited the aid of Shaikh Suggur bin Sultan of Shargah, who joined him with two hundred men, but too late to be of any avail, for the Beniyas, after having done all the mischief in their power, had left the place, and taken up their position at Joomeerah, distant about eight miles from Debaye. Not yet satisfied with the very serious blow inflicted at Debaye, Khaleefa bin Shakboot a few days subsequently sent out a foraying party, which surprised Khan (a village on the coast between Debaye and Shargah), and completely stripped the place, carrying off fifteen slaves, without any loss to themselves. The presence of this courageous and energetic chief greatly harassed and annoyed the Shargah and Debaye people, keeping them constantly on the watch; for nearly all the male inhabitants, having proceeded to the fishing, had left their territories in an almost defenceless state. Reinforcements were sent to Shargah from Ras-ool-Khyma and Lingah, upon which the Beniyas Chief returned to Aboothabee, but shortly again set forth

* This Buteel was originally the property of Esai bin Tarif, but was confiscated on his seceding with his tribe from Bahrein.

upon plundering excursions into the Brymee country, and on his return secretly left Khuttum with four hundred followers, with the intention of making a night attack upon these two places (Shargah and Debaye), but his object being betrayed, he was compelled to relinquish the design, and proceeded in the direction of Ras-ool-Khyma. Here, however, he found Shaikh Sultan prepared to receive him, and was therefore unable to inflict any serious injury. After killing four and wounding two men of the Joasmees, he was obliged to retreat, with the loss of three men killed, and his own riding camel, with accoutrements, which fell into the hands of the enemy.*

CONTINUATION TO THE YEAR 1853,

BY LIEUTENANT H. F. DISBROWE.

The Shaikh of Debaye in the early part of the year 1843, at a time when contentions were raging between the Joasmee and Aboothabee Chiefs, after observing a strict neutrality for a considerable period, suddenly entered into an alliance with the latter, and offered his services as a mediator between the two belligerents. "This proceeding," we are told by Captain Kemball, "gave umbrage to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, who but ill concealed his disapprobation": indeed the aversion of the chiefs must have been reciprocal; for at one moment we find Shaikh Muktoom of Debaye acting mediator, and presently we observe him, after a peace has been effected between the two rival chieftains, instigating the one, his ally (Shaikh Khaleefa, Chief of Aboothabee), to break the peace by foraying the territories of the other (Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur), his enemy. The subjects of either party, too, those of the Joasmee as well as of Debaye, began to show their feelings of enmity, by a course of petty aggressions, which however, it must be allowed, do not seem to have been committed with the knowledge or consent of either of the chiefs.

A. D. 1843.

Mahomed bin Majid, a subject of Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, having seized (August 1844) a native of Chaab from a Debaye boat, the people of the latter tribe, not choosing to await reparation that they knew would be, and which eventually was, afforded them by the Resident, took upon themselves to

A. D. 1844.

* The subsequent proceedings and intrigues of the Debaye Chief, being generally connected with the occurrences among the Beniyas and Joasmees, are recorded in the Sketches of those tribes.

effect reprisals, and to board and plunder a Buggarah belonging to Abdoolla bin Butye of Shargah. This act was not in any way countenanced by Shaikh Muktoom bin Butye: far from it,—he inflicted punishment upon his offending subjects; caused whatever had been taken from Shaikh Sultan's people to be restored to them; and went so far as of his own free will to bind over the delinquents to keep the peace, by making them lodge in the hands of the British Agent the sum of 100 crowns, as security for their future good behaviour. A striking proof was this of the well working of the system in operation for the suppression of piracy; for it was Shaikh Muktoom bin Butye who in former years gave as much if not more trouble to the British representative than any one of the maritime chiefs, by the open manner in which he encouraged a spirit of maritime irregularity.

From the commencement of 1845 to the close of the ensuing year the Joasmee and Aboothabee Chiefs did all in their power to reduce the Shaikh of Debaye to a state of submission. Shaikh Muktoom bin Butye, and his staunch and faithful ally the Chief of Amulgavine, proved, however, more than a match for their formidable adversaries: they successfully defended themselves against all the attacks, both foul and fair, that were made upon their territories, and at the close of 1846, when a last and tremendous attack was about to be directed on the fort of Debaye, a quarrel arose between the two allied chiefs, each of whom suddenly shifting his policy, preferred overtures of peace to the common foe, Shaikh Muktoom bin Butye, who entered into an alliance offensive and defensive with Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, but refused the advances of Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon.

A. D. 1845-46.

A. D. 1847.

When we commenced our narrative, the Beniyas and Joasmee Chiefs were in the thick of contentions; then came the Shaikh of Debaye, who by joining the former offended the latter; presently the Beniyas and Joasmees entered into an alliance offensive and defensive, and attacked the Shaikh of Debaye; and now we find the Debaye and Joasmees acting in concert, and the Beniyas at enmity with either.

The last arrangement, however, though scarcely more than nominal in the outset, remained unbroken until the month of July 1848, when a truly close and intimate alliance was entered into between the two (Debaye and Joasmee), for the purpose of opposing the plans of aggrandisement which the now all powerful Chief of the Beniyas seemed to entertain in the direction of their respective territories.

A. D. 1848.

Shaikh Muktoom, fearing an attack upon Debaye, found it to his interest to remain in league with Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, who on his side, too, trembled for the safety of his possessions on the Batinah

BOO FELASA.

Coast. It was clearly, therefore, fear and apprehension alone that drove these chiefs to unite, and grow, as it were, into one, for much jealousy had been of late displayed by either. They combined, however, and strove in union well together.

The two chiefs were shortly joined by the Shaikh of Ejman, and when the Wahabee forces had been defeated, and the Beniyas had reached the zenith of his power, the three chiefs espoused the cause of the fallen Syud bin Mootluk, and repaired to Brymee, for the purpose of ejecting therefrom Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon.

A number of skirmishes followed, in the immediate vicinity of the forts; but owing to the arrival of a mediator in February 1849, and the acceptance of peace by the belligerent parties, the whole of the chiefs returned to their seats, and hostilities ceased.

A. D. 1849.

Shaikh Muktoom still kept up a friendly intercourse with the Joasmees; and both chiefs, especially the former, strongly advised Ameer Fysul in November 1849 to rebuild the town and fort of Adeed, and to replace therein the people of the Gubeysat Tribe. Their intrigues, however, did not produce the desired effect: the tribe in question thought fit, during the absence of Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon at Shinas and Muskat, to secede from Aboothabee, and repair to the Guttur Coast, —a step which so incensed the Beniyas Chief that he resorted to measures of the greatest severity to bring the offenders to punishment,— measures untempered with mercy or honesty, that eventually reduced the power and resources of the tribe to a state bordering on nothingness.

To relate the part that was taken by the Debaye Chief in the Muskat, Brymee, and Sohar complications, will not detain us long.

Shaikh Muktoom cordially hated the Beniyas Chief, and was ever striving to reduce and weaken his power; and when the Joasmee summoned the rest of the tribes to unite with himself and proceed to the aid of the Chief of Sohar, nothing would have tempted the Debaye Shaikh to declare himself one of the league, had he not thought an attack upon Shaikh Syud was sure to be made during the course of operations.

This, and this alone, prompted him to equip a body of troops, and repair to Zeit, to meet the rest of the chiefs; but when he found Shaikh Sultan caring for the interest of none but himself,—when he saw him bent on a move in the direction of Batinah,—he was no longer eager for strife: he reluctantly followed as far as Shinas, and, after the reduction of that place, returned to his seat at Debaye.

A. D. 1850.

Early in the ensuing year we gather, from the tenor of a conversation held by the Resident with Shaikh Muktoom bin Butye on the 30th January, that

A. D. 1851.

BOO FELASA.

the Debaye Chief had entered into terms of friendship and amity with Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa; and, in consequence thereof, "had written to Ameer Fysul, strongly dissuading him from his scheme of forming a settlement at Khore al Adeed," which led the Wahabee to express his surprise and astonishment at finding the very chief who proposed the plan, and urged its immediate fulfilment, suddenly thwarting and opposing the project.

This intrigue was quickly followed by another.

In the month of March 1851 arrived at Debaye, on his way to Aboothabee, one Moobaruk bin Suroor, the Chief of the Monasir, with letters from Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur to Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon. Negotiations, it would seem, had for some time past been carried on by the chiefs above mentioned, and the letters now in the possession of Moobaruk were nothing more or less than the acceptance of offers that had been made to the Joasmees by the Beniyas Chief.

The envoy had scarcely placed foot on the soil of Debaye ere Shaikh Muktoom became aware of the important documents he held in his hands. Moobaruk was seized, and thrown into confinement; a plain and distinct intimation was sent to Shaikh Sultan, that if he wished to keep on good terms with the Debaye Chief, then must he neither permit the letters nor the envoy to go to Aboothabee.

Shaikh Sultan, unwilling to break with Shaikh Muktoom, but more unwilling to remain at feud with Shaikh Syud, did not boldly and manfully declare his determination to make peace with the Beniyas whether Muktoom wished it or no, but resorted, to effect his object, to his usual mode of duplicity.

He feigned compliance with the desires of the Debaye Chief, by despatching his Secretary, Mahomed bin Ali Boo Shelabee, to bring back the letters he had sent, and so soon as he returned to Shargah he forwarded the identical documents in charge of a man of the Aboo Heyle straight to Shaikh Syud at Aboothabee.

The result of the affair was that peace was concluded between the Joasmee and Beniyas Chiefs, and Shaikh Muktoom, fearful for himself, drew more closely to the Wahabees.

The time was now at hand for the arrival of His Highness the Imaum from his possessions at Zanzibar, on the African Coast. He had long talked of repairing to Muskat, for the purpose of adjusting and arranging the quarrel that had been so unhappily raging between his son and the Sohar Chief.

Shaikh Muktoom, enraged with the Joasmee for the alliance he had lately contracted, and thinking the moment favourable for cultivating the friendship of the Muskat authorities, deputed his brother on a friendly mission to Syud

A. D. 1852.

BOO FELASA.

Soweynee, and eventually, when His Highness arrived, and commenced operations against the Sohar Chief, he afforded him active support, and remained in union until the spring of the succeeding year, when, while on his way from Muskat to the island of Kishm, he was seized with an attack of small-pox, which carried him off before he reached the end of his journey.

There was much of good in Shaikh Muktoom: he was a chief of undoubted bravery and ability; he was also, so far as we are able to judge, as much esteemed and beloved by the people of his tribe as any one of the maritime chiefs; and, as regards the fulfilment of engagements with the British Government, I cannot do better, I think, than quote the opinion expressed by Captain Kemball in one of his letters to Government regarding him :—

" Shaikh Muktoom," he tells us, " though manifesting on his first establishment at Debaye a refractory spirit, which led to the adoption of coercive measures towards him, had at least for the past ten years been distinguished among the chiefs of the coast for the general observance of his engagements, and apprehending clearly the policy of the British Government as conducive to the advancement and prosperity of the Arab States, for the earnestness of his endeavours in support of its arrangements to preserve the maritime tranquillity of the Gulf."

Shaikh Muktoom was succeeded by his brother Shaikh Syud bin Butye in the Chiefship.

Shortly after assuming the reins of government, Shaikh Syud bin Butye (on the 2nd October 1852) repaired to Muskat, on a visit to His Highness Syud Saeed. His departure at so early a season, before he was firmly seated in his new position, was scarcely prudent or wise; for he must have been well aware that there were aspirants to the chiefship he held, eagerly seeking an opportunity to take to themselves what they looked upon as their hereditary right. We find, accordingly, that Syud bin Butye had barely left his seat ere " the sons of the late Muktoom, by name Soheil and Husher, with their maternal uncle Majid bin Dulmooj, and some of the Al Boo Felasa, surprised the fort of Debaye, whose garrison acted treacherously and had an understanding with them, and they took the fort, seizing the guardian appointed by Syud bin Butye, by name Syud bin Rashid, the maternal uncle of Muktoom, who was asleep, and whom they placed in confinement, together with another person, named Khaleefa bin Saeed." Syud bin Rashid did not remain in captivity long; he was set at liberty, and permitted to assume the title of chief, but not to resume command of the forts, which continued in the hands of Soheil and Husher. By no means content with the mere nominal power that thus reverted to himself, Syud bin Rashid resolved to resort to treachery for the purpose of

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expelling Muktoom's sons from Debaye. The measures he adopted were crowned with success: Soheil and Husher were compelled to quit the place, and to flee for protection to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur.

Such was the posture of affairs when Syud bin Butye returned to his seat at Debaye. He perceived at a glance the enormity of the evil existing; he saw how much it was likely to increase, now that the Joasmee had mixed himself up in the quarrel. Nor was he mistaken,—Shaikh Sultan was busy intriguing in every manner and shape: he had already induced one Syud bin Maanaul Moheyree, by tempting offers in gold, to quit Debaye with his tribe, and to go and settle at Shargah; and it is difficult to say how matters would have ended had not Syud bin Butye made advances to Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon that resulted in an alliance, offensive and defensive, between the two chiefs, who were likewise joined by the Shaikh of Amulgavine, thereby forming a coalition too strong for the Joasmee to dream of opposing it.

Nothing of importance connected with this tribe occurred from this period until the spring of 1853, when Captain Kemball proceeded on a tour of the Gulf, for the purpose of arranging matters connected with the Perpetual Treaty of Peace* to be entered into by the maritime chiefs. It is not unworthy of notice that Shaikh Syud bin Butye alone of their number failed to wait upon Abdoolla bin Fysul on the occasion of his arrival at Brymee with a Nujdee Force,†—he only remained at his post; and from the tenor of a conversation held by him with the Resident on board the Honorable Company's sloop of war *Clive*, off the port of Shargah, may be gathered how extremely averse he was, or affected to be, to the presence of a Wahabee force in the province of Oman.

A. D. 1853.

From the promptitude displayed by Shaikh Syud bin Butye in repressing maritime irregularities whensoever committed by his dependents, and from the readiness he showed to subscribe to the new treaty of peace, it is plain that he was anxious to cultivate the good will and friendship of the British Government in the same degree as had been done by Shaikh Muktoom, his brother, before him.

* Vide page 88 of this Selection.

† Syud bin Butye deputed his maternal uncle to Brymee, in his stead.

HISTORICAL SKETCH

OF

THE TRIBE OF EJMAN,

FROM THE YEAR 1820 TO 1841,

PREPARED BY

LIEUTENANT A. B. KEMBALL;

WITH CONTINUATION

FROM THE LATTER PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1853,

BY LIEUTENANT H. F. DISBROWE;

SUCCESSIVE ASSISTANTS TO THE RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

EJMAN.

At the date of the General Treaty for the Suppression of Piracy in this Gulf, concluded by Sir William Grant Keir in 1820, the port of Ejman would appear to have been considered a dependency of the Shaikh of Shargah, having been included in a treaty with that chief for the surrender of the towers, guns, and vessels of certain places therein enumerated.

A. D. 1820.

So shortly subsequent, however, as the beginning of 1823, Rashid bin Humeed of Ejman addressed a letter to the Resident, complaining of the aggressions committed against him by Sultan bin Suggur, and declaring that he never would submit to his authority. An attempt on the part of the latter chief to induce the Resident, while on a visit to Shargah in the same year, to recognise his supremacy, by showing him a paper signed by several of the Shaikhs in that neighbourhood, in which they acknowledged their dependence upon him, would allow also of a supposition that his jurisdiction was not altogether undisputed.

A. D. 1823.

On the other hand, in a case of piracy committed upon two Debaye boats by a subject of Rashid bin Humeed in 1827, a remonstrance addressed to Sultan bin Suggur occasioned the offender, with two of his followers, to be placed in confinement, without any objection being raised on the subject of his responsibility, or right of interference.

A. D. 1827.

The revival of the Wahabee power under Toorkey bin Saood, in 1827, was seized by the Shaikh of Ejman as a new opportunity for intrigue, and, according to the correspondence of the Government Agent at Shargah, he appears to have endeavoured to persuade the Wahabee Chief to furnish him with troops, for the purpose of enabling him to throw off his dependence upon Sultan bin Suggur, or even to supplant him in his superiority amongst the Joasmee Tribes. Toorkey bin Saood, in reply, is said to have told him that he conceived it would be highly beneficial if Sultan bin Suggur were to resume the supremacy which he formerly exercised, and that it was expected he (Rashid bin Humeed) would demean himself accordingly towards that chief. He added, that

as the sea was under the dominion of the British Government, he had no power upon that element.

Alluding to this interview, Shaikh Rashid himself, in a letter to the Resident, dated in 1831, speaks of the pacific views of Toorkey bin Saood in terms of the highest praise, and takes credit for exertions to establish a good understanding between the British Government and the Wahabee Chief, from whom he procured a letter to the address of the Governor of Bombay. No belief, however, was placed in his sincerity, there being little doubt that his real intentions were to excite hostility and disturbance,* and to obtain a sanction for the renewal of the former system of indiscriminate aggression and piracy.

A. D. 1831.

Shaikh Rashid bin Humeed died, and was succeeded in the authority over Ejman by his son Humeed.

A. D. 1838.

Shaikh Abdool Azeez, the elder brother of Shaikh Humeed bin Rashid (the acknowledged chief), contrived with his slaves to effect, in May 1841, an entrance into the fort of Ejman, and, being secretly supported by the greater part of the inhabitants, to maintain his position: nor did Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, though the father-in-law of Humeed, exercise any interference, but treated the affair entirely as a family quarrel.

A. D. 1841.

Shaikh Abdool Azeez, however, alarmed at the preparations making by his deposed brother to erect another fort in the neighbourhood, deemed it advisable to restore him to his former authority, until a better opportunity should offer to forward his object.

He has since succeeded in supplanting him, and is now the acknowledged ruler of Ejman.

CONTINUATION TO THE YEAR 1853,

BY LIEUTENANT H. F. DISBROWE.

Taking up the history of this tribe in continuation of Captain Kemball's Historical Sketches, the first occurrence worthy of notice is that of a collision, in September 1844, between two boats on the pearl banks, the one belonging to Shargah, the other to Ejman. In this case the people of the Joasmees were decidedly the aggressors.

A. D. 1844.

* Such acts and proceedings of the tribe occupying Ejman as are worthy of notice, or mixed up with the Policy of the British Government, are recorded in the Sketch of the Joasmee Tribe. (Vide page 329 of this Selection.)

EJMAN.

"One Esai bin Jassim, an inhabitant of Shargah," to quote the words of the British Agent, "with a number of pearl boats belonging to that tribe, were anchored among those pertaining to other tribes. By chance the Buggarah of one Syf, a native of Ejman, was engaged in the pearl fishery near that of the abovementioned Esai bin Jassim, when a misunderstanding took place between them on the subject of the cables of their anchors. It was at first confined to talking and abuse, but Esai bin Jassim shortly after fired a matchlock at the Ejman Buggarah, and then boarded her, thrust a spear into the body of one of the crew, and struck another three blows on the head with an iron mace.

"The Ejman people did not resort to arms, but flung themselves into the sea, and were eventually picked up by pearl divers of their own tribe, and conveyed home in their boats."

This matter, when it came to the ears of the Resident, was at once taken up by that officer, who wrote to Shaikh Abdool Azeez, asking him whether he wished the case to be settled according to Mahomedan law, or would prefer its being treated by the British authorities as one of violation of the Maritime Truce.

The reply of the Ejman Chief leaving the adjustment of the affair in the hands of the Resident, demands were immediately made upon Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur for redress, in the shape of 200 dollars, which sum Esai bin Jassim was to be compelled to disburse, as compensation to the wounded Ejmanee.

The vessels of war were despatched to Ras-ool-Khyma and Shargah, to support the requisition, and a communication was addressed to the Chief of the Joasmees, acquainting him with the object of their visit. No hesitation was exhibited by Shaikh Sultan to comply with the demand preferred against him; on the contrary, he hastened (December 1844) to furnish an order for the amount required at the hands of his lawless subject, and brought the matter to a peaceable settlement.

About this time, also, took place an affair reflecting the greatest credit upon the character of the chief of this tribe.

Two vessels, having embarked a quantity of rice at Lingah, on the 5th December 1844, proceeded over to Shargah, but being caught in a storm, and unable to make the port in consequence, they strove to enter the backwater leading into Ejman harbour.

One vessel foundered in making the attempt; the other, however, after getting rid of 100 moras of her cargo, succeeded in reaching the inner harbour.

A. D. 1845.

Shaikh Abdool Azeez, hearing what had occurred, hastened down to the beach, accompanied by his brother, and both of them, drawing their swords, swore a solemn oath that they would cut down the first man who dared

EJMAN.

to approach the boat, or lay hands on the rice. After a while, the owners of the cargo, apprised of what had befallen their vessels, came to Ejman, where they remained a period of six days, drying their rice, and eventually left for Shargah, without having lost a grain of their property.

So marked was the conduct of Shaikh Abdool Azeez, so far removed from the usual spirit of mischief displayed by the chiefs in cases of like temptation, that the British Government thought it right to notify their approval of his behaviour by a special vote of thanks. Major Hennell, therefore, was requested to intimate to the Ejman Chief how highly the Government he represented appreciated his praiseworthy exertions and conduct.

A. D. 1846.

In the early part of the ensuing year (1846), Shaikh Abdool Azeez entered into an alliance with the Chiefs of Debaye and Amulgavine, for the purpose of resisting and repelling the combined attacks of their common foes, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur the Joasmee Chief, and Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon the Beniyas Chief. He scarcely, however, deserves the name of an ally, for in lieu of remaining staunch and firm to the cause he had espoused, and to which, moreover, it was his especial interest to adhere, he was ever inconstant and changeable.

We find him on one occasion permitting himself to be detached from the side of Shaikh Muktoom the Debaye Chief, and acknowledging his subservience to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, merely, it was supposed, to enable him to proceed to the fishery.

Again, we are told by Major Hennell, some three months later in the selfsame year, that "the Chiefs of Debaye, Ejman, and Amulgavine, one and all loudly complained of the Joasmee's unfriendly proceedings, in preventing intercourse between their respective subjects"; and lastly, in a letter from the same officer, bearing date the 15th of December 1846, we read that "the Shaikh of Ejman had found himself so pressed by the adherents of the Joasmees on either side of his port, that he had been compelled to withdraw from his alliance with the Chiefs of Amulgavine and Debaye, and place himself under the protection of his former enemy, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur." From which it would seem that he accommodated himself entirely to the existing state of circumstances, and had no hesitation in declaring for this party or that party, according as he thought would be most beneficial to his personal interests.

A. D. 1848.

There is nothing of importance to relate until the summer of the year 1848, when, after the Brymee forts had succumbed to the prowess of the confederate Chiefs of Aboothabee and Sohar, the Joasmee and Debaye chiefs, trembling for

the integrity of their respective possessions, entered into a close and strict alliance, and proposed to the Shaikhs of Ejman and Amulgavine that they also should join the league against the Beniyas Ruler. Either, however, declined the invitation received, and refused to take part in the machinations of the Joasmee and his complying associate of Debaye.

In the month of September 1848 a serious conflict occurred between the people of Ejman and those of Himreeah.

A feud, it would seem, had long existed between the inhabitants of the two places, and although for some time past it had lain apparently dormant, it was all of a sudden revived, and hostilities were resorted to with more than their usual ferocity. The circumstances attending the renewal of strife were these :—

On the 18th of September, Syf bin Abdoolla dying, the people elected in his stead one of their elders, Abdoolla bin Abdool Suteef. Whether the step gave umbrage to Shaikh Abdool Azeez, or whether he thought a favourable moment for a recourse to coercion had arrived, is not known. By whatever feeling he was actuated, however, he set out with a force of no less than four hundred followers, for the purpose of inflicting chastisement upon the people of Himreeah. His brother, Humeed bin Rashid, also accompanied the expedition. One half of his army was posted on the banks of the Khore, and with the rest he proceeded to Himreeah direct. The foe was well prepared to receive him : they left a small body of troops to defend their town, and with a party, some hundred and twenty in number, hastened to meet the invader. The detachments encountered, and notwithstanding the numerical superiority of the Ejmanees, the people of Himreeah proved quickly victorious. The former, perceiving the fall of Abdool Azeez, their Chief, and also that Humeed bin Rashid, his brother, was wounded, finding themselves deprived of a leader, were seized with a panic, and fled from the field in the greatest disorder.

The Himreeahites followed close in pursuit, until they reached the very walls of the town of Ejman, whence, after killing and wounding a considerable number, they retraced their steps to Himreeah. Such was the result of the conflict. As to casualties, the Ejmanees, besides their chief, suffered a loss of twenty-six killed and twenty men wounded. On the side of Himreeah, the chief and five others were killed on the spot, and as many as twenty-two placed *hors de combat*.

Humeed bin Rashid was elected Chief of Ejman, and the son of Syf bin Abdoolla head of Himreeah.

Hostilities continued for a length of time, neither chief permitting his subjects to proceed to the pearl fishery, the season for which had now arrived, until Abdoolla bin Rashid, Chief of Amulgavine, at the

invitation of the Chief of Heera, repaired in person to Ejman, and mediated a peace between the contending parties.

Humeed bin Rashid had scarcely been chief a couple of months ere he espoused the cause of the defeated Wahabee, and joined the league against Shaikh Syud at Brymee. What part, if any, he took in the skirmishes that were fought with the Chief of the Beniyas, does not appear. Of his subsequent proceedings no mention is made. We simply gather, from a letter addressed to Major Hennell, on the 8th of December 1848, that he set out on the 4th of the month with the Nujdees, Joasmees, and Boo Felasa, to attack the holders of Brymee.

A general peace was concluded in February 1849, in the terms of which Humeed bin Rashid was of course included.

In the spring of 1850, when the Joasmee repaired with his allies to Sohar and the Batinah Coast, for the purpose of assisting Syud Ghes, repelling Shaikh Syud, and contending with Syud Soweynee, Shaikh Humeed bin Rashid proceeded to Zeit, to join Shaikh Sultan, with a detachment of two hundred men.

Not one single matter of interest remains to be told, affecting this tribe, further than a simple mention of the Treaty for Perpetual Peace at Sea,* entered into by the Maritime Chiefs of the Arabian Coast, to the conditions of which Shaikh Humeed bin Rashid exhibited the greatest readiness to subscribe in the month of May 1853.

* Vide page 88 of this Selection.

HISTORICAL SKETCH

CONNECTED WITH

THE TRIBE OF AMULGAVINE;

BY

LIEUTENANT H. F. DISBROWE,

ASSISTANT TO THE RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

Submitted to Government on the 19*th August* 1854.

AMULGAVINE.

THE first subject worthy of mention connected with this tribe is the re-establishment of friendship between its Chief, Shaikh Abdoolla bin Rashid, and Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, the head of the Joasmees.

The latter chief, as it would seem, was driven, in October 1844, by adverse winds, to take shelter in the port of Amulgavine, and notwithstanding the blood feud existing between the Joasmee and Amulgavine Tribes, Shaikh Sultan, at the pressing invitation of Abdoolla bin Rashid, went ashore, and partook of the hospitality that was graciously proffered him. He continued the guest of the Amulgavine Shaikh for the space of a night and a day, when, after professing his feelings of friendship and amity, he quitted the place, and proceeded on his way to Ras-ool-Khyma.

A. D. 1844.

In the month of October 1845 the Chief of Amulgavine identified himself with the Wahabee at a time when the latter was contemplating the seizure of the fort of Zeit, in the vicinity of Ejman, and when the whole of the maritime chiefs, save himself alone, had arrayed themselves against him, and determined to oppose with all the means in their power the execution of the design he had in view. It is needless entering further into detail here on this matter, full particulars having been already given in the narrative of the Wahabee Tribe, with whose history the subject is more particularly connected.*

A. D. 1845.

Early in the ensuing year Shaikh Abdoolla bin Rashid, finding Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur was bent on compelling him to renounce his independence, and own allegiance to himself, entered into the closest alliance with Shaikh Muktoom bin Butye, for the purpose of opposing the ambitious designs of the Joasmee.

A. D. 1846.

Shaikh Muktoom was delighted to fall into the views of Abdoolla

* Page 457 *et seq.* of this Selection.

bin Rashid; indeed it was he that proposed a coalition, for he beheld a fortified structure in course of erection at the very door of his territories (at Aboo Heyle, within three miles of Debaye),—a structure which, if once completed and manned, might almost endanger the safety of Debaye itself. These towers were not to be built: all the maritime chiefs agreed with Shaikh Muktoom of Debaye, that such a building, within gunshot range of the outskirts of his capital, must not be permitted to rise. One and all combined to oppose its construction, and Shaikh Sultan would not have been able to stand for a moment had he not contrived to win over the Beniyas Chief to his side, and to estrange the affections of the Chief of Ejman.

The Shaikhs of Debaye and Amulgavine, the only two that were left, remained closely united. The former chief said, that so long as the Maritime Truce existed he feared no danger from the side of the sea;—he declared his perfect indifference for any attempts they might make from the land. Shaikh Abdoolla bin Rashid bore an active part, and behaved himself nobly throughout the hostilities: he it was who commanded a party of his own people, when attacked by a body of troops from Shargah; he it was who, after a ferocious struggle, put them to flight, and sent them back without a leader, that leader being slain on the field, and no less a person than a son of the mighty Shaikh Sultan; he, too, ever acted in concert with Shaikh Muktoom bin Butye, and, unlike the vacillating Shaikh Abdool Azeez, who was now for, now against, the Chief of Debaye, he neither swerved to the right hand nor to the left, but co-operated with him on every single occasion, and remained in unison

A. D. 1847.

until the spring of 1847, when a Treaty of Peace being entered into between Shaikh Sultan and Shaikh Muktoom, he was also included. "Aware, however, of the feelings of bitter enmity with which he was regarded by the former, who had reaped nothing but damage, both in power and reputation, since the commencement of the aggressive proceedings, Shaikh Abdoolla bin Rashid was not disposed to allow himself to be lulled into security by the hollow engagement" that was now concluded.

Nothing of importance occurred until early in the year 1848, when

A. D. 1848.

hostilities commenced between the Beniyas Chief and the Wahabee Lieutenant, during which all the maritime chiefs, save one, ranged themselves on the side of the latter,—that one was Abdoolla bin Rashid. He appears to have been favourably inclined to Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, and to have viewed the brilliant successes of that chief with as much delight as he beheld with distaste the attempts of the Joasmee confederacy to re-establish Wahabee supremacy in the province of Oman. As far as

can be learnt, he took no active part whatsoever in the quarrel; and notwithstanding the pressing invitations or demands of the Joasmee, that he should act offensively against Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, contrived to preserve a strict neutrality throughout the contention.

A. D. 1848-49.

In 1850, however, when a series of hostilities were commenced by the Joasmee Chief and his allies against the Muskat authorities, Abdoolla bin Rashid declared for Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur,—he went so far, at least, as to send a small detachment of camel-men to join the Joasmee forces at Zeit, and can therefore no longer be said to have remained neutral. Shaikh Sultan was, as usual, peculiarly grateful for the succours afforded. He hastened to show unmistakeable symptoms of gratitude. By way of return for the aid that was proffered, he seized upon all the date groves and other property pertaining to Amulgavine that were to be found in the neighbourhood of Shinas. Abdoolla bin Rashid remonstrated, but without effect: the seizures were retained, and the people of Amulgavine, fearing an attack upon their capital, were unable to proceed to the pearl banks.

A. D. 1850.

Nothing of sufficient interest to be related occurred until the close of the year 1852, when Abdoolla bin Rashid entered into an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the Shaikhs of Aboothabee and Debaye.

A. D. 1852.

The two latter chiefs were in the midst of negotiations, owing to the intrigues set on foot by Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, who had determined to support the pretensions of the sons of the late Muktoom bin Butye to the Chiefship of Debaye, in supersession of Shaikh Syud bin Butye, when Ali bin Abdoolla bin Rashid, the son of Abdoolla bin Rashid, arrived at Aboothabee, and the three chiefs contracted the engagement already alluded to.

There remains but to mention that in the month of March 1853 Abdoolla bin Rashid proceeded to Brymee, to wait upon Abdoolla bin Fysul, and, in seeking permission to return to his port, for the purpose of meeting the Resident, had some degree of restraint imposed upon his actions. In the month of May, however, when the Muskat and Wahabee complications had been brought to a close, he repaired to Shargah, and having visited Captain Kemball on board the Honorable Company's sloop of war *Clive*, subscribed the Perpetual Treaty of Peace entered into on the 4th May 1853* by the Maritime Chiefs on the Arabian Coast, for the future entire cessation of disorders at sea.

A. D. 1853.

* Vide pages 88 and 89 of this Selection.

2.09
F. Whitelock's and J. R. Wellsted's travels into the interior of Oman, November 1835–March 1836

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VI. Notes taken during a Journey in Oman, and along the east Coast of Arabia. By Lieutenant F. Whitelock, I. N.

In November 1835, Lieutenant Whitelock obtained the sanction of Government to travel in the interior of Arabia and Persia, in order to make himself proficient in the languages of these countries, and arrived at Muscat in the beginning of the following month (December 1835). Having laid down no fixed plan, he determined in the first place to proceed to Semed, a town situated inland south of Muscat, where he was informed Lieutenant Wellsted was residing. He left Muscat on the 13th, and on the 16th of December arrived at Semed.

On the 19th December, in company with Lieutenant Wellsted, he started for Nezwah, and arrived there on the 22d. Here they remain-

ed a few days, and then proceeded to the Green Mountains, a description of which is given in this communication. They spent a few days among the mountains, and met with great kindness and hospitality from the people; they then returned to Nezwah by a different route. At the latter place they received information from Muscat, that H. H. the Imaum had engaged with a Shaik to conduct them from Braimee to Deryeh for 500 dollars, for which sum he agreed to supply camels, guards, water, &c. In consequence of this information, they considered it necessary that one of them should proceed to Muscat to close the bargain with the Shaik, and to procure the money required. Lieutenant Whitelock volunteered to undertake the journey, on which he started on the 1st of January, and arrived at Muscat on the 4th. He found great difficulty in obtaining the money from the agent. and was in consequence obliged to remain longer in Muscat than he should have done, for the place was very unhealthy at the time. Here the Author was attacked with fever, and finding that he was not likely to recover at Muscat, he left it, though in a very weakly state, and reached Nezwah, by easy stages, on 20th January. He found Lieutenant Wellsted seriously ill, and all the servants laid up with fever, and unable to move or render them the slightest assistance. Under these circumstances, they were, much to their annoyance, forced to abandon for a time their projected journey, for which every arrangement had been made with the Shaik of Lasha.

In order to re-establish their health, they determined to proceed to the sea coast, and accordingly started for Sib, situated a few miles from Muscat, and considered a very healthy place.

Having remained here a month, and finding their health greatly improved they determined to attempt the journey to Braimee, and thence to proceed on to Deryeh, if possible. They procured the necessary letters from the Imaum, who provided a Shaik to escort them. The Author and his companion started on the 25th February, and proceeded along the coast as far as Suick, then changed their direction towards the interior, and arrived at Abree on the 12th of March. At Abree they were treated most unceremoniously by the Shaik, who requested them to leave the town as expeditiously as possible, for he could not protect them, nor give them a guide or guards to escort them to Braimee, as he was afraid of the Wahabis. They afterwards learned that the Wahabis were actually in the town at the very time.

Finding it impossible to get to Braimee by this route, the travellers returned to Suick on the coast, and were most hospitably entertained by the Shaik. After remaining several days at this place, they determined to try if they could get to Braimee from Schinas, where they arrived on the 25th March in a boat from Suick. Here they waited several days for permission from the Wahibi Chiefs, but finding that a longer stay was necessary before they could expect to obtain it, they resolved to make the most of their time, and to proceed in a boat to Cape Mussendom, in order to visit Coomza. As they were on the point of starting on this expedition, they received intelligence that the Imaum was very anxious to see them, and had despatched messengers in quest of them. They therefore returned to Muscat, where, on their arrival, they found that the report which had induced them to visit the place was false.

Mr. Wellsted, finding his health still bad, and that there was little prospect of being able to proceed to Deryeh, determined to return to Bombay, for which place he started in April 1836.

The Author again set out from Muscat for Rostack, a town which he had not visited before. Here he was very civilly treated, but finding that he could not prevail on the Shaik to allow him to proceed through his territories to Braimee, he left Rostack for the coast; and on the 18th April reached a place called Messna, where he remained only one day, and then proceeded to Sohar, and thence to Schinas, at which place he arrived on the following day.

At Schinas the Author had an interview with the son of the Wahabi Chief, who was passing on his way to Muscat; he attempted to obtain a pass from him, but without success. On the following day, the Author hired camels, and set out from Sharga across the desert. From Sharga he visited Cossáb, then Bahrein, and Grane or Quoit. At the latter place he attempted to procure a boat to take him to the Táb or Endian river, which it was his object to visit, but not finding a boat here, he proceeded to Bussorah, where he was more successful.

The Author gives the following sketch of the general features of the part of Oman which he traversed in his various journies through that province.

'The range, of which the part we visited is styled the Green Mountains, appears to continue as far as Cape Mussendom, gradually decreasing its distance from the coast as it approaches the Cape, so that from Burka the range is distant 40 miles, from Schinas 15, from Khoresa Khan 10, and about a quarter of a mile from the beach at Cape Mussendom. The chain at the Green Mountains is composed of three parallel ranges, of which the central one is the highest. Here the hills are not detached, but connected together by gorges of considerable elevation, whereas in the part of the chain

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towards Cape Mussendom the hills are detached, though they follow the same general direction. The country between the sea and the mountains presents, immediately adjoining the coast, a belt of date groves as far as Khore Kulba, occupying a breadth of about four miles, beyond which the plain, at every point at which I crossed, is barren up to the foot of the principal range, but has detached hills scattered irregularly over it. Beyond the mountains to the south, we have sandy desert, which separates Oman from the province of Lasha and Nejid, the boundary of Oman in this direction being a line which runs directly from Ras-el-Had to Abothubi. The coast between Abothubi and Cape Mussendom is denominated by the natives generally the "Oman Coast" that which extends from the Cape just mentioned to Ras-el-Had, is called in the same manner the 'Batnah Coast."

TRAVELS IN ARABIA;

BY

LIEUT. J. R. WELLSTED, F.R.S.

INDIAN NAVY.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

OMAN AND NAKAB EL HAJAR.

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MDCCCXXXVIII

March 11*th*. The body of the Green Mountains bore this morning E. by S. ½ S., and were distant about thirty-five miles. I found the Sheïkh had assembled a guard of seventy men, scarcely more respectable in appearance, though somewhat better mounted than those supplied us from Muskin. At 10·30 we left the skirts of the town, and proceeded west, at a rapid pace, over the plains. Our escort sent forth scouts to the right and left, and an advanced party a-head: notwithstanding all their apprehensions, we reached

the village of Ayal at 1·30 without meeting with a single individual. Our route ran along a broad valley, on either side of which the hills run in a table-topped range, with sloping sides, or are broken into detached chains, presenting isolated pyramidal hills, somewhat truncated at the upper part, but of the same uniform level and direction as the continuous ridges. Quitting Ayal, where we obtained a second guard, we entered another broad valley, in the centre of which there ran a narrow rivulet, and at 5·30 put up for the night at the small village of Arudh.

March 12*th*. At ten hours our guard, who had passed the night right joyously within the walls of the village, being collected, we left, and crossed a succession of sandy, barren plains, similar to those of yesterday. Not a breath of wind was stirring, and as we occasionally passed through the narrow valleys which intersected our path, the concentration of the solar heat within them was almost overpowering.

At 12·50 we passed the extensive grove and town of Derese, with the people of which our party were at feud, and, in consequence,

we gave it a wide berth. At 1·50 we arrived at the town of Inán: here the Sheïkh of the tribe resides. A few years ago he was possessed of considerable influence, not only in his immediate vicinity, but also with the most powerful tribes in Nejd; but his power is now confined to Inán, where he usually shuts himself up in its fort. Our path conducted us through the centre of the town, and I observed that cultivation was carried on in inclosures to an extent equal to any spot I have seen in Omán: some of the trees are also very lofty, and, again, an imagination at all alive to passing scenes must have been forcibly struck by the contrast which the shade and gloom, upon which we were now entering, presented to the dust and heat of the parched and sandy track we had just quitted. After passing another town, somewhat similar, at 3·50 we arrived at Obrí. Passing the bazár, they conducted us to an open space before the Sheïkh's house, where we were left with our baggage to await his appearance. Towards sunset he paid us a visit, and I thought I could perceive at a glance the character of the being we had to

deal with. It will apply as a general remark, that the Sheïkhs of the towns in Omán are very personable men, with a dignified deportment and pleasing manners; but this was a sneaking, greasy-looking animal, who had more the appearance of a butcher than a Sheïkh. Upon my producing the Imám's letters he read them, and, without returning any answer, took his leave. About an hour afterwards he sent a verbal message to request that I should lose no time in quitting his town, as he begged to inform me, what he supposed I could not have been aware of, that it was then filled with nearly two thousand Wahhábís. This was, indeed, news to us: it was somewhat earlier than we anticipated falling in with them,—but we put a good face on the matter, and behaved as coolly as we well could. In the mean time we prepared to pitch our tent, and, having done so, sent a messenger to the Sheïkh to intimate that I wished to see him. About nine, A.M., he came, accompanied by some cut-throat looking ruffians, whom he styled his relations. I then led the conversation at once to the subject, and inquired what num-

ber of men he could furnish to conduct me to Bireïmah. This roused him, and he swore by the beard of the Prophet, such was now the danger of the road, that he neither could nor would furnish me with a man. I was unprepared for his refusal, but, as we should never take an Arab at his first word, I strove, by every argument I could think of, to shake his resolution. I stated that the dangers of the road were well known to Seyyid S'aid at the time he addressed the letters, and his certain anger when he should learn that he had been disobeyed. I hinted that I would myself amply reward him, provided he would comply; but he remained unmoved. Then, as a last resource, I told him that I could not think of going back, unless he furnished me with a letter to the Imám, containing the substance of his present communication, which he very readily promised to do. I inquired if it was true he had sent a verbal message to request I should leave his town: this of course he denied, but ten minutes afterwards indirectly repeated it, and then left. We experienced none of those offers of assistance, provisions, or other accommodations, which we

had been always in the habit of receiving from the other Sheïkhs in Omán, his object without doubt being to drive us out of the town as soon as he could; and all I saw and heard gave me little reason to delay obliging him in that respect. The Wahhábís had been crowding around us in great numbers, and seemed only waiting for some pretext to commence an affray. On these emergencies I always adopt one plan, which is, to remove every weapon from the reach of those who were with me. Whitelock and myself alone were armed, and we knew too well the consequences that would accrue from any rash use of weapons, to encounter such a risk. The men were in general small, and had no other clothes than a cloth round their waist. Their complexion was very dark, and they wore their hair long. It was not until some time afterwards that I discovered they were a party under Sayyid ibn Mutluk, whose future proceedings and subsequent defeat I have given in my account of Bedib. Our situation was therefore very precarious, the only chance of escape depending on our firmness and conduct, for they were then marching to attack

a part of the Imám's dominions, and he was the only protection we had.

Old 'Ali, who had an awful opinion of our new acquaintances, declared that he could not sleep; that they were prowling about the tent, and we should inevitably be robbed or murdered before the morning. My interpreter, a Persian, six feet high, and stout in proportion, was so perfectly unmanned by his fears, that he went into fits. There was some ground for his fears, as I believe the Wahhábís have a more thorough detestation of the Persians, as sectaries of 'Ali, than any other class of Mussulmans. When the Sheïkh came and presented me with the letter for the Imám, I knew it would be vain to make any further effort to shake his resolution, and therefore did not attempt it; in the mean time news having spread far and near that two Englishmen, with a box "of dollars," but in reality containing only the few clothes that we carried with us, had halted in the town. The Wahhábís and other tribes had met in deliberation, while the lower classes of the townsfolk were creating noise and confusion. The Sheïkh either had not

the shadow of any influence, or was afraid to exercise it, and his followers evidently wished to share in the plunder. It was time to act. I called 'Ali on one side, told him to make neither noise nor confusion, but to collect the camels without delay. In the mean time we had packed up the tent, the crowd increasing every minute; the camels were ready, and we mounted on them. A leader, or some trifling incident, was now only wanting to furnish them with a pretext for an onset. They followed us with hisses and various other noises, until we got sufficiently clear to push briskly forward; and, beyond a few stones being thrown, we reached the outskirts of the town without further molestation. I had often before heard of the inhospitable character of the inhabitants of this place. The neighbouring Arabs observe that to enter Obrí a man must either go armed to the teeth, or as a beggar with a cloth, and that not of decent quality, round his waist. Thus for a second time end our hopes of reaching Der'ayyah from this quarter; I did not however yet despair, but determined to push on for Síb, embark there, and endeavour, from the port of

Schinás, to cross over to Bireïmah. I had letters to the Wahhábí chief, and if I could only reach him, I had little doubt but that I might in safety continue on to the former town.

Obrí is one of the largest and most populous towns in Omán. Few of its inhabitants, who are of the Yaknah tribe, engage in mercantile pursuits of any kind, confining their bartering to the mere necessaries of life, and living on the produce of their date groves and corn fields. Agricultural pursuits have in other parts of the world a tendency to humanize and soften the character of a people. There they produce no such effects, and where the husbandman endeavours, by an assumed ferocity, to stifle or suppress any softer feeling. I imagine they are urged to this by a desire, when they mix with their Bedowin neighbours, to make up by such display, for the low estimation in which that people not unfrequently regard all those who follow occupations more peaceful than their own.

Indigo, dates, and sugar are their exports, and rice, spices, and white cotton cloth, sent

to be dyed blue, the imports. We passed several enclosures of barley, and towards evening halted near our former encampment at the village of Ayal.

Contrary to Ali's expectations, we got through the night minus only a few trifling articles, which we deserved to lose, because they were left without the tent.

March 14*th*. Nearly the whole of the village, at the instigation of Ali, watched around us last night. I had killed three or four sheep for them, and, either from being too intent on their supper, or from some other cause, a gun, sword, and a few other things were purloined. In our present mode of travelling we could ill spare those articles, and I accordingly represented the matter to the Sheïkh, and he to the elders of the town. After making a great noise, and a furious debate, it was decided the articles should be restored.

When this was resolved on, in order, it would appear, to avert the disgrace and consequent punishment of the offender, who, I have reason to suppose, was a near relation of the Sheïkh's, the latter issued directions

that the articles stolen should be deposited, in the space of half an hour, in a certain obscure part of the grove; and there they were found at the expiration of the appointed time.

CHAPTER XV.

Advice to travellers—Honesty of the Bedowins—Seyyid Hilál—Advises the Author to abandon his enterprise—Sohar—Its commercial importance—Population—Trade—Ahmed ibn Aisan—Defeated by the Wahhábis—His character—Revenue—Harbours of Omán—Asses—Schinas—Villages—Date Groves—Dibah—Description of the Country—Bireïmah—Water—Milk Bush—Goats—Inhabitants.

In a country where the natives are disposed to be hostile, a traveller, if he can possibly avoid it, will do well not to return by his former road. In the first instance he will most probably have passed before they recover from the effects of their surprise, but afterwards he naturally becomes the subject of much conversation and inquiry, and on his return, if disposed for mischief, they look out for him. The events of to-day and yesterday, in addition to many others which oc-

curred previously, convince me of the propriety of these remarks.

On our way to Obrí we passed through Inan without exciting more attention than a gaze of astonishment; but the intelligence of our return had preceded us, and, in consequence, we were received at the entrance of, and followed through the town, by a mob of young men and children, who hooted and pelted us through it. The Sheïkh too, who was formerly all civility, now would not suffer us to proceed without a present, in addition to the one I had already given him for his trouble; nor had I any other alternative, much to my annoyance, than to submit. It is, however, worthy of remark that, with the exception of the few articles at Obrí, this was the first and only time I have lost anything by petty theft or open extortion in Omán.

On the afternoon of March 19th we again reached Suweïk, where Seyyid Hilál received us with all his former kindness. He was much amused, but no way surprised to hear of our reception at Obrí, and his only astonishment appeared to be that we escaped so

well. I found, that having received intelligence of the forward movement of the Wahhábís, he had sent a messenger to recall us, but who missed, and passed us on the road.

The Sheïkh gave me no encouragement to persevere in my attempt to reach Bireïmah.

"However," said he, "if you are desirous of trying the only remaining chance, I will furnish a good boat to convey you to Schinas, and instruct the Sheïkh there to forward you on, with a guard, to Bireïmah."

On the 22nd we therefore embarked for that port, and reached it on the afternoon of the 25th. The coast between these two points presents such a number of towns and villages (all of which will be seen on the map), that I question if it is not among the most populous in the world. The principal, and by far the largest of these is Sohar.

In point of commercial importance, Sohar ranks next to Maskat. It has about forty large bagalás belonging to it, and maintains a considerable trade with Persia on the one hand, and India on the other. The number of inhabitants is estimated at nine thousand; but some of these, residing in contiguous

hamlets, are included in the estimate. Sohar is an ancient town: from its ports the Arabian ships formerly took their departure for China. I find mention made of it in several early authors. To the Portugueze, under the name of Soar, it was well known. In 1829, during the minority of Ahmed Ibn Aisan, the present Sheïkh of this town, the Imám possessed himself of the government of his district, and, as it is generally thought, intended to retain it, but his design was defeated by the young Sheïkh, who, by stratagem, obtained possession of the fort, and has since successfully held it against several attempts of the Imám to dislodge him. Peace has been subsequently declared between them; but as the territories of this chief are prolonged in a narrow strip, in a south-east direction, from Sohar to Rosták, through the very heart of the Imám's dominions, Seyyid S'aid, it is thought, still views him with a jealous eye, and would seize with avidity any opportunity which might present itself to dispossess him. The government of this district is mild and regular, and similar in its elements to that of Maskat; but the

character of its ruler is bold, reckless, and inconsistent. The Imám, in speaking of him, always styles him the Madman.

There are about twenty families of Jews at Sohar, who have a small synagogue. They are of the same class as those of Yemen, and, like them, subsist by lending money at interest to the people. The Arabs call them "Vad Sarah," the "Children of Sarah," but hold them in great abhorrence. Limes are dried here, and exported in large quantities to the Persian Gulf.

At the period of my visit the Sheïkh was engaged in hostilities with the Wahhábís, who plundered several of his towns, and even compelled him to shut himself up in his fort at Sohar. The Imám, desirous of seeing his power humbled, would neither interfere nor render any assistance; but had his followers possessed resolution equal to that of their chief, the contest would very soon have been decided. The inhabitants of the sea-coast constitute very indifferent warriors, and having made a dash, on their first appearance, into the very centre of the enemy's forces, he found himself deserted by the greater number

of his troops, who were principally composed of this class, and only succeeded in making his escape by the most reckless gallantry: this has since taught him more caution.

It is thought Sheïkh Hilál aspires to the sovereignty of Omán. Many of the Bíazí sect, for reasons which I have given in another place, are disposed to regard their present Imám as one who has fallen away from the true faith, and Ahmed Aisan trims his sails accordingly. He affects great sanctity, and being endued with the gift of tears, is seen to remain without speaking to any one, weeping for hours. He also aspires to the spirit of prophecy; and flimsy enough as is the veil, has succeeded in creating among many with whom I have conversed the precise feeling he has been desirous to create.

Ahmed ibn Aisan's revenue is derived from the port of Sohar, which yields him annually ten thousand dollars. He also exacts a duty of five thousand dollars from the town of Rosták; but this is not more than one half of the aggregate sum collected by Sayyid S'aid, when in possession of the country, because Ahmed remitted a moiety as a consideration for their acknowledging his authority.

From Maskat to Schinas the coast of Omán is remarkably destitute of harbours, the only shelter the whole line affords being some narrow salt water creeks, or khores, as they are styled by the Arabs, which have only a sufficient depth of water to admit vessels of two feet draught. The inhabitants in consequence possess few boats of larger size than can be accommodated within them, or hauled upon the beach, which, upon the appearance of a north-wester, they most commonly do. In the date season they follow the same plan until they are freighted, and again launched for the purpose of proceeding to their destination. But the communication with the different ports seems more general by land than by water. For this purpose asses and camels are put in requisition; more generally the former. The price of a good ass is from fifteen to thirty dollars: their pace is considerably faster than that of a camel's, the latter being two miles and three quarters, and the former three miles and a half an hour: it is a short, quick trot, which they maintain

throughout the greater part of the day. The asses of Omán are nearly equal to those of Bahraïn, and a considerable number are annually shipped off to the Isle of France.

Schinas is but a small town, with a fort and a shallow lagoon, affording anchorage for small boats. It is said to yield to the Imám an annual revenue of three thousand dollars; but that is not more than is sufficient to defray its expenses. During the expedition to Rás el Khaïmah, in 1809, our force, in an attack on the fort, lost several men. Its inhabitants that year had thrown off the Imám's yoke, and, connected with the pirates, infested the entrance of the Gulf for some months. But soon after Rás el Khaïmah fell they returned to his rule, and its fort admitted a party of Belúches soldiers, whom he retains in his pay. I found the Sheïkh absent, and from those he left in charge we could obtain neither answers to our questions nor common civility. However, upon my threatening to leave their port, and represent our reception to the Imám, they became alarmed, and towards the evening I was enabled, by their assistance, to forward the

Imám's letter to Sayyid ibn Mutluk, the Wahhábí chief, who, I had every reason to believe, was still at Bireïmah: with it I also sent a note, requesting that, if he were willing to receive me, he would, as the intermediate country was in a very unsettled state, send a small force to conduct the party from the sea-coast to his encampment. I employed the time which elapsed after the despatch of our letters in collecting information of, and examining, as far as my means enabled me, the surrounding country, of which I shall now give some description.

There is such an universal sameness in the common features of this part of Omán, that it would be unnecessary and tedious to enter on minute details; I shall therefore give a general outline of the country and its inhabitants, commencing with the sea-coast.

From Schinas to Rás Mussendon, the north-east extremity of Arabia, the Maceto and Acabo of the Greeks, and the Rás el Jebel, or cape of the hills of the Arabs, the general direction of the coast is N. ½ E.; and throughout the whole distance it is indented with deep bays, coves, and inlets, which be-

come more numerous and more irregular in their outline as they approach the Cape. This indentation is also continued on the western side of the promontory, and a narrow ridge, five hundred yards in width, is all that separates Kasáb Bay on one side, and Goobut Gureï'yah on the other. There are probably few parts of the world presenting an outline so tortuous and irregular as the space included between this isthmus and the Cape.

A succession of villages and date-groves extend from Schinas to Dibha, where the maritime plain (Batna of the Map) commences. At Dibha the Imám has a fort, and he formerly drew from the village a small annual revenue of four thousand dollars. Water, vegetables, and cattle, all good in their several kinds, may be obtained here. It has a few boats, which are employed in bringing grain from the Persian shore. The intermediate parts of Khórfakán and Khór Kulba are similar in size and in the productions they afford to Dibha.

From Dibha to the northward, a range of mountains rise up directly from the sea, exhibiting in many places the most romantic

aspect. The only beach met with is at the extremity of the coves, where a small portion of sand or shing, composed of broken coral or shells, is occasionally found, thrown up by the force of the wind and waves. From the main ridge of mountains, the average height of which is about two thousand five hundred feet, nearly midway between the eastern and western shore of the promontory, several lateral valleys extend towards the sea. Bireïmah may be approached from Schinas by two of these, Wádí Khór and Wádí Uttar. From Fidgira another road leads across the ridge to Shárga, which is two and a half days distant. A few date-groves are reared near the banks of the rivulets, which wind along their beds; but little else is cultivated, and the line of oases, extending from Obrí to Bireïmah, forms the boundary of the cultivation in that part of Omán. From thence to the shores of the Persian Gulf the whole is an arid and sandy waste. Two days' journey from Schinas, a few miles to the southward of Wádí Uttar, on the road to Bireïmah, there is a collection of thirty hamlets, called

Beldan Beni Chab, from the name of the tribe who occupy them. They are in number about one thousand five hundred, and though Wahhábís, are remarkable for the protection which is afforded by them to all who flee there, be their crimes or their faith what they may.

Bearing south from this small district stands the town of Bireïmah, similar in its extent and general features to Bedí'ah: it possesses several hamlets, and is watered by as many streams. There is a fort here, mounting a few small guns, belonging to the Ghafari tribe, who profess the Wahhábí tenets, and refuse to acknowledge the authority of the Imám. The usual number of inhabitants is estimated at two thousand, but, owing to the late influx of the Wahhábís, there were at this season nearly treble that number collected within its precincts. The inhabitants bear the character of being equally wild, and averse to the visits of strangers with those of Obrí. Although the heat of the summer season is very great, the climate of Bireïmah is considered far

superior to any part of Omán, and almost equal to that of Nejd, which is everywhere extolled as the finest in Arabia.

From Dibha to Rás Mussendon, together with that extent of hilly country included within the bifurcation of the main range and the sea, the whole space appears to be barren, and generally destitute of water. That obtained near the sea-coast is indifferent and brackish; and the lonely clumps of palms, which occasionally peep forth from some secluded nook or hollow, when contrasted with the bleak and sombre appearance of the hills, afford, by their verdant hue, a pleasing contrast. A scanty sprinkling of grass in the sandy beds of the valleys, and a few aromatic herbs and shrubs peculiar to the Desert, furnish but indifferent pasturage to the numerous flocks of goats which are everywhere met with. The *Euphorbia Tirucalla*, or milk bush, is also found here, growing out of the fissures of the rock. Notwithstanding the peculiarly acrid nature of the juice of its leaves, which is sufficient to excoriate any part of the skin on which it may be placed, the goats and camels feed thereon

with impunity. Sheep are scarce. Both roam over the rocks without an attendant, yet they are taught to come at call, when it is necessary to milk them. The distance to which their owners will make themselves heard on these occasions is very great, and they can maintain, without difficulty, a distinct conversation across the coves, some of which are half a mile in breadth.

The whole of this district is peopled by a race, who speak a dialect differing from that of the tribes in other parts of Omán. They are also remarkable for their extraordinary attachment to their native wilds, and beyond hiring themselves out for a few months in the date harvest, on the Batna coast, and an occasional visit to the Island of Larák, where a small party of them reside to catch and cure fish, they rarely quit their country. They likewise keep aloof from all their neighbours, and I have often inquired for them in the town without success. Before the visit of the surveying vessels they had never seen an European, and they testified as much surprise at the sight of looking-glasses, watches, and other objects of curiosity, as

could have been exhibited by the veriest savage of New Holland. They are mostly very poor, wearing no other covering than a narrow cloth round their waist, which barely serves the purposes of decency. Their habitations are often small circular huts, constructed of loose stones, about four feet high, and usually erected on the strip of sea-beach already mentioned. Other dwellings are found within the space sheltered by some impending rock, the sides and front of which are built up in those spots which require it, but the greater number reside in caves and hollows. On one occasion when the surveying vessel drifted close to the shore, and it was feared she would ground, the hills, which, but a few minutes before, were without a solitary individual, instantly became covered with armed men, who had crawled forth from their caves to share in the expected plunder.

Their principal food is dates and salt fish, rice being nearly unknown to them, but they obtain, occasionally, a small supply of barley and wheat. It has been asserted that this people are of a fairer complexion, and speak

a language distinct from the other inhabitants of the province; but both opinions are incorrect. Those I met with were of a darker hue than the common race of Arabs, and their language differs no more from that used in Omán, than does the dialect of Yemen from that of the Hejas. A colony of Persians formerly settled in Kúmza, and also in Kasáb Bay, where their descendants still remain, and those who have seen them may have originated the supposition.

The number of those who inhabit this rocky wilderness is very considerable,—not less, as far as I could estimate, than fifteen thousand souls. Both the eastern and western shores are lined with villages. The Sheïkh of Kasáb can muster five thousand men under his government: the Sheïkh of Bokh has nearly two thousand, and the chiefs of the other towns in equal proportion. They rear a small quantity of poultry within their dwellings, including a few ducks, which I never recollect seeing in any other part of Arabia.

CHAPTER XVI.

Maritime Robbers—Forbearance of the Indian Government—Instructions to our Cruisers—Audacity of the Pirates—Anecdote—Capture of the Sylph—Massacre—Attack upon the Minerva—Captain attempts to blow up his Vessel—Crew offered up as a Sacrifice to the Prophet—Singular Ceremonies—National traits of Character—Respect for Women—Resolute bravery—Contempt of Death—Expedition against the Pirates—Mohammed Ali—Pirate Vessels—Reparation of Losses—Author engaged in Surveying the Arabian Coast—Additions to Geographical Knowledge—Danger of withdrawing our Squadron—Destruction of a Piratical Boat—Transportation of her Commander—Population—Tribes—Authority of Chiefs—Simplicity of their Domestic Habits.

It remains to notice the pirates, a race hitherto but little known, but whose power and influence was long felt by, and is still intimately connected with the political condition of the tribes in this part of Arabia. They occupy a part of the coast within the Persian Gulf comprehended between the mountain range and the sea-shore, and extending in that direction from Kasáb to the

Island of Bahrein,—a distance of three hundred and fifty miles. On the map, this portion bears the designation of the Pirate Coast.

[...]

Here, as in other parts of Arabia, I have found great difficulty in ascertaining the amount of the population. Little reliance

can be placed on the testimony of the chiefs, who are ever desirous of enhancing the power of their own, and depreciating that of other tribes; while, from their maritime pursuits, and their connexion with the pearl fishery, the amount of actual residents is constantly fluctuating. The number of their huts affords no surer guide, for, being built of the branches of the date palm with little trouble, when old and damaged by the wind, they are often deserted and left standing. The mean of my several inquiries induces me to fix their number at twenty thousand, exclusive of women and children. The principal tribes are the Johásmí, Menasír, Benî As, and Maháma: the former is the most powerful. They not only possess all the chief ports of the Arabian coast, but have also established themselves on the Persian shore, where they have several large towns and flourishing villages. Their name is derived from a Saint Johásmí, who resided on a low tongue of land, and the tents of his followers, which were pitched around, gave the name of Rás el Khaïmah, or "Cape of Tents," to the promontory on which a town bearing the same designation

was subsequently erected. The Johásmís very soon after its promulgation embraced the tenets of the Wahhábís, with whom they were always in strict alliance, and to this cause we are to attribute the bitter hatred of the Princes of Omán. Their present chief is considered to be wily and politic. In their peculiar mode of warfare he possesses great abilities, but is otherwise deficient in that boldness and frankness which characterises the Arab. His capital, Rás el Khaïmah, was wholly dismantled in 1819, but is now rebuilt, and, perhaps, of greater magnitude, and more populous than before. If our ships, therefore, were not kept in constant communication with him, there is little doubt, both from his ability and disposition, that he would occasion us some trouble.

The tribe next in importance to the Johásmí is that of Benî As. Its late Sheïkh, Tanún, was an enterprising character, who possessed considerable power, and maintained a regular force of four hundred men, very well armed and equipped. Small as this number may appear, it was sufficient to give him considerable influence over his rivals, although

the number of troops he could otherwise bring into the field was estimated at four thousand only. When the Imám, in 1829, undertook an expedition against the Island of Bahrein, he endeavoured, by the payment of a considerable sum of money, to secure the co-operation of Tanún; but when the hour of attack arrived, his lukewarmness was so apparent, that it is to this day believed he also received a bribe from the other side.

The surveying vessels, in 1828, received much attention from this chief, who was very fond, during their intercourse with him, of engaging in the several games with which the officers and men passed away their leisure hours, and equally happy if they would share in those of his own people. On these occasions the most perfect good humour existed. One day, an officer had been matched to run on foot against Tanún, who was in person rather short, but very active, and with abundant vivacity, and love of amusement. For some time after they had started the officer held the lead, but finding, as he approached the goal, that the longer-winded little Sheïkh was about to pass him, he threw

himself headlong before his path. Over flew Tanún, amidst shouts of laughter from his tribe; but, nowise disconcerted or annoyed, the Sheïkh arose, and, after joining most heartily in their mirth, congratulated his opponent on the success of his stratagem. In wrestling, leaping, and other athletic exercises, his Arabs generally were equally matched with, and, not unfrequently, had a decided advantage over our Europeans.

The authority exercised by these chiefs differs but little from that of the Sheïkh government on which I have hereinafter touched. From the fierce and turbulent character of those they govern, their power is necessarily of a somewhat despotic nature, yet, in adjusting broils, and in matters connected with the general interest of the tribe, the opinion of their old men has great weight. The direct interference of the Sheïkh is, in fact, neither sought nor often called for; and the tribe is ruled without the aid of frequent punishments; for, when its relations are so simple and so well understood as in Arabia, offences against the good order of society rarely occur. In their diet and mode of living these chiefs

preserve the same simplicity as the Bedowin Sheïkhs ; a fact the more extraordinary, since they are not in the same manner shut up in a desert, but in constant communication with Indians, Persians, &c., and having more wealth and power, would experience no difficulty in supplying themselves with foreign luxuries. It follows then, that this self-denial, whilst retaining the national manners, must be considered as purely voluntary.

While cruising on this coast in 1827, I was proceeding with dispatches to the Sheïkh of Sharja, Sultan Ibn Suggar, when a strong breeze unexpectedly set in, and raised so heavy a swell on the bar, that our boat, in attempting to cross it, was capsized. This occurred some distance from the land, but, all being good swimmers, we reached it without much difficulty, and with no other inconvenience than a thorough drenching. After landing, the gale increased, and for three days we could not attempt to put off to the vessel. I had then some opportunity of studying the private character of the people, as well as that of their rulers. Sultan was unremitting in his attention to me, a meal being

every day prepared at, and sent from his house. On one occasion he invited me to dine and pass the evening with him. I was received in a small room, furnished with only a rude table, two or three chairs, given him by the commanders of our vessels, and some carpets, on which, after I had declined the honour of the chairs, we all seated ourselves. Our dinner was, as usual, of the most frugal description, and, after its removal, the Sheïkh's brother roasted and pounded the coffee, which the Sheïkh himself made and handed round. A story-teller was then called in, whose tale, judging from the peals of laughter he drew from his hearers, must have possessed much entertainment; but I was then too ignorant of the language to understand it.

2.10
H. H. Whitelock's account of the Arabs of the Coast, 1836

An Account of Arabs who inhabit the Coast between Ras-el Kheimah and Abothubee in the Gulf of Persia, generally called the Pirate Coast. By Lieut. H. H. Whitelock, I. N.

THE number of inhabitants properly said to belong to this shore, cannot be ascertained with much certainty, as they are mostly seafaring people, and at some seasons of the year, particularly during the pearl fishery, the towns are nearly deserted by the men, who leave their wives and children at home under the care of those who have passed the period for active employment in such arduous work.

Any calculation deduced from the number of houses and supposed occupants, would be very fallacious in a country where the inhabitants live principally in cadjan huts, which are erected without much trouble or expense, and are frequently deserted: we have therefore to rely upon their own accounts, and as the Shaiks are generally actuated by directly opposite views in giving information regarding the power and influence of each other, perhaps the mean difference of such statements may be taken as an approximation to the truth, and as such, they may be computed at 11 or 12,000, belonging chiefly to the various tribes of Joasmee, Menasseer, Beni-Yas, and Mahama.

The character of the inhabitants on this Coast is in most points, what might be expected to be the result of their mode of life and occupation. Their only business in peace is on the water as fishermen, and divers for pearl. But as each town is generally at war with the neighbouring one, they are familiar enough with strife and plunder, so that, when employed, it is in the most active manner, and they have to encounter great hardship in obtaining their livelihood. These occupations, however, cannot be pursued during many months of the year, as the temperature of the water is too cold for them to dive for pearls, except in June, July, August, and September; and in the winter months the violence of the sea on this open shore puts a stop to the fishery, except in the creeks or immediate vicinity of of their homes; having no agricultural labors to take to at this time, they are reduced to a total state of idleness, which, no doubt, leads to their predatory acts upon each other.

Being familiar with arms from youth, and hardy of constitution, naturally accustomed to privations, fatigue, and danger, it is to be expected that they should be brave, and they are found to be so.

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Amongst themselves the character of the lower orders appears to advantage : quarrels are seldom heard of; old age is always respected, and filial duty performed ; hospitality is proverbial : in manner they are stern, and any thing trivial, or in the way of joke or humor, is either not understood or despised ; firmness of body and mind are the qualities that alone carry respect with them, and are the necessary qualifications for their rulers.

The Shaiks on this Coast are despotic, and always retain a strong body-guard for protection, and to keep their subjects in order and obedience ; this is effected usually without frequent recourse to violent punishments, as far as I could learn, as they do not exact much from the people beyond military service in war time.

The old men are usually consulted in matters of importance, and to settle disputes and quarrels, and this apparently satisfies them all.

Tanoun, the Chief of Abothubee, at the time I am writing of, was an active character and fond of enterprize ; he carried this in his appearance and seemed to delight in warlike exercise.

I remember his paying Captain Guy a visit of ceremony, accompanied by twenty or thirty soldiers, fully equipped for war and mounted on tall camels, which were remarkably well covered with hair, and of a bright brown color, and certainly the finest I ever saw. In approaching they made a charge at full speed in regular order, and pulled up suddenly within three hundred yards of us, when down the camels dropped on their knees at the word of command. Tanoun approached a little in advance in the centre of his men, who formed in half circle behind him. Captain Guy rose, and walked forward to meet him. Refreshments, coffee, and sweetmeats, had been prepared in the tent, with the necessary carpets for sitting down upon before hand, and the visit went off in the usual way. In the evening Captain Guy returned it, and we saw the soldeirs shoot at a target with matchlocks.

I cannot extol their practice, for our sepoys of the Marine Battalion equalled them fully with their muskets ; and the Doctor and some of the officers rather astonished them, by taking so much better aim with their rifles and fowling-pieces.

Tanoun was rather a small man, but well made ; he was reputed to be both brave and liberal, and appeared to be feared by the people. He was at the head of the Beni-Yas tribe, and could command the services of about 400 well appointed soldiers : this gave him rather the ascendancy by land over the Shaik of Sharjah, and the other chiefs on this Coast ; and his aid was considered to be of such importance to the Imaum of Muscat, when he made an attack on the Island of

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Bahrein in 1828, that he endeavoured to secure it by purchase, and, as far as outward appearances went, he gained his point. However, during the attack Tanoun's men deserted the Sultan's cause in so shameless a manner, that it was generally believed that these mercenaries were in the pay of both parties.

Sultan Bin Suggur, the Chieftain of Sharjah and Ras-el Kheimah, (belonging to the Joasmee tribe,) has the advantage over the Shaik of Abothubee in the number of his boats. They are generally at war with each other. He differs from the usual character of these men, which is generally bold and frank ; and is thought to be a cool, deceitful person, and no faith can be placed in his engagements with any party ; but they admit his abilities for strutagem in their mode of warfare. He would have been, no doubt, a troublesome character, had his power not been taken from him during the expedition in 1819 and 1820, which laid Ras-el Kheimah, then a most formidable town for this country, in total ruin, and destroyed most of the forts at the other towns.

Previous to this event it was supposed that Ras-sel Kheimah, and its dependencies in the Gulf, could fit out nearly 100 boats; many of them were from 3 to 400 tons burthen, and with this force they perfectly infested the seas, and committed the most daring piracies on the trading vessels, and on some occasions attacked our vessels of war.

If it be remembered, that the entrance of the Gulf between Larack and the Quoins is only 36 miles broad, it will at once be seen how easily they could plunder the vessels proceeding either up or down the Gulf ; and to render this even more easy, it so happened that we were totally ignorant of the deep inlets about Ras Masandam, which afforded them such excellent points to sally from, or retreat to, when chased.

After the destruction of Ras-el Kheimah, and the capture of their best boats, they were reduced to order, and, with little exception, have remained so for the last 16 years : indeed, beyond their own quarrels, we have seldom heard of any acts of plunder on the sea.

Their connection with the opposite ports* on the Persian Coast, many of which had been conquered by them, is nearly broken off, and the number of inhabitants on the Coast is much reduced. If they are kept in this state, and not allowed to make head again

* Lingar, a town of considerable trade, situated between Cape Bostana and Basidoh, being governed by a relation of Sultan Bin Suggur, and populated chiefly by the Joasmee tribe, may be still considered in alliance with Ras-sel Kheimah and Sharjah.

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which they both hope and expect to do, I do not think the Gulf will be ever again in a state of general disorder: if it is, we shall have ourselves to blame, as nothing is to be apprehended from any other part of the Gulf, except perhaps from Bahrein, which has more resources within itself, and the power of being more troublesome to us, than the whole of the other ports put together. But, as I shall have to speak of it hereafter very fully, I shall not mix it up with this account.

If I am right in supposing that if the Gulf is again ever seriously disturbed by piracy it will be from this Coast, I believe that every body properly acquainted with the subject will admit, that Basidoh is the best port that could be selected for a naval power to be stationed with a view to suppress it: it is so immediately in the vicinity of the piratical ports, and that part of the sea in which they would commit their depredations. It has secure anchorage and other advantages as a naval depot, superior to any other place that I know of in that vicinity: it may be objected to as unhealthy, but it is less so than any other place that has been tried.

When the troops were stationed at Kishem, Daristan, and Salkh, situations all differing in aspect, they were found equally unhealthy, or rather more so than at Basidoh.

If the presence of a naval force is required in the Gulf, it is more particularly so in the lower part of it; and the inconvenience of the distance, and the time it takes to communicate with the authority at Bushire, will be seriously felt in times of trouble: and of this the Arabs are well aware, and can reckon with accuracy how long it will be before any cognizance can be taken of their misdeeds, in consequence of the necessity of a previous report being made to the political authority.

From the intricacy of the navigation between Abothubee and Sir Beni-Yas, the surveying duties were principally performed by detached parties from the vessel; and I formed one of the number that quitted the Psyche in February 1824, with the ship's boats fully equipped with every thing for six weeks' consumption. The Shaik of Abothubee (Tanoun) had readily supplied two good native vessels, pilots, and a strong guard of Arabs for us, under charge of his nephew, who was then a conceited young man about 20 years of age, very vain of his management of a war-camel, and his prowess in throwing a spear; and I think he was much disliked by the people for his pride.

They joined our sports as readily as we did their's, and wrestling, leaping, and single stick, often formed the diversion of the afternoon;

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and on these occasions our proud conductor frequently met a fall, and his extreme discomforture was much increased by the loud laughter of the Arabs. In the evening we joined their sports, and in a circle round a large log-fire, played at simple games of chance, and sipped coffee.

I much regret I did not know the language well, as I believe we had one or two capital story-tellers amongst them, amusing fellows I can attest, from the attention and laughter they could cause when they pleased.

Our first encampment was on an island, where we procured a donkey and seven camels, which we found very useful, as walking in the heat of the day in the soft sand had laid us up pretty generally with sore feet; and I was much afraid we should have to part with them when we left the island, as I knew it would be impossible to boat the large brutes in any thing we had, and the narrowest part to cross was four fathoms deep and one and half mile broad. In reply to my inquiries the Arabs laughed, and said I should see how they would manage it, which they did in the following manner. They chose a tractable camel for a leader, and made them one after the other fast in a string, with about three yards of line intervening; they pushed the first into the water, hoisted their large sail in the boat, and by dint of blows he was soon fairly afloat, then another, and in this way the whole line were towed at the rate of two miles an hour across the creek: the donkey would have been served in the same way, but we had boated him in the mean time ourselves. I never happened to see this done either before or since.

The Arabs on this Coast, when arrived at full vigor, are strong, muscular, thick set men, and combine their efforts when working together in an unusual degree. I have often seen then launch and haul up their boats with apparent ease under difficult circumstances, and, perhaps, from a mixed feeling arising from a desire of shewing themselves to advantage and to oblige, they frequently volunteered their service on like occasions to assist us. In early youth they are lathy, slender looking men, active withal, but considerably under our standard in stature; from thirty to forty they are a powerful thick-necked race, with a developement of sinew and muscle that I never saw surpassed. But in old age, generally much attenuated; it is seldom that you meet with a sleek, corpulent person amongst them at any age.

They wear the Wahabee dress generally, and appear proud of it; I dressed up once or twice to please them, and they appeared heartily amused. The head dress, which is composed of rich silk and cot-

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ton thickly woven, is striped red or green and bright yellow, about four feet long and three broad, with the end of the material twisted into a fringe of long cords on the side; they wear it hanging over in front very much, and it gives a scowl to their harsh rugged features which suits with their character; a pouch for tobacco or cartridges of some rough skin, and a horn for powder worn over the shoulder and suspended by silken strings; a matchlock generally ornamented with silver about the stock; a spear about seven feet long, and always a rich dagger in the girdle, form part of their usual costume, to which I should add a long double-edged strait sword, having a long handle without any guard for the hand, the sheath of leather usually ornamented with silver. The body dress is generally a long white shirt open in front and buttoned at the throat, and sandals made of camels hide very well tanned.

The camoleen, or outward garment, is made of woollen twist, either thick and close wove, or exceedingly fine and open; the thick kinds are mostly black, and sometimes ornamented with gold thread, when worn by the better orders. The poorer classes use a striped camoleen white and brown; they vary in cost from two to thirty dollars. They bind a cloth round the loins, which is generally chequered brown and white; it is sometimes made entirely of silk, but more frequently of a mixture of silk and cotton. The men shave their heads, and do not usually allow the beard or mustaches to grow very long.

The women wear blue shirts or very loose gowns, handkerchiefs on their heads, and always dark masques over their faces, with peep-holes to see through. A few of them are pretty, and they are much fairer than the men, who are mostly of a deep, healthy, brown color.

The children are neglected in point of cleanliness, and it is common to see them thus early afflicted with opthalmia, which I think partly arises from the flies being allowed to lodge round their eyelids; they appear to become quite insensible to the annoyance, and the insects remain in clusters on their dirty faces undisturbed. In youth, as I believe any kind of education on this Coast is uncommon, they are allowed to run free and nearly naked, and amuse themselves in the water with little boats, which generally are very complete models of the native vessels and well made; this forms a hardy training to fit them for their future occupation, as they are inured to the water, and become excellent swimmers at a very early age.

The Arabs are very dirty in their persons, and rarely wash their clothes, although they feel the consequences as much as other people; and I have seen a man in a passion from this annoyance call for a pot of hot water and strip himself immediately, seeming to gloat on

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the destruction he was about to cause. In some cases of sickness, they rub the body with ghee and saffron powder mixed, and allow it to remain on as long as it will.

The houses of the better classes are constructed of stone with flat roofs to sleep upon, without comfort of any kind beyond mats and rude bedsteads: the poor classes live in cadjan huts.

Their diet is simple enough, but wholesome; dates, fish, cakes of flour, and milk, form the principal articles: rice being expensive, is an indulgence with the poor, but they are very fond of it. Pillaw made with fowls or kid, and fruit, form the evening repast with the higher orders. Coffee is drunk at all hours out of small cups of china placed in a cup or frame of silver or brass, according to the condition of the owner. Smoking is common enough, but not on this Coast so much as elsewhere, as some of the Wahabees do not use tobacco at all. They cook in earthen pots, generally placing the fish on the living embers, and so toasting it; at the same time the sides of the pot are covered with their wheaten cakes, which are soon baked: the fish cooked in this manner is very sweet. Dates are abundant and cheap, and form their chief article of food. Fruit is not produced on this Coast in any quantity, but you can obtain limes and melons in the market, and sometimes grapes, which are probably brought from Lingar, or from the interior.

I do not know much of the diseases that prevail amongst the Arabs excepting fever and opthalmia; the latter is very common, and they say that diving on the pearl banks is the principal cause of it, and of most of their other ailments.

They readily apply for our medical aid, but frequently, after some round-about story about pains and aches, out comes the real business, and they ask for something to increase their power of sensual indulgence, and, of course, go away disappointed.

Fish is plentiful, particularly mullet, which are caught in nets, in the back waters, in great numbers: at sea they take the red rock fish, and occasionally seer fish, and small sharks; dog-fish are likewise very numerous, and the natives appear to prefer them to most kinds.

The birds that are common on this line of Coast, are the curlew, stork, plover, and a small bird called the sandlark: none of them are good eating, generally of a fishy flavor.

Taking the average of the Gulf produce into consideration, the cattle may be pronounced good, but very small. A bullock is seldom found to exceed 200lbs. in weight: sheep and goats are procu-

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rable. The fowls are good, but smaller than usual, and in great number; eggs, cheese, and butter, are easily obtained.

Indeed, considering the nature of the land, which is a loose sandy desert, it is surprising to find so many articles of consumption; and it argues that the country, not far distant inland, is rich and fruitful, as it is said to be. Tanoun, the late Shaik of Abothubee, in 1822, offered to escort a party of us to what he described to be an ancient city, situated in a most fruitul country, seven days journey from the sea. I do not know what prevented the excursion, as it was very desirable for many reasons that it should have been undertaken. I have heard also that there is a caravan route from the Coast, which takes its course through a beautiful valley lying between a pass in the mountains, which are seen at Ras-el Keeimah, extending beyond Ras Masandam to Core-facaun, and another range situated more distantly in land, which again appears at the Coast at or near the town of Sohar. It would be a pleasing journey for a couple of officers to undertake, and could be accomplished in the cold weather, I should think, very comfortably from Basidoh in the space of six weeks: a request to this effect from the Resident would, no doubt, meet with compliance from the Shaik of Sharjah.

The whole line of this Coast presents a bold approach, but it is a dangerous lee-shore in a north-west wind, which blows certainly two-thirds of the year; and in the winter months heavy gales come on without further warning than a thick dense atmosphere, and rolling sea setting on shore, which generally precedes the wind a few hours. It is extremely dangerous to remain at anchor on such occasions, and I never experienced a narrower escape from shipwreck than in the *Discovery*, during the survey in February 1822. We had anchored rather close in, wishing to obtain observations of Jupiter's Satellites: the wind and sea set in at midnight, and the vessel drove so, that it was about equally dangerous to make sail off shore, or ride out the gale at anchor. The latter course was chosen, and the tope-sail yards were sent down, but in twenty-four hours we parted three cables, so that no alternative remained, and being all prepared, the order to set sail and cut the cable was given: the vessel cast the wrong way, and lost considerable ground in wearing round; the driver and jib blew away, and the vessel was buried in the surf under courses, and the fore-top mast stay-sail.

We had only four fathoms water, and every one knew that if it shoaled in the least, the vessel must strike; so much so, that at one time Captain Guy hesitated for a moment whether he should not beach her at once. The Coast was lined with natives, who thought

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our fate inevitable. At the time it was impossible to tell how they would act on such an occasion, but I have heard since, that the Shaik ordered every exertion to be made to save the crew, upon pain of death if disobeyed, and this had caused them to collect in such numbers.

The vessel gradually crept off shore, and in six hours, anxiously spent by those on board, we cleared the Coast, having neither anchor nor cable on board; and cruised about until we met a vessel, and obtained what was wanted.

The towns are built close to the different creeks or backwaters: indeed, if it was not for the convenience of shelter afforded to the boats by the latter, this Coast could not be inhabited. Ras-el Kheimah is, from local circumstances, the most eligible place on the Coast for the site of a town, and is gradually increasing again in size and population.

Abothubee is a very mean place, having scarcely a stone building in it; it has advantages, however, from its anchorage near shore and creeks on both sides, that may ultimately cause it to be of greater importance.

The Coast is low with sandy hillocks near the sea; barren, with the exception of tufts of coarse grass, and low underwood here and there, and, in the vicinity of the towns, a few date groves are reared close to the wells.*

The inhabitants being Wahabees, are generally very strict in the outward observances of religion, never omitting, under any circumstances, their ablutions and prayers at the proper hour. Perhaps they may be considered bigoted and intolerant, and they certainly have no regard for any people not professing the Musalman faith, but they do not carry this into matters of a trivial nature, as they readily partake of food in your company, and permit you to use their utensils in drinking or eating.

The Arabs have mostly one or two slaves in their families to assist them in their daily labor: their kindness to them speaks much in favor of the Arab character, and shows their proper and manly feelings towards mankind in general: the slaves are usually brought up in the Mahomedan religion, and are not unfrequently placed in situations of high trust by their masters. I have frequently seen them in command of boats, and I once happened to be a passenger from the Red Sea in a fine ship called the Nassaur, which was commanded by a young slave belonging to the owner of the vessel, who lived at Hodeida.

* The fresh water on this Coast is good, except at Chothubee, where it is very brackish.

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He could just remember the circumstance of his being kidnapped at an early age, during a thunder-storm when attending some sheep, by a man on horseback, and his subsequently becoming reconciled to his fate by the kindness of the women. Of course he was too young to know much of his own country, although some faint recollections remained, and he thought the trees in the country he came from were larger than any he had ever seen since: he remembered that the men wore feathers stuck on their heads. This, with some other particulars, and the length of the journey, which terminated at Lindee on the African Coast, led me to conclude that he had been brought away from some distant place in the interior of Africa. At Lindee he was sold to his present master, who educated him with paternal kindness, for which he is truly grateful; and, although now only about 28 years of age, he is entrusted with most valuable cargoes to Bombay and Calcutta.

The Arabs marry at an early age, indeed as soon as they can maintain a family, and generally continue with only one wife, until she has passed the prime of life, when they indulge themselves with a second, if their circumstances will afford it, and perhaps eventually with a third.

I have questioned the natives several times about this practice of having a plurality of wives, and they admit that the women generally live very miserably together, and quarrel with each other incessantly. I remember a very intelligent young man telling me, that he was married to two wives at different ports, and that he kept the fact a secret from both of them, to save himself from annoyance. The women marry as early as 14 years of age, and, if they have many children, break down in their personal appearance very prematurely.

Towards strangers the Arabs evince considerable dislike to any notice being taken of their women, and they endeavour to keep them out of sight as much as possible. It is the custom, when you wish to inquire after the health of a man's wife and family, to put the question in this way, "How is your house?" and any further allusion to them would be taken in bad part. In courtesy the Arabs are formal, and never omit the customary salaam when they first meet another person.

Their burial-grounds are generally situated outside the village, and frequently in neat sequestered spots: the grave is dug about four feet deep, and the head of the corpse is invariably placed towards Mecca; that is, as nearly as they are able to judge of its bearing from the spot. On the death of a person, the loud lamentation of the

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female relatives may be heard at a considerable distance, and their outward manifestation of grief is very great.

The ground is heaped up over the grave, and a flag stone is placed at the head and foot: they sometimes erect small mosques, covered with a dome, over the remains of their rich or distinguished men.

The *pearl fishery* commences in June, and is continued until the equinox in September. During this period the water is very warm, and seldom disturbed for any length of time by the wind. The weather is excessively hot, and rendered truly oppressive by the dense state of the atmosphere.

The pearl bank extends from Sharjah to Biddulph's island, a distance in a straight line of about 330 miles. The bottom is sand and loose coral, and the depth of water is from five to eighteen fathoms, but very irregular.

The number of boats that are employed in the fishery throughout is said to be 3000, which are principally fitted out from Bahrein and its dependencies, from the towns on the pirate coast, and from Lingar and Assalow on the Persian side, as the right of fishing is free to all in the Persian Gulf. The boats are mostly small, with a crew of about seven men. However, there are many vessels that are about 50 tons, and have a crew of fourteen or twenty men.

The boats that are sent to the fishery from the pirate coast are generally found in fleets, averaging from seven to twenty, employed about the islands formerly called Maude's Group, which is the widest part of the pearl bank: they seldom or never proceed higher than the Island of Hallool. It is their custom to remain at sea until the boats are laden with oysters, and then to proceed to a convenient island to open the shells; and, from the large heaps which I observed on Sir Beni-Yas, Zurkoh, Surdy, and Seer Abonnaid, I conclude that these are found to be the most convenient islands for this purpose.

Above Hallool, and as high as Katif, the pearl bank at this season is literally covered with small fishing boats from Bahrein and its dependencies; and, not possessing here so many convenient places for opening their oysters, they are obliged to be continually running in and out of the port of Bahrein; but this is not of much consequence, as the best fishing ground is found in the vicinity of their own coast.

When fishing, the vessels anchor on the bank in various depths of water, from five to sixteen fathoms. The crew then commence the work by dividing themselves into two parties, as they are nearly all equal to the business of diving, which is described by the Arabs as the most fatiguing work. One party remains in the boat to receive

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the oysters, and to haul up the divers; the others strip naked and place their feet upon a stone weight, which is attached to the end of a line made fast at the other end to the boat: retaining hold of this with their hands, and being provided with a basket or net to put the oysters in, they are lowered down to the bottom by those on board; after filling the basket, which will contain seven or eight oysters, they jerk the line as a signal to the men on board to haul them up again, which is done as quick as possible.

When diving they make use of a piece of horn to close the nostrils, to enable them to breathe longer, which likewise prevents the water getting up the nose; this is about the size and form of a common wine bottle cork, with a notch at one end cut in the centre, so as to fit remarkably well: they continue down about 40 seconds in ordinary depths of water. I never saw one of them remain above a minute. On rising to the surface, they cling to the boat for rest, for the space of about three minutes before they dive again. In this way they continue at work by relieving each other, until their boat is filled with oysters.

When the fleet is laden, they direct their course to some neighbouring island, and secure their boats under its lee; the oysters are then landed from the boats, and the sails, oars and yards, are formed into tents, to protect fishermen from the insufferable heat of the day, and glare of the sand. We frequently visited their little encampments, and on some occasions bought a quantity of unopened oysters to try our luck, which they parted with at the rate of two dollers a hundred without much hesitation. I am inclined to think this is a fair valuation, as the result generally left it doubtful whether we had the best of the bargain; for from this quantity we usually obtained two or three small pearls worth about a dollar each, and I have known them to offer the money back again for them.

For opening the pearl oysters they use a common claspknife, and are very quick and expert; the pearl is found adhering to the cartilage, or hard part of the oyster which is attached to the shell.

During the fishing season the boatmen live on dates and fish; the latter are every where abundant and good. It is really an act of charity to add a little rice to their repast, for which they are always very thankful, and in return will give you every information they can about the fishery.

On one of these occasions, I questioned them regarding the danger they incurred from sharks when diving, as they are exceedingly numerous. They said it was not uncommon to meet with accidents from them, but described the risk as nothing when compared to the

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danger they encountered from the saw fish.* Many of the divers said they had seen people cut absolutely in two by these fearful monsters.

The Arabs describe the diving as very injurious to their health, and this usually shows its effects in their appearance. They are very much reduced, and suffer likewise from inflamed eyes: for which disease they apply antimony as a remedy. I shall here observe, that the use of antimony applied to the eyelids is general amongst both sexes, as they are always found provided with a small tin box, which is frequently inlaid with gilt and full of this powder. In using it, they smear the end of a smooth rounded piece of mother of pearl, and apply it to the inner part of the eyelid.

The islands afford perfect shelter to their boats during the strong north-west winds, which occasionally come on even at this season; but unfortunately they are mostly destitute of fresh water. At Sir Beni-Yas there is a beautiful lagoon with five fathoms water, situated on the south side of the island; the entrance into it is narrow, with only three fathoms water, but quite safe. It is much resorted to by the pearl fishermen, as the surface is always perfectly smooth, being entirely landlocked.

On the island of Surdy, there are some wells of fresh water; and it is to be regretted that there is not good anchorage. A ledge of coral rock extends about two cable's length from the island, with eighteen fathoms within a quarter of a mile of the shore, shoaling rapidly towards the beach; upon the margin of this vessels anchor, but it is too close in to be safe. The remains of a town are found here, and one or two buildings stand entire at the present day. It is much frequented by the Arabs, who dry their fish there in very large quantities.

The mineral specimens that I can call to memory as common to the islands, are trap, volcanic rock, gypsum, granite, sandstone, antimony, and iron ore.

The appearance of these islands viewed from a distance is highly interesting, owing to the very curious form of the hills, and the variegated color which they present. A scientific account of them would, I dare say, afford much new information; but I have merely alluded to them, with a view to convey a general idea of the islands.

The value in money of the pearls that are obtained throughout the Gulf during one season, is calculated at forty lacs of rupees.

* Pristis *Lath.*

45

During the *fishery*, Bahrein and its dependencies employ . . . . . 2430 Boats.
Sharjab Ras-el Kheimah. ditto 350
Abothubee and other towns of the Pirate Coast, about 350
Towns on the Persian Coast, about 100

Total number of boats employed 3230

The smallest boats employ five men, and the largest about eighteen. The former are the most numerous; therefore I think if the average number of men be estimated at nine to each boat, the result will give a very near approach to the correct number employed in the fishery.

Total number of boats employed . . . 3230
Average number of men in each boat . . . 9

Total number of men employed 29,070

Each boat pays a tax according to its size and the number of men, from one to two dollars to the Shaik of the place they belong to.

The crew are never hired for fixed wages, but have certain shares of the produce, regulated according to the expense and risk they incur in the outfit of the boat, or their expertness in the fishery as divers.

The Hindoo merchants purchase up a great part of the pearls, and export them to India. It is supposed that three-fourths of the produce is thus disposed of; the remainder is sent into Persia, Arabia, and Turkey.

The Arabs in the Gulf consist of so many different tribes, and being generally actuated by feelings of animosity towards each other, from the recollection of former feuds, it is not to be expected that peace and order can be maintained amongst them during the fishery, as various parties are huddled together frequently on the same island, which they resort to for shelter, or for the convenience of opening their oysters. Plunder and strife is therefore not uncommon, and it requires much vigilance on our part to suppress it, and to do this effectually, it is absolutely necessary to have two vessels on the pearl bank for the purpose.

[This, in the first edition of the Geographical Transactions, is marked "to be continued." But on searching the Society's repositories no continuation appears of the MSS. of Lieut. Whitelock. In the Catalogue of papers belonging to the Society, it is mentioned as having been "lost during the sickness of Dr. Heddle." The subjoined paper is probably the next in the sequence to that now missing. It has not been before printed. G. B. *Secy.*]

Regional relations

2.11
Destruction of Qubaisat settlement at ʻUdaid by Shaikh Khalifah b. Shakhbut, May 1837

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No 34 of 1837.
Residency in the Persian Gulf,
Bushire 17th June 1837.

Political Department
Sir,

I have the honor to report for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor in Council the Capture of Adeed on the 11th Ultimo by the Beniyas under the personal Command of their Chief Khuleefa ben Shackboot Sheik of Aboothabee The details of this attack are so fully communicated in the accompanying translation of a letter from the Agent at Shargah as to render it unnecessary for me to go into particulars. From this report it appears that the Ul Gubeesat allowed themselves to be surprised and that after losing fifty men in resisting the invaders on finding their access to fresh water cut off the remainder surrendered. The Chiefs however made their escape inland and a few others of the Inhabitants succeeded in passing the Beniyas fleet and getting to sea in their boats. In

Residency Persian Gulf. Reporting Capture of Adeed by the Beniyas

Forwarding report of the Shargah Agent of the particulars.

To,
I. P. Willoughby Esqre
Secretary to the Government,
Bombay

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On obtaining possession of the place Sheik Khuleefa proceeded to render it uninhabitable by destroying all the Forts and buildings and at the same time rendering the wells useless by throwing the bodies of the slain into them, and afterwards filling them up with the ruins of the Tower in their vicinity

The removal of the Ul Gubeesat from Adeed advantageous

P. Although there is some reason to apprehend that this successful exploit of the Beniyas Chief may involve him eventually in war with the Chiefs of Debaye and Ras-el-Khymah still I look upon the removal of the Ul Gubeesat Tribe from Adeed as an advantageous circumstance Sheik Khuleefa has now no longer any excuse for declining the responsibility of the whole line of Coast lying between that place and Aboothabee a track which includes the Khyran Beniyas frequented last year by the notorious Jasem bin Jubber and his lawless associates

Interference of the Debaye Sheik justifies the seizure of his boat in Adeed.

P. Adverting to the seizure of the Debaye boat in Adeed and the loss of some of her Crew mentioned by the Agent I do not doubt that Sheik Muckhtoom will bring forward this circumstance in justification of any attempts at retribution he may make either openly by his Tribe or secretly by supplying the Ul Gubeesat who have taken refuge in his port with the means of committing aggressions upon the Beniyas

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I submit however that the undue and irregular interference of the two boats of the Debaye Chief in the hostilities between Sheik Khuleefa and his revolted subjects which is fully proved by one of them actually carrying off 22 of the Inhabitants and the other attempting to do the same removes the blame of violating the Truce from the ruler of Aboothabee and leaves it upon the former Chief. From the tenor of the reply made by Sheik Sultan bin Sugger to the Adeed fugitives who, at the instigation of the head of the Boo Felasa Tribe applied to him for the means to enable them to attack the Aboothabee boats, it is evident that however unpalatable the capture of Adeed may be to him still that he is not inclined to withdraw his subjects from the Pearl Banks in order to espouse the cause of the defeated Tribe. In this opinion I have been confirmed by the receipt of a letter from his brother Saleh of Sharjah in which after alluding to the success of the Beniyas Chief he expresses a hope that this circumstance will not be permitted to break up the truce. If therefore the intriguing and restless spirit of the Debaye Sheik can be controlled I am not without hopes that affairs may be kept quiet, at least for the period of the Pearl Fishing. I have already sent off letters to this Chief warning him that he will be held responsible for any acts of aggression committed by the fugitives from Adeed who have

Sheik Sultan not disposed to interfere during the Pearl Fishery

Sheik Muckhtoom

The Debaye Sheik informed that he will be held responsible for the acts of the Adeed fugitives in his place.

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have taken refuge in his place and I shall despatch the Honorable Company's Sloop of War Clive as soon as possible after her return to this Port with a further intimation that he will not be permitted to violate the truce or to adopt any measures of a hostile nature against Aboothabee at least before the termination of the period assigned to it

and that he will not be permitted to violate the truce.

4th With reference to that part of the Agents report where he mentions that Sheik Khuleefa had sent up boats to Wukra and Bidda to demand the surrender of certain individuals belonging to Adeed who had taken refuge in those places I have since received information that the Sheik proceeded in person to the Coast of Guttur and contented himself with warning the Chiefs in that neighbourhood that he would consider them as altogether responsible in the event of the fugitives of the Ul Gubeesat Tribe taking advantage of the protection thus afforded them to injure or annoy his subjects or Dependents. —

Proceeding of Sheik Khuleefa on the Guttur Coast.

5. From all I can learn the conduct of Sheik Khuleefa towards his revolted dependents since he has brought them again into subjection has been characterized by moderation. All those relocated in Aboothabee have had their boats restored to them and the Sheik has published a full amnesty and pardon to such of the fugitives who

Sheik Khuleefa behaves with moderation

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who may chose to return, at the same time promising to give back to them their Vessels and property on the condition of their demeaning themselves in future as quiet and obedient Subjects.

I have the honor to be &c.

/Signed/ S. Hennell.

Officiating Resident &c.

69.



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and people of Debaye are somebody employed but it
is the upper Land. That disturbances take place
between them and the Bonyas on which account
after the other Tribes with their Encampments moved in
the ground. Have already explained your Letter
Bank Muscat for 150 Matchlocks accompanied by 450
Land people of Debaye for the purpose of attacking
and which place he reached on the 16th from May
to the [illegible] of the most part of the place
which was [illegible] that he was desirous in his
behalf the interests. The people of Debaye had di-
vested the interests. A boat Carrying the intended
provisions and Stores for some time
past Debaye on the way. The boat was sent and
3 days before Bank Muscat and delivered her letter
but the Wakeel and the reports and the enemies
the gone there became to an understand the Bo
Tribes Tribe and had totally moved from Khaysh
opened Khor Khan was in formidable for the Vessel
as the Bonyas Chief would not dare to attack
upon them when he was aware that Seth Bank Muscat
of Debaye and Bank Seller of [illegible] had
they must remain [illegible] his view. Hearing
this information preparations were made and
consequently they were completely surprised by
the arrival of the Bonyas Chief with his force

Enclosure No. 1
to Bombay Political Letter
dated 17 June 1837

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of about one hundred they had not more than 150 men and 150 slaves
and servants in the Town. Two Debaye Boyanks were Lying
present out [illegible] one of which was [illegible] Under the
protection of Bank Muscatteers. Both with their own proprietors
were made for defence and 10 men under the Command
of Syhad bin Hamid [illegible] were sent to occupy the Tower
which commands the water while the remainder remained
all the other [illegible] Hardly the number of
Leaving 15 boats opposite the Town for the purpose to land
men against the [illegible] Tower being himself the
first man who set foot on shore. The number in
the Western Town was soon known as well as that
he was supported with Artillery. Encouraged
by this circumstance a general attack [illegible] by
the Chief himself was made and scaling ladders being
formed with [illegible] from the Boat were planted on all
sides and the small garrison fled to the second
upon perceiving this the people of Debaye pursued
and by this time the Chief with the whole
all fled. Left of further resistance the right only of
flight. Hearing his behaviour when Chief with his soldiers
made them escape on Hamboat. Mahomed bin Ally
with his slaves and some of his friends succeeded in
getting to sea in his Boyank followed close enough
to Bonyas Boat. Whether they were overtaken or
not is not precisely known. Of the two Debaye boats

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the attack, one of the accomplices by a simple
signal of the place would be an important help
being in any 22 of the inhabitants. As the Debaye
left on board with the Captain of the Mackliss
and a letter wrote addressed to Hadj Jassim
and as fortunate. He stated that his Company
in the first boat when at last they attempted
to escape carrying with them 20 of the inhabitants
they knew fell into the hands of the Bonyas
who, they afterwards, put to death all the adult
people together with 5 of the Women including
the two relations of the Debaye Chief. The
Bonyas Women declared that the latter were
killed by falling on shore - After the capture
of the place Hadj Mubarak caused first
embarking all the women and children with their
effects completely destroyed the whole of the
Towers and Houses, and the... collected together
of the [illegible] Debaye then set the walls. the afternoon
filled the [illegible] up with the ruins of the Towers and
obliterated all appearance of them - Among the
inhabitants ... Indian Merchants who had
come to ask and to punish our Pearls; it was
said he was possessed of much property and
was sent him up and the K. The Bonyas say

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that 53 of the Enemy were killed and 87 taken
prisoners of the boat 30 were charged by the
Bonyas and by the force by Hadj Sultan
& Mubarak bin Attiq - I understand Ch.
Hadj Mubarak has sent down a fleet
& Warlike to demand the surrender of 25
men of the Al Jabal and with 2 boats have
left a large force - the [illegible] is afraid that
they should begin to plunder sea - Should
any return to the people of Debaye who are
suffered with pride and always ready
to provoke confusion and disturbance - In
every Hadj Mubarak has received
permission to allow go to sea with 40 and under
of any good like the other Tribes they carried
on an active correspondence with the place
and at the same time and messages to Hadj Sultan
assuring me as strong how he [illegible] by which
permission has been obtained by Hadj Mubarak
they have [illegible] sent and have left to
the Chiefs of the Tribe upon the Banks, some
days to warn them the upon their guard against
any attack on the part of the Bonyas - I am sure
that they have your instructions & like the

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first opportunity of retaliating upon the people of Jabrah the death of the relations of Khalifa. If this be the case the Bin Ruqaya will only receive Encouragement upon their present proceedings but will also probably attack those of his allies and Khalifa & Juggin and the Pearl Fishery will be altogether put an end to on the arrival of the 22 gunboat from Abu Dhabi & Debay the latter have not been heard from & Capt. Hall May must not expect to find them & Capt. Hall May must not expect to find them with a boat and Men to proceed to the Gulf and commence operations upon the Bin Ruqaya. Upon this receiving the Resident's letter and communicating its with Shaikh Sultan. And they express the deepest regret on hearing of the capture of Dhow and Cash but under present circumstances the Political Agents were absent upon the Pearl Fishery and was impossible that he could proceed from the Pearling Ground to Sharjah for that purpose in the Remainder of the Fishery Season the return of the people he wanted to do all that they requested. The Shaikh further said he may that when he could send to the

75 Arabian boat for the purpose of establishing the Truce by Shaikh Sultan I had no idea that Muhaya the Shaikh of would have been permitted to make war upon Abu Dhabi having given him an order for 100 Shaikh Khamis upon Sharjah he must then look to that place. Upon the receipt of this Dhow they returned to Debay. I am given to understand the people of the latter place are permitted them with the means of committing aggression upon the Bin Ruqaya - Gun upon some time since he boat was visited by a vessel of theirs and I send and request that nothing should be done to prevent the commission of lawless and irregular acts and demanded the frequent appearance of the Cruizer off the Arabian Ports will inform the Affairs of this Agency I expect that Bin Ruqaya has been sent from Shaikh Tyrab and to run a School to his Capital Bustar in Bryman and to Shaikh Sultan for Jeppa. The Bin Ruqaya State Tyrab upon the advance of Shaikh Mohd to Khan



Transcription of previous document

Enclosure in letter to Govt. dated 17 June No. 54
Pol Dep.

Substance of a letter from Moollah Houssen the Agent at Shargah to the Off. Res dated 26 Safar or 1 June 1837.

A.C. I have the honor to report that Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur of Ras el Khymah, Shaikh Rashid Humud of Ajman and Shaikh Abdoollah bin Suggur of Amulgavine are at present residing quietly in their own places and that their respective subjects are peaceably following their usual avocations of Pearl Fishing and Trading. The Chief and people of Debaye are similarly employed but it is to be apprehended that disturbances could arise between them and the Beniyas in which case I fear the other Tribes will also become involved in the quarrel. I have already reported to you that Shaikh Khuleefa left Aboothabee accompanied by 450 boats of all sizes for the purpose of attacking Adeed which place he reached on the 14 May to the great alarm of the inhabitants of that place who would not before believe that he was serious in his warlike intentions. The people of Debaye had at once dispatched a boat to warn them but instead of proceeding direct she had remained for some time pearl fishing on the way. She however reach Adeed 5 days before Shaikh Khuleefa and delivered her letters but the Al Qubusat still refused to credit the information thus given them because an individual of the Boo Felasa Tribe who had lately arrived from Shargah assured them there was no foundation for the report as the Beniyas Chief would not dare to commence hostilities against them when he was aware that both Shaik Muktum of Debaye and

confusion and disturbance on learning that Shaik Khuleefa had received permission to go to war with Adeed instead of remaining quiet like the other Tribes they carried on active correspondence with that place and at the same time sent messengers to Shaik Sultan accusing me as having been the medium thro which permission had been obtained by Shaik Khuleefa. They have since sent out two boats to all those of their Tribe upon the Banks some say to warn them to be upon their guard against any attack on the part of the Beniyas. Others think that they have issued instructions to take the first opportunity of retaliating upon the people of Aboothabee the death of the relations of their Chief. If this is the case the Beniyas will not only revenge themselves upon Shaik Mukhtoom's subjects - but will also probably attack those of his allies such as Shaik Sultan bin Suggur and thus the Pearl Fishing will be altogether put an end to.

On the arrival of 22 fugitives from Adeed at Debaye the Shaik put them into a boat and sent them to Raz el Khymah with a request to Shaik Sultan to furnish them with a boat and men to proceed to sea secretly and commence aggressions upon the Beniyas. Upon their reaching the Joacmee capital and communicating their wish to Shaik Sultan that Chief expressed the deepest regret on hearing of the capture of Adeed and told them that under present circumstances when all his vessels and subjects were about upon the Pearl Banks it was impossible that he could afford them the assistance they asked for but that on the termination of the Fishing and the return of his people he would do all that they requested. The Shaik further went on to

say that when the Resident visited the Arabian coast for the purpose of establishing the Truce he (Shaik Sultan) had no idea that Khuleefa bin Shakboot would have been permitted to make war upon Adeed. Having given them an order for 100 ?( ) upon Shargah he sent them back to that place. Upon the receipt of this sum they returned to Debaye I now fear that the people of the Guttur place will secretly furnish them with the means of committing aggressions upon the Beniyas. It is some time since the coast was visited by a vessel of war and I said and repeat that nothing tends so much to prevent the commission of lawless and irregular acts as the frequent appearance of the cruizers off the Arabian Ports.

With reference to the affair of Nedjd I beg to report that a messenger has been sent from Shaik Fysul who is now in Lahsah to his Naib Nusar in Brymee and to Shaik Sultan bin Suggur. This man reports that Fysul upon the advance of Shaik Khaled to Reas left that place and with all his property retreated to Lahsah and there joined Omr bin Afeesan. Other accounts however state the latter Chief refused him admittance and that he has now taken up a position between that district and Ajeer having written to the Bahrein Chief requesting him to pass over to the Island all his property. His object is to see whether Khaled wishes to sieze his person. If this be the case he will retreat to Byrmee. H. H. the Imam has garrisoned the Fort of Mombassa with 300 men amply supplied with stores. He has now gone to Zanzibar carrying with him 8 principal men of the place. In the Autumn he will return to Muscat.

2.12
Departure of Al bin ʻAli Shaikh ʻIsa b. Tarif from Abu Dhabi, December 1839

No 142

Secret Department

From

J. Bennett

Resident in the Persian Gulf

To

C. P. Reid Esquire

Acting Chief Secretary to Govt

Bombay

Sir

Dated 20th December 1839.

Adverting to my Letters No 133 in this Department, under date the 17th Inst. March, on the subject of the proposed removal of Isa bin Tarif and his followers, from Abothabee, to Muskat, I have the honor to report for the information of the Honorable the Governor in Council, that on the 26th Instant, this Chief again visited me, on board the Clive. His object in seeking another interview was, to inform me, that His Highness the Imam, had from some reasons, with which he was altogether unacquainted, most unexpectedly declined acting upon his promises

to

to him, and had moreover refused to send his relation Mullah bin Mahomed to Aboothabee to resist the Alli ally in getting away from that place, as had been arranged — that deprived of the looked for support of the Imam, it was probable, that he would be under the necessity of quitting the Beneyas Port, in opposition to the inclinations of Shaik Isha Iisa bin Shakbool, who no longer restrained by the influence of His Highness, would not unlikely instigate the Chief of Bahreim to join him in harrassing, if not openly attacking the Alli Ally in their new location of Wukra — that under these circumstances, he (Shaik Esa), and his followers, could not venture to take up their residence on the Gulfar Coast, unless the British Government would engage to prevent Shaik Abdoollah bin Ahmed, and the Beneyas Chief, from committing any aggressions upon them — I replied to Shaik Esa, that however desirous I felt to assist him, in consideration of the wrongs he had sustained, and the prudence and

and moderation he had displayed through out these trying circumstances, still, I could not give such a promise as he then asked, unless under the special sanction of the Government. On receiving this answer Esa bin Sareef said, that this being the case, he and his Tribe would settle themselves upon the Island of Ges (or Kism), off the Persian Coast) the Shaikh of which place, would gladly receive them. He replied, that I saw no objection to this location, which possessed the additional advantage, of being situated within the boundary line laid down by the Government, as the limits of the maritime hostilities of the Arabs, and therefore they need not be under any fear of molestation from either the Shaik of Bahrein or the Chief of Aboothabee — I being however at the same time fully understood, that himself and followers, would be equally precluded from committing any aggressions upon either of the two places above refered to —

Esa

2nd Esa bin Sa'eef then asked me to give him a letter to Shaikh Khalifa bin Shahbut requesting him to allow the old Ally to leave Bushire without hinderance or molestation. This I consented to furnish, and moreover intend to exert my influence in favor of Esa and his Tribe, whenever I can do so without compromising the Government as I consider it highly conducive to our interests to maintain an influence over him, and of paramount importance to prevent a person of his determined and energetic character, with such numerous brave and devoted followers, throwing himself into the arms of Khorshed Pasha, which distress might urge him to do, were no other opening left to him.

3rd The change in the views of the Imaum in respect to this Chief is very extraordinary after the earnestness and anxiety His Highness displayed in his favor on my first arrival at Muscat. I am myself altogether at a loss to account for it, but

but should it subsequently be in my power to throw any light upon this point I will not fail to bring it to the notice of the Honorable the Governor in Council.

I have the honor to be &c.
(signed) A. Bonnell
President in the Bay

Honorable Company's
Sloop of War Clive Muscat
the 24th December 1839

(True Copy)
(signed) H. Macnaghten
Secretary to Govt.

Transcription of previous document

No 140

Secret Department

From

S. Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf

To

L. R. Reid Esquire
Acting Chief Secretary to Govt.
Bombay

Dated 27th December 1839

Sir

Adverting to my letters No 133 in this Department, under date the 17th instant, on the subject of the proposed removal of Esa bin Tareef and his followers from Aboothabee, to Wukra I have the honor to report for the information of the Honorable the Governor in Council, that on the 26th instant, this Chief again visited me, on board the Clive. His object in seeking another interview was to inform me that His Highness the Imam had from some reason with which he was altogether unacquainted, most unexpectedly declined acting upon his promises to him, and had moreover refused to send his relation Hillal bin Mahomed to Aboothabee to assist the Alli Ally in getting away from that place, as had been arranged - that deprived of the looked for support of the Imam, it was probable that he would be under the necessity of quitting the Beneyas Port, in opposition to the inclinations of Shaik Khaliefa bin Shakboot, who no longer restrained by the influence of His Highness, would not unlikely instigate the Chief of Bahrein to join him in harrassing, if not openly attacking the Alli Ally in their new location of Wukra - that under these circumstances, he (Shaik Esa), and his followers, could not venture to take up their residence on the Guttur Coast, unless the British Government would engage to prevent Shaik Abdoollah bin Ahmed, and the Beneyas Chief, from committing any aggressions upon them. I replied to Shaik Esa that however desirous I felt to assist him, in consideration of the wrongs he had enstained (sustained) and the prudence and moderation he had displayed throughout these trying circumstances, still I could not give such a promise as he then asked, unless under the special sanction of the Government. On receiving this answer Esa bin Sareef said that this being the case, he and his Tribe would settle themselves upon the Island of Ges (or Kum), off the Persian Coast, the Shaik of which place, would gladly receive them.

I replied, that I saw no objection to this location, which possessed the additional advantage of being situated within the boundary line laid down by the Government, as the limits of the maritime hostilities of the Arabs, and therefore they need not be under any fear of molestation from either the Shaik of Bahrein or the Chief of Aboothabee, it being however at the same time fully understood, that himself and followers would be equally precluded from committing any aggressions upon either of the two places above referred to.

2nd Esa bin Sareef then asked me to give him a letter to Shaik Khaliefa bin Shakboot requesting him to allow the Alli Ally to leave Aboothabee without hinderance or molestation. This I consented to furnish, and moreover intend to exert my influence in favor of Esa and his Tribe, whenever I can do so without compromising the Government as I consider it highly conducive to our interest to maintain an influence over him, and of paramount importance to prevent a person of his determined and energetic character, with such numerous brave and devoted followers, throwing himself into the arms of Khorshed Pasha, which dispair might urge him to do, were no other opening left to him.

3rd The change in the views of the Imam in respect to this chief is very extraordinary after the earnessness and anxiety His Highness displayed in his favor on my first arrival at Muscat. I am myself altogether at a loss to account for it, but should it subsequently be in my power to throw any light upon this point I will not fail to bring it to the notice of the Honorable the Governor in Council.

I have the honor to be

(Signed) S. Hennell

Resident in the Persian Gulf

Honorable Companys
Sloop of War Clive Muscat
27th December 1839

(True Copy)

J. P. Willoughby

Secretary to Governor

2.13
The Egyptian invasion of eastern Arabia, 1838–1839

No 2109 Encl.

Bombay Castle 15th May 1839. Secret Consn.

To

His Excellency Khoorshid Pacha
Commander in Chief of the
Egyptian Forces
in Kedjaz,

Sir,

With reference to my
letter to your Excellency's address under date
the 28th February last, stating advantage of
the approaching visit to Bharein of Rear
Admiral Sir Frederick Maitland K.C.B.
Commander in Chief of H.B. Majesty's
Naval Forces in the East Indies to inform
you

No 2109 Cont.

Bombay Castle 15th May 1809 Secret Consultn

you Excellency, that H. B. Mc Government has intimated to His Highness Mahomed Ally through Colonel Campbell the British Consul General in Egypt, that they hope and trust he will upon full Consideration abandon any intention of Establishing himself in the Persian Gulf because as it has already been declared to him such a scheme on his part could not be viewed with indifference by the British Government.—

In conveying to your Excellency the assurance of my high esteem and Consideration.—

Residency Persian Gulf
Karrack
10th April 1809.

I have the honor to be &c &c
Signed J. Harnell
Resident in Persian Gulf

Translation

A Son Excellence Koorshid Pacha
&c &c &c

Monsieur,

Par rapport a ma letter du 28me du mois de Fevrier passé que j'ai l'honneur d'

No 2109 Cont.

Bombay Castle 15th May 1809 Secret Consultn

de addresser a votre Excellence ci jointe la depeche du depart prochain du Contre Admiral Sir Frederick Maitland Chevalier de l'Ordre &c Commandant en Chef des Forces Navales de sa Majesté Britannique aux Indes, d'informer votre Excellence, que, les Ministres de S.M.B. ont signifié a son Altesse Mahomed Ali par les mains du Col Campbell, Consul General Britannique en Egypte, qu'ils ont entiere attente et confiance que son Altesse, toutes choses bien reflechies abandonnera ses intentions de s'Etablir dans le Golfe Persique puisque il a été déjà intimé a son altesse que le Gouvernement Britannique ne pourra pas voir une telle démarche de sa part, avec indifference.—

Je saisis cette occasion d'assurer votre Excellence de ma haute estime et Consideration et je suis —

Date du Hotel du Resident dans le Golfe Persique a Karak
le 10 Avril 1809

de votre Excellence le très
Humble et très obeiss. ant Serviteur
Signé J. Harnell
Resident au Persian Golf

True Copy
Signed J. Harnell
Resident Persian Gulf

Trans

No 2110 Cont.

Bombay Castle 15th May 1839 Secret Consn.

No 27 of 1839.

From Captain S. Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf

To,
J. P. Willoughby Esquire
Secretary to Government
Bombay,

Dated 15th April 1839.

Sir,

I have the honor to forward for the information of the Honble the Governor in Council, the enclosed copy of my instructions to my Assistant Lieutenant Edmunds, on the occasion of his accompanying Rear Admiral Sir Frederick Maitland on his visit to some of the Ports of this Gulf. —

Residency in the Persian Gulf
Karrack
15th April 1839

I have the honor to be &c
Signed/ S. Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf

To,

No 2110. Cont.

Bombay Castle 15th May 1839 Secret Consn.

To,
Lieutenant Edmunds,
Assistant Resident Persian Gulf

Sir,

It being the intention of Rear Admiral Sir Frederick Maitland to visit the Arabian and Persian Coast on his return to India, I am desirous that you should avail yourself of A. G's invitation to accompany him, as your personal acquaintance with the General States of affairs in the Gulf and the different Chiefs will I conceive materially facilitate A. G's intercourse with them. —

2. It is probable that the Admiral in the course of his intended tour may touch at Bhareen and I shall be glad if Sheikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed waves his usual practice and visits A. G. on board the Willoby, in the course of conversation with this Chief, you will

oblige

No. 2110 Cont.

Bombay Castle 15th May 1839 Secret Consultn.

oblige me by intimating to him that as yet there has been no opportunity of communicating with the Al Ally and altho' it is uncertain whether a reconciliation can be effected on the terms offered by him, yet that the Government will hear with pleasure the readiness with which he has met its desire for the restoration of peace and tranquility.

3. Some time ago a boat belonging to Sheikh Khumbut of Ruwie was seized and plundered by Abdool Uzeez bin Hussein of the Ameer tribe residing on an Island of that Name near Ratif. From the Report of our agent it appeared that Sheikh abdoolla bin ahmed had interfered in the affair and that restoration of the boat and Cargo had been promised. I do not however hear that the engagement has been kept — I have written to the Chief of the Ameers informing him that such Conduct will not

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Bombay Castle 15th May 1839 Secret Consultn.

not be tolerated, and that his property must be forthwith restored and his people restrained from such acts for the future should you think it necessary you will be good enough to authorise the agent Mahomed Ally, to hire a boat and proceed over to the Island himself.—

4. The period assigned for the last years Fence, established among the Maratime Arabs under our Mediation having nearly reached its termination, I request you will take the opportunity afforded by this visit to impress upon the Chiefs the Comforts they have derived from it; and also the advantages of their consenting to a renewal if not for another twelve months, at least until the termination of the present Pearl Fishery Season.—

5th In the event of Sheikh Sooltan bin Suggur or others of the Arabian Sheikhs touching upon the

No 2110 Cont.

Bombay Castle 15th May 1839 Secret Consn

the approach of the Egyptian Forces under Command of Khoorshid Pacha to the Shores of the Persian Gulf, you will be pleased to express yourself in general terms to the effect that the British Government does not view those movements with indifference, and that a remonstrance has been made against them to H. H. the Viceroy of Egypt. —

6. I request you will take an opportunity in the Course of your visit to the Arabian Ports to make some general enquiries regarding the number of men that could be furnished in the event of the Government desiring to raise a Corps of Arabs. It might also be advisable to have an idea of what number of Camels and horses could be hired or purchased should any necessity arise for there being entertained. —

7. As you may probably have

No 2110 Cont.

Bombay Castle 15th May 1839 Secret Consn

have to visit Aboothabee in making the arrangements for the reestablishment of the Forces, you will most likely meet with Essa bin Tareef. you will have the goodness to inform this person that the Government is much displeased at the Conduct of some of his followers who have taken out of a Congoon boat, other property than that belonging to Bhareen — that his vessels have been seen cruizing off Aseeloo and that there is reason to think he has Captured a Bhareen boat near Kuweit, which is beyond the restrictive line, If these facts be proved you will inform him that I shall be under the necessity of putting an end to his cruizing. You will also hint that it is not likely he will be permitted to disturb the general tranquillity of the Pearl Fishery when all the other Arabian Chiefs have agreed to suspend their feuds and quarrels during that period. — All these circumstances

may

No 2110 Cont.

Bombay Castle 15th May 1839 Secret Consn.

may perhaps incline him to a reconciliation with his former chief. Should any disposition of this nature be manifested I request you will give it every encouragement short of guaranteeing on the part of the Government, Sheikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed's offer to the ul ally.—

5. Should an opportunity offer for your touching at Kishm I request you will take charge from the Sheikh of fifteen boxes of Madras piece Goods and one box of sundry clothes which were recovered by him from the Bugla Putch Rhamun after the run on shore near the Island of Angar. These goods having been ensured by British subjects the Sheikh has engaged to deliver them all up, as it is difficult at present to ascertain the exact contents of each chest you will have the goodness to receive all that can be obtained from the Sheikh without coming to extremities,

leaving

No 2110. Cont.

Bombay Castle 15th May 1839. Secret Consn.

leaving the balance to be adjusted on a future occasion.

Residency in Persian Gulf Karrack 12th April 1839

I have the honor to be &c
Signed J. Bennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf

No. 2110. Cont.

Bombay Castle 15th May 1839 Secret Consultn.

No. 2111

From T. Maitland Esquire
Rear Admiral & Commander in Chief
To The Honble J. Farish Esquire
Governor in Council
Bombay

Sir Dated 3d May 1839.

In reference to my Letter

No. 2111 Cont.

Bombay Castle 15th May 1839 Secret Consultn.

Letter No. 25, of the 30th March last, I now beg to inform your Honor in Council that I was induced to remain at Karrack until it could be known by Letters from Shiraz what view the Regent of the Province of Fars had taken of the occurrences at Bushire on the 25th of that Month, as well as of the removal of the Residency to the Island of Karrack. —

As Captain Hennell will have reported to your Honor in Council the Communication he received from the Prince, and the Measures adopted by him Consequent thereupon, it is not necessary for me to touch further on that Subject, than to state, that the Resident, having on the evening of the 10th Ultimo, received an intimation from Mahomed Hussain Khan, of his arrival at Bushire on a Mission from the Prince Regent for the purpose of arranging the differences which had arisen between him and

the

No. 2110. Court

Bombay Castle 15th May 1839 Secret Consultn

the Governor of Bushire, and expressing a wish that he would meet him in Bushire Roads, I received the Resident on board the Wellesley, and proceeded in her to that anchorage where an interview took place; but as the result was not of a nature to induce Captain Hennell to rehoist the British Flag at Bushire, he returned to Karrak on the 17th Ultimo, in the Honorable Company's Brig Tigris, on which day I prosecuted my intention of returning to Bombay, calling on my way down the Gulf at some of the Arabian Ports; being accompanied by Commodore Bruce, in the Elphinstone; and taking with me Captain Edmunds, the Assistant Resident, that I might have the benefit of his able Assistance in communicating with the Sheiks.—

I arrived at Bahrein on the 21st of last Month, and was visited by Sheik Nassar, who had been left by

No. 2111. Court

Bombay Castle 15th May 1839 Secret Consultn

by his father, Sheik Abdoolla, in the Government of the Island on the return of the latter to Khore Hassan, one of his Continental possessions, after his Conference with Captain Edmunds, on his visiting Bahrein in March last.—

Enclosed I forward Copy of the Notes taken by Captain Edmunds of the Conferences held with the different Sheiks, which, as conveying their Sentiments, will render any detail on my part unnecessary, and from which your Honor in Council will perceive throughout the friendly feelings entertained by the Sheiks towards the British Government, and the confidence expressed that their safety depends upon the support they may receive from it, but it is lamentable to observe the Spirit which exists amongst these Chiefs and their Tribes—They having made no preparation for resisting a foreign foe

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for should he attempt to subjugate them; And even at Bahrein, where from the Warlike Character of the people and their maritime habits, they have the means, through an armed flotilla, of assuming a formidable attitude, no measures, have been adopted for the defence of the Island. —

The only person among the Sheiks invited to meet me at Rassal Khyma, who did not comply with the requisition was Rahiffa Bin Shakboot, who declined under the pre=text of the absence of his Brother Sultan Bin Shakboot, and there being no person with whom he could entrust the Government of his Tribe, but there is reason to believe he considered it derogatory to his dignity to attend at a conference held within the jurisdiction of Sultan Bin Suggur, with

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with whom he has long been at feud, and one of the purposes for which I visited that part of the Coast was to induce, if possible, these two Chiefs to forget their private animosities and unite for the General good, there is however reasonable ground to hope that these desirable ends may be accomplished to a Certain extent, as Captain Edmunds remained at Rassal Khyma, in the Elphinstone; that he might exert his influence towards it and as both those Chiefs, who have at present a Truce with each other under the Mediation of the Indian Government have expressed a wish to be reconciled.

The last person I saw before I sailed from Rassal Khyma, was Essau Bin Tareef who is mentioned in Captain Edmunds Report as having thrown off his allegiance * * to Abdoolla, and Committed * * * acts

of

No 2114 Cont

Bombay Castle 15th May 1839 Secret Consn

of Violence and Spoliation against his Chief and the Inhabitants of Bahrein who expressed a wish to make up his differences with the Sheiks, and only required some guarantee for his safety and the Restoration of his property to induce him to submit; I hope therefore Captain Edmunds will be able to get over the difficulty before he quits the Coast of Arabia.—

On the 24th ultimo the day after I left Bahrein, I fell in with His Majesty's Sloop Cruizer charged with the Dispatch addressed to me by your Honor in Council, of the 28th of March last, with its enclosures.—

Had the Supplies of provisions on board the 'Wellesley' been such as to have enabled me to remain in the Gulf, I would certainly have done so, and endeavoured to have carried into effect the

No 2114 Cont

Bombay Castle 15th May 1839 Secret Consn

the Recommendations of the Right Honble The Governor General of India as Conveyed in the letter to your Honor in Council from the Secretary with His Lordship dated the 15th of March, by opening if found advisable, a direct Communication with Koorshed Pacha on the Subject of his encroachments on the Arab Tribes Situated on that Side of the Persian Gulf, but as I had delayed my departure from Karrack, to as late a period as I could with prudence Considering the Reduced State of the Wellesley's provisions, it was not in my power to adopt that Course which however is of the less importance, as the Measures recommended by the Governor General had mostly been anticipated by Captain Kennell, and it did not appear that the Sheik of Bahrein was in the least apprehensive of an early Attack on

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Bombay Castle 15th May 1839. Secret Consn.

on the Island from the Egyptian Troops.—
That Captain Stonnell thought
however best in possession of the Sentiments
of the Government on the present State of
affairs on the Western Side of the Persian
Gulf, I directed Commander King to
proceed without loss of time to Karrak, and
deliver to him the despatches with which
he was charged, and after receiving any
Communications the Resident might have
to forward to Bombay, to rejoin me, in
the Cruizer at that Presidency.—
With reference to the
7th Para: of the Letter from the Officiating
Secretary with the Governor General, I beg
to enclose Copy of a Letter I have received
from Commodore Brucks on the Subject
therein adverted to; together with an
Extract from a Note from the same
Officer, which, with the Report before
alluded to made by Captain Edmunds
to the Resident on his return from his
late

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Bombay Castle 15th May 1839 Secret Consn.

late Mission to Bahrein and El Katiff
Copy of which I understand has been trans-
mitted by the latter to your Honor in
Council will furnish His Lordship with
all the information I have been able to
obtain upon the disposition, Strength to
&c of the Contending parties on the ara-
bian Coast, and the means of resistance
at the Command of the Attoobee Chief.—
I have only further to
add, that I sailed from Rasouk Khyma
on the 30th Ultimo, having transferred
Captain Edmunds to the Elphinstone,
that he might remain, and use his
influence with the Sheiks to Come to an
accommodation, and form a Treaty for
their mutual defence.—
I have the honor to be &c
Signed/ F. Maitland
Rear Admiral and
Commander in
Chief

Wellesley
at Sea.
5th May 1839

Notes Rec. Lr 4
H. Grant

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Notes of Conferences, between Rear Admiral Sir F. L. Maitland K.C.B. and the undermentioned Sheikhs in the Persian Gulf, taken by Captain Edmunds, Assistant Resident, between the 22nd and 30th April 1839. —

On the 23rd the day after the "Wellesley" arrival, Sheikhs Nassir, Ahmed, and Mohomed, came off to visit the Admiral, They expressed great regret that their father Sheik Abdoola bin Ahmed in Consequence of his having had no intimation of the intended visit, should still be absent at Khore Hussan, and were desirous of sending off a boat immediately, to Convey him direct to where the "Wellesley" was at anchor, but on being assured that she would sail before he could possibly arrive, they abandoned this Idea, but said they would

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would dispatch a boat to inform Abdoolla of the arrival of the Flag Ship, and to Convey the presents intended for him by the Admiral. The Substance of the Conversation with these Sheikhs was their declaring that their father as well as all the Chiefs and Subjects of Bahrein, looked to the English Government alone for the arrangement of their affairs, whether with Egypt, or their recalled Subjects who fled and have lately been making war on, or rather plundering Bahrein Vessels, under the lead of Esau bin Tareff.— As Regards the Egyptian force under Rooshid Pacha, they in Reply to the Admirals query, affirmed that no onward Movement had lately been made nor was immediately contemplated, and that since the Mission of Ameen Effendi to Bahrein, the Pacha had not made any demands on, or held Communication with, Sheik Abdoolla, as Regards Esau bin Tareff

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Sarcf and the al ali, they said that they considered the affair in the hands of the Resident, and seemed to be confident of its being arranged satisfactorily especially as a good understanding was now being brought about between the Benyas Chief with whom they had taken refuge at Abothabee and Bahrein, and that at the present time Sultan Bin Shakboot brother to the Chief of the former place, was their guest, having been sent on a mission to Sheik Abdoolla—

On the morning of the 23d as the "Wellesley" was standing out from Bahrein, Sultan bin Shakboot Brother of Maliffa Bin Shakboot Chief of Abothabee came on board, In the Course of Conversation, he confirmed the Statement of Abdoolla's Son Regarding the new friendly intentions of the Bahrein and Abothabee Chiefs, and said that every thing was arranged, and it now only

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Bombay Castle 15th May 1839 Secret Consltn

only remained for the principals themselves to ratify the treaty agreed to. He further said that it would now be necessary for Evan Bin Sarcf and the al ali tribe either to Settle as peaceable subjects at Abothabee, or to leave the territories of the Benyas tribe, who were averse to involving themselves, on account of the hostile designs of these people—

On the 25th the Wellesley anchored at Shigar, and on the following day the Chief Said Bin Sugeeb, came off to visit the Admiral. He was profuse in his declarations of friendship, declaring that although Settled on Persian Ground and tributary to Persia, he Considered himself an English Subject, as they had always protected him, and were possessed of the Sovereignty of the Seas, in which he had so great

an

No 2111. Cont.

Bombay Castle 15th 15th May 1839. Secret Consultn.

an Interest. He enquired Regarding the late affair at Bushire, on the occasion of the "Wellesleys" Being fired upon, and expressed a good deal of anxiety, Regarding the designs of the Egyptian Army under Khoshid Pacha but at the same time, stated that from its position on the Persian Shore of the Gulf, he had nothing to fear from them, that his only fear was of the Arabs generally, one of whom he esteems himself to be; as belonging to the Joasmee tribe. He further asked whether it was the intention of Government, to Restore the Naval Establishment at Bassadore, and on being informed that no such thing was at present Contemplated, he asked whether Lingar, was Calculated for this purpose, Saying that he should be glad to see the English there, and would give them every assistance, possible, if the Government determined on forming a Settlement in his Country. —

On

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On the 26th the "Wellesley" Rafael Ships 26th Ult.
Arrived ~~&c. &c. &c~~ at Rasval Khyma and Ibrahim the young ~~&c. &c~~ Son of Sheik Sultan bin Suggar, came off, having been Sent by his father to ask after the admirals health &c., and to inform him that he had arrived the same morning from Shanjah for the purpose of Visiting him, whenever Convenient. —

On the 27th Sheik Sultan himself appeared and the chief purport of his Conversation was Regarding the anticipated invasion of his Country by Egypt, He pretended to think that his and all the other arab tribes together would not be able to withstand the army of Khoshid Pacha, and Said that their only hope was in the friendship and protection of England, that he had long ago pointed out his danger to the Resident who he believed had

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had informed the Government, but they as yet had given him no assurance and that therefore he was thinking of going himself or sending his son to Bombay to urge his suit with the Government. After this he said that in the event of not being able to prevail on the British Government to protect him, he had intended abandoning his Country for the Persian side of the Gulf but that now as Persia was — no longer friendly with the British, he must devise some other scene, and asked whether we could not allow him to settle at Bassadore, or on some Island, He was told that Bassadore and Kishm were the property of the Imaum, and as a general answer to the above, the Admiral informed him that the English Government was now remonstrating with Mohomet Ali against his attempting the subjection of the maritime tribes of the Gulf, in whose

welfare

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Bombay Castle 15th May 1839 Secret Consn.

welfare, Government continued to feel great interest, but that the best security would be found in the unanimity of the Arabs themselves. The Sheik admitted the truth of the last observation, but declared that it would be very difficult, if not impossible to get the Arabs, to act together as they had no Common Head and acknowledged the authority of their own Chiefs only that each petty Chief even if he had only a hundred followers considered himself an independent Sovereign, He said however that although there was difficulty in inducing the Arabs to act in Concert, that he for one would be glad to see an offensive and defensive treaty against all foreign Enemies, established between them under the Mediation of the Resident, also that he was most desirous for the

Continuance

No. 2111. Cont.

Bombay Castle 15th May 1839 Secret Consult

Continuance of peace, and that other Chiefs being equally desirous of it; there was little doubt of an arrangement being Come to, which would Secure all the Arab tribes, from the evils of erring one against another.—

"Sultan Bin Suggar also expressed his Readiness to attend to any Call which might possibly be Made on him by the Government for the use of fighting men, armed boats &c. so long as their Service was not required at, a distance from the Coast he said if so Called upon, he would go to war any where, Regardless of Consequence."—

On the 30th Sheik Muckroom Bin Butai of Debay Came on board, having arrived during the night from his own place, which he left, immediately on hearing of the Admirals' arrival at Rassal Khyma, &c.

No. 2111. Cont.

Bombay Castle 15th May 1839 Secret Consult

He expressed his readiness to enter into any pacific Arrangement, Recommended by the British Authorities, and declared his Readiness to Meet and oppose the Egyptian Force, as far as his means would allow of.——

Signd/ F. Maitland
Rear Admiral &
Commander in Chief

Extract of a Note Received from Commodore Brucks I.N. by Rear Admiral Sir F. L. Maitland K. C. B. 30th April 1839.

I went up to the old fort last night, I find part of it remaining as we left it, and the Square Tower, on the right of the Town is built on the ruins. I met a Man whom I knew formerly and asked him the strength of the Tribe, he says with Strangers

C. to Hill Court.

Bombay Castle 15th May 1839 Secret Consltn.

Strangers, Ras-ul-Khyma &c. Amulo among Ajmain and Sharjeh, have about 11,000 Men, but he did not know how many Seamen – and that near 3000 from the different ports were now absent on Trading Voyages, and would be back in May and June – three fourths of these are gone to India and the Red Sea

/True Extract/
Signed/J. Maitland
Rear Admiral and
Commander in Chief

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Captain S. Hennell, Political Resident, Persian Gulf to the Government of Bombay, May 7, 1839.

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No. 42

Residency in the Persn Gulf
Karrack 7th May 1839

Secret Department

Sir

Residency in the Pn Gulf reporting on the disposition &c.a &c.a of the Arabian Sheiks of the Persian Gulf with reference to the advance [p. 291]. of Khorshid Pasha

With reference to the 2nd Paragraph of your letter No 642 in this department under date the 28th March last drawing my attention the 7th Para. of a dispatch from the Officiating Secretary with the Right Honorable the Govr General of India dated the 13th of the same month in which His Lordship desires to be made acquainted with the disposition, the strength and the relative interests of contending parties in this quarter and more particularly with the means of resistance which the Uttoobee[1] chief can command I have now the honor to lay before the Hon'ble the Governor in Council all the information I possess upon these several points.

Only three parties at the present time in hostile relations with each other.

2nd At the present moment Khorshid Pasha the Egyptian Commander, Abdoollah ben Ahmed the Sheik of Bahrein, and Esa ben Tareef the head of the Al-i-Ally Tribe are the only Tribes who can strictly speaking be said to be in hostile relations with each other. The last however of those whose interests are more or less affected by the advance of the Forces of Mahomed Ali in this direction includes all the Maritime Arabs from the mouth of the Euphrates to Ras-el-Had as detailed in the margin.

Shaik Jabur of Kowelt.
Shaik Khuleefa of Abothabee.
Shaik Mukhtoom of Debaye.
Shaik Sultan ben Suggur of Ras-ul-Khyma and Sharjah.
Shaik Hamed ben Rashid of Ejman.
Shaik Abdoollah ben Rashid of Amulgaween.
Sued Hamad ben Azan of Sohar.
His Highness the Imam of Muscat.
*Khorshid Pasha.
"

3rd The strength of Khorshid Pasha necessarily lies in his artillery and regular Troops, the exact number of which it is difficult to ascertain. It is however thought, that including his cavalry and irregular Mughrubbee Infantry he has not above 3,500 available, unless indeed he has received the reinforcements of 1000 Horse and 2000 Foot expected by him* from Medinah. From the Coast which is already in his possession and the Bedouins under his authority he could probably collect from 4 to 5,000 men but upon these little dependence could be placed in the event of his experiencing any thing approaching to a reverse.

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4th The means of resistance possessed by Shaik Abdoollah ben Ahmed are such as to afford a prospect of success if fairly brought into play. His insular position and the great superiority of his Naval Force of course are very much in his favor. His War boats which are numerous are of the first discription of that class of vessels His subjects are brave and determined and are moreover equally accustomed to serve at sea as well as on shore. Of these in the two Islands of Manama and Muhorag alone perhaps not less than five or six thousand armed men prepared to support their chief to the last extremity could be collected without difficulty while half as many more might be brought over in case of emergency from the Uttoobee possessions on the main land. The population of Bahrein would furnish a much larger number of men capable of carrying arms than that above specified, but I have not included the Aboriginal or Sheeah inhabitants, who are an unwarlike race but who smarting under the oppressive conduct of their Uttoobee Masters would gladly see the downfall of that Tribe and the establishment of any other power in its room. Could Khorshid Pasha once gain a footing in the Island of Manama with his guns and stores and at the same time keep

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open his communications with Ageer and Kaleef, I think it probable that the unregulated bravery of the Uttoobees would eventually succumb to the powerful effects of the disciplined Troops and Artillery of the Egyptian Commander, but

(1) *Uttoobee.* interlined.

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as long as the Bharein Chief maintains his Naval superiority, the enterprize would be one of so much risk as to render it doubtful it will ever be attempted by the Pasha unless supported by the ships of the Viceroy or those of His Highness the Imaum of Muscat. The arrival of the former has been long looked for in the Gulf but it is possible that the earnest remonstrances of the British Government may have induced Mahomed Ali to suspend his intentions of dispatching them. Regarding the Vessels belonging to Muscat it is not likely that the Regency of that Port after becoming acquainted with the views and wishes of the British Government will allow their Fleet to co-operate in any Naval expedition contemplated by the Egyptian ruler in this quarter.

Esa ben Tareef.

5th Of all the Arabian Chiefs possessing any naval resources the only one whose interests would be promoted by a connexion with the Egyptian Commr or who is likely to cooperate cordially with him is Esa ben Tareef. This individual the Governor in Council is aware seceded from Bahrein with his followers in consequence of the oppression experienced from the hands of the relations of the Uttoobee Chief, and after residing a short time in Muscat finally settled in Aboothabee the Shaik of which place Khuleefa bin Shakboot had then intimated his intention of making common cause with him against Bahrein. Notwithstanding this declaration however, the natural good judgement of the Beniyas Chief has led him to see how deeply the conquest of Bahrein by the Egyptians would affect the independence of all the other maritime Arabs, and therefore instead of joining Esau ben Tareef in his cruize against the trading vessels of that Island, he has sent his brother Sultan, and I am informed entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with the Uttoobee Shaik at the same time intimating to the members of the Al-i-Ally residing in Aboothabee, that under these circumstances he cannot allow of their carrying on aggressions against his Ally while they avail themselves of the protection of his Port. I am in hopes that this change in his position, and the natural reluctance which exists in the breast of almost every Arab to see those with whom he is at all connected by the ties of blood or clanship, altho his enemies, fall under the yoke of a foreign power, may induce Esa bin Tareef to accept the overtures of Peace proferred by the Shaik of Bahrein. At the same time it is not impossible that the desire to revenge the injuries and losses they have sustained from the hands of their relations in Bahrein may induce the Al-i-Ally to remove from Aboothabee and settle in Kateef a measure which would greatly promote the views of Khorshid by affording him the assistance of several large vessels and some five hundred brave and energetic men. I shall however exert my influence to thwart such an arrangement which considering the large advances made by Esa ben Tareef to the Beniyas divers for the ensuing Pearl Season can hardly, even if seriously contemplated, be carried into effect for some months.

[p. 294].

[p. 295].

Shaik Jabur of Koweit.

6th Next to the Ruler of Bahrein the Chief whose interests are most likely to be seriously affected by the advance of the Egyptian Army to the shores of the Persian Gulf is Shaik Jabur of Koweit whose Port being situated on the main land of Arabia renders him much more tangible than Shaik Abdoollah ben Ahmed. He possesses a large and well appointed Fleet but from the above circumstance it cannot like that of the Bahrein Chief's be made available for the defence of his place. His subjects (who are a branch of the Uttoobees) are brave and many in number. I consider it to be an object of great importance that this place should not fall into the possession of the Pasha as its position is near the mouth of the Euphrates and the numerous vessels belonging to it would greatly facilitate the attainment of those objects which are supposed to be held in view by Khorshid Pasha in the direction of Bussorah and Bagdad. I have not yet received the reports of the officers I have lately dispatched for the purpose of instituting enquiries into the resources &ca of Koweit and other places in its neighbourhood and cannot therefore speak with any certainty regarding the real sentiments entertained by Shaik Jabur with reference to Khorshid Pasha's advance. It is affirmed that an Agent of the Egyptian Commander is stationed in that Port for the collection of supplies. I trust however that the measures lately adopted by us will induce the Shaik to see the imprudence of promoting the views of a power like Mahomed Ali whose success must inevitably lead to the exchange of his present nominal dependence on the Porte for the condition of a humble and submissive Vassal.

[p. 296].

Shaik Khuleefa bin Shakboot of Abothabee.

7th The next place of importance on the Arabian Coast is Aboothabee, situated about the same distance to the Eastward of Bahrein as Koweit is to the North West. The Beniyas who inhabit this Port and its Vicinity are a brave and

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[p. 297]. warlike People mustering altogether in cases of emergency perhaps 8,000 Armed Men. Even during the height of the Wahabee ascendency this Tribe always maintained its independence and refused to pay the Zakat or Tithes claimed by the head of that Sect. There is consequently little probability of Khorshid Pasha making any impression upon Shaik Khuleefa bin Shakboot the Chief, who has distinctly shewn the line of policy he intends to pursue in the present juncture by having promised his support to the Beni Naiem now in open opposition to the Egyptians and as already stated having entered into a close alliance with Shaik Abdoollah ben Ahmed of Bahrein. He has likewise exhibited a disposition to bury ancient feuds and enter into close and friendly relations with Shaik Sultan bin Suggur the Head of the Joasme Tribe an object greatly to be desired and which I should not despair of seeing accomplished were it not for the intrigues of Shaik Mukhtoom of Debaye (a port lying between Shargah & Aboothabee) whose interest lies in keeping the Beniyas and Joasmee Chiefs at variance.

Joasmee Shaiks.

[p. 298].

8th The visit of Rear Admiral Sir Frederick Maitland in the Wellesley to Ras-al-Khyma has been most opportune, and will in all probability decide the future policy of Shaik Sultan ben Suggur with reference to Khorshid Pasha. From the report of the Native Agent at Shargah it appears that the wily Egyptian has deputed to the Maritime Shaiks of Oman a person named Sued bin Mootluk who during the time that Shaik Toorkey was head of the Wahabee Sect resided in Brymee as the Naib or deputy of that personage. This individual who possesses great personal influence among the Arabian Tribes and who has a perfect knowledge of their various and conflicting interests having been removed by Fysul the Ex Wahabee Chief has joined the Egyptian Commander and as above stated has been dispatched by him to Ras-ul-Khymah to persuade the chiefs on the Coast of Oman to acknowledge the authority of Mahomed Ali in reality but ostensibly that of his Tool Khaled the now nominal head of the Wahabees. Sued bin Mootluk's unexpected appearance seems to have thrown the Joasmee Chief into the greatest perplexity, but at last by a mixture of threats and promises the Egyptian Agent persuaded him to unite in requiring the Beni Naiem who have lately got possession of Brymee to surrender it to the Nedgdees. The reply received was they would bury themselves in the ruins of the place rather than give it up. On receiving the summons of Sued bin Mootluk the Beni Naiem applied to Shaik Khuleefa of Abothabee and Sued Humood of Sohar for support to meet the Common Enemy I am happy to add that this call was promptly responded to by the latter Chief who instantly dispatched his brother Ges with 200 men to Brymee. Secretly pleased in his own mind at this bold demonstration of the Beni Naiem Shaik Sultan ben Suggur was still according to a letter I have lately received from him greatly embarrassed between his desire to maintain his own independence and his dread of the power of the Egyptian Ruler. I have no doubt however that the appearance of the Wellesley and the knowledge of the disapprobation with which the British Government views the proceedings of Khorshid Pasha on the Shores of the Persian Gulf will at once determine Shaik Sultan to decline any further connexion with Sued bin Mootluk and to unite with the other Arabian Chiefs in making a bold and resolute stand against the further encroachments of the Pasha. His example will certainly be followed by the Shaiks of Debaye Ejman and Amulgaween who in matters of general policy commonly acknowledge his supremacy. The united Forces of these three Chiefs may amount to about 10,000 men of which number 8,000 would be the adherents of Sultan himself.

[p. 299].

Humood ben Azan of Sohar.

[p. 300].

9th I have already stated in a former Para that Sued Humood ben Azan of Sohar had sent a reinforcement under his brother to the Beni Naiem in Brymee he stands therefore fairly committed with Mahomed Ali. He is a man of great talent and energy and may be considered as a most important addition to the league against the Egyptians. On an emergency he can muster about 5000 armed dependents.

The Imam of Muscat.

10th With regard to the Government of Muscat the expression of the wishes of the British Government will I am satisfied be sufficient to prevent any support or aid being afforded to the Egyptian Commander. It is asserted that some time back His Highness the Imam had agreed with Mahomed Ali to pay him an annual tribute if placed in possession of the Island of Bahrein but the Agent at Muscat reports that the present Secret instructions held from His Highness by the Regency of Muscat are to join cordially with Humood ben Azan of Sohar in his opposition to the encroachments of Khorsid Pasha if it be ascertained that he is acting bona

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fide in his exhibition of hostility, otherwise they were to be guided by circumstances. The establishment of the supremacy of Mahomed Ali over the Province of Oman and the Arabian Shores of the Persian Gulf, is so obviously opposed to the influence and interests of the Imam in this quarter that I feel assured he cannot view the progress of Khorshid Pasha with indifference. At all events the line of policy taken by the British Government with reference to the Pasha's encroachments will I doubt no ensure the neutrality of the Muscat Governm[t] even if it should refuse to join those Arabian Chiefs who I trust are determined to make a resolute stand for the maintenance of their independence. [p. 301].

I have the honor to be &[ca]

(signed) S. Hennell

Resident &[ca]

To

I. O. Willoughby Esq[re]
Secretary to the Government
BOMBAY

2.14
An Egyptian Agent at Sharjah, June–July 1839

No. 89 dated 18. July 1839.

Copy of a Despatch from Lieut. Resident in the Persian Gulf dated 10. July 1839. A.

No. 3.

Forwarding translation of a letter from the Arabian Agent at Sharjah, relative to the progress of the Egyptian influence in Oman.—

Recd. from the Foreign Office 21st September 1839

Secret Department (A)

To

J P Willoughby Esqre,
Secretary to Government,
Bombay.

Sir,

Persian Gulf Residency 1st Augt 1838 — Shargah Agent — Persian Influence in Oman —

I enclosing for the information of the Honble the Governor in Council the accompanying translation of a letter from Moollah Rousein the British agent at Shargah received at Kurrak on the 24th ultimo I have the honor to state that having no reason to doubt the correctness of this report it appeared to me evident that unless relative to instant and decided measures of counteraction were adopted the influence and authority of Rhorshid Pasha of the Egyptian would be speedily extended over the Province of Oman. I therefore determined to avail myself of the opportunity afforded by the H. C. Steamer Hugh Lindsay touching on the Arabian Coast on her way to Muscat for the July Overland mail to visit some of the principal ports in that quarter, with the view of taking such steps as the urgency of the case might seem to call for. I had the less hesitation in undertaking this object as the state of affairs in Persia appeared sufficiently tranquil to allow of my absence without detriment to the public service.

2. On the evening of the 26th ultimo I embarked in the Hugh Lindsay and arrived at Bahrein on the afternoon of the 28th. Being desirous of learning more precisely the real sentiments entertained by Shaik Abdoollah bin Ahmed the Chief of that Island with reference

reference to Rhorshid Pashas proceedings, and also of ascertaining as far as possible the actual motives which had induced him contrary to every expectation so readily to acknowledge the supremacy of Mahomed Ally by consenting to pay him an annual tribute, I lost no time in requesting that I might be favored with an interview. The Shaik having agreed to meet me at the agents House in Muharrac, I landed early the next morning, and was shortly after joined by him attended only by his younger Vakeel Abdoo Shaik after the usual Compliments and some preliminary conversation upon the state of Syria, and the present hostile attitude maintained on the Aleppo Frontier by the Egyptian and Turkish Armies all those present withdrew excepting the old Chief and his younger, myself and Arabic Moonshee. I then informed the Shaik that I had taken advantage of the Steamer touching at Bahrein, partly in order to renew the personal acquaintance which had commenced between us so many years before, and partly to obtain a more full explanation from him touching the motives which had led him to submit so unexpectedly to Rhorshid Pasha. That I had felt much concerned to learn from his reply to the letter I had sent to him by the Government Vessel, the insufficient grounds, as they appeared to me, of his hastily proceeding. It was true, I said, that upwards of three months before I had declined giving an opinion upon the point he had then referred to

to me, regarding the expediency or otherwise of his sending a Member of his family to Lahsah to meet Khorshid Pasha, because at that time, not having been made acquainted by the latter with his views upon Bahrein, it appeared to me a matter of little Consequence which way the Shaik decided on a point of apparently such minor importance. I had however mentioned in that Communication that I possessed no instructions from the Government but that I would make a reference to Bombay on the subject under these circumstances and especially referring to his promise given to my assistant Captain Edmonds that he would take no steps in regard to placing himself under the authority or protection of any foreign power without first Communicating with the British Residency, I said that I did not think the Shaik had acted either so openly or fairly as he ought to have done, considering the intimate nature of his relations with the British Government in having entered into an engagement with Khorshid Pasha without first giving us specific notice of his intention to do so. In reply to my observations the Shaik said that he Considered the object of his writing the letter referred to was sufficiently explicit, that on the receipt of the reply informing him that he himself was the best judge as to the expediency or otherwise of sending one of his relations to Lahsah, he had given up all hopes of either support or assistance from

from the British - that Considering himself thus left to his own unassisted resources, and finding himself threatened with a war with Aboothabee - his trade harrassed by the aggressions of Isa bin Tareef - his Bedawin Subjects on the main going over in great numbers to Khorshid Pasha, who was then threatening an invasion. Considering moreover the difficulty of defending Bahrein from an attack if made from the opposite Coast, there being many places where in a few hours a fleet of a hundred boats Could make its way across without the possibility of being approached by either ship or Bugla on account of the shallow water and numerous shoals lacking the separated all these Circumstances into Consideration he thought his own interests were best Consulted by his agreeing to pay the Pasha so trifling a sum, as little more than 2000 dollars a year to secure the integrity of his own territories and the undisturbed possession of his own authority over them, as it had been expressly stipulated by him that no agents of the Pasha were to reside in Bahrein. He stated, that the Shaik had entered into a very serious engagement which by binding him to Consider the friends and enemies of Khorshid Pasha, as his own might for ought he knew place him sooner

or

or later in hostile relations with the British Government and therefore as it was opposed to the spirit of the first article of our Treaty with the pacificated Arabs, which pledged him as one of its members, to the maintenance of a lasting peace with the English I felt certain that my own Government would not sanction it and therefore I considered it my duty to hand him a distinct protest against it. The Shaik after having read this Protest (which is nearly the same as the one which I thought it advisable to send to Khorshid Pasha and of which a Copy and translation is now enclosed for the information of the Government) again expressed his regret that he had not been made sufficiently aware before that the support of the British Government would have been afforded him, but that after having written the letter he had referred to he did not think that any blame could attach to him on my pointing out that upwards of three months had elapsed between the date of the communication in question and that of the engagement he had entered into with the Pasha in which interval his interview with Captain Edmunds and the visit of Rear Admiral Maitland must have made him quite aware of the views of the English Government with reference to the proceedings of that personage – he replied that the engagement alluded to had been negotiated before

Sends copy and translation of a protest made to Khorshid Pasha against visiting a tribute from Ahmed

before the arrival of the Wellesley and the date actually affixed only marked the period when it was finally ratified. The Shaik adverting to my remark touching the probability of his engagement with the Pasha placing him in hostile relations with us observed that such a contingency could never occur, it was true he added that he had been compelled by the pressure of circumstances for his own preservation to make certain arrangements but that on the Pasha calling upon him at any time to act in opposition to the views of the British Government he should always consider it quite a sufficient reply that he had been forbidden compliance by us upon my pressing this point further he said that both himself and every other Arab detested being at all connected with or coming under the Rule of the Egyptians and that if the British Government would give him a distinct and written pledge to protect him and his from all attack and aggressions of Khorshid Pasha and the Arab Tribes connected with him that he would drop all further connexion with the Pasha, and intimating that we had disapproved of the agreement he had entered into avow himself a dependent of Great Britain on my asking the Shaik to give me a few lines to the above effect, to enable me to

to submit them to the authorities in India, he declined doing so, saying that for the present at least, he had got rid of a pressing evil by a comparatively trifling sacrifice and he would not therefore give a document which might seriously commit himself until he received the fullest and most satisfactory assurances from the Government of its protection and even then, he said, that to preserve his own consistency he must decline compliance with the terms of his agreement with the Pasha, upon the grounds, that they were displeasing to us. Towards the conclusion of the interview when I remarked to the Shaik that he appeared more inclined to connect himself with the Egyptian than the British Government, he seemed alarmed and altered his tone saying, that he rejoiced beyond measure to find that the encroachments of Khorshid Pasha in this direction were so displeasing to England, and that were this generally known among the maritime Arabs and Bedouins it would diffuse universal joy. That nothing but the skill with which the Egyptian Commander had availed himself of the unhappy feuds and divisions among the Tribes could have enabled him to establish himself in Central Arabia with such a comparatively small force, but that in the event

event of Ibrahim Pasha suffering any check or defeat from the Sultans army in Syria, almost every Arab in Nedjd would be immediately arrayed against him after alluding in a tone of complaint to the Government not having Compelled Essa bin Tareef and the Al Dialy to return to their allegiance to him but expressing his sincere desire for the maintenance of his friendly relations with the British, the Shaik took his departure.

3. The impression I have received from this interview is that Shaik Abdoollah bin Ahmed being now advanced in years, is unwilling to be placed in any situation calling for active and personal exertion, and that to avoid this he is prepared to make considerable sacrifices he is evidently overawed by the almost invariable success which has hitherto attended the political intrigues and military operations of Khorshid Pasha. Indeed to such an extent does this influence act upon his otherwise naturally acute mind, that I am inclined to think he is doubtful whether the English could cope with the Pasha prosperously by land however superior they may be by sea. At all events so great is the Shaiks desire to have his tranquillity as little disturbed as possible that I am by no means certain whether he would not prefer allowing

matters

matters to remain on their present footing than hester himself to maintain his independence, even with the aid and support of the British Government nevertheless he would be delighted to be relieved from the burden he has taken upon himself if this could be done by the influence of England without imposing upon him the necessity of making any personal exertion

4 As a general belief has been entertained by myself as well as others that Bahrein could be protected by our vessels of war from an attack I think it right to draw the attention of the Government to the positive assertion of the Shaik that there are many parts between the Island and the main where neither Brigantine nor Ship could be of any service in preventing a large fleet of boats from making its way across in the course of a few hours Shaick abdoollah assured me that in the time of Shaik Nasser he had himself successfully attacked Bahrein in this manner although his antagonist possessed a strong naval force, but which could not be made available

5 no alteration appears to have taken place on the stations and distributions of the Egyptian army in nedjd, the Pasha himself being according to the latest accounts, still at his Head quarters in Shurmada settling the affairs of central Arabia Shaik abdoollah in speaking of Bejuiss and its refusal to submit to Saied bin Mootluk mentioned a report, that Khorshid had given 1000 Crowns to 400 camel

camel mounted Horse of the mutter Bedouins under Bin Baddad and Nouffeyen to march across by land to reinforce Said bin Mootluk who belonged to their Tribe The Shaik added that considering the season the difficiency of water in the desert and other difficulties he doubted whether the expedition would be undertaken In Concluding the subject of Bahrein I have only to observe that the tone of my conversation and the tenor of my protest have made Shaik abdoollah aware that I consider he has placed himself in a some what ambiguous position with reference to us It must however remain for the Government to decide whether it is advisable to detach him altogether from the Egyptians by giving him the written pledge of protection he asks for

6 On the 1st instant the Hugh Lindsay anchored off Abushahr Abushahr within the reefs about three quarters of a mile from the Town, a position which could not have been occupied by a sailing vessel without incurring much risk thus showing the advantages which would attend the permanent addition of a Steamer to the Gulf Squadron It was afterwards ascertained by sounding that the Hugh Lindsay could have lain within a pistol shot of the place without the least danger Shaik Khuleefa bin Shaheen having come on board I informed him after

after the usual Compliments on both sides had passed, that having received information which led me to believe that certain chiefs on the Coast had by entering into friendly communication with Sueed bin Mookhtuk been acting contrary to the understanding which had been come to in their interview with Captain Edmunds on the occasion of the recent visit of admiral Baithland I had lost no time in repairing to the spot in order to ascertain who the individuals were who had thus rendered themselves obnoxious to the displeasure of the British Govermt by their deceitful proceedings The Sheik in reply denied with great apparent earnestness and sincerity, that he had given the slightest countenance and support to the Pashas Agent, on the contrary he said that he had expressly intimated to Shaik Sultan bin Suggur, that the only condition upon which he would consent to bury all former feuds or quarrels in oblivion was the expulsion of Sueed bin Mookhtuk from his territories within a given time. The Shaik then dwelt with much earnestness upon his close alliance and friendly relations with the inhabitants of Bayonee, who he added, were supported by Humood bin Ayan of Sohar and quite determined to resist any attempt to bring them under the rule of the Egyptians that he had received two communications from Sueed bin Mookhtuk sealed with the Pashas Signet, calling upon him to acknowledge the

the authority of that Person of which he had not taken the slightest notice (an assertion which I afterwards ascertained was a positive falsehood) that from the time of the receipt of the last letter that addressed to him upon the subject of Sueed bin Mookhtuk he had been more than ever determined to avoid all Connexion with that individual, but on the contrary to cultivate more assiduously than before, his relations with the British Government and resisting to the last extremity all attempts of Khorshid Pasha to subjugate him to look to the English alone for support and protection on any asking Shaik Khalifa whether he would give me a written paper expressive of these sentiments to be readily assented, and I have now the honor to enclose a Copy and translation of this document for the information of the Honble the Governor in Council. The Shaik was profuse in his expressions of satisfaction that he had seen me and had been made so explicitly aware of the disapprobation with which the proceedings of Khorshid Pasha and Sueed bin Mookhtuk in these quarters was viewed by the British Government adding that the Pashas agent was only a promoter of feuds and quarrels among the Tribes and that he would pledge himself that if once removed from

3/ Copy and Translation of declaration made by Shaik Khalifa bin Shakhbut

from Sharjah, that person should not be allowed to land at any place between Abookhaee and the Gulf Coast notwithstanding all these professions I felt quite satisfied from his manner, that the Bunnyas Chief had been in frequent Communication with the Egyptian agent but I think the effect of this visit and the tone held by me will prevent his Committing himself for the present by any overt support or assistance to Sued bin Mookluk Prior to taking his departure the steamer was got under weigh at the Shaiks request, and the manner in which she steamed out of the narrow channel in which she was lying directly against the wind appeared to make a very powerful impression upon him.

7. Leaving Abookhaee at Sun Set the Hugh Lindsay came to opposite Debaye the next morning and about noon Shaik mukhtoom the Chief of that place came on board on my opening the object of my visit in nearly similar terms to those I had used to the Shaik of Abookhaee he began by expressing his earnest desire to meet the views of the British Government in every respect and then went into a long accusation against Shaik Khuleefa who, he affirmed, had by his treacherous proceedings rendered the engagements which had been entered into by the arabian Shaiks in the presence of Captain Edmunds against the Comonion Enemy of no effect that the Bunyan Chief had been in Constant correspondence with Sued

bin Mookluk ever since the date of that interview, and that only the day before two messengers had arrived from Abookhaee to the Egyptian agent with letters from the Shaik offering to support him with his forces in an expedition against Bryme. Shaik Mukhtoom concluded by saying that although Shaik Sultan had nigerly fulfilled the terms demanded by Khuleefa as the Condition upon which all further aggressions upon each others territories were to cease yet the latter had no sooner returned to Abookhaee than he plundered seventeen valuable Camels from the neighbourhood of debaye. These statements were Corroborated by the British agent Moollah Hoosein on this coming on board from Sharjah to which place the Hugh Lindsay had proceeded on the arrival of Shaik Mukhtoom. The agent L'Remise informed me that Shaik Sultan bin Seggur had put Sued bin Mookluk in possession of a strong fortified House and Tower forming part of the defences of that Town, he also told me, that three days before a messenger having arrived from Khorshid Pasha via Kateef and Bahrein to the Egyptian agent, with other letters to the address of the different chiefs, and according to the Sueds statements promising speedy reinforcements, flags were hoisted, and guns fired in

in token of rejoicing Shaik Mukhtoom before
his departure assured me that he had never
visited Sued bin Moodluk and pressed me to
insist upon Shaik Sultan bin Suggur removing
by and him from the coast where his presence he observed,
translation was produced nothing but inquiring to the matter
a declaration made time Arabs to my request that he would give
Shaik me those sentiments in writing the Shaik assented
Mukhtoom without hesitation a copy and translation of this
delays document forming enclosure No 1 is now
transmitted for the information of the Government
of

Quitting Sharjah on the afternoon of the
Amulgavine 7th the Bryth Lindsay anchored off Amulgavine about
sun set and at my invitation I was shortly after-
wards visited by Abdoollah bin Rashid the
Shaik of that place The subject of Khorshid
Pasha and the proceedings of Sued bin Moodluk
in this quarter formed the topic of our conversa-
tion The whole tenor of the Shaiks language
plainly shewed that he was (as indeed he has
always been represented) altogether averse to the
presence of Sued bin Moodluk on these parts and
the extension of the Egyptian influence to the shores of the
Persian Gulf He said that the expulsion of the
Pasha's agent had been fully determined on by all
the Shaiks and he was quite at a loss to com-
prehend the sudden change in Sultan bin Suggurs
policy on this point Shaik Abdoollah bin Rashid
urged

urged me strongly to press upon the Joasmee
Chief the expediency of removing this intriguer
from his territories, and added that it was of
much consequence that this should be done
with as little delay as possible, as the evils arising
from his artful proceedings were increasing
while the difficulty of effecting his removal
daily became greater He appeared great satis-
faction on hearing that it was my intention
to send an agent to Bryniee saying that
he thought it would produce the best effect
on the minds of the Inhabitants of that place
confirm them in their purpose of maintaining
their independence and make a great impression
on all the Arabs upon the Coast and in the
interior The Beni Naeem he said were even
more than ever determined to resist the attempts
of Sued bin Moodluk to subjugate them Since
the receipt of my letter of encouragement
He added, that such was the satisfaction the
arrival of this Communication had produced
in Bryniee, that a salute of nine guns had
been fired on the occasion on my showing him
the paper given me by Shaik Mukhtoom (en-
closure No 1) he readily gave me another from
himself couched in the same terms

9. At Sun Rise on the morning of the 3rd Inst
Instant the Steamer anchored off Rasel Khymah
at

at no great distance from the Town Bowring sent over Moollah Hamjeen on shore with a request to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur to afford me a meeting that chief accompanied by a few of his principal followers came off about noon after the usual compliments had passed I informed the Shaikh that the object of my visit to Rasul Khymah was to require an explanation from him regarding his late extraordinary conduct in having forgetful of his obligations to the British and his long and intimate connexion with that Government apparently thrown himself into the arms of a Power whose establishment on this side of the Arabian Continent, he was quite aware was not only obnoxious to the views of England but also inevitably destructive of his own independence these proceedings I added were the more inexplicable as being wholly opposed to the language and sentiments he had expressed to Rear admiral Sir Frederick Maitland, on his recent visit to Rasul Khymah In reply to these remarks the Joasmee Shaikh entered into a long explanation to show that he had been perfectly sincere in the professions he had made to Captain Edmunds on board the Wellesley that no one could be more fully aware than himself of the evil and injurious effects which had arisen, and were likely to arise from the continued Sojourn of said bin Mootluk in this quarter and that under this impression he had actually taken steps for the removal of that

that individual from his territories when all his arrangements were thwarted and overturned by the treacherous proceedings of Shaikh Khuleefa of Abothabee who had entered into a close and intimate correspondence with the Egyptian agent and had offered him an Asylum in his Port in Case of his expulsion from Sharjah In corroboration of this statement the Shaikh produced a letter received by said bin Mootluk only three days before from the Benegas chief acknowledging the receipt of the Pashas communication and after alluding to the little assistance afforded to the Syed by the Joasmees during the four months he had resided on their Coasts pledged himself to support him in the attainment of his objects with the whole of the resources of the Benigas whether by land or sea although somewhat struck by this glaring proof of the deceitful character of Shaikh Khuleefas proceedings as the document produced must have reached its destination about the same time that the latter was disavowing to me in the most serious and energetic manner his having entered into any correspondence with said bin Mootluk

I thought it best in my reply to Soultan bin Sugger to affect to believe that at the time this communication was sent, Shaik Abuleefa, having been deceived by the misrepresentations of the Pashas Agent, had not been aware of the disapprobation with which the Government viewed the proceedings of Khoorshed Pasha and Said bin moothuk in this part of Arabia; but that on being made acquainted with their sentiments he had readily pledged himself both verbally and in writing to drop all further connexion with both. On hearing this, Shaik Soltan said, that he was quite as desirous of the removal of said bin Moothuk from his Coasts as I could be, but that the said had positively refused to leave the country, unless satisfied that the British authorities were opposed to his continued sojourn, and would intimate the same to him in writing. The Shaik added, that if I would furnish him with a document to this effect, one great difficulty in inducing the Egyptian agent to take his departure would be removed. I replied that the conduct of said bin Moothuk was so directly contrary to the assurances given to H. M. Ministers by Mahomed Ally - so opposed to the declarations of Khoorshed Pasha, and so immediately tending to interrupt the relations of peace and friendship existing between the mari-

-time

time Tribes of the Arabian Coast and the British Government, that he could be looked upon in no other light than as a disturber of the general tranquillity, and therefore I should have no hesitation in addressing letters both to Shaik Sultan and Said bin Moothuk upon the expediency of the latter quitting these Coasts and returning to Medgd. I accordingly prepared the two documents of which the accompanying Enclosures N.5 and 6 are copies and translations. On receiving the communication to himself and being made acquainted with the contents of the one addressed to the Pashas Agent the Shaik expressed himself quite satisfied, and said that I might rely with confidence on immediate arrangements being made for the departure of said bin Moothuk. I answered, that with every wish to believe him sincere, yet I could not conceal that the confidence I should otherwise have placed in his promises had been greatly shaken by his proceedings subsequent to his interview with Admiral Maitland, but that if he was bonafide in his present sentiments he must give me a paper to the same effect as those so readily furnished by the other Shaiks on the Coast. After some hesitation he said, that the removal of Said Moothuk, and the opinions expressed in the document referred to might not

unlikely

unlikely give serious offence to Khorshid Pasha and therefore in the event of this being attacked by that General, he wished to know, whether he might look to the British Government for aid and support. Bearing in mind the opinion expressed by the Right Honble the Governor General "that circumstances might occur under which it might be proper that aid should be afforded to them (the Arabian Chiefs) in arms and ammunition" and also "that Sultaun bin Suggur Chief of the Joasmee Tribe and any other Chieftains who may seek for assistance and advice from the Resident should certainly be encouraged and strengthened as much as possible" bearing in mind I repeat these opinions and my firm belief that a crisis had arrived, in which decided measures were called for to prevent our influence in this quarter being altogether supplanted by that of Mahomed Ally, I ventured to think that I did not exceed the spirit of my instructions in distinctly assuring the Joasmee chief that if his Compliance with the wishes of the British Government involved him in hostilities with any other power, I would engage to furnish him with such munitions of war as might be necessary and proper on the Shaik asking me whether I would give him this promise in writing,

I

vide Para 3rd Sec. 3 made to the Letter of the 7th April in the Secret Dept. to the Bombay Govt.

I answered, that I had no objection to do so but that I must first be satisfied by the departure of said bin Mostluk from his Coasts, that he was sincere in his professions and secondly he must add a Clause to the declaration given by the other Shaiks binding themselves to enter into no Correspondence or treaty with Mahomed Ally, his dependents or any other foreign Power, without the knowledge and consent of the British Government and moreover that the Friends and Enemies of the English should stand in the same relations with themselves. To the addition of this clause the Shaik consented without hesitation and said, that to remove all doubts of his sincerity the engagement above referred to might be deposited in the hands of Moollah Hoossun the British Agent at Sharjah with instructions, that it was not to be handed over to him, (Shaik Sultaun) until the final departure of said bin Mostluk and his followers. The arrangement being finally agreed upon and Shaik Sultaun having affixed his Seal to the declaration of which No. 7 is a copy and translation. I drew out an agreement to furnish him, under certain conditions with Warlike munitions, and now do myself the honor to Submit a transcript of this document both in the Original and Arabic,

Arabic, for the Consideration and I venture to hope approval of the Right Honble the Governor in Council.

In concluding the particulars of my interview with Shaik Sultan I must not omit to mention, that he dwelt with great indignation upon the utter faithlessness of Shaik Khuleefa, in having, without provocation plundered the Debaye Chief of a number of valuable Canoes although he himself had made a considerable sacrifice in settling the claims of the former upon the latter in order to effect a permanent reconciliation Shaik Sultan urged it upon me, that the engagement to abstain from any further aggressions upon each others territories, had been solemnly ratified in the presence of my Assistant Captain Edmunds, on board one of the Government Vessels, and therefore I ought to take up the subject - As the Shaiks arguments were not destitute of reason, I promised that when more weighty matters were settled, I could enquire into the affair, and exert my influence to procure the restoration of the plundered property.

10th In referring to the commencement of my Communication to Shaik Sultan bin Suggur (Enclosure No 6) intimating that the Bin Naeem of Brymee had been taken under protection

protection, pending the settlement of the subjects under discussion between the British and Egyptian Governments, I now beg to forward for the information of the Honble the Governor in Council a translation of a letter from Hamid bin Surour, and Mahomed bin Abdollah, Chiefs of the Naeem Tribe, to the British Agent at Shargah appealing to the English Authority in the Gulf for support and protection against the intrigues and aggressions of Said bin Mootluk. This appeal, under the present critical juncture of Affairs, I have considered myself justified in receiving favorably and therefore on reply, I have encouraged them to stand firm in their determination to maintain their own independence, informed them that as soon as a Suitable person can be found it is my intention to send an agent to reside on Brymee, and that on the event of their being attacked for their compliance with our views, that I will furnish them with a supply of Ammunition if necessary.

11th I feel quite assured that Shaik Sultan bin Suggur at the present moment is sincere in the professions and promises he has made to me, and I think it likely he will take immediate steps to induce Said bin Mootluk to quit his territory, in which object, aided as he will

will be by the support and wishes of the Chiefs of the neighbouring districts he will probably be successful But the character of the Joasmee chief is so hollow and faithless, and at the same time so vacillating that it would not very much surprise me to find him again changing his intentions and policy. However this may be I entertain every hope that I have succeeded in giving a check at least for the present to the intrigues of Saud bin Mo.Tuk and the encroachments of Khorshed Pasha in Oman by having infused confidence and courage into those disposed to uphold their connexion with the British and lowered the hopes and pretensions of the party inclined to advance the Egyptian influence in this part of Arabia. I consider it however my duty, explicitly to lay before the Government my opinion that this favorable reaction is not likely to be permanent unless supported by firm and decided measures by the Indian and Home authorities. The report of Ibrahim Pasha being successful on his impending conflict with the Sultan — the arrival of reinforcement in Oman either by land or sea from Khorshed Pasha — or the return of Saud bin Mootluk / supposing him now removed / with a larger and better equipped

equipped body of Troops - all or any one of these not improbable contingencies would be sufficient to turn the scale and give the final blow to our already unsettled influence on these coasts. Previously to having had the advantage of a personal examination into the actual state of affairs on the Arabian Coast of this Gulf, it was my opinion as expressed in a late communication to the Honble the Secret Committee that the only effectual check to the encroachments of Mahomed Ally in this direction could be given by Her Majesty's Ministers making serious and peremptory remonstrances to Cairo. I am however inclined now to think that this alone will not be sufficient unless some demonstration be likewise made by the Indian Government on this side. It is difficult to point out how such a demonstration could be most effectively exhibited, but I would most respectfully suggest for consideration that in the event of Sheik Sultan bin Suggur not removing Saud bin Mootluk voluntarily, agreeably to this promise, that he should be forced to expel him, and supported by our naval and military means should he allege his want of power as an excuse for the non-performance of this engagement. The Naval Force in the Gulf should be sufficiently increased to

to enable us to provide for the safety of Karrak and at the same time to keep two Vessels of war cruizing off the arabian Coast until the present crisis be past. In the event of Syud bin Mootluk's returning to Muteef, and Whorshid Pasha again preparing to dispatch him by Sea with a larger force to the Coasts of Oman, authority should be given to blockade that Port as well as those of Ajeer and Sohar, should it be ascertained that any of the Chiefs on the Coast, for the furtherance of their own feuds and quarrels with each other, are aiding and abetting the Egyptians, or those Tribes connected with them, in attacking Bryinee, they should be threatened with the destruction of their Towns and Vessels, if they did not immediately desist, and this threat should be carried into execution if necessary. If these measures were authorised, and at the same time an explicit intimation given to Mahomed Ally by Her Majesty's Government that he would be held responsible for any loss of life which might arise from carrying them into operation, it would, I venture to think, at once put an end to the temporizing policy he has so long successfully pursued, and by compelling him to issue peremptory orders for the with drawal of his Troops and Agents from the direction

direction of the Persian Gulf, secure the independance of this side of Arabia, and thus establish the influence and reputation of Great Britain in this part of the world upon a firmer foundation than ever.

I have the honor to be &c
(signed) S. Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf

Enclosure No 1

Translation of a letter from Moolla Houseein, the Agent at Shargah, to Captain Kemball, Resident in the Persian Gulf - 21st May 1839.

"I have the honor to report that after the breaking up of the assemblage of the Chiefs on the occasion of meeting Captain Edmunds, Shaik Sultan bin Sugger returned to Ras-ul-Khymah where he was joined by Shaik Mukhtoom of Debaye. I understand that Shaik Rashid bin Shukboot of Aboothabee on arriving off Shargah (on his returning to his own Country) sent his man Saeed bin Saleem on shore to Sued bin Mutluk, with a message (as I am told) to this effect" Shaik Sultan bin Sugger and the other maritime Chiefs have entered into engagements which will be productive of great damage and injury to you, as they intend to expel you from their territory, but should this be the case, you may depend upon an honorable reception in Aboothabee until reinforcements arrive for you from Khorshid Pasha. It is also believed that Esa bin Tareef has entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with Sued bin Mootluk. Shortly after the return of Shaik Sultan to Ras-ul-Khymah, he arranged with Mukhtoom, that his writer should proceed to Shargah, and having prepared two vessels, send off Sued bin Mutlook

Mootluk and his followers. upon the arrival of the writer at that Port, Sugger bin Sultan (the son of the former Chief) sent off a Man to Sued bin Mootluk with a message to say that the Sea Coast belongs to the English, that as the Sueds force was quite inadequate to the conquest of Bryneé, and Shaik Sultan could no longer afford the expence of maintaining him and his followers, the best thing he could do would be to avail himself of the opportunity which then offered, and and return to Hatef. Sued bin Mootluk replied that he would not quit Shargah except upon satisfactory grounds viz the production of a writing from the British Government to the effect that Shaik Sultan was ordered to expel the Mogolies from his territories or else a paper from the Shaik himself, directing him to quit the Country, in either of which cases he said he would proceed to rejoin Khorshid Pasha, and lay these documents before him, or he would go somewhere else, and await the return of his messenger from Hedjed. On receiving this answer, Shaik Saleh and Shaik Sugger were much perplexed, and the former proceeded himself to Sued bin Mootluk, in order to find out what the real

real state of the case might be. In the course of the interview the Egyptian agent produced letters from Khurshid Pasha to the address of all the Shaiks of Oman, including Humood bin Azam and the Imam. The purport of all these communications was the same as that of the enclosure I now forwarded to you. This intimation sorely grieved Shaik Saleh, who taking the letter addressed to his Brother proceeded with it to Rasil Khymah. On the receipt of this communication the Shaik was much distressed, and confounded, not knowing how to behave to Saeed bin Mootluk, as at first he had only produced letters from Khalid bin Saood. It was at last arranged, that Shaik Sultan should write to Saeed bin Mootluk to the effect, that on his first arrival in these parts the Shaik had not been aware that he was deputed by Khurshid Pasha, but that now he had become acquainted with this circumstance from the Pasha's communication, he begged to assure him, that both himself, country, and subjects were entirely at his disposal, and he (Sultan) was ready to obey all his orders but that he hoped that he would write both to the Egyptian General and Khalid bin Saood to say, that Shaik Sultan bin Suggur had been the only

one amongst all the Arabian Shaiks of the Coast who had received and supported him. With this letter Shaik Saleh returned to Sharjah and having waited upon Saeed bin Mootluk apologised to him for what he had formerly said and entreated his forgiveness which was readily accorded by the Egyptian agent, who wrote letters to his superiors couched in the terms requested by the Joasmee Chief. These were sent off on the 17th ultimo by a special messenger via Bahrein. The greatest possible honor and attention is now paid to Saeed bin Mootluk by all the Shaiks and Chief Men, who wait upon him morning and evening. He Saeed talks very large and affects the greatest possible dignity. Khurshid Pashas letters have been sent to the different Shaiks. Two of these, Abdoollah bin Rashid of Ahmulgavine, and Mukhtoom of Debaye, have both declined visiting his agent, but the latter to prevent the disputes has at last sent his Brother to wait on him. Saeed bin Mootluk deceives the Shaiks, by spreading false intelligence from Nedjd, such as that a Force has marched from that Province, and arrived at Guttur &c. &c. who hearing this, are filled with terror and redouble their attentions

to

to the Egyptian Agent all the Arabs however which come from Bahrein state that this is untrue. They report that Khorshid Pasha has left Riaz for Surmadah and intends proceeding to Medina. The Men in Byrimee are unanimous and are quite prepared to fight. Ges bin Azan has left there 15 foot and as many horsemen in charge of the Fort of Sabarah and has promised that wherever they may be threatened with an Attack he will rejoin them. He has returned to Sohar with the remainder of his Force. The People of Byrimee have sent word to Shaikh Sultan to the effect that they belong to his Tribe and that if he wishes that District for himself he had only to send one of his Sons and they would all acknowledge his authority, but that if he intended to coerce and to place them in the power of a Tyrant they would not submit. To this Shaikh Sultan having returned no answer the Imam sent out 40 Camel Men to the neighbourhood of Rasil Khymah, and captured 30 female Camels with which they returned to Byrimee Shaikh Sultan has sent a Messenger to them on this subject.

Enclosure in Moollah Housseins letter of 21st May 39

Translation

Translation of a Circular letter addressed by Khorshid Pasha to the several Chiefs in Oman, dated 18th Zil Kaada - 4th February 1839.

From Khorshid Pasha the Commander in Chief of the army in Hedjaz, to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur. At this time my Agent Syed bin Mootluk has been despatched to you as the Chief of Oman. Him you are to hear, obey and assist, whosoever disobeys has no one to blame but himself.

Arabic copy of the above.

Enclosure No 2.

Protest.

Residency in the Persian Gulf

Karrak 25th June 1839

The undersigned having received an official Communication from His Excellency Khorshid Pasha, the General in Chief of the Egyptian Army in Hedjaz, through his Agent Mahomed Effendi to the effect, that Bahrein had submitted to the authority of Mahomed Ally Pasha, and that its ruler had agreed to pay the annual sum of three thousand Dollars as Zukaat, and having further in reply to a Communication made

to

to Shaik Abdoolah bin Rhimo upon the subject & been informed by that Chief that being pressed by Khorshid Pasha his fears had induced him to enter into certain arrangements with them, the undersigned takes an early opportunity of protesting in the most earnest manner against these arrangements or any & such agreement as that above referred to, as being & directly opposed to the assurances given by His Highness Mahomed Ally Pasha in reply to the remonstrances made by Her Britannic Majesty's Government against the encroachments of Khorshid Pasha in the direction of the Arabian Ports of the Persian Gulf.

Signed S. Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf

True Copy
Sigd S. Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Enclosure No 3

Translation of a written declaration given by & Shaik Khuleefa bin Shaikhoot, Chief of Aboothabee, to Captain Hennell, Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated 1st July 1839.

I Khuleefa bin Shaikhoot, Shaik of the & Beniyas

Beniyas do declare that it having been made apparent to me from the communication of Captain Hennell the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, that the proceedings of Khorshid Pasha in these parts are opposed to the views of the British Government, and directly contrary to the answers given by Mahomed Ally Pasha to the latter, with reference to its disapproval of the aforesaid proceedings and it having further been made manifest to me from the reply of Khorshid Pasha through his Man Mahomed Effendy to the Resident that he had no intention of interfering in the affairs of these quarters, and that he had received no orders from his superior to do so, it is evident to me that the arrival of Syed bin & Mootluk in these parts interrupts the relations of peace and friendship existing for so long a period between the British Government and the Arabian Chiefs. I am not therefore consenting to his actions and proceedings, nor am I disposed to submit to the authority of Khorshid Pasha, Syed bin Mootluk, Mahomed Ally Pasha, or any other, but I am desirous of strengthening the foundation of the ancient amity and friendship established

established between me and the British Government, whatever therefore may be conformable to their wish, and they may direct, I am obedient to the same and will act in every respect agreeably to their intention and order without fail.

L.S. of Shaik Khuleefa

(Same translation)
(Sign) S. Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Enclosure No 4

Translation of a declaration made by Shaik of Muktitoom of Debaye, to Captain Hennell, Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated 2nd July 1839.

I Muktitoom bin Butye, Shaik of Debaye, do hereby certify, and have considered it incumbent upon myself to declare as follows, to Captain Hennell, the British Resident in the Persian Gulf that I am neither consenting nor disposed to the arrival of Syed bin Mookbik in these parts, for it is apparent to me that his remaining here is the cause of confusion and disturbance among the Arabian Tribes of Oman, & that

that he is an interrupter of the friendship and peace, confirmed by Treaty which has been established for so long a period between the British Government and the Arabian Chiefs. For this reason and because my grand object and great inclination is the strengthening of that ancient friendship subsisting between me and the English Government, so that it may continue firm upon its former foundation, be it known to high and low, that I am not favorable to the journey of Syed bin Mookbik in these parts neither am I disposed to submit to the authority of either Suleyman Pasha or Mahomed Ally, but my inclination and desire is to be under the protection of the British Government and obedient to its objects and views.

L.S. of Muktitoom bin Butye.

(A true translation)
(Sign) S. Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Enclosure No 5

Translation of a note from Captain Hennell to Shaik Sultan bin Suggur, Chief of Ras-ul-Khymah, dated 3rd July 1839

From

From Captain Hennell British Resident in the Persian Gulf, to Sultan bin Suggur, Chief of the Joasmees. Be it known to you, that Mahomed Ally Pasha having directly assured the British Government in reply to their warnings, that he had no intention of establishing his authority in the direction of the Arabian Coast of the Persian Gulf, and moreover Khurshid Pasha having openly intimated through his Agent Mahomed Effendi that he had no design of interfering with the concerns of the maritime arabian Chiefs of Oman, it is clear that Syed bin Mootluk is acting without the authority of Mahomed Ally, and is no other than a disturber of the relations of peace and friendship which have been established by Treaty for so long a period between the Chiefs of Oman, and the British Government. It is consequently in every respect advisable that Syed bin Mutlook should be removed from your territory without delay, and you will therefore hasten to prepare vessels for embarking that Person and his followers, and sending them to Kateef. Should you be apprehensive that on leaving your Country this individual should land in any other of the Arabian Ports,

I

I have to inform you, that a general warning has been given, that any one of the Chiefs at peace with the British Government, affording him a place in his territory, his friendship with the Sirkar will be interrupted, and he will have no one to blame but himself.

True Translation

Sgd/ L. Hennell

Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Enclosure No 6

Translation of note from Captain Hennell, to Syed bin Mootluk. 25th June 1839.

From Captain Hennell, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, to Syed bin Mootluk. Let it not be concealed from you, that until the affair be settled by the Governments of Great Britain, and Egypt, I have taken Humood bin Surour, and Mahomed bin Abdoollah, the Chiefs of the Nacem in Brymee and under protection. Whosoever therefore commits any aggression on the two Chiefs aforesaid their Tribe, will have to answer for the consequences of his conduct, especially as Mahomed Ally Pasha has openly avowed, and declared in his reply to the warnings of the British Government, that he had no intention of interfering with those parts. Moreover I was much astonished

astonished when I received information that you had produced, and distributed letters to the address of the Shaiks of Oman declaring that you were the Chief of that Province. This is a claim which is not admitted, and it is besides directly opposed to the declaration of Mahomed Ally. I cannot consequently view you otherwise than as disturber of the Peace and friendship existing between the British Government and the Arabian Shaiks. It is therefore expedient that after the receipt of this letter you, without delay, retire from these parts and return to Khorshid Pasha.

True translation
(Sgd) J. Kennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Inclosure No 7

Translation of a declaration made by Shaik Sultan bin Suggur, Chief of Rasel Khymah, to Captain Kennell.
Dated 3rd July 1839.

I Sultan bin Suggur, Shaik of the Joasmees do hereby certify, and have considered it incumbent upon myself to declare as follows, to Captain Kennell, the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, that

that I am neither consenting nor disposed to the arrival of Syed bin Mootluk in these parts, for it is apparent to me that his remaining here is the cause of confusion and disturbance among the Arabian Tribes of Oman, and that he is an interrupter of the friendship and Peace, confirmed by Treaty, which has been established for so long a period between the British Government and the Arabian Chiefs. For this reason, and because my grand object and great inclination is the strengthening of that ancient friendship subsisting between me, and the English so that it may continue firm upon its former foundation, be it known to high and low, that I am not favorable to the sojourn of Syed bin Mootluk in these parts, neither am I disposed to submit to the authority of either himself, Khorshid Pasha, or Mahomed Ally, but my inclination and desire is to be under the protection of the British Government and obedient to its objects and views.

Additional Clause by Shaik Sultan bin Suggur 3rd July.

I also further agree that I will enter into no correspondence or engagements with Mahomed Ally, and his dependents or any other Foreign Power, or without

without the Knowledge and permission of the British Government, as its Enemies are my Enemies, and its Friends, my Friends.-

(True Translation)
(Sign) S. Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf

Enclosure N° 8

Translation of an agreement entered into with Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, Chief of Rasil Khymah, dated 21 Rubeea ool Sanee A.H. 1255, or 3rd July 1839.-

I, Captain Hennell, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, do hereby engage, that in the event of Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, Chief of the Joasmee Tribe being attacked from any quarter, on account of his compliance with the wishes of the British Government, and his applying to me for warlike munitions, I will assist him with them as may be proper, stipulating however that the aforesaid Shaikh shall continue firm to his engagement, that he will form no treaty nor carry on any correspondence with Mahomed Ally, or those connected with him, or any other foreign power, without the Knowledge, and consent of the

British

British Government

True Translation.-
(Sign) S. Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Enclosure N° 9

Translation of a letter from Hummud bin Sunoor, and Mahomed bin Abdoollah, Chiefs of the Naeem, dated 24th Suffer or 8th May 1839.-
A.C.

We wrote to you before and brought to your notice certain subjects. You know that in these parts our hope and trust is in you. You are all aware of the arrival of this oppressor (Saeed bin Mootluk) and what his intentions, and objects are towards us and others, but we think it right again to remind you of them, our purpose in discussing this subject with you is (to show) that if he obtains authority (in these parts) it will be most injurious both to us and others, but who is it that is aware of this, or contemplates the future consequences, or who is there who reflects upon the times, and that which is connected with them, both past and present. We therefore hope that immediately you receive this letter

you

you will wait upon the Sirdar of the Christian Govern-ment, and make an engagement between him, and us taking us under protection, and restraining from us Sued bin Mootluk, and those sent by him to Oman, as well as those who are inclined to create confusion. If this Tyrant once knew that he was interdicted by the British Sirdar he would refrain altogether from his proceedings. we would not have made this representation, or given you this trouble, had it not been for the good opinion we entertain of you, God willing, an arrangement will be made for the whole of us, for you differ from others both openly, and in secret. Do even more than we hope from you. Abdool Azeej, who is with us, and of us, is now proceeding to you we have communicated every thing to him, and whatever he may agree upon, is the same as if from ourselves, and we will act upon it. We will obey whatever you may order us. Exert o yourself to the utmost and send a speedy answer.

(True Translation)
(Sign) S. Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Enclosure No 10

Translation of a letter from Captain Hennell, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, to Hamud bin Surur, and Mahomed bin Abdoollah Shaiks of the Naeem Tribe at Bymmee. H. C. Steamer Eagle Sunday 3rd July 1837

Let it not be concealed from you that I have considered

considered it necessary to visit the Coasts of Oman for the purpose of meeting the Shaiks of those parts, in order to find out who those might be who in opposition to the wishes of the British Government had become obedient to Sued bin Mootluk and were prepared to assist him. I have heard from our Agent Moollah Hoosein, what has afforded much satisfaction. I rejoice that you continue firm in your friendship with the Government, and refuse to submit to Sued bin Mootluk, and also that you are prepared to oppose any one who may come to take your Country. In truth this is prudent. In my interview with the Arabian Chiefs I have informed them of the disapprobation with which the British Government views the proceedings of Khorshid Pasha, and the sojourn of Sued bin Mootluk in these parts, and have urged them not to submit to his authority or to allow him to reside in their territories, otherwise the bonds of friendship subsisting between them, and the Government will be severed, & they will have only themselves to blame. therefore continue firm and established in your places, being of good Cheer, and confident. Should any one attack you on account of your compliance with the wishes of the British authorities, & you require assistance in warlike munitions, let me know, and at the same time inform me in what manner it is requisite to forward them. Know also that I have been endeavouring to find a fit Person to send to reside in Bymmee as an agent from me. As soon as such an individual can be procured I will dispatch him to you without delay

(True translation)
True Copies. (Signed) S. Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf

G. F. Taylor
A. Reid
Asst. Chief Secy.

Secret Department (B)

To

J. W. Clough by, Esquire

Secretary to the Government Bombay

Sir

With reference to my letter to your address of this days date I have the honor to enclose for the information of the Honble the Governor in Council a copy and translation of a letter addressed by me to Khorshed Pasha Commander in chief of the Egyptian Forces engaged upon the subject of the proceedings of Hamood and his agent Said ben Mootlek in these quarters

Honble Companys I have the honor to be &c

Steamer Hugh Lindsay / Signed / J. Mexnell

4th July 1839 Resident in the Persian Gulf

Translation

Honble Companys Steamer Hugh Lindsay 4th July 1839

From Captain Mennell British Resident in the Persian Gulf to H.E. Khorshed Pasha Commander in Chief of the army engaged let it not be concealed from you that I have learnt with astonishment and regret from the agent of the British Government residing at Sharjah, that Saeed ben Mootluk subsequently to his arrival in these parts on seeing that his affairs did not advance as the agent of Khaled ben & Jasod,

Jasod has produced and distributed letters from you addressed to the several Arabs in Oman intimating that you had appointed him Chief of that Province, and further threatening those who disobeyed his authority.

I have already acquainted H.E. with the receipt of information from the British Government that H.H. Mahomed ally in reply to their warnings has disclaimed the intention of advancing in the direction of the Arab sea shores bordering on the Persian Gulf which has been openly declared by you in several Communications to me that you have received no orders with reference to your proceeding in these quarters It is therefore evident that H.E. is acting in direct opposition to your own authorities and consequently should an interruption in the friendly relations of the two States take place through your acts you are incurring a heavy responsibility both to your own and the British Government moreover at the time your agent Mahomed Effendi arrived and met me on the Island of Karrak, he assured me that you had no intention of interfering in the affairs of the Arabian chiefs of the Coast of Oman the proceedings however of Saeed ben Mootluk in those parts are contrary to those assurances, and consequently, either it was the intention of Mahomed Effendi

Effendi to deceive me, or else Bin mostluk is acting without authority from you In either case it is expedient that Y.E. should direct the immediate return of Bin mostluk from the Coast of Oman as a disturber of those relations of peace and friendship which have been so long established between the British Government and the Chiefs of that Province

I have further to acquaint Y.E. that the Wahabee Sirdar and Mahomed ben Abdoollah the Chiefs of the Naiim in Beymee have intimated to me that they have placed themselves under the protection of the British Government and Consequently it is my intention to attach an agent to proceed to that place and reside there.

I shall hasten to transmit a full report of these circumstances both to India and England and I must again in the most distinct manner repeat to Y.E. that I have received the instructions of the British Government to warn you seriously against your proceedings in this parts as calculated to interrupt the relations of amity subsisting between the states of Great Britain and Egypt.—

True translation

/Signed/ S Hennell

Resident in the Persian Gulf

True Copies.

S.B. Reid

Actg Chief Secy.

2.15
Disturbances at Buraimi, July–August 1839

No 88 of 1839.

Residency in the Persian Gulf
Kamah. 26th August 1839.

Secret Department

Sir,

I have the honor to report for the information of the honorable the Governor in Council the arrival of a boat dispatched by Moollah Hoosein the British Agent at Sharjah with letters from himself and the Chiefs of the Arabian Coast to my address. For the reasons mentioned in my letter of this days date No 75 Political Department there is not sufficient time to enable me to furnish Government with translations of these communications by the present opportunity I can only therefore briefly state that

Moollah

To,
L. R. Reid Esqre
Acting Chief Secretary to the Govt
Bombay

Residency Persian Gulf
Reporting departure of Syed Hoosein Bushire from Coast of Oman.

Moollah Houssein reports the departure of Sued bin Mootluk with his followers to Ajeer having previously to his quitting Sharjah been personally assured by Sheik Sultan bin Sugger that if he returned to Oman in force he (Sheik Sultan) would join him with all his resources The departure of Sued bin Mootluk also viewed with pleasure by the Sheiks of Debaye Lyman and Amulgavein does not appear to have afforded satisfaction to the subjects of Sheik Sultan bin Sugger as they are apprehensive lest the Egyptian Agent should be sent back by Land with large reinforcements by Khorshid Pasha and that the British Government although powerful by Sea will afford them little protection by land. Moollah Houssein further reports that Sued bin Mootluk on his voyage from Sharjah landed on the Island of Henn on the Persian Coast and carried off from thence 200 Sheep and other property. This gross and wanton aggression upon the subjects of a friendly Power I shall take the first opportunity of bringing to the notice of Colonel Campbell for the information of Mahommed Ally Pasha. It may however be taken as a specimen of the proceedings which are likely to be encouraged by Sued bin Mootluk if he again obtains a footing in Oman.

Sued bin Mootluk carries off plunder the Island of Henn on the Persian Coast.

2

Sheik Khuleefa breaks his engagements with his attacking the people of Buymee.

2

I regret much to report for the information of the Honorable the Governor in Council that Sheik Khuleefa bin Shackboot of Abootabee has in direct opposition to all his pledges and engagements personally attacked the Naeem Tribe of Buymee in pursuance as it is asserted of an agreement between himself and Sued bin Mootluk by which he was to harass the people of that place by every means in his power pending the return of the Egyptian Emissary with a large and efficient force. Until the present time I have always been led to believe that the best understanding subsisted between Buymee and Abootabee and I am therefore quite inclined to give credit to the reports from all quarters that his present movements have originated entirely from a design to promote the views of Sued bin Mootluk and his superior Khorshid Pasha. I am therefore of opinion that if an example were made of the Beriyas Chief by his being compelled to afford compensation for all the plunder and loss he has inflicted upon the Naeem and also to desist from further aggressions against that Tribe under the threat of the destruction of his boats and towers it would have an excellent effect upon the other Sheiks on the Arabian Coast and throughout the Gulf. Although our influence will unquestionably be seriously affected in these quarters by the return of Sued bin Mootluk with a force from Bushyre by Land we still such an exercise of our powers

of a Chief who has thus acted so directly and openly in opposition to his own promises as well as to the expressed wishes and views of the Government would not fail to produce a powerful impression. To do this effectively however an addition to our present Naval Force of an efficient Sloop of War and an armed Steamer is necessary in order that while carrying out such an operation during the winter months the safety of Sharak against an attack by Sea may also be provided for.

I have &c.

/ Signed / J. Kennedy.

Resident. &c.

24

X From Sheikh Rashid bin Maktoum 9
(no date)

I have to inform you of my affairs with the Beni Yas with whom I agreed to oppose Saeed bin Mutlak. towards the end

27

should be able to get no footing in Buraimi.
The people in that direction would all remain neutral
but after Saud bin Nedhaik had left these people
put themselves in opposition to me shewing
their hostility by plundering my people, three
of whom were killed, and 150 Camels stolen.
They sought all benefits conferred by me, such
as presents of guns powder and lead and
by having enfeebled them in their wars against
Bin Nedhaik. After having stolen these things
they made an foray into the country of my
people the Zumeem tribe destroying their
date groves and cutting off their waters.
You are aware that the country of the Zumeem
belongs to my father Sheikh Saeed and that
the date groves are common to them & me.
On this account I want to make peace
with them and to close the door of discord,
but I perceive from the Natives unwillingness
& hostility in every respect. This is according
to decree of the Almighty; that which cannot
avoid by ingenuity shall be removed of itself like
oppressions of tyranny. All that has
occurred is in violation of agreements
existing between me and them. I was
formerly at enmity with them but after
I found that you wished me to desist
from against Bin Nedhaik it was impos-
sible to do any thing but to listen to
your wishes. You must now tell me

28

what you consider best to be done, or
send a person to make peace between me
and them, in order that we may live at
peace with all the people of Buraimi; and
attentive I am to arrange my affairs
with them myself. I have at present
given up making aggressions on them and
having lately received any [illegible] the Beyádi
people will certainly come in this direction.
Whatever is in your heart impress me
and I will act conformably. So long as
I live I will continue your friend.
As regards Saud bin Nedhaik please find
he will appear again in this country. Do
with respect to any thing from
last opposition and hostile attempt.
You will defend me from the attacks
of Saud bin Nedhaik and others, and
when I require assistance I will apply to
you. You must not attend to what
base persons may say against me

X (Dated 6th Ppr.)

Transcription of previous document

From Sheik Kuleifa bin Shakboot

(No date)

I have to inform you of the affairs with the Naiem with whom I agreed to oppose Saed bin Mutluk in order that he should be able to get no footing in Oman. The people in this direction were all unanimous but after Saed bin Mutluk left these people put themselves in opposition to me showing their hostility by plundering my people, three of whom were killed, and 150 camels stolen. They forgot all benefits conferred by me, such as presents of gun powder and lead and my having assisted them in their war against Bin Mutluk After having stolen these things they made a foray into the country of my people the Zuwerer tribe destroying their date groves and cutting off their water. You are aware that the country of the Zuwerer belongs to my father Shakboot and that the date groves are common to them and us. On this account I went to make peace with them and to close the door of discord, but experienced from the Naiem nothing but hostility in every respect. This is according to the decree of the Almighty, that whoever aids tyrants shall himself feel the oppression of tyranny. All that has occurred is in violation of agreements existing between me and them. I was formerly at enmity with them but after I found that you wished me to assist them against Bin Mutluk it was impossible to do anything but to listen to your wishes. You must now tell me what you consider best to be done, or send a person to make peace between me and them, in order that we may be at peace with all the people of Oman; or otherwise leave me to arrange my affairs with them myself. I have at present given up making aggressions on them not having lately received any provocation. The Nejdi people will certainly come in this direction.

Whatever is in our heart inform me and I will act comfortably. So long as I live I will continue your friend. As regards Saed bin Mutluk please God he won't appear again in this country. He will never get anything from me but opposition and hard treatment. You will defend me from the acts of Saed bin Mutluk and others, and when I require assistance I will apply to you. You must not attend to what base-born people may say against me.

2.16
Captain Atkins Hamerton's journey to Buraimi, January 1840

N.o 1883 Cont.d

Bombay Castle 2.d April 1840 Secret Cons.n 14

N.o 1883 From Captain S. Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf
To I. P. Willoughby Esquire
Chief Secretary to Government
Dated 30.th January 1840

Sir.

With reference to my letter N.o 1 in this department under date the 12.th Instant I have now the honor to forward for the information of the Hon.ble the Governor in Council the accompanying copy of Captain Hamerton's notes of his proceedings whilst residing in Sharjah from the 27.th November 1839 to the 6.th January 1840.—

Residency in the P.n Gulf Karrak 30.th January 1840

I have the honor &c.
Signed S. Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf

Diary of Captain Hamerton's proceedings while at Sharjah.—

27 Nov.r 1839 Wednesday 27.th November 1839, Landed from the Clive at about ½ past 3 P.M. and went to the Agents house in the evening the Schaik Sayeed bin Sultan came and took tea.—

28 Nov.r 1839 Thursday 28.th November 1839, this morning the

No 1803 Cont

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Agent went to Ajmaun to endeavour to
arrange about my going to Byreemee, he
returned at 10 P.M. telling me that all
would be right, that the Shaiks at Aj-
-maun had agreed to take me but that
Hamed bin Rashed the Chief had that
day started for Ras-el-Khymah, that a
letter had been sent off to him, and when
his answer was received the Camels would
be ready, no doubt was entertained of his
acquiescing in my going.—
Friday 29th November 1839. went and visited 29th Novr 1839
Shaiek Salla the late Governor of Shargah
nothing remarkable all day, further than
that I heard from several people that all
sorts of reports were current regarding my
going to Byreemee and that two Expres
had been sent thence from Ajmaun since
my arrival.—
Saturday 30th November 1839, nothing remark- 30th Novr 1839
-able during the day received a visit from
the Shaik Sugger bin Sultan and some
of the Chiefmen of the place.—
Sunday 1st December 1839 waiting for the... 1st Decr 1839
arrival of Hamed bin Rashed or an answer
to

No 1803 Cont

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to the letter sent to him—on my asking
the Agent Abdlah Hussein if he thought
the people of Ajmaun sincere in their
professions regarding my going to By-
-reemee he said he did think they were—
2d Decr 1839 Monday 2d December 1839. Before sunrise
this morning the Agent was about to
start for Ajmaun to endeavour to draw a
final answer from the Shaikh about
my going to Byreemee and to enable
me to determine as to the necessity of
sending the Residents letters to the Sam
Chiefs—when a letter arrived from Shaikh
Sultan bin Sugger saying that he had
received the Residents letter recommending
him to desist from hostilities with Muga-
-wain and that he had written saying
he would do so until his return from
Muscat, but that the people of the Place
were preparing to war with him in the
evening the Agent returned from Aj-
-maun saying that things wore a bad
aspect, that he could not get a decided
answer from the Shaiks although Hamed
bin

No 1003 Con A

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bin Rashid had returned from Ras-el-
Khyma he sent word that he would
send horses and Camels to bring me to
Ajmaun in the morning.—
Tuesday 3d December 1839. Early this morn- 3d Dec. 1839
ing Shaikh Salla called on me and said
the Resident had told him to give me
advice and assistance, that he now called
on me to recommend my not going to
Ajmaun that the Shaikhs were only
deceiving me, that they did not intend
to assist me but that they would prevent
me if possible going to Byreemee. I got a
description and a kind of plan of the Fort of
Byreemee from a man of the place. Ab-
dullah bin Howdeen the Chief of the
Beni Khuttul has just arrived saying
he wishes to see me; he is now in Sheggar
bin Sultans house in private conversation
with him, at about 1 P.M. bin Howdeen
came and said he could not assist me either
with men or Camels, or in any way be
concerned in my going to Byreemee that
if he did so it would involve him in
trouble with the Chief of Abothebee, the
Naim

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Naim tribe and all the Chiefs on the Coast.
I have determined to send the Residents
letters by Mahomed bin Soliman to
Byreemee. I am now quite satisfied that
the Ajmaun people do not intend to
allow me if possible to go, I find that
Sultan bin Sugger is doing what he
can to prevent me going. I wrote to the
Byreemee people.—
4 Dec. 1839 Wednesday 4th December 1839. Went to visit
Shaikh Salla, had a long interview with
the Beni Khuttul Chief, he told me
the same tale to day as yesterday saying
if he & his people assisted me in the
least it would involve him in difficulties
with the rebels of the people.—
5 Dec. 1839 Thursday 5th December 1839. Started for Aj-
maun found great difficulty in getting men
to man the Agents boat, I find the
Mullawah or Chief Priest for Ras-el-Khymah
is at Ajmaun to prevent the people assist-
ing me and also trying to prevail on
Hamed bin Rashid to visit Sharjah to
confer with the Shaikh, he sent all over the
place to prevent any of the people in the towns
of

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of Ajmaun or Shargah from assisting me. I also heard that Hamed bin Rashed of Ajmaun had written to the tribes saying, I was only going to see Byreemee previous to the Margah Fair taking it, I saw Hamed bin Rashid at Ajmaun, he said he would send a Cossid with letters to Byreemee, that he could not himself at present leave his town - the Cossid started in my presence, I told the whole of the Sheikhs present that the good will of the Sircar was in their favor in consequence of their having as they had done resisted the encroachments of the Egyptians and I urged Hamaun tribes at Byreemee the same thing and also told them that if they could make up the difference now existing between them that the Government would enable them to resist their enemies the Romees by assisting them with ammunition and provisions but to understand that the Sircar would not take them under their protection & send troops to their assistance.

Friday December 6. 1839. Sheikh Sugger bin Sultan

6 Dec 1839

No 1003 Cand.

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Sultan called on me and said that the people of Mubgaum were building up a bastion so as to command the watering place that it was now within five days of the time they had agreed to give up some camels and other things they had taken from him - he found they did not intend to do so, the building the tower he considered indicative of war and asked me to write to the people to discontinue building it waited the return of the Resident or to consent to his going to prevent them - I told him the latter request I had nothing to do, I had not the power, but that I would think of the former request -

7 Dec 1839. Early this morning the Cossid who took my letters from Ajmaun on the 5th Instant returned having been beaten and robbed about half way between Ajmaun and Byreemee near a well called the Bir Mokhaby - the Camel, his arms and the letters were all taken from him, he said there were eighty men of the Beni Khuttil tribe near the well when he reached it, he told them

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them he was going to Byreemee with letters from the [Bailees] the Resident, shortly after they fell upon him saying you shall not take English letters to the Shaikhs at Byreemee this Cofid was a slave of Hamed bin Rashed called Singeer, he knew three of the men Khudeja bin Hamdush Rashan bin Sobte and Mubarack ibin el Mainphi first named individual lives in Sharjah, I have frequently seen him in the Shaikhs house.—

At abart 12 o'clock a man of the Beni Khittal tribe called Shumlan bin Amair brought me the Camel, arms and letters which had been taken from the Cofid, he said that he came up to the party shortly after the robbery and seeing letters which he knew from their shape and direction to be from the English Sircar he recommended that the whole of the things should be restored telling them + there was no knowing what might happen if the letters were destroyed, after a little they became afraid and gave up the

No 1083 Cont.

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the things to him and he brought them to me, I gave the Cofid ten dollars and presents to the amount of twenty four and a half dollars to the man who brought back the things.

8th Dec 1839. Sunday 8th December 1839. This morning Shaik Salla the Lab Shaik of Sharjah brought a man of the Jeé tribe to me called Mahomed bin Alli Gusha who agreed to take the letters to the Chief of Byreemee for six dollars and to bring me an answer in seven days, this mans tribe is at peace with all the tribes about the country viz the Naim, Beni Khittal Beni Khal Bowahese.—

9th Dec 1839 Monday 9th December 1839. This morning the Agent Mulla Hussein told me that a friend of his who had just come from Ras-Khyma had told him that he heard Shaikh Sultan bin Sugger say that as long as he Mulla Hussein was alive he could do nothing that he had frequently heard that this Shaikh intended to harass him even to take his life.—

This evening I went out to see the

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Shaikhs assn under arms, there were about three hundred men on the ground I counted two hundred and fifty spears although the Shaikh assured me there were three thousand present. they were a miserable set of men, their spears of a bad description; too long and heavy and their matchlocks the worst I ever saw +

Tuesday 10 December 1839. Hamed bin Saleh (Albuainain) came from Hamr and said he wanted to speak privately to me, when he asked me why I did not go to Byreemee. I said I could not get a single man to go with me, he said getting up to go out, I will return directly and tell you something, in about an hour he returned and said I have arranged all, I will myself go with you and twenty five other men, we cannot go with less for fear of the Beni Khuttick, if we do not go I fear the Nain Shaikhs will not come to meet the Resident, several letters have been sent to prevent them coming, if the Resident will protect us

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us and not desire Sultan bin Sugger to destroy our little town we will do any thing required of us - if you come to Hamr in the morning we will be ready to start I said I would go. I found it reported all over the place that news had arrived from Muscat, that the good understanding between the English and the Imaum was at an end that the French Ambassador and the Americans were to send out ships to assist the Imaum that the power of the English was all over and their money spent.

Dec 1839 Wednesday 11th December 1839. Went this morning to Hamr and found the Camels and people ready to start with us for Byreemee, I found a man of Sugger bin Sultans there who said that if the people either went with us to Byreemee or assisted us that Sugger bin Sultan would destroy their town, that he would consider them as his enemies if they were concerned in any going to Byreemee, the Shaikh said give us a promise that the English will protect us against Sugger bin Sultan

us

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we will go in spite of any thing he could do. I was obliged to say that I could not do so as I had not the power to say so. I was greatly enraged at this, I saw Suggers man who brought this message to Hain, he did not delay a moment, he delivered his message and went away. I returned to Shargah and found that Sugger bin Sultan was aware that I had seen the person he had sent to Hain and knew what he had said. he called around all the wise men of the place telling them that what he'd done he did by the advice of his father, he asked them to advise him now how to act. they all told him they could not now advise him, that I would tell all to the Resident who would write it to the Government and that something unpleasant would take place. he then enquired of a trader who had just come from Kuratchee if what he heard about the force there was true or not, he told him that it was quite true, that he himself had seen near Kuratchee six thousand tents full of Mijanny regular

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regular Troops, he shortly after sent off a Expid to his father at Ras-el-Khymah.

11th Dec. 1839 Thursday 12th December 1839. This morning Shaikh Sugger bin Sultan called around and said that he had heard that the people at Hain had told him to me yesterday, that if the Resident had spoken to him he would have sent men with me to Byreemee, that he would now arrange about my going. I asked him how I was to believe such a thing when on a former occasion on my asking him to assist me at the time my Consid was robbed he declined to do any thing saying that he had no power beyond the date trees around the town although the Man who committed the crime was then in his town. I at 8 A.M. received a letter from Hamed bin Surur and Mahomed bin Abdolla (the Suamee Chiefs of Byreemee) saying they were much displeased that Hamed bin Rashid had not taken me to Byreemee that his excuses were without truth. that they thought on the arrival of Mahomed bin

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bin Sahiyen that I was with him-
on his arrival near the fort of Byreenee
they fired the guns in honor of the letters
from the Resident- Mahomed bin Sul-
man writes to me that when he reached
near to Byreenee he saw about fifty
men of Ruleefas- of Abothabee who
when the guns of the fort fired went
away.—

The Cossid who brought me the letters
this morning, is the nephew of Fayel
bin Mahomed and in the confidence of
all the Mainee Shaikhs his name is
Mobarrek bin Zerwan albushamee, he
says the Shaikhs desired him to tell
me that they would certainly take
me to Byreenee when they had seen
the Resident, on the arrival of the Resident's
letters many of the Shaikhs were at Jumeh
about sixteen hours from Byreenee, they
say that all hands will please God
leave Byreenee on the 5th of Shawwal i.e.
12th December to meet the Resident.—
Friday 13th December 1839- Nothing remark- 13th Dec 1839
able during the night. I sent Sugger bin
Sultan

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Sultan ding all he could to make the
Cossid Mobarrick leave the town—
14th Dec 1839 Saturday 14th December 1839- Mobarrick
the Byreenee Cossid told me that the
Man I had just seen with him was
a confidential man belonging to
Shaikh Muktoom of Dubey, he had
come to him from Muctoom to tell him
that the Egyptian army was now at Guttar
(the track between Ras Rocken and Abo-
thabee) and that unless he wished to
forfeit the good will of all the Shaikhs
he would instantly mount his Camel
unknown to me and be off to present
the Nainas Shaikhs coming to meet the
Resident that if he even met them on
the road he should tell them where the
Egyptian army was- that he had heard
that Koorshid Pasha had written a letter
to the (Kaikeas) Resident upon reading
which he trembled- that the Imam of
Muscat was not now on terms with
the English- Shaikh Salla the late Chief
of this place was present and told him
there was no truth in what Muctoums
man

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man had said the moment it was known at Ras el Khymah that I was about to start for Byreenee, the Shaikhs Minister was sent off on a fleet Camel no one in the durbar knew where to. he returned in a short time saying that a Bedowin was gone to do the required service. Sultan bin Sugger has ordered Ryahhin Salmin the brother of the Byreenee Agent to leave Shargah and not to enter the English Service as his brother had done.

Tuesday 15th December 1839. Nothing par- 15th Dec 1839
ticular except the arrival from Byreenee of Abdulla Azeez bin Rashed with the Sons of Alli bin Hamood the Hasem Chief viz Hamood Mahamed and Sultan.

Monday 16th December 1839. Hamed bin 16 Dec 1839
Alli bin Hamood and his two brothers sent Camels and men to me requesting me to come and see them at Ajmaun as they could not come to Shargah, I went and on my return I found Sultan bin Sugger had arrived from Ras-el-Khymah and this Consd the 5th gunfire ringing

Capt

F.W. Reade

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me letters from Hamood bin Sarour and Mahomed bin Abdoola of Byreenee saying they would start on the 6th of Shwal so as to arrive at Ajmaun to meet the Resident on the 10th i.e. the 17th December 1839. I had to-day also letters from Alli bin Hamood saying he was himself unfortunately unwell and could not come, but that he was sending his son Hamed and Fazil Bin Mohamed with full powers to arrange for him as his Agents.—

Dec 1839 Tuesday 17th December 1839. This morning Shaikh Sultan bin Sugger called on me saying he was sorry to find his son had been conducting himself so ill that he had not directed him to interfere or to prevent me going to Byreenee, he had done wrong he said in doing so, he said he had also heard that his son had refused to assist in recovering the letters and things taken from my Consid at the Bin Mohafey on the 6th instant. I told him it was quite true that his son Sugger ever since I arrived here had behaved very ill.—

Capt

he

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he said he was sorry for it and went
away - he on going home confined the
man who committed the robbery, his
name is Khullfa bin Hamdush -
Wednesday 18th December 1839 - The Shaikhs 18th Dec 1839
of the Nooim Tribe came from Byeenna
and as they would not come to Sharjah
I arranged for their going to Ajmaun,
they were unprovided with any thing
I told them I would send them provisions
in the morning.
This morning I started on a Camel to 19th Dec 1839
see the Shaikhs on reaching Hamr we
found Hamed bin Surroor of the Suannee
also Mohamed bin Abdullah Suannee
with Mahomed bin Saef Bokhreibanee
and about one hundred and fifty men,
we rode along the line the whole firing
as we passed - we then proceeded to Aj-
maun and met Fajil bin Mahomed,
Sohman bin Mohamed and Mufta bin
Sohynaun of the Suannee tribe, also
Mahomed bin Alli Rashed bin Hamdan
Abdullah Ageg bin Rashed Ahmed Bin
Rashed of the Bokhreibanee tribe with about
two

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two hundred men drawn up as at Hamr
the two parties fired a salute the fort
also fired three guns at intervals of eight
or ten minutes, in the evening I re-
turned to Sharjah - Hamed bin Surroor
told me he would go with me to Byeenna
that what the people said regarding my
coming to see the place previous to the
English taking it from them was all
untrue, that if the English wished they
could take it when they pleased - they
asked when the Resident would arrive,
I told them I expected him every day. -
21st Dec 1839 Returned the visit of the Shaikhs
Sultan bin Sugger and Sallah visited Shaikh
Saeed Boot, the late Chief of Aboothabee - in
the evening I was visited by Shaikh Muck-
toum of Dubey this last Chief was most
insolent in his manner and brought
an insolent letter to the Agent Mulla
Hussein - he is a self conceited fellow and
as ill disposed to the English as a man
can be -
21st Dec 1839 Saturday 21st December 1839 Received a letter
from Hamood bin Surroor saying he would
be

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be obliged if I would send the Agent to him - I wrote that I would myself see him in the morning -

22d Dec 1839

Sunday 22d December 1839 - Went to Ajmaun to see Ahmed bin Sunoor, he told me that he had received a message from Sultan bin Sugger advising him to return instantly to Byreence and to make the other Shaikhs do the same, that he would give him a quantity of powder shot and money if he wanted it, not to see the Resident and to put no confidence in the English Government.

The Beni Kuttub tribe took two Camels from the Bookhaboose tribe last night from the town of Ajmaun Hamed bin Sa'af heard where they were and said he would have them back on my return to Shargah, I found it reported that the Shaikhs Ship of Ajmaun was to be taken from Hamed bin Rasched and given to Abdool Azez bin Rashid, that the Resident had been ill received by the Imaun of Muscat and had gone to Bombay, all this it was said was written to Muktoom the

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the Shaikh of Duby -

23d Dec 1839

Early this morning monday 23d December Sultan bin Sugger called on me and said that Hamed bin Sa'af had started to recover some camels which had been stolen from him by the Beni Kuttubs, I told him I thought it strange that the Shaikhs who came to meet the Resident should be robbed by the Beni Kuttubs who were living in his town, he at this grew angry and said the Agent was his enemy he had no right to tell me that the Beni Kuttubs were living in Shargah, I asked him if it was not the case, he said yes, but that he had no authority over them he thought it best to please the English by turning (Durvesh) a Hermit and spend the remainder of his days in quiet at Bassadore -

24 Dec 1839

Tuesday 24th December 1839 - Abdulla Azeez bin Rasched came in and said that the Shaikhs of the Beni Khab were sending letters and messages all last night to Sultan bin Sugger who wished them

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him to leave Ajmaun and come to Sharjah - I received a letter from Fazil bin Mahomed saying that he wished to leave Ajmaun and come to Hatta he wished me to give him advice. I told him I thought it best for him to remain at Ajmaun but that of course to suit his own pleasure. —

Wednesday 25th December 1839 - The Shaikhs of the Beni Otal Hamed bin Zaid and Mohamed bin Ameir called to say they had heard I had been told they wished to leave the Noimee people, that they had come to Sharjah from Ajmaun on private affairs - I told them they were quite right to do so, that it was not by any means my business where they went, they said they did not see Sultan bin Sugger last night, this is not true they were with him all night. -

A Lady of the Shaikhs Harem told the wife of the Agent that if matters were not arranged to the satisfaction of the Shaikhs of Ras-el-Khymah, Sharjah and Dubey that they would place themselves under

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under the King of Persia or the Sultan of Misser / Egypt /, when the English could no longer interfere with them by land or Sea. —

25th Dec 1839 Thursday 26th December 1839 - went to Ajmaun this morning and found the Shaikhs dissatisfied with their nations after some discussion an arrangement was made. —

27th Dec 1839 Friday 27th December 1839 - A grand Muster of all the fighting men in Sharjah, the Shaikh Sultan bin Sugger said there were three thousand men present, there were not six hundred, I counted the spears three times & three I made two hundred and twenty seven and the second two hundred and nineteen. —

28th Dec 1839 Saturday 28th December 1839 Fazil Bin Mohamed wrote me to say that as he had interviews with Hamed bin Rasched of Ajmaun that he had left the place and come to Hatta, Sultan bin Sugger has heard that Aden had been taken from the English, the whole of the Garrison destroyed and a great number of officers

sent

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sent prisoners to Egypt.—

Mulla Mohammed the Mozzin of Sultan bin Sugger called and said the Shaikhs army was quite ready to attack Mutgawain — he was very insolent in his manner and asked me if I had heard the news from Aden, I told him I had not nor had he heard the truth, he replied the Government would soon hear it. 29th Dec 1839.

Sultan bin Sugger called and said that on Friday last the people of Mutgawain had commenced building up the tower, that it was now as high as a mans waist as he had promised the Resident not to go to war until he returned from Muscat he asked me to write to the Shaikhs to discontinue the building — that if he did not that he must go to war that his boat containing two Cofirds had been fired at.—

I told him I could only advise the people to keep the peace until the return of the Resident and that I would most strongly advise him to keep the promise he had made to the Resident that I knew well he did

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did not believe the lies which were circulated in the place, he said he did not know what to believe — Abdull Azeez bin Rashed said that he had nothing to do with the Shaikhs hearing opinion that his brother had made some arrangements with Sultan bin Sugger, who they believed had agreed to receive the Egyptians that the arrangements had given offence to all hands — which caused the Shaikhs to leave.—

30th Dec 1839 Monday 30th December 1839. The Shaikh Sultan bin Sugger has collected all hands to go against Mulgawain, all hands making head and cooking shot. I have received a Message from the Naime people saying that if Sultan bin Sugger went against Mulgawain they would assist the Shaikh Abdulla bin Rashed against him — I said I was going myself to Mulgawain in the morning — that if it was God I would prevent hostilities until the arrival of the Resident.

I also told Sultan bin Sugger that I must again advise him to keep his promise to the Resident.—

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Tuesday 31st December 1839. I started this morning for Amulgavain and on arriving there I found the people under arms and a great many persons employed building up the tower, I saw the Shaikh Abdullah bin Rasched a very sensible sort of man- he said that if I could prevail on Shaikh Sultan bin Sugger to say that he would not come against him untill the arrival of the Resident that he would discontinue building up the tower untill matters were arranged- that his people said they never would be the Ryots of Sultan bin Sugger, they would be killed to a man round the tower rather than submit that Sultan bin Sugger never kept his promise when he had the power of breaking it- I told the Shaikh I would do all I could to prevail on Sultan bin Sugger to keep the peace untill the arrival of the Resident.— 31st Dec 1839.

Wednesday 1st January 1840. Early this morning Sultan bin Sugger called on me and said he did not know what was the object of my going to Byreine and why I did not 1st Jany 1840.

go

N° 1883 Cont B

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go he knew not- I told him he was not talking as he ought to do, that he had lost an opportunity of shewing his determination to thwart the views of Government in any way he could ever since I came here- he replied I am a well wisher of the English Nation.—

2d Jany 1840. Thursday 2d January 1840. Abdoolla bin Hoorden the Chief of the Beni Khuttuls (a Bedowen tribe) came to me and said he wished much to see the Resident- I advised him to wait somewhere near this place untill his arrival- he told me that he had declined to assist the Shaikh Sultan bin Sugger against the Shaikh of Mulgavain (this I was aware he had done) that he never kept his word with any one when he had the power of breaking it- that if he assisted him he would only lose his Camels and people and afterwards ill treat him, I told him that the English Government would not be friend or assist any one who was the enemy of the Imaums of Bymene, he said he would go and see the Chiefmen of his tribe and then return

to

No 1003 Con. D

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to me —

Friday 3d January 1840. - Sent the servicing 3d Jany 1840.
to all the Shaikh. Abdulla bin Hamdan
came and said he would give an answer
as to the reconciliation of all matters
between the Suwaiees and the Beni Khuts-
hid tribe. —

Abdulla bin Hamdan called and said he 4th Jany 1840.
would certainly see the Resident on his
arrival - he promised that none of his tribe
should take camels or any property from
the Suwaiees - the Zowahirce or any of
the people who were here waiting to see
the Resident. A boat came from Muscat
and I boarded her before any person land-
ed from her and enquired if there was any
news, the people said none of a strange
nature. Sultan bin Sugger sent for her
crew and in about an hour afterwards
it was reported all over the town that
the English had lost one hundred ships
in an action with the Chinese that Ma-
homed all assisted by the French had
taken Aden and that four ships were
coming from the Red Sea with Military
stores

No 1003 Con. D

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stores and Troops, that the Resident had
gone to Bombay having been unable
to arrange matters with Imaum of Muscat
3d Jany 1840. Sunday 5th January 1840. Sultan bin Sugga
came and said that he had heard a
great deal of news but he did not know
if it was true, I told him he well knew
it was not true, he then said I must
be very tired of remaining at Shargah
and asked me why I did not go to
Bymmee - I told him it was strange his
asking such a question when he knew
right well he had prevented the people
assisting me in any way he could, that
on the very day I was about to start
he prevented me, he said he did not
I said let us talk of something else,
he got up and said when the Resident
came he would settle all. —
6 Jany 1840. Monday 6th January 1840. Resident in sight
going off to the ship.

Sgt Atkins Hamerton 63d
15th Regt N.I.

True Copy
Signed J. Hannell
Resident in the Persian Gulf.

No 34 of 1840.

Secret Department

From Captain S. Hennell

Resident in the Persian Gulf.

To,

J. P. Willoughby Esquire.

Secretary to Government

Bombay,

Dated 30th March 1840.

Sir,

Adverting to my letter to your address No 26 in this Department, under date the 3d Instant, I have now the honor to transmit for the information of the Honorable the Governor in Council, the enclosed Copy of a Communication from Captain Hamerton of the 15th Regiment N.I. forwarding the notes of his journey to Bryjmee, accompanied by a plan of the Forts of that place, and a Sketch of his route, all of which I consider highly creditable to

to that Officer.

2d I confess that the report made by Captain Hamerton regarding the Forts of Bryjmee, and their state of dilapidation, has greatly disappointed me, and I am at a loss to imagine how they could have acquired the extended and established reputation they certainly possess. The only part of the larger Fort, belonging to Mahomed bin Abdoollah, in repair, is the ditch, which according to Captain Hamerton's account, is in excellent order, and being twenty four feet wide, and fourteen deep, is certainly a formidable obstacle to overcome by undisciplined Troops, and one which I can easily believe must appear impassable in the eyes of the Arabs. Were this Fort properly repaired, and the Towers sufficiently enlarged to hold guns and flank the Curtains, it might, if vigorously defended by its present possessors, offer a serious resistance to any Force excepting a

a regular one supported by Artillery Any attempt however to render the defences of Bryemee more effective, would be so a difficult of execution, and would involve so large an outlay, that I should be reluctant to recommend its adoption to the Consideration of Government Notwithstanding the extensive and productive Date Groves and the great facilities of cultivation afforded by the unusually copious supplies of Water, with which the plain of Bryemee abounds, the Chiefs and inhabitants appear to be in a state of great poverty, and almost destitute of money. If therefore they were provided with Funds in Order to repair their defences, every probability exists that these would be diverted from the purpose for which they were furnished, and applied to relieve their more pressing necessities.

The

3d The Number of men composing the several branches of the Naeem Tribe when collected together (viz. 2650) is larger than I had estimated. In consequence however of being under so many separate Chiefs, their actual strength is much diminished, as the permanency of their good understanding with each other, is always liable to be affected by the many causes of feud and quarrel which are constantly arising among these wild people, which would not be the case were they an united Tribe under one recognised and acknowledged Head.

4th Upon a due consideration of the several points brought forward in Captain Hamilton's report, I do not think it necessary under present circumstances to recommend to the Honble the Governor in Council that any further

outlay

outlay should be incurred on account of the Bryemee Sheikh, beyond an occasional present of moderate extent to the four principal Chiefs in order to keep up the influence we have already acquired among them. Contemptible however as the Forts in question may appear to us, it must be remembered, that had it not been for the resolution shewn by their Holders to oppose the pretensions of the Egyptian Agents, aided probably by their celebrity as places of strength, the influence, if not the authority of Mahomed Ally would in all likelihood have been ere now extended over the greater part of the province of Oman Iam therefore still of opinion, that in the event of Khorshid Pasha at any time sending a Medgde Force without Guns

or

or regular Troops against them, it would be advisable to afford aid in the shape of ammunition & provisions, provided they exhibited a determination to resist, which would be easily seen, as they are sufficiently strong to maintain their position against a Bedouin Army if inclined to do so, until assistance from us, of the description above alluded to, could reach them. The case however would be different were Bryemee to be threatened by the Egyptian Troops supported by Artillery as I do not think, that any expenditure we might previously make, would render the Forts capable of standing a regular siege, unless defended by a garrison of British Troops, and as this is not a very probable contingency I see no advantage

in

in the Government incurring a large = disbursement for objects not likely to be attained.-

5th I do not myself believe that the Bayonee Chiefs entertain any serious intention of submitting to the authority of Sheik Sultan bin Suggur, as their policy has hitherto been to play off that Chief against H. H. the Imam of Muscat. as remarked, however, in one of my former letters, even were Captain Hamerton's ideas regarding the extension of Sultan bin Suggur's power well founded, I do not con= =ceive that this need be any source of = apprehension to us, but rather the = Contrary. As long as we retain the con= =trol of the sea, the principal resources of the Joasmee Chief must always be at our command, and were the authority of all the petty Sheikhs of Oman merged = in

in that of the greater Chiefs such as the Imam of Muscat, Saeed Humood of Sohar, and Sultan bin Suggur of Rasel Khymah, I should consider such a state of = affairs, not only as advantageous to our general interests, but in a great degree beneficial to the Province at large.-

6th In bringing Captain Hamerton's zealous exertions in the public service to the favorable notice of the Honorable the Governor in Council, and at the same time submitting for sanction a contingent Bill for the expenses incurred by him, amounting to = German Crowns Two hundred and sixty three I venture to express my respectful hope, that the Government will be pleased as a special case, to mark their approval of the = efficient

efficient manner in which that officer has executed the duties entrusted to his charge, by authorising the payment to him of the Deputation allowance usually granted to second Assistants, when detached on the public service, namely one hundred and fifty Company's Rupees per Mensem for the period he was employed in the Political Department from the 23d of November 1839. to the 30th March 1840.

I have the honor to be &c.
(Signed) A. Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Residency in the Persian Gulf Kumait 30th March 1840.

Comp.2
SHWatt

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ANNEX B, No. 37

Captain Hamerton's proceedings at Shargah Byreemee and Sahor[1]

On the 13th January I landed from the Clive at Shargah and commenced distributing the money ammunition and rice given into my charge for that purpose by the Resident. In consequence of the name of Sulimaun bin Abdullah the Brother of Mohamed bin Abdullah having been omitted in the list—the latter objected to receive his quota, saying that he was the principal Schaikh of Byreemee and that as the brother of Hamed bin Suroor/who was greatly inferior to himself/ had received 100 crowns and 40 bags of rice it would appear as if he stood lower than that person in the estimation of the Government if this distinction was made, that however whether he received anything or not he had pledged his word to the Resident that I should visit Byreemee and he was determined to abide by his promise.

As Schaikh Abdullah spoke of the inferiority of Hamed bin Sunoor to himself; and also of the determination of that person to prevent my going to Byreemee, in the presence of the other schaikhs of the Naimi without their contradicting him I felt sure he spoke the truth. I therefore thought it best to treat the omission of Sulimaun bin Abdullah's name from the list as a mistake and soothed Mohamed bin Abdullah's wounded pride by making his brother a present of 100 crowns and 40 bags of rice.

From the 13th to the 31st of January was occupied by the intrigues of Schaikh Sultan bin Suggur supported by Hamed bin Sunoor to prevent my going to Byreemee Mohamed bin Abdullah however remained firmly resolved to perform his promise, and declared before the assembled chiefs of Byreemee at schaikh Sultan bin Suggur's house, that no one should prevent me from undertaking the journey if I wished it and concluded by saying that he swore by God and the Prophet that he would consider and revenge any insult or injury offered to me as if shown to himself. Being however anxious to prevent any quarrel arising between the schaikhs on my account I made Mohamed bin Ali Bushlabee /schaikh Sultan bin Suggur's minister/ a present of 10 dollars and he finally arranged the affair for me, by the disbursement of 40 dollars to Hamed bin Suroor to give to some vagabond arabs called Guzzus /men who are outcasts from their tribes for offences/ who were the only people who supported him in his opposition to me.

On the 21st January about 4 in the afternoon we mounted the camels and left Shorgah riding until about ten PM over the desert. The men who left along with me were Schaikh Mohamed bin Abdullar, his brother Sulimaun—the three sons of Ali bin Hamood of Zuneh and fifteen men of the Suamis and Bokhreebonee tribes. We halted for the night at a place on the desert called Zellah where there was a well with good water and three large trees but no houses or tents whatever—there was no trace of a road, the direction south by east—the distance from Shargah to Zellah is about /3/ three hours but we lost the proper direction a little after starting which rendered it difficult to find the place in the dark.

22nd January this morning /after an incessant night of rain/ we were about to start, upon which a man who had just arrived from Shargah ran and caught hold of the halter of my camel calling out that he had not received anything from Hamed bin Suroor or Sultan bin Suggur and that unless I consented to give him something that I should not go farther towards Byreemee but return to Shargah—several of the people who were present called to him to let the camel go but instead of doing so he attempted to mount it. I prevented his doing so and mounted myself. Sulimaun bin Abdullah the brother of Mohamed bin Abdullah schaikh of Byreemee rode up with his match alight saying that if the fellow followed us or gave any further trouble that he would shoot him. The people said he was an out-cast from the Beni Khuttub bidowin tribe and lived in Shargah, one of the fellows who were to have prevented me going inland. We then proceeded until nearly sunset when we arrived at the Bir Mohafiz a fine well where we watered the camels and filled our water skins and then we went on to a gorge in the hills /but off the line of road/ when we halted for the night. It rained during the whole night. The ascent the whole of the day was very gradual over sand hills; no forage whatever, the direction south, south east; the distance from Zellah to the Bir Mohafiz 10 hours.

23rd January after a most unpleasant night in consequence of the rain we started an hour after sunrise; going over hard sand hills at an hour before noon we came

[1] Bahrain Archives, Book 123, pp. 84-106.

to an old ruined fort called Ghurraf amongst thick Babul jungle, and around which there are several wells of good water, we watered, and filled the skins, and after noon prayers again went on over hard sand hills. On the right of the track babul jungle some of the trees of considerable size and many decaying. There has scarcely been any rain in this part of the country for the last three years. Ghurraf formerly belonged to the Suamis of Byreemee but they were driven out of it fifty years ago by the Beni *Khabs* or *Chabs* and at present the beni Khuttubs bedowin tribe live about it; in the cold season there is good forage for camels in the neighbourhood. At 4 o'clock the ascent became much greater and the sand very heavy and we were entering a second range of high hills and at sunset we halted under a high peak called Jibel Yiffs in the country of the Beni Khabs—there are concealed wells here but we had not with us any person who knew where they were. The road to day was very tortuous; the direction south by east and south south east.

24th January we started this morning about an hour after sunrise, the road very heavy over high mountains of sand in many places so steep that the camels could not ascend, or descend which obliged us to wind round the base of the hills, the heat was very great, we had no water for the camels and they were frequently much distressed and blown in ascending the hills. At about 3 P.M. we entered a third range of hills, and in about an hour we commenced discending into a beautiful valley covered with wheat fields just coming into ear /the property of the Beni Khabs/ the name of this valley is Hurmulliah. There are in it two large towers called Kahal and Jiburee in which there were a considerable number of armed men for the protection of the cultivation. We here watered the camels and having filled our skins we proceeded south to within about three hours of Byreemee, when we halted for the night; next morning the 25 January at two hours after sunrise we started and reached Byreemee before noon. The town is of considerable size the greater part in a state of delapidation and the wall around the whole of the town a perfect ruin. The fort of Al Byreemee is on the south side of the town in an open plain as shown in the sketch. It is nearly a square surrounded by a dry ditch about 24 feet wide. On the inner side of the ditch there is a wall about 8 feet high, 3 feet thick at the bottom and not thicker than a foot or fifteen inches on the top: it is constructed /as is the whole fort/ of sun dried brick, and intended to protect match lock men defending the ditch—between this wall and the fort there is an open space of about 30 feet with mangers for feeding camels or horses. The fort wall is about 14 feet high, 5 thick, with round towers at the angles ill constructed, they do not flank the curtains. They are the only places where it appears ever to have been the intention to place guns. The length of the inside of the fort from N to S is 61 paces, and breadth from E to W 60 paces. I twice paced it the people objected to my measuring any part of it. The wall at present is not in any parts thicker than 5 or six feet at the *base*, and on the top from 18 inches to 2 feet—the towers rise above the wall from 8 to 12 feet—there is on the north side of the fort, and in the inside, a well independent of the Kenauts or aqueducts which also run *through* the fort into the town of Byreemee.—The whole fort with the exception of the ditch is in a sad state of repair, and if left alone in a few years will be a ruin—there are a few wretched guns of small calibre about 8 pounders without carriages—and when intended to be fired the people place a stone or block of wood so as to raise the muzzle a few inches from the ground. There is no shot for any of the guns the schaikh has some round stones and lumps of wrought iron which were collected last year when Said bin Mutluk came to Shorgah.

Byreemee in its present state could not of course stand for an hour against an enemy provided with guns—but if repaired and armed with a few guns would be a place of considerable importance in the estimation of the natives of this part of Arabia. The ditch is looked upon by the people of the place as impassable if defended with their own spears and match locks if no guns were brought against it, and if they behaved in a spirited way it could make a capital defence against an Arab force without guns.—However Byreemee is talked of all over the country as impregnable. To the North west of Al Breemee stands what is called the little fort the property of Ahmed bin Suroor/Suamsi/; it is about 300 yards from the other, it is nearly a square, length 53, breadth 50 paces, inside walled round with towers, at the angles the wall is 15 or 16 feet high, loop holed the thickness at the base about 5 feet and at top 18 inches, there are several broken guns in it without carriages. I thought it strange that the people had no idea of when or by whom the guns were brought to the place. The schaikhs told me that no person had asked such a question before and that they had never heard by whom they were brought—within this fort there are two openings into the acqueducts but no well

as in the other fort independent of them. The Arabs who hold and inhabit Breemee are the Suamis—a branch of the Naimee tribe. They can in time of war bring into the field 800 men[illeg]—under Schaikh Mohamed bin Abdullah 500 men, under Ahmed bin Surroor 300 men.

In time of need the whole of the Naim tribes unite for the defence of Byreemee when Ali bin Humood of Zunch, the Chief of Bokhrebanee tribe, is then considered the first in rank. His own Taipha musters 600 fighting men, the other chiefs of the Bokhrebanee tribes are Rashid bin Hamdam and Abdullah bin Rashid, chiefs of the same Taipha who together muster 300 men—Hamid bin Suef 250 men, and Sultan bin Mohamad 200—all of the Bokhrebanee tribe, of which Ali bin Hamood of Zunch is the chief schaikh—Zunch is under Jibel Hafut—about 6 or 7 hours from Byreemee—and all the Bokhrebanee live about Jibel Hafeets. Besides the Bokhrebanee, there is the Albusuamee tribe, of which Fadhil bin Mohamed is the chief—this tribe had a right to feed their cattle in and about Hafeet and musters 500 men—all these tribes united for the defence of Byreemee, when it was supposed that Said bin Mutluk intended to take it, on the part of Koosshed Pasha. They are all considered and called the Maime tribes of Byreemee and collectively muster /2,650/ men. They are armed with swords, spears and match locks, the latter a very good weapon of its kind, better than the generality of match locks usually seen with such people; and they keep them in very good order and are very good shots. They also wear the Jumbiah /a broad curved dagger/. They have no horses but great numbers of camels.

Byreemee derives its importance from the great quantity of water which flows into and through the plain in the midst of which it is situated and which renders it of such value to the tribes who live in and about it from the ease with which they are enabled to cultivate the date, which to an indolent people like the Arabs forms the chief article of food. The Byreemee dates are and have long been considered the finest in Oman: the trees are larger and more luxuriant than any to be seen in Turkish Arabia. The wheat produced in the valley of Byreemee, although not cultivated to any great extent at present, is of a fine description. The fruits, which grow in great perfection, are oranges, and lemons of several kinds, grapes, figs, mangoes, olives and pomegranates, coffee was formerly cultivated on the hill Hafeet, but in consequence of disputes /as the people say/ amongst the tribes, but perhaps in truth from their own love of ease contenting themselves with very little, it has of late years been discontinued.

The water which renders Byreemee so very productive comes from the mountains which lie between it and the coast through Kenauts or aqueducts. There is not even a tradition among the Arabs of the country regarding the time when or by whom they were constructed. The chiefs said on my asking about them, that no person knew for certain by whom they were made, but that they were supposed to have been constructed by Sulimaun bin Dawd/Solomon the son of David/. They are works of great labour. I found that they extended to the distance of (14) fourteen hours from Byreemee.

The Naim tribes are now evidently much recluded [*sic*] in numbers and sunk in consequence, amongst the tribes of Oman. The Suamis of Byreemee formerly mustered /4,000/ four thousand men, and they do not now amount to more than eight hundred. The principal chiefs at present of the Naimes are Ali bin Hamood/Bokhrebanee/ of Zunch Fadhilbin Mohamed/Albusuamis/Mohamed bin Abdullah /Suamis/Ahmed bin Surroor/Suamis/and Hamed bin Saif/Al Bokhrebanee/ amongst whom there is at present a good understanding, but I was given to understand that little confidence was placed by any of the schaikhs upon Ahmed bin Surroor /Suamse/ from his being under the control of his *brother Hamed* who is his minister/ and who has the character of being a man of no truth and inclined to break any compact he may make however solemn for a trifling temporary advantage, and gave great offence to the whole of the tribes by evincing an inclination last year to side with the Zauahir tribe, and enter into the view of Kuliphar bin Shakhboot, the chief of Abothebee, when he wished to induce the Naimes to give up the fort of Byreemee to Said bin Mutluck when he was at Shargah last year.

On the 28th January I started from Byreemee at noon in company with Mohamed bin Abdullah—his brother Sulimaun and five men of the Suamis tribe who insisted on going with me to Sahar, when we reached a place in the hills called Ambach where there are wells and plenty of good water we met a party of men who said they had been sent by Hamed bin Sunoor to request me to wait there until he came from Byreemee, as he intended to go with me to Sohar, I

said I had seen Hamed bin Sunoor just before I started from Byreemee and he said that he wished to go to Sohar with me but as he had not come I supposed he did not intend doing so and that I would not stop an instant—we then rode on until sunset when we left the track and went into the hills to a well called bir el Hameza where we halted for the night, the road all the way was very good and water in several places, the direction east by north half north.

29th January at sunrise we left the bi el Hameza and getting into the track we left yesterday evening and proceeded until about 10 A.M. when we entered the bed of a mountain torrent called the Wadi al Yizzoc near a fine date grove called the Nachl al Heil where there is a fine stream of water. At noon we reached another large date grove the Nachl beni Gallab where there is also a stream of good water. At 3 P.M. we came to a pass between two high peaks in the wadi al Yizzee called Shigaree, here there is a round tower called the Beeri al Shigaree. It was built by the Imam of Muscat but now belongs to Hamed bin Saif/Al Bokhrebanee/ There were several match lock men in the tower, they fired a gun as we approached and demanded two dollars a head from us but we refused to pay anything and after some altercation we passed on — There is a spring of good water here, and I saw a gun an eighteen pounder/iron/in good condition lying near the tower which the people told me was sent by the Imam of Muscat for the fort of Byreemee but that they were unable to drag it further from Sohar they had no carriage for it and it was brought to where it then was by being dragged by men along the ground—they tired of the job and left it at Shigaree—at 4 P.M. we came to an aqueduct upon arches crossing a ravine called el Malana belonging to the Kunude arabs and at sunset we arrived at a small town/Saleet with large date groves and a fine stream of water here we halted for the night. Plenty of water all the way to day no forage except for camels. The road very good, winding through high mountains, direction from Bir al Hameza to Saleet N.E. distance about eleven hours.

30th January started about an hour after sunrise and shortly afterwards saw the sea towards the north east, when we commenced descending the hills—and entered the plain at the Kenauts called fellegh el gubau which extend from the hills to the date groves of Sohar about noon we arrived at the town of Al Shir where I heard that the chief of Sohar was absent at Ristok but that his vakeel Saed Salleh was at el wah a town about three hours distant I wrote him a letter and about three P.M. started for Sohar where we arrived about an hour after sunset—and where my arrival excited the astonishment of the people had I been a wild beast such as never before was heard of I could not have excited greater curiosity everyone came to see the English man who had been to Byreemee I found that the most extraordinary reports were in circulation regarding the object of my going to the interior which were so absurd as not to be worth mentioning. I found a boat just starting for Muscat and as I heard many letters were written giving an account of all I did at Byreemee I wrote to the Imam to prevent his being deceived by the false reports which I was aware were written to him.

At midnight Saed Salleh arrived and called on me requesting to know if he could render me any service saying that Saed Hamood bin Ayan the chief of Sohar would come in from Ristock if I wanted any thing done or wanted assistance to go anywhere—that I should have camels horses men or anything he could command I said I only wanted a place to put up in until I could procure a boat to go to Bunder Abass—Said Saleh told me there would be a batill which was coming from Muscat to take two horses to the Resident going to Khurgh in a few days in which I could have a passage it arrived in the evening and on the 3rd of February I embarked for Bundar Abass where I arrived on the 9th February—and procured the statements from the parties mentioned in my instructions regarding the wreck of the bugalon Futie al Rahman and which I forwarded on my arrival in Khorgh—bills of exchange are not saleable at Bunder Abass there are no wealthy merchants there the mercantile transactions are conducted by hindoo brokers belonging to the Muscat Merchants who told me that bills to the amount of ten thousand rupees could not be disposed of there in three years the chief exports from Bunder Abass are dye stuff and gums from Yizd and the imports piece goods and sugar.—

In conclusion I beg to submit for your consideration the submission of the Naime tribes to the authority of schaikh Sultan bin Suggur of Ras el Khyma which would when we consider that he may be said to possess the whole coast from Ras el Khymah to Shorkah on the one side and many of the finest harbours on the opposite put him in possession of the whole country included between Shaikah Byreemee Shinass and Ras Mussuldum and of the unfriendly disposition of Sultan bin Suggur towards the English government there cannot exist a doubt and that he would readily league with and assist any hostile power which might appear against us on his coasts. The Naime tribes in their present condition /from

their poverty/ could make but a feeble resistance to the Egyptian army provided the/Nizam/regular troops were to be brought against them and of this Sultan bin Suggur is well aware. When I was at Byreemee the Mutawah a chief priest who was with Sultan bin Suggur at Shargah nearly all the time I was there was constantly advising the expediency of the whole of the Naime tribes becoming as he called it the ryots of Sultan bin Suggur as the best means of avoiding being subjected to the dominion of the/gurbee/the Egyptian Mahamot Ali.—

The two tribes who reside in the port of Oman I visited are the Beni Khab and Beni Khuttub the latter a bedowin tribe and without any fixed place of residence numbering about 600 men—there are at present amongst them many bad characters who involve the tribe in disputes with their neighbours—their chief is at present Abdullah bin Howudan the Beni Khab inhabit that part of the country between Jibal Yiff and Hurmilliah there are apparently dessentions amongst this tribe of long standing but they are on good terms with the Naime they are estimated at 600 men.

With respect to the road from Shargah to Byreemee as regards the transport of artillery it must be considered difficult but practicable while that from Sohar to Byreemee may be considered good and indeed I did not meet in the way a place where even heavy guns could be conveyed with but little difficulty plenty of water the whole way but no forage for *horses;* for camels there is abundance.—

The plan of the fort and town of Byremee together with the sketch of the route I travelled will perhaps in some way elucidate what is intended to be explained.

Atkins Hamerton
Capt[n] 15 Regt
— BNI —

No 1884 Encl

Bombay Castle 2d April 1840. Secret Cons. 14

No 1884

From Captain S. Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf
To S. R. Willoughby Esquire
Secretary to Government Bombay
Dated 1st February 1840

Sir,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Mr Acting Chief Secretary Reids letter No 1699 in this Department under date the 22d November, conveying the instructions of the Right Honble the Governor General as communicated in the Despatch from Mr Secretary Maddocks of the 21st october 1839 regarding the measures to be pursued with reference to the conduct of Sheikh Khuleefa bin Shackboot, in attacking the Shumamis of Bryuee in violation of his engagements and promises

2. I regret to find from Mr Maddocks communication that I have expressed myself so obscurely in my letter of the 28th August 1839 as to convey to the Right Honble the Governor General an impression that I had engaged the British Government to protect the Chiefs of Bryuee but

No 1884 Encl

Bombay Castle 2d April 1840. Secret Cons. 14.

but I trust that the explanation afforded in the 4th paragraph of my letter of the 17th october last, No 102 in this Department, will satisfy His Lordship, that I am too well aware of the importance of such a step, as that of pledging the protection of the Government to any place or tribe, to venture to do so without the express authority and sanction of my superiors. In order however to remove all doubt upon this point, I availed myself of the opportunity afforded by my personal interview with the Chiefs of Bryuee on the 11th ultimo, to explain to them fully that the British Government did not consider them under its protection, but simply in the light of friends whose views and interests corresponded with its own that as long as these last coincided with our policy they might expect our good will and countenance, and that in the event of their resisting the attacks of the Egyptians they would be assisted in the maintenance of their independence,

by

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by a moderate supply of the munitions of War and provisions.—

3. With regard to Sheikh Khuleefa of Abouthabee I beg to state that the promises he made to me in our interview of the 1st July were voluntarily offered on his part, when I recommended the Shiwaunis of Bayuna to his Friendship and protection, as a tribe in whose welfare we took much interest, in consequence of their determination to maintain their independence, and to oppose the encroachments of Khorshid Pasha and his Agents. These promises having once been given the Benyas Chief was bound at all events to abstain from actual aggression upon the Bayuna Sheikhs, if he did nothing more. That he was aware his proceedings were in violation of his engagement is fully shewn by the fact of his offering three Chiefs the sum of 200 Dollars provided they would give him a paper to the effect that his only object in proceeding to their districts was to make peace between them and their neighbours

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neighbours the Zuwahir. My letter of the 26th October last No 109 in this Department reported the arrival of a special Agent from the Benyas Chief for the purpose of exculpating his late conduct. On this occasion I deemed it politic to hold out hopes that the displeasure of Government might be softened provided he gave some proofs of the sincerity of his professions, by restoring the Camels plundered by his tribe from the Sheiks of Ras-el-Khymah and Debaye. I have not yet received any reply to this intimation but it is more than probable that the doubt expressed in the letter above referred to of the Benyas Chief complying with this requisition will be realized.—

4. I still however retain the opinion formerly submitted to the Government that as a matter of general policy Sheik Khuleefa as well as the other maritime Arabian Chiefs should be made to understand, that their promises and engagements with us are not to be violated with impunity.

Sir

No 1884 Cont.

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In the event therefore of the Benyas Chief not having restored the camels, to which I have referred in the preceding para: or obtaining a paper from the Sheikhs of the Shurkamies and Naeem Tribes, stating that he has afforded them entire satisfaction for the injuries he has inflicted upon them. I shall gladly avail myself of the sanction afforded by the Right Honble the Governor General to compel Khuleefa ben Shackboot to pay down the sum of one thousand german Crowns as a moderate compensation for the aggressions he has committed upon the Bryniee Chiefs.—

5. The town of Aboothabee is however from its peculiar position one of the most difficult of approach on the Arabian Coast, and during the winter months it would involve much delay and very considerable risk to attempt any operations against that place unless with a large Naval Force aided by the services of a Steamer to tow the vessels in and out of the narrow Channel by which alone the place can

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can be attacked with effect. By a reference to Commodore Brucks letter of the 2nd October forming Inclosure No 4 in my letter No 89 Political Department of the same date, it will be observed, that this officer considers three vessels as the smallest number by which any effective operations can be carried on against Aboothabee. It will also probably not escape the notice of Government that within the short period (eight days) I was upon the Arabian Coast on board the Clive that vessel was twice compelled to put to sea by the stormy weather of this season, and had not she quitted at the time she did, would have been under the necessity of leaving the Coast a third time from a violent North West Gale which we experienced on our way up the Gulf. At the present moment there are only four vessels of War on the station, one of which has proceeded to Bussorah to assist Lieutenant Lynch in the building and equipment of the new Iron Steamers lately arrived from England, and as one

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of the others is absolutely required either at Kurrack or Bushire, it is obvious that we have not yet a sufficient Force at hand to act efficiently against the Bunyas port. Under these circumstances it appeared to me advisable to put off active measures until the season opened, and at the same time to keep a check upon Shiek Khuleefas proceedings, by the prospect of impending punishment for his past misdeeds I therefore addressed a letter to him from Shargah to the effect that if within the space of three months he had not restored the Camels belonging to Rawel Khymah and Debaye carried off by his people, or did not produce a satisfactory letter from the Bryanee Chiefs certifying that he had fully adjusted all the causes of complaint existing against him, it was my intention under the orders of my superiors to despatch a squadron to Aboothabee and compel him to pay down the sum of one thousand German Crowns as a moderate compensation for

No 1084 Cont A

Bombay Castle 2d April 1840 Secret Cons 14

for the injury he had inflicted upon the Naeem and Shumaamee Shiekhs, and as a punishment for the infraction of his pledges and promises to the British Government. If this intimation has the effect of influencing Shiek Khuleefa to take steps to conciliate the Bryanee Chiefs and cultivate their good will to such an extent as to draw from them an acknowledgement of the nature above referred to, our purpose will be answered, while at the same time the fear of consequences of so serious a nature as those threatened will most likely prevent any further aggression upon the Tribes in question should however the case be otherwise, I trust that the arrival of the Taptee and a Steamer in the Gulf, by the time the season for operations has opened, will enable me to send so powerful a naval force to Aboothabee as to obtain an immediate compliance with our demands without any attempt at opposition

No 1084 Cont.

Bombay Castle 2d April 1840 Secret Cons. 14

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No 1084 Cont.

Bombay Castle 2d April 1840 Secret Cons. 14

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

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opposition. —

Residency in the Pn Gulf Kamachi 1st February 1840

I have the honor &c
Sigd S. Hennell
Resident in the Persn Gulf

2.17
Relations between Shaikh Khalifah b. Shakhbut, Shaikh Sultan b. Saqr and the Na'im, 1841–1844

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ANNEX B, No. 6

Sultan bin Suggur, Chief of Ras al Khaimah, to the Political Resident, Persian Gulf, August 9, 1840

Translated substance of a letter from Sultan ben Suggur Chief of Ras ul Khymah, dated 10th Jumidia ussassie or 9th August 1840 [p. 48].

Acknowledges the receipt of a letter and says that he is desirous of peace and quietness, more especially as such sentiments are in accordance with the wishes of the British Government, but states that it is known that the subjects of Khalifa ben Shakhboot made forays last year on his subjects both sea and on shore and likewise on the people of Bremie but that Khalifa would wish to make it appear that the Mazariah and Manasir tribes would have been guilty of these trespasses have gone in the direction of Nedg'd and are from under his control, Yet Sultan ben Suggur asserts that they are Khalifa's subjects, and that any body of men coming from the direction of Nedg'd must come to him, and on friendly terms with him, Accuses Khalifa of intriguing with the people of Nedg'd although he professes the contrary and asks what force comes from the direction of Nedg'd exceeding 2 or 300 men all composed of the Manasir, Mazariah, and Benyas tribes, and says that they were the people that plundered the Beni Kuttub, and while, Khalifa cognizant of the whole affair; but yet that he allowed it and continued on friendly terms with them, at the same time under an engagement and professing friendship to the Benie Kuttub, and even a party from Aboothabee itself had plundered the Benie Kuttub, and killed five of the principal men; Says that he sends his Moonshir Mahomed ben Alli to wait upon the Resident.

Enclosure No 5 in Pol. letter No 92 dated 3d October, 1840.

[p. 49].

Translated by T.M.

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ANNEX B, No. 7

Shaikh Mahomed bin Abdullah and Shaikh Humud bin Surur, Chiefs of Buraimi, to Moollah Hussein, Agent at Sharjah, August 12, 1841[1]

[p. 245]. Letter from Shaik Mahomed bin Abdoollah and Shaik Humud bin Suroor Chiefs of Brymee to Moollah Hussein dated 12th August 1841—

Be it known to you, that Shaik Khaleefa bin Shakboot on his return from the neighbourhood of Ras-el-Khymah proceeded to the districts of the Zoowahir and sent for us to meet him. For a long time we refused but finding that no
[p. 246]. assistance came to us from the south, we at last had had an interview with him, and have consented, as the Nakeels of the naeem Tribe, and Shaik Sultan bin Suggur to make Peace—Shaik Khaleefa has made himself responsible for the conduct of the Munasir Moojara Joowahir [sic] Tribes and the followers of Sultan bin Syf (the Imams Governor of Shinas) From the 19th Inst—this Treaty comes into operation.

Translated by S.H.—

[1] Incorporated in a letter from the Agent at Sharjah to the Political Resident, Persian Gulf, dated August 18, 1841.

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ANNEX B, No. 8

Commodore G. B. Brucks, I.N., to Captain S. Hennell, Political Resident, Persian Gulf, August 23, 1841.

No. 113 of 1841 [p. 216].

Secret Department

C.I.C. Ship of War Coote
Off Rass-ul Khyma 23rd August 1841

Sir,

On my arrival off Seer Beni Yass I first learnt that the Coast from Rass ul Khyma to Abothubee was in a state of War by land.

2nd It would appear that about the 23rd of the month Rubbee ul Akhur (18th June) Khalifa bin Shackboot made a Foray on Debay and there burnt a battilla[1] hauled upon shore, belonging to Mooktoob and valued at three thousand Dollars, besides carrying off some plunder, Sultan bin Suggur having expressed an opinion on this affair not pleasing to the Chief of Abothubbee, about four days after he entered the Village of Kann belonging to Sharga at night and completely looted it of every thing worth having, also carrying off about fifteen or twenty Seedies, [p. 217]. Khalifa now continued in the neighbourhood hovering about for some time causing great alarm, and half the Sharga Boats were called in from the Pearl Fishery to have the Men to defend the place, the next account of Khalifa was a Decent on the Date Groves near Rass-ul Khyma on the 10th Iumada ul Akhur (29th July, his success here would have been complete, but for bad management of those under him, as they did not unite their parties in time and the attack was by a few only, not more than fifty, he was opposed by about three hundred men, half of whom were of the Hill people whom Sultan bin Sugger had called in, one of Khalifa's men was killed and one wounded, on the part of the Rass-ul Khyma people there was five killed and wounded some camels and other cattle were captured and carried off by the Bani Yass, but the surprize having failed they were according to the tactics of Arab warfare soon off again: When near the place Khalifa dismounted from his favorite camel Fariha'r and as he thought left it in a place of safety, he mounting a horse for the attack, during the skirmish some stragglers from the Rass-ul Khyma people found the Camel, killed [p. 218]. the men who had charge of it, and carried it off with a sword of Khalifas and a shawl as a trophy; on the 15th of the same Month 3rd August Khalifa was at Brahamee, here it appears Khalifa not wishing openly to attack the chiefs believing them to be under our protection had encouraged the Menuassier Tribe under his influence to do so, these plunderers always found shelter with the Zouarhier Tribes belonging to Khalifa and occupying six or seven villages in the neighbourhood of Brahamee, and under the immediate control of his Father Shaick Shackbut. The chiefs of Brahame in consequence attacked these Villages and Khalifa went to their protection, this has ended in a negociation and a Truce is concluded in which Sultan bin Sugger joins; the only party concerned who will not become party is Shaick Mucktoob of Debay; except between Khalifa and this chief all is for the present quiet.

3 A circumstance has arisen out of this warfare which particularly calls for your prompt attention or we may have a most serious outbreak on the sea, which may cause much difficulty and trouble to suppress. When the Expedi- [p. 219]. tion was sent against the Pirates in 1819 the Towns of Lingar Magoo Tawoona and others were from the circumstance of their acting with the people of this coast, a part of the places directed to be attacked; the Shiraz Government hearing of this, sent a Rakum to Mr. Bruce the Resident saying they would enquire into and punish their own subjects, and the consequence was, a great portion of the Vessels employed in Piracy escaped and none of these places became parties to the Treaty; I mention this to show the ill effects caused by our delicacy and lenity in 1819-20, so different from the policy pursued in 1809.

[1] This Battilla belonged originally to Essai bin Tarif, was seized by the Shaick of Bahrain and given to Mooktoob [original footnote].

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4th The chief of Lingar is nominal head of most of the Villages up to Magoo, is the near relation of Sultan bin Suggur, and after him and his family the chief of the Joasmees; at all times Shaick Saed bin Gareeb takes an active and prompt part in all the quarrels on the coast, he is appealed to by all, and his influence
[p. 220]. is very great; last year he it was who effected the arrangement with Shaick Sultan and his son when the latter seized Sharga, and which ended in adding another Shaick on the coast to increase our troubles. On the late occasion of the expected attacks by Khalifa, about one hundred armed men were sent in two boats from Lingar to Sharga, while three times that amount were kept ready to be transported should Sultan bin Suggur or his son require them, and these boats and men met any of the Abothubbee Vessels on the sea, not being bound by any Treaty or Members of the Truce, they would certainly have taken so good an opportunity to attack them and this would have brought on an open war on the sea, for I hardly think the Truce would be binding on the Beni Yass in such a case or even in their preventing succours going to their enemies, from parties and members of the Truce.

5th As we have now no relations with the Persian Government, and if the above is not checked we shall most likely be involved in difficulties, I respectfully
[p. 221]. suggest that the chief of Lingar should either be placed under our control or else forbid under penalties to meddle with coast affairs, as he may himself, or by him, Sultan bin Sugger and others may cause as much annoyance. In the meantime I have pending instructions from you notified to Sultan bin Sugger and the chief of Lingar that until I hear from you I shall seize any boat I find on the coast armed and manned beyond what is usual in Trade, as enemies and send them to Kargh for your decision, I feel convinced that nothing but prompt measures can check the evil likely to come out of this active part taken by the Lingar chief in the affairs of the Arabian Coast. Another strong ground is, we have entered into treaties with the chiefs of this coast to put down the slave trade in certain limits, and having Sumallee slaves is prohibited by this treaty, by means of Lingar so far as Rass-ul-Khyma Sharga and their Dependencies this is avoided; this year I am informed by the Agent that a Bugallou belonging to Sharga, Moota bin Furich Nacoda and Owner went to Babarrah and brought from thence slaves among which were ten female Sumallees, this boat when on her return to Lingah, three of these girls were sent to Magoo, two or three to
[p. 222]. Rass-ul-Khyma, the rest to Sharga; Sultan bin Suggur the Chief is well aware of these facts. Again the brother of Abdallah bin Rashid of Amulgaveen brought two in his Bugallou and many more are purchased from Lingah[1] and places on the Batnah coast. A few years back there was no direct slave trade on this coast, they bought from Muscat and other places, such as they required[2] now it is in a most flourishing state; and all the inland tribes supplied;[3] this year six or eight vessels went and more than three or four hundred slaves have been brought to this coast direct, besides, nearly as many more from Lingah.[4] A man of Rass-ul-Khyma named Abdullah bin Hussain in his Bugallou brought three Sumallees, this is also known to Sultan bin Sugger, the truth is, Lingah serves now as a port to cover the slave trade as it did in former times to secure the plundered property—to show the fallacy of the chiefs aiding in putting down the slave trade Ibrahim bin Sultan the Chief of Rass-ul-Khyma's son and Said bin Rashid brother to the chief of Amulgaveen are this year the two principal traders.

6th In conclusion few now living know these people so well as myself I have known personally, and with much intimacy the Elder chiefs for a quarter of a
[p. 223]. Century and more[5] while the younger ones I have known from their childhood. I know their feelings and that of their people, and it is from this I feel myself called on to point out an evil easily checked while in the bud, but which will be a work of difficulty if allowed to go on.

7th I have in virtue of the 3rd Article of the Treaty with the Arab chiefs demanded the Sumallee slaves, also those who brought them to the place; the parties being absent are to be at my disposal on my return from Muscat. The not enforcing [*sic*] Sir W. G. Keirs Treaty, the intent of which was, the Arabs

(1) *Kargah* struck through, *Lingah* interlined.
(2) *such as they required* interlined.
(3) *and all the inland tribes supplied* interlined.
(4) *Lingah* followed by *principally*, which is struck through.
(5) *and more* interlined.

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were, not in any way to trade in slaves, which was declared Piracy, has caused these people to think treaties with us a mere matter of form, as I was present at the signing of that Treaty, and heard it fully explained to all the chiefs, by Captain Thompson, and the late Mahomed Allie Kharon, who was with the General, I know the above to be the true intention and understanding at the time, by all parties of that Treaty.

I have the honor to be
Sir
Your most obedient Servant
(signed) Geo. B. Brucks,
Commodore I.N. Commanding
Naval Squadron in the Gulf of Persia.

Captain S. Hennell,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

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ANNEX B, No. 9

Moollah Houssein, Agent at Sharjah, to Political Resident, Persian Gulf, October 8, 1844[1]

Enclosure in the above.

Translated Extracts of a letter from Moollah Hoossein the Agent at Shargah to the Resident in the Persian Gulf dated 8th October 1844.

I beg to inform you that Muktoom ben Butye on becoming aware of the orders which had been issued by the Sirkar Relative to furnishing and exacting retribution from those who had been guilty of irregularities at Sea and ascertaining that two buggarahs the one belonging to Sheheen bin Zaal and the other to Gureeb bin Mujjun his subjects had committed an aggression at Sea and
[p. 471]. thereby certainly rendered themselves liable to severe punishment and retribution (and I had written to him with reference to the pearls which his people above mentioned had plundered at Sea from Abdullah ben Butye of Shargah) of himself passed sentence upon himself and without discussion or delay immediately seized them and recovered from them the very pearls themselves and sent them to me I forthwith restored them to Sheikh Sultan bin Suggur and took his receipt —Muktoom further informed me that he had exacted 100 Real as security from the crews of the two Boats and that on my arrival at Debaie he would deliver the amount into my hands, in accordance with the spirit of the instructions which had been given with reference to the Boo Muhair—Such was the conduct of Sheikh Muktoom. I now return to Sheikh Sultan bin Suggur and the affair of the Al Boo Muhair—I previously reported to you that Sheikh Sultan had declared that the sword, dagger and single pearl belonging to the people of Debaie were in the possession of Essai bin Muttur and that that individual had gone to Biddah but promised that on his return he would recover these articles from him and hand them over to me. Esai bin Muttur arrived at Shargah on the 6th Ramzan and I thereon applied to the Sheikh for a final answer, he sent to Esai bin Muttur and his people to deliver up the arms but they would not consent to restore them and Sheikh Sultan was six days engaged in despatching and receiving Cossids and exhorting them in order to obtain from them the
[p. 472]. Debaie property that he might deliver over the same to me but they would not accede to his requisitions whereon he went himself to Esai bin Muttur and his people and by care and management succeeded in obtaining from them the Sword dagger and Pearl and gave them over to me—On receiving the same from Sheikh Sultan with the Chaab Man and his share of the returns of the Fishery regarding whom the correspondence had taken place I went to Debai on 24th Ramzan and delivered all over to Muktoom bin Butye and took his receipt when he gave me 37 Mujjurs of Gold and 6 Mahd Shah Rupees equivalent to 100 Reals the security for the Crews of the two boats and I also addressed a letter to you upon the subject which is enclosed.

On the conclusion of his business at Shargah Sheikh Sultan left on 4th October for Ras-ul Khymah in a buggarah with Esai bin Muttur. On their arrival off Amulgavine the wind became adverse and the tide carried them inshore. It happened that Esai bin Muttur had business at Amulgavine and proceeded himself into the place to transact the same and informed Abdullah bin Rashid and his people saying " there is Sheikh Sultan bin Suggur in the buggarah if you desire to arrange matters with him come with me to him and Please God it will be well." This is the public account but I learn privately that Sheikh Sultan
[p. 473]. himself sent Esai bin Muttur to Abdullah bin Rashid and his tribe with peaceable and friendly views. In short Abdullah bin Rashad took with him his brother Syed bin Rashid and the heads of his tribe and went to Sheikh Sultan bin Suggur and brought him to his town and treated him with the greatest respect and spread before him fruits and food and he remained with them in Amulgavine the day and the night and, so I have learnt by report, the two Sheikhs re-established intercourse and friendship—But this is improbable nor is it possible that they should perfectly divest their minds of all inimical feelings, on either side they being at blood feud and having respectively suffered much loss in property but the people judge only by outward appearances—

[1] Enclosure in PRPG No. 137 of November 25, 1844, to Government of Bombay.

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All is quiet at the present time between Muktoom bin Butye and Sheikh Sultan bin Suggur and his Son Suggur—Neither decided enmity nor friendship are apparent—the people of Debaie hold communication with Shargah and vice versa but Muktoom bin Butye and his brother Syed go not to Shargah nor Sheikh Sultan and his Son Suggur to Debaie—The Chief of Ejman and Sheikh Sultan and his Son Suggur are on the worst terms but intercourse is carried on between the subjects on either side

Sheikh Khuleefa bin Shackboot and his forces consisting of horsemen and Camel men set out from Aboothabee on the commencement of the hot weather—I heard of their being at Brymee and that all the Naim Tribes, the Al boo-Shamis and Al boo Khureyban and the other Bedouin Tribes such as the Beni Kuttub, Beni Kaab, Ghuflah and Zowahir the whole had entered into engagements with him and become united with him as one—It appears to me that at the present time there is not throughout the interior one Bedouin tribe opposed to him—About [p. 474].
the middle of Ramzan Syed Humood bin Azan and Syed Khutan ben Syf Governor of Shinas left their own territories and came to Brymee to meet Sheikh Khuleefa bin Shakhboot and the current report is that they became united with him in one condition (formed a strict alliance) Syed Humood after the interview returned to his own territories and Syed Khutan remained with Sheikh Khuleefa desiring to return with him to Aboothabee—Some days since Sheikh Khuleefa sent to Muktoom bin Butye to come to Brymee apparently with a view to arranging matters between him and the Ghuflah—Muktoom however excused himself from going fearing in his own minds that Khuleefa would seize and detain him but sent his brother Syed with about 40 Men mounted on horses and camels to Brymee and wrote to Sheikh Khuleefa saying " A Government Vessel is presently expected in these parts I am unable to come but my brother Syed waits upon you and you are as one of ourselves and in my place—Sheikh Khuleefa upon this effected a peace between the Ghuflah and the people of Debaie. Khuleefa and his Troops left Brymee for Aboothabee on 24th Ramzan (7th October) and Syed bin Butye on 25th of same Month reached Debaie—You are aware that previous to the interposition of the British Government and the conclusion of peace and a Truce between them the people of these parts were all of them in the worst possible conditions, their country waste and themselves cut off from all means—but when the Sirkar mediated and concluded a Truce between them and promoted the Pearl Fishery and trading Voyages, their food and the good things of life increased. [p. 475].
Their merchants became rich—their country populous and their women highly ornamented (richly clothed)—During the present year they have collected a great number of pearls (to the value of) about four Sacks (of Dollars) probably more—

True translated Extracts

(signed) A. B. Kemball,

Assist. Resident &c.

2.18
The third Wahhabi occupation of Buraimi, 1845–1848

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Translated Extracts of three letters from Moolla Hoossein, Agent at Shargah, to Lieutenant A.B. Kemball, assistant Resident in the Persian Gulf in Charge - dated 12th, 14th and 15th Rujub 9th, 11th and 12th August.—

a. b. On the 16th Roobee-ool Saney Ameer Iysul wrote letters to the Sheikhs and Bedauins and gave them to Ali bin Musrook - that he might deliver them and return with answers - He first visited the Sheiks on the Coast, then went to Bujmee and its neighbourhood, and thence to Sohar and Muscat.—

The Contents, as I have learnt, of the letters to the Addresses of Sheikhs Suggur, and Mukloom, were to the effect, that Iysul bin Turkey intended on the termination

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termination of the hot weather to send Syed bin Moallook with an Army to take Buymee, to slay all those who should not acknowledge his authority, and to aid all those who might be for him — you are aware that the people of these parts are inclined to the people of Nedjd, and should the Country and tribes of Buymee, become subject to the latter, all the rest must follow — It will not be sufficient for them to possess themselves of the Country of Buymee and rest in peace and quietness but it appears to me doubtless that, — there are many who are dissatisfied and desirous of irregularities, and who will lay open paths now closed to them. —

I

(383) 25

I think that they desire to get all the Coast into their possession since many of its inhabitants use every endeavour to lay the same under their authority, thinking they will then be able to commit irregularities on the seas — such is their folly. —

I was ready to start to pay my respects to you, but the above having presented itself, I have postponed my departure until I may learn how things will turn out. —

I have heard that Sultan bin Suggur, on sale bin Khurooks arrival, with Tyrul's letter, and his learning its Contents — wrote, as also did others, influential inhabitants of Ras-el Khyma, secretly, in reply, and dispatched

a

(324)

a Nedgdee Cossid by name Dilleem,
who left on the 10. Rujjub on his way
to nedgd via Kuteiffe – I intend pro-
ceeding to Ras-el Khyma that I
may learn the true state of affairs
between Sultan bin Suggur and
the nedgdees.

Muktoom and Suggur
bin Sultan apparently disapprove
of the people of nedgd: Comming to
these parts.—

Of the three Sons of
Abdullah bin Ahmed who had
taken up their abode at Singah
Ahmed – Mahomed and Ali – the
Second embarked with Salmin
Bin Nassir Sowaydee at Shinas
for Semaum – on reaching Ras –
Pansoora – the former in the last-

ters

11. do

(325) 24

latters' buteel, went to Semaum, &
the latter with his people to fish
for Pearls opposite to the Guttur
Coast – The first and third embark-
ed at Singah in two buggalahs
came to Sultan bin Suggur at
Ras-el Khyma, to solicit assis-
tance in taking Bahrein, and
making war against Mahomed
bin Kuleefa and Easa bin Tarif pro-
mising, if the same was afforded,
that they would annually pay a
certain fixed sum, as also give some
horses etc:– what is public regard-
ing the answer given by Sultan
bin Suggur is, that on the termi-
nation of the Pearl Fishery he
would give assistance provided
he should not be forbidden by
the English Government, or others —

probably Shabees

They

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They left their buggalahs at Ras-el Khyma, and embarking in a bug-galah with 30 Men, came to Shar-jah Suggur bin Sultan, paid them great attention, they asked his aid - he made the same promises as his father - at the end of Jumad-dee-ool Sanee, they went to Muk-toom at Debaie and received the same answer - They received letters for their fathers, from the above men-tioned Sheikhs saying that he should obtain from the Sirkar permission for them to come to his assistance -

Abdullah ben Rashid in the beginning of the month embarking with 20 Men, in a buggalah went to Ganse Essa bin Saif paid him great attention and gave him the

mast

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mast and sail of a large bug-galah, that had belanged to Ab-dullah bin Abdullah bin Ahmed, a Horse and 100 Bags of Rice - From Ganse, he proceeded to Chanak where he remained two days, and has this day returned to Amul-gavine where he is now occupied with the Buggalah he is building - The Chiefs are each in his own ter-ritory - Khuleefa has been some time gone into the interior to the Monasir and Manaseah, of whom he has, it is said, collected 700 men desiring to plunder the Naem, Beni Kutlub and Ghuflah - all is quiet on the Seas Praise be to God, no irregularity or dis-turbance has taken place - The Pearl Fishers are engaged in their vocation, and have this

year

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year been very successful.

The Bedouins of Beni Kuttub, and Ghuflah have joined with the Naeem and are at war with the tribes under Khuleefa - with reference to Muktoom bin Butye, he has made a friendly agreement with Khuleefa also with Sultan bin Suggur, and Suggur bin Sultan - whoever shall act contrary to it - the others shall join against him - a great friendship exists between him and Abdullah bin Rashid.-

Formerly a very good understanding existed between Muktoom and the Bedouin Tribes, but on the 1st. Instant, a disturbance took place - a Kaffilah belonging to Muktoom's people on the way from Debaie to Bupnee was

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was plundered by the Ghuflah tribe - one of its men was killed and one woman was wounded - Muktoom on hearing this, on the 6th. Instant, started with 35. Camel riders, and going clandestinely took 300 Camels belonging to the Ghuflah tribe, and brought them to Debaie. although the Chiefs of the Bedouins and Sultan bin Suggur, wrote to him to return them - he would not do so - He sent the Camels to the Monasir. -

True translated Extracts

/Signed/ A.B. Kemball

assist. Resident Persian Gulf
in Charge

True Copy

/Signed/ A.B. Kemball

assist. Resident Persian Gulf
in Charge

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(3) 71

Powder and Lead which was forthwith furnished him by that Chief. A person entrusted by said Sun Mootluk with letters addressed to the several Sheiks of Buraim has reached Bahreim and will proceed on his Mission by Sea.

2 I do not anticipate that any serious inconvenience will be experienced by us in regard to our relations with the Maritime Arabs of the Gulf by the establishment of this intriguing and unprincipled Character in Buraim. But as he will doubtless endeavour to extend his influence and authority over the Arabian possessions of His Highness the Imaum of Muscat, I am not altogether free from apprehensions lest his proceedings in that Quarter may materially affect the Interests of that Chief and faithful Ally of the British Government.

I have &c.
(Signed) S. Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf

Office No. 83 of 1845
Cons. No. 22 of 1845

To
J. P. Willoughby Esqre
Chief Secretary to Government
Bombay

Political Department Bushire 14th February 1845

Ans P.L.B for 1845 Page 171

Sir,

I have the honor to report for the information of the Honorable the Governor in Council the receipt of a letter from Bahreim dated the 7th Instant informing me that the notorious Said bin Mootluk left Lahsah on the 13th Ultimo in command of a Body of Cavalry & Infantry troops and proceeded in the direction of Buraim. On his arrival opposite Biddah he sent to Shaikh Essa bin Tareef for a supply

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Transcription of previous document

Office No 83 of 1845
Cons: No 22 of 1845

To
J. P. Willoughby Esq.
Chief Secretary to Government
Bombay.

Political Department Bushire 14th February 1845

Sir,

I have the honor to report for the information of the Honorable the Governor in Council the receipt of a letter from Bahrein dated the 7th instant informing me that the notorious Saed bin Mootluk left Lahsah on the 13th ultimo in command of a body of Ameer Fysul's troops and proceeded in the direction of Oman. On his arrival opposite Bidda he sent to Shaik Esai bin Tareef for a supply of powder and lead which was forthwith furnished him by that Chief. A person entrusted by Saed bin Mootluk with letters addressed to the several Shaiks of Oman has reached Bahrein and will proceed on his mission by sea.

2. I do not anticipate that any serious inconvenience will be experienced by us in regard to our relations with the Maritime Arabs of the Gulf by the establishment of this intriguing and unprincipled character in Oman. But as he will doubtless endeavor to extend his influence and authority over the Arabian possessions of His Highness the Imam of Muscat, I am not altogether free from apprehensions lest his proceedings without quarter may materially affect the interests of that old and faithful ally of the British Government.

I have etc.
(Signed) S. Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf

Office No. 116 of 1845
Cons: No. 32 of 1845

To
J. P. Willoughby Esqre.
Chief Secretary to Government
Bombay

Political Department
Ans. 32 B.
for 1845
Page 171

Bushire 11th March 1845

Sir,

I have the honor to forward for the information of the Honorable the Governor in Council the accompanying translated Extract of a letter from Moollah Nooreen the Native Agent at Shargah dated the 19th Ultimo reporting the arrival in Oman of the notorious Saed bin Mootluk with a considerable force from Medgid and his occupation of the Fort of Beyneh without opposition in the name of Ameer Fysul the Wahabee Leader.

&c &c

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2 Will the Maritime Arabian Chiefs appear to be saying with each other in the exhibitions of their obedience and the amount of their Offerings to the Wahabee Authorities have no doubt will remain his authority with a successful and unsparing hand. From his having been expelled from Shargah through our influence in 1839 during the period of the Egyptian Ascendancy he probably entertains any feelings but those of good will towards us and as far as in him lies will most likely endeavour to thwart our policy, but I do not anticipate with much prospect of success so far as they are concerned although as stated in a former despatch, I fear the endeavours to extend the Wahabee Authority amongst the Arabian professions of His Highness the Imaum of Muscat will prove a source of embarassment and annoyance.

I have &c.
(Signed) S. Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf

Enclosure No. 1.

Translated Extract of a letter from Moollah Hussein Agent at Shargah to Major Hennell, Resident in the Persian Gulf dated 12th Suffur (19th February 1845).

On the subject of the proceedings of Saad bin Mootluk and his forces and their arrival in these parts, I beg to inform you that when they got clear of the district of Kattiwar and entered the boundary of the territories of the Beni Yas Saad bin Mootluk was apprehensive and uneasy in his mind suspecting the sincerity of the words and engagements of the people of these parts and the tribes of Baseena and the Sheikhs of Bayneen and fearing treachery and enmity on their part that on his arrival at Bayneen they would excite ill feeling, rebellions and hostilities against him. Saad bin Mootluk therefore set on foot certain intrigues and promises to attaining the Boundary of Bayneen sent Messengers from himself to Suroor bin Ali the head of the Bin Ali with a

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51 99

view to ascertain the news of the Sheikhs of Bayneen and what was going on among them (desiring) that his Suroor himself should go himself to Hummud bin Suroor and Mahomed bin Abdullah and if he observed among them any movement towards opposition and hostilities in every endeavour to check it and make them aware of his power and the strength of his troops and followers and that Sheikh of Bin Ali and all the Sheikhs of Oman had bound themselves to support him in his views and himself to fight against them and seize their country. Suroor bin Ali on the arrival of Saad bin Mootluk's Messengers and them making known the object of their Mission went to Hummud bin Suroor and Mahomed bin Abdullah and communicated to them account of Saad bin Mootluk and his forces. These did not hesitate and firmly hold professions of their faith until they should have made an engagement with Saad bin Mootluk and pledged him to abstain from injuries and oppressions towards all their tribes but on the contrary no sooner did they hear the report of Saad bin Mootluk and his forces and his desire to obtain professions of the faith of Bayneen than they acceded to the proposition of Suroor bin Ali and immediately hoisted their flags and standards and tendered submission and proceeded with Suroor bin Ali to meet Saad bin Mootluk at a distance of 6 Farsukhs (14 Miles) and conducted him to Bayneen on the last day of Muharram (7th February) in order to establish ties of friendship between the Sons and Hummud bin Suroor and Mahomed bin Abdullah withdrawing their servants and Dependants from the Forts Saad bin Mootluk placed in each about 100 Men of his Motgad Auxiliaries. As soon as he had taken possession of the Forts and settled in the boundary he assumed the duties of Authority and Government the people of those parts were frightened and the fear of him

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took possession of their hearts and he assumed authority
over them. He also sent Messengers with the letters from
Tyseel Bin Turkee and letters from himself to Syed Hamood
bin Azaan and Rashid bin Hamood al Aboosan and all the
Sheikhs of Emaun, Citizens and Bedowins conveying threats
and injunctions and dispatched Seyf bin Ali al Gawahiree
to Muscat to Syed Sowynee the Son of Syed Saeed and
Messengers to Zanzibar: He despatched Agents from himself
to all the Bedowin Tribes to levy Zikaat (Tithes). It should
not be hidden from you that it is customary with the
people of Nedjed on their authority becoming established in
any territory not to behave well in their proceedings and
relations with the inhabitants but on the contrary to exhibit
fraud and severity and violence towards the population
in order that fear may entertain a dread of them and be
held by them in subjection because Leniency towards the
people of the present day makes them bold. Before
reported to you in a Letter dated 25th Muharrem that the
Sheikhs of Roose parts after the arrival amongst them of
the Messengers Delemi and Abdul Azeez bin Salameh from
Tyseel bin Toorkee and Saad bin Mosellah by the way of
Bahreen had occupied themselves in preparing provisions
for Saad bin Mosellah and his forces. On learning that these
had reached Buymee and taken possession of the fort
and settled in the Country they prepared themselves to go
in person to Buymee to meet him and each desired to
outstrip his neighbour with a view to improve his own
position. It was not at first the intention of the people
of Debaie to despatch any one from themselves to meet Saad
bin Mosellah, but Sheikh Mubarak bin Shakboot sent to Syed
bin Butye and the heads of the people of Debaie saying
it is incumbent upon you to despatch on your part an
Envoy

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Envoy with same men that they may accompany me to
Saad bin Mosellah, and I will be answerable for whatever
may happen to you as may be required from you of guard
in various circumstances; So the people of Debaie appointed on
their part Saad bin Rashid and with him about 20 Men
and they were 6 to 8 Camels for his Shakboob and the latter took
of his Dependants about 200 Men as also flour and Rice
and Dates etc. to the value of about 800 Reals and on the
8th Suffur (15th February) Rashid from his Encampment for
Buymee. With regard to Abdullah bin Rashid of Qumzayma
and Abdul Ageez bin Rashid of Emaun they determined
together upon proceeding to Buymee to meet Saad bin Mosellah
the former took of his followers, Citizens and Bedowins about
150 Men and Rice and Dates etc. to the value of about 800
Reals and the latter and his Brother Hamood of their Dependants
about 80 Men and of Rice Dates etc. about 400 Reals worth and
took their departure on the 8th Suffur from Qumzayma and
Emaun for Buymee. Sheikh Sultan bin Suggur took of
his followers, Citizens and Bedowins about 250 Men and
to the value of 800 Reals in Rice, Dates etc. and started on
the 12th Suffur from Shargah for Buymee.

But it is unpardonable that Saad bin
Mosellah will act becomingly in his proceedings and
relations with the Sheikhs of Emaun for the latter are not
united together in one condition but each is endeavouring
to injure his neighbours and further the former will
himself use every effort against their union.

In these days the whole of the Sheikhs of
Emaun both Citizens and Bedowins and the tribes of Beni
are all in Buymee submissively dependant upon Saad
bin Mosellah and he will do with them as he may desire
whether for good or evil. There are of the people of Shamo
hasti

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parts who are much averse to the Conduct of the people of Nedgd even those parts but a great number highly pleased

True translated Extract
Signed S. B. Hennell
Offg Resident Persian Gulf

Transcription of previous document

Office No 116 of 1845
Cons: No 32 of 1845

To
J. P. Willoughby Esq.
Chief Secretary to Government
Bombay

Political Department Bushire 11th March 1845

Sir,

Herewith I have the honor to forward for the information of the Honorable the Governor in Council the accompanying translated extract of a letter from Moollah Houssin the Native Agent at Shargah dated the 19th ultimo reporting the arrival in Oman of the notorious Saed bin Mootluk with a small force from Nedgd and his occupation of the forts of Brymee without opposition in the name of Ameer Fysul the Wahabee Leader.

All the Maritime Arabian Chiefs appear to be vying with each other in the exhibition of their obedience and the amount of their offerings to the Wahabee Agent who I have no doubt will exercise his authority with a successful and unsparing hand. From his having been expelled from Shargah through our influence in 1839 during the period of the Egyptian ascendancy he probably entertains any feelings but those of good will towards us and as far as in him lies will most likely endeavour to thwart our policy, but I do not anticipate with much prospect of success so far as they are concerned, although as stated in a former despatch, I fear the endeavour to extend the Wahabee Authority over the Arabian possessions of His Highness the Imam of Muscat will prove a source of embarrassment and annoyance.

I have etc.

(Signed) S. Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf

Enclosure No 1.

Translated Extract of a letter from Moollah Hussein Agent at Shargah to Major Hennell, Resident in the Persian Gulf dated 12th Suffur (19th February 1845).

On the subject of the proceedings of Saad Bin Mootluk and his forces and their arrival in these parts I beg to inform you that when they got clear of the district of Guttur and

entered the boundary of the territories of the Beni Yas Saad bin Mootluk was apprehensive and uneasy in his mind suspecting the sincerity of the words and engagements of the people of those parts and the tribes of Naeem and the Sheikhs of Brymee and fearing treachery and enmity on their part that on his arrival at Brymee they would incite ill feeling, rebellion and hostilities against him. Saed bin Mootluk therefore set on foot certain intrigues and previous to attaining the boundary of Brymee sent messengers from himself to Suroor bin Ali the head of the Fowahir with a view to ascertain the news of the Sheikhs of Brymee and what was going on among them (desiring) that he Suroor bin Ali should go himself to Humud bin Suroor and Mahamed bin Abdullah and if he observed among them any movement towards opposition and hostilities use every endeavour to check it and make them aware of his power and the strength of his troops and followers and that Khaleefa bin Shakboot and all the Sheikhs of Oman had bound themselves to Fysul bin Turkee and himself to fight against them and seize their country. Suroor bin Ali on the arrival of Saad bin Mootluk's messengers and their making known the object of their mission went to Humud bin Suroor and Mahomed bin Abdullah and communicated to them accounts of Saad bin Mootluk and his forces. These did not hesitate and firmly held possession of their facts until they should have made an engagement with Saad bin Mootluk and pledged him to abstain from injuries and oppression towards all their tribes but on the contrary no sooner did they hear the report of Saad bin Mutluk and his forces and his desire to obtain possession of the forts of Brymee than they acceded to the proposition of Suroor bin Ali and immediately hoisted their flags and standards and tendered submission and proceeded with Suroor bin Ali to meet Saad bin Mootluk at a distance of 6 Fursukhs (14 miles) and conducted him to Brymee on the last day of Mohurrum (7th February) where he pitched his tents between the forts and Humud bin Suroor and Mahamed bin Abdullah withdrawing their servants and dependants from the forts Saad bin Mootluk placed in each about 100 men of his Nedgd Auxiliaries. As soon as he had taken possession of the forts and settled in the country he assumed the duties of Authority and Government. The people of those parts were frightened and the fear of him took possession of their hearts and he assumed authority over them. He also sent messengers with the letters from Fysul Bin Turkee and letters from himself to Syed Humood bin Azan and Rashid bin Humed ul Shafire and all the Sheikhs of Oman, citizens and bedouins conveying threats and injunctions and dispatched Seyf bin Ali ul Zawahiree to Muscat to Syed Soweynee the son of Syed Saeed

and messengers to Jaalan. He deputed agents from himself to all the bedouin tribes to levy Zikaat (tribute). It should not be hidden from you that it is customary with the people of Nedgd on their authority becoming established in any territory not to behave well in their proceedings and relations with the inhabitants but on the contrary to exhibit power and severity and violence towards the population in order that men may entertain a dread of them and be held by them in subjection because leniency towards the people of the present day makes them bold. I before reported to you in a letter dated 25th Mohurrum that the Sheikhs of these parts after the arrival amongst them of the messengers Deleem and Abdul Azeez bin Salameh from Fysul bin Toorkee and Saad bin Mootluk by the way of Bahrein had occupied themselves in preparing provisions etc. for Saad bin Mootluk and his forces. On learning that these had reached Brymee and taken possession of the forts and settled in the country they prepared themselves to go in person to Brymee to meet him and each desires to outstrip his neighbour with a view to improve his own position. It was not at first the intention of the people of Debaie to depute anyone from themselves to meet Saad bin Mootluk, but Sheikh Khulifa bin Shakboot sent to Syed bin Butye and the headsof the people of Debaie saying it is incumbent upon you to despatch on your part an Envoy with some men that they may accompany me to meet Saad bin Mootluk, and I will be answerable for whatever may happen to you or may be required from you of great or minor importance. So the people of Debaie appointed on their part Saad bin Rashid and with him about 20 men and they went to Khuleefa bin Shakboot and the latter took of his dependants about 200 men as also the former and rice and dates etc. to the value of about 800 Reals and on the 8th Suffur (15th February) started from his encampment for Brymee. With regard to Abdullah bin Rashid of Amalgavine and Abdul Azeez bin Rashid of Ejmaun they determined together upon proceeding to Brymee to meet Saad bin Mootluk. The former took of his followers, citizens and bedouins about 150 men and rice and dates etc. to the value of about 600 Reals and the latter and his brother Humed of their dependants about 60 men and of rice, dates etc. about 400 Reals worth and took their departure on the 8th Suffur from Amalgavine and Ejmaun for Brymee. Sheikh Sultan bin Suggur took of his followers, citizens and bedouins about 250 men and to the value of 800 Reals in rice, dates, etc. and started on the 12th Suffur from Shargah for Brymee.

But it is improbable that Saad bin Mootluk will act becomingly in his proceedings and relations with the Sheikhs of Oman for the latter are not united together in one condition but each is endeavouring to injure his neighbour and further the former will himself use every effort against their union.

In these days the whole of the Sheikhs of Oman both citizens and Bedouins and the tribes of Naeem are all in Brymee submissively dependant upon Saad bin Mootluk and he will do with them as he may desire whether for good or evil. There are of the people of those parts who are much aversed to the control of the people of Nedgd over those parts but a great number highly pleased.

True translated Extract

(Signed) A. B. Kemball
Asst Resident Persian Gulf

CONCLUSION, TO THE YEAR 1853,

BY LIEUTENANT DISBROWE, ASSISTANT RESIDENT, PERSIAN GULF.

A. D. 1844.

We learn from the termination of Captain Kemball's Historical Sketches of the Muskat Government, that His Highness the Imaum was at this time meditating an expedition against his rebellious subjects of Seevee, and had been striving, by presents of money, to induce the maritime chiefs of the Arabian Coast to assist him in the undertaking.

The plan was not lost sight of, nor did the Arab Chiefs fail to espouse His Highness' cause; for towards the latter end of December, we find that troops to the number of one thousand left for Zanzibar in the ship *Naseeree* and five Buggalows, the whole commanded by Humeed bin Ahmed. To these must be added the auxiliaries from the Arabian Coast, consisting of "the nephew of Abdoolla bin Rashid, Chief of Amulgavine, with fifty men; Ali bin Rashid bin Humeed, brother to the Ejman Shaikh, in his own Buteel, with sixty men; and Muktoom bin Butye, of Debaye, with three vessels." The result of the expedition we shall learn in the sequel.

About this period (November 1844) the Imaum concluded a Treaty with the King of the French. "A French squadron, commanded by Captain De Fosse, arrived at Zanzibar, armed with full powers to enter into a treaty with His Highness." The latter had already communicated with the British Ministry, in order to obtain their sentiments on the proposed measure; and an intimation having reached him, through Captain Hamerton, that no objections existed to his entering into relations with the French, the Treaty* with that nation was at once concluded.

During the absence of His Highness at Zanzibar, whither he had proceeded on a visit to his African possessions, the Government of Muskat was left in the hands of his son Syud Soweynee, a man of a temperament singularly weak and vacillating,—one totally unfit and

* Copy of this Treaty is annexed.

MUSKAT.

unable either to uphold the dignity of his father, or to command the obedience of his subjects. Differences arose between the Beni Jaubir and the tribes of the Al Mualik and Al Humeed, residing within the district of Burka: hostilities commenced between Humeed bin Salim, Governor of Musnaah, and the Bedouins; and none of these feuds did His Excellency find himself in a position to compose. Difficulties succeeded difficulties. While harassed by the disaffection of his own people within, news reached of the approach of a Wahabee force from without, and that the troops would shortly arrive at Brymee: Syud Soweynee was perplexed and embarrassed; the Brymee authorities were in trepidation, and at a loss how to act, "whether to deliver up their forts, or defend their territories." His Excellency had recourse to his usual mode of conduct: he flew for advice to the Resident, and was recommended by that officer to keep up, if possible, a good understanding with the Wahabee Ameer, and to accede to any terms he might proffer, provided such concession did not lower the dignity of his father: if, however, the demands made by Fysul should prove to be of so imperious and extravagant a nature as virtually to nullify his own independence as Governor, then would he act wisely by representing to the Ameer that without the consent of the British Government, whose ally he was, he never could submit to the requirments that were sought at his hands. Meanwhile, Syud bin Mootluk, the Wahabee Agent, had reached Brymee with all his forces. The holders of the forts, overawed, or thinking resistance useless, handed them over to him without demur. The maritime chiefs, too, proceeded to wait upon him, and did all in their power to manifest good will and respect towards him. Demands were made upon His Excellency Syud Soweynee, and Syud Humood bin Azan, the Sohar Chief, to the amount of 20,000 and 5,000 reals respectively. Notwithstanding the bitter enmity that originally existed between the Imaum and the Sohar Chief, the reconciliation effected between them, through the mediation of the Resident, appeared to be something more than nominal, as was at the time supposed, and bid fair to prove firm and lasting; for we now find His Excellency Syud Soweynee and the Sohar Chief drawing more closely to each other, and endeavouring by a coalition to avert the impending danger. Syud Humood was ready to fight the Wahabees, but His Excellency at one time consenting to, at another shrinking back from, the idea of hostilities, it was at length agreed that Syud bin Mootluk should be informed that Syud Humood would at once pay the 5,000 reals required of him, but that His Excellency, ere satisfying the demands that were made upon him, would write to his father for instructions;—until these had arrived he could not pay one farthing of tribute. Such were the terms offered, and to such did Syud bin Mootluk pretend to agree.

MUSKAT.

The Wahabee influence, which, on first arrival of the Agent, was so great as to endanger the security of the Imaum's dominions, received a severe shock in the open defiance of the Beni Saeed. The people of this powerful tribe set at naught his authority, refused to disburse an iota of tribute, and inflicted chastisement upon his envoys. Syud bin Mootluk threatened to exterminate them, and called upon the chiefs of the coast to assist him. They however, either disgusted at his arbitrary proceedings, or for some other reason best known to themselves, begged to be excused from joining him.

About this time letters arrived from the Imaum to his son, "enjoining him to strengthen Burka, Semayle, and Nukkul, and, in the event of a rupture with the Wahabees, to confine himself to the defence of the forts, and on no account to leave Muskat."

His Highness also intimated the complete failure of the expedition against Sevee: his troops had been defeated with severe loss, and compelled to retire; many of note were slain;—amongst the number Humeed bin Ahmed, who went in command of the expedition, also Nassir bin Ali, late Envoy to England.

Syud bin Mootluk's forces now made a foray into the district of Burka, killed some two or three women, and carried off a number of the latter, as also a large quantity of sheep and camels; and when His Excellency remonstrated, and sought reparation for these aggressive acts, the only reply he received was one couched in terms most overbearing and tyrannical; indeed the Wahabee Lieutenant seemed bent on something more than the mere venting of empty words and threats, and notwithstanding the promise so lately made to Syud Soweynee, that he would await his reply from Zanzibar, appeared to have been meditating immediate mischief; for early in the month of June we find him summoning the Arab Tribes to assemble at a place called Ghoopee, and declaring to them his intention to march upon Muskat forthwith. They on their side were not slow to obey: a large force was speedily collected; from the Beni Kuttub alone did he muster auxiliaries to the amount of 300 horse and 1000 infantry, and from all the rest of the tribes considerable numbers flocked to his standard. Muskat was evidently in danger. So powerful an army could not be withstood with ease, and no hopes of clemency could be entertained at the hands of so determined and merciless an invader. There remained but one alternative, either to resist successfully, or to be humbled excessively. All, however, was disorder and confusion at Muskat: either no one perceived the danger he was in, or, if he did, he cared not whether he was doomed to stand or to fall. Troops there were none, at least deserving of the name of troops. The garrison not long since had been reinforced with an accession from the neighbouring

tribes: they however forsook the place, and returned to their homes. Such was the defenceless state of Muskat, such the lethargy of her inhabitants, when she was threatened by the Wahabees. Her fate seemed inevitable; when the Resident stretched forth a helping hand. On the 25th June 1845 he addressed a letter to the Wahabee Ameer, remonstrating against his proceedings in Oman, and begging him, if he valued the friendship of the British State, not to permit His Highness the Imaum's dominions to be thus invaded. He likewise wrote to Syud bin Mootluk, desiring him to suspend hostilities, pending the receipt of further instructions from his chief, the Ameer. Meanwhile, also, the ships of war were sent to cruise off the Coast of Batinah, and, by constantly showing themselves, manifested the interest felt by the British towards their ally, the Imaum. At this conjuncture, too, while affairs were in so critical a position, fresh advices reached Syud Soweynee from his father, empowering him, if driven to extremities, to pay to the Wahabee an annual tribute of 6,000 crowns, and desiring him to keep on the best of terms with the Sohar Chief.

The intervention of the Resident, coupled with the opportune arrival of the above instructions, had, no doubt, a salutary effect upon the Wahabee, and inclined him to come to terms more moderate than he probably otherwise would have done; for we find the Ameer hastening to reply to the Resident's communication, and expressing the great feeling of friendship he bore to the British Government; and although he dilated somewhat largely upon his rights to exercise authority over the province of Oman, there can be no doubt he felt and knew that it would be wiser far to waive some portion of his asserted claims, and come to a modified settlement with His Highness the Imaum, than to attempt carrying out his intention to the full, and thereby incur the displeasure of the British power. Whatever his feelings may have been,—whatever his motives,—the matter ended more favourably for the Muskat authorities than they had any right to expect, or deserved. His Excellency Syud Soweynee engaged in the name of his father to pay an annual tribute of 5,000 German crowns, besides a present on this occasion of 2,000 German crowns to Syud bin Mootluk, which made a total of 7,000 German crowns for the first year,—a sum exceeding by 1,000 the amount authorised by the Imaum. The Wahabee forces were withdrawn; Mujees, a dependency of the Sohar Chief, that had been illegally seized upon, was restored, and peace was established.

Scarcely had the above settlement been effected, when disturbances arose in other quarters. The people of Khuthra (a branch of the Beni

Saeed), who, as already stated, had openly defied the Wahabee's authority, were now joined by two other tribes scarcely less powerful than themselves, the Al Saeed and Al Boo Rashid. These three banded together, and resolved to arrest the rising power of the invader: they busied themselves repairing their forts, taking in stores, and arming the population around. Not a messenger of Syud bin Mootluk's was permitted to pass through Batinah unmolested,—some were detained, others beaten. Presently, too, we see the Shaikh of the Naeem Tribe making overtures to the Sohar Chief, and inviting him to join in common cause with himself against the intruders. Syud Humood bin Azan gave a ready ear to the invitation. The Muttowas (a branch of the Beni Saeed) likewise coalesced, and into the hands of the latter did the Sohar Chief transfer his forts, conditioning their immediate surrender to him whensover the Wahabees no longer stood in their way. Here, then, we have two separate confederacies—both composed of powerful and numerous followers—embarked in the same undertaking. The effect of these leagues must, no doubt, have been highly beneficial, and tended greatly to prevent the inordinate aggrandisement of the Wahabee power in the province of Oman; indeed, when we take into consideration the opposition Syud bin Mootluk met with from the above tribes, the general ill feeling borne towards him by the maritime chiefs and others, and the necessity he found himself under of coming to moderate terms with His Highness the Imaum, it can hardly be doubted that his name had of late somewhat fallen in the eyes of the people, and that he had signally failed in the execution of his proud pretensions.

ANNEX B, No. 10

Major S. Hennell, Political Resident, Persian Gulf, to the Government of Bombay, September 9, 1847

[p. 469].

Office N° 387 of 1847
Cons: N° 92 of 1847

To
A. Malet Esq^re^
Secretary to Government
Bombay

Political Department — Bushire 9th September 1847

Sir,

Herewith I have the honor to transmit for the information of the Honorable the Governor in Council the accompanying translated Substance of a letter from the Native Agent at Bahrein, dated the 24th Ultimo reporting the return of the Envoy deputed by the Chiefs of that Island to negotiate an amicable adjustment of their quarrel with Ameer Fysul the Wahabee Ruler. Shaik Busheer has arranged matters apparently to the satisfaction of Shaik Mahomed bin Khuleefa, having brought down a formal treaty of Peace, by the terms of which, no aid is to be afforded to the Ex Chief Shaik Abdoollah bin Ahmed with a view to the re-establishment of his Authority over his former possessions, but he is to reside for the future at Lahsah under the protection of the Ameer. Busheer bin Ramah
[p. 470]. has however pledged himself on the part of the Bahrein Shaik for the payment of 4000 Dollars, which under present circumstances he will find some difficulty in raising.

2. The Mission of Shaik Busheer was exceedingly well timed as Ameer Fysul being at that date pressed by the invading Force from Mecca under the Shurreef of Mecca Bin Aoon and Ameer Khalid was glad to compromise matters with the Chiefs of Bahrein. The submission of the Wahabee Ruler to the extent of ceding certain districts to the Shurreef—the payment of an annual tribute of 20,000 Dollars besides a number of valuable Horses, has caused a considerable diminution of the influence hitherto enjoyed by the Wahabees. In the Fort of Brymee, the Deputy of Ameer Fysul, Ul Ujajee (who commands that stronghold) is compelled to trust entirely to his astute management of the fueds and passions of the surrounding Tribes, for the maintenance of the moderate degree of authority he still possesses. With the slightest combination among the Chiefs on the Coast he could be expelled without any trouble. His present political influence may therefore be considered as very small and not at all[1] likely to seriously affect the interests of the Imam of Muscat.

3. At the present date I am happy to report that profound tranquillity exists through the Persian Gulf, both by Land and Sea. Although Shaik Mukhtoom of
[p. 471]. Debaye rejected my proffers of mediating an inland Truce between himself and Shaik Sultan bin Suggur for the period of the Pearl Fishery, he has, as I anticipated found it to his interest to allow matters to find their own level. Accordingly at this time a friendly intercourse is carried on between Debaye and Shargah. And even Mukhtoom himself in a late letter to me admits the existence of what he terms a "kind of peace" between himself and the Ioasmee Chief. The Shaik of Aboothabee Saeed bin Tahnoon appears to hold himself aloof from both parties. The Amulgavine Chief however feels the causes of the enmity subsisting between himself, and Shaik Sultan bin Suggur, to be too deeply rooted to allow of an unrestricted intercourse between his people and those of his rival. No aggressions are committed on either side, but the parties hold no communication with each other: one trifling exception to the above has however lately occurred as Shaik Abdoollah had since complained that the Crews of two of his boats on the pearl Banks were ill-treated and beaten by the Commander of a Ioasmee Bateel and a great number of their Spears broken. As this Statement is corroborated by Moollah Houssin who saw the marks of the blows on the Amulgavine people on their return to their own Port, it is my intention to call upon Shaik Sultan bin

[1] *all* interlined in pencil.

Suggur to fine the Nakhoda of the offending Vessel 100 Keronees for his having committed this breach of the Peace.

4. At the date of our Vessels of War being on the Coast all the Pearl Fishers had returned from the Banks for the purpose of passing the Mohurrum or Fast of the Ramzan on shore. The Season up to the present date has been I am happy to hear very successful. Immediately on the termination of the Fast the Divers will put to sea again unless the spread of the Cholera among them should present their leaving their respective Ports. [p. 472].

I have &ca

(signed) S. Hennell,
Resident &ca

Enclosure N° 1

Translated Substance of a letter from the Agent at Bahrein, to Major Hennell, Resident in the Persian Gulf—dated 12th Ramzan—24th August 1847.

On the 17th August Busheer bin Ramah arrived from Nedjd, he was accompanied by a Gholam of Ameer Fysuls' named Billal, and brought letters for the Shaiks touching the negotiations which had passed between him and the Wahabee Chief. Amicable relations are now established between the Ameer and the Sheikhs, the former having sent them a written treaty of peace, framed in accordance with the terms agreed upon between Busheer bin Ramah and himself. Ameer Fysul introduced the subject of a reconciliation between Abdoollah bin Ahmed and Mahomed bin Khuleefa, to Busheer bin Ramah—the latter however who had been invested with full power to act for the Sheikhs, when he went to Nedjd, declined to listen to his propositions. Fysul perceiving that nothing could be done for the Ex Chief, called him to his presence, and told him, he might settle under his protection at Riaz, or Lahsah, or Kuteef or Koweit. Busheer bin Ramah states, that Abdoollah bin Ahmed, despairing of success through Fysul, decided upon Lahsah, where he is to remain for the present until he sees what may turn out—all his expenses are to be paid by Fysul, it having been agreed that if he settled in the Wahabee Country, or in Koweit that Fysul should support him. When Busheer bin Ramah left Nedjd, Abdoollah bin Ahmed came with him to Lahsah. Billal, Fysul's Man is still at Bahrein waiting to receive 4000 German Crowns, which it has been agreed they should give him. The Sheikhs wish to sell their Dates to enable them to liquidate this sum, Busheer bin Ramah having come under an engagement that it would be paid. [p. 473].

True translated Substance

(signed) William Campbell

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Office No. 211 of 1848
Secret No. 43 of 1848

To
A. Malet Esqre
Chief Secretary to Government
Bombay
Political Department
Bushire 5th July 1848

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor in Council the accompanying translated Extract of a letter from the Native Agent at Shargah, confirming the particulars of the defeat sustained by the forces of the Wahabee Agent at Buraymee, in an attempt to invade the Territories of Sheik Seif bin Mahomed of Sohaar in consequence of that Chief's hesitating to pay the tribute demanded by the former.

2. Moollah Hay[illegible] further requested the same

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same length as the present precarious position of the Wahabee Agent, who, unless he be relieved by the advance of a force from Medgel, is likely to be reduced to great straits. I greatly doubt whether Shaikh Sultan bin Saggur will afford him any real aid unless he finds there is a prospect of Shaikh Zyad bin Khalifa succeeding in placing a reinforcement for his Agent. I consider however that this best prospect of the latter escaping from the difficulties of his present position lies in the quarrels and animosities which are almost certain to break out between the different Tribes at present combined against him.

3. I am happy to be able to report for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor in Council, that up to the date of the latest letter received from the Arabian Coast, no acts of Piracy had occurred nor any disturbances taken place at Sea.

I have &c.
(Signed) S. Hennell
Resident &c.

Enclosure No. 1.

Translated Extract of a letter from Agent at Shargah to Major Hennell, Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated 25th Jumadee 2nd Sanee 1264. 29th May 1848.

At

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At the present time Sheikh Saeed bin Tahnoon is at Aboothabee employed in equipping Guns &c being his preparation if he is to be believed to march against Mahammed bin Sef bin Ojajee. At the same time since the Beni Nas have fled, horsemen and Camel Riders, including the Mowzarahs and the Bedaweens acknowledging his Authority, under the command of his brother Hamdan bin Tahnoon and Mahammed bin Hammad bin Murrah moved into the Interior; and they are now encamped at the Watering places opposite to Jibbal Alie, receiving their provisions from Debaie. At the same time two sons of Alie bin Hamood, Sheikhs of the Bin Ka Ka Bin Khuraybain defeated Rashid bin Hamdan to Aboothabee to conclude an alliance with Saeed bin Tahnoon and engage one Thousand to assist him in prosecuting hostilities against Mahammed bin Sef bin Ojajee.

I beg to report this state of affairs with Mahammed bin Sef bin Ojajee the Deputy of Sef bin Sultan. A very serious collision took place lately between him and Sef bin Hamood arising out of the following circumstances. On the 6th May, he sent emissaries to him Hamood to demand tribute in the shape of Rice, Coffee and hard Cash, who, it appears returned for reply that the Articles required were not

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not fail discovering as his subjects were greatly impoverished
but, Please God, after the lapse of two Months he
would proceed to comply with his demands.
Mahammed bin Sef answering this excuse sent
emissaries a second time to Sef bin Hamood with
a letter to the effect that on its receipt he must
send without fail 500 Bags of Rice, 2 Bales of Coffee,
10 Barrels of Gunpowder, 5 Tons of Lead and 10000
Dollars otherwise, if he did despatch within five
days, he should consider him a rebel and treat him
accordingly. Shaban that day was much agitated
at this Message, and wrote back to Mk Ajajee that he
must at present expect none of his demands, but if he
would consent to join forces their negotiations with the
inhabitants could come to some arrangement and
until the friends of the contention and the Bata Tribes, it
was all that was hoped for otherwise, if this could
not be conceded, he must act as his thoughts prompted.
When Mahammed bin Sef's Messengers dismissed the new emissaries
he shrewdly suspected that on receiving their response
Mk Ajajee would forthwith advance to avenge him and accordingly
laid his plans and sent to the Chiefs of tribes acknow-
ledging his Authority settled in the Mountains in
the neighbourhood of Sahar and in the Batinah
territory, such as the Kulamzeah, the Mujabel, the
Ressah, the Beni Amur, the Beni Jabir, Al Kuneam,
al

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Al Sukhoot and a branch of the Naeem tribe Al so
Khuney have to inform them of the correspondence
that had taken place between him and Mahammed
bin Sef Mk Ajajee commenting very forcibly upon the
wicked policy of the Wedyabet (Wahabees) and their
gross exactions, and urging them to unite cordially
with him. These acceded to his proposals and he
according by in conjunction with them prepared
a force of 1000 Matchlock Men and placed them
in ambush in the valleys and on the roads in the
Mountains through which the Wedyabet forces must
pass on their way to Sohar and their Batinah Ports.
He warned also the remainder of the said tribes to
be ready to assemble to give battle and succeeded
too in obtaining the co-operation of Khalfan bin Sef.

Thus he, now revenged to Mahammed bin
Sef Mk Ajajee. On the return of his Messengers with
the reply of Sef bin Hamood, Disappointed in his
demands he became expeditively arranged and immediately
prepared for hostilities, assembling the tribes under
his command both the Invaders and Sedentary such as
the people of Rayyanee, the Zowabie, Beni Naab and
Fazil bin Shamies's Bedouin dependants amounting
altogether to a very considerable force he selected
there from about 1000 Men, horsemen and Camel
Riders, and placed them under the Command

of

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of Abdul Rahman bin Shakbout Al Katib with 70
Men of the Hedgedoes troops (30 Lonsemen and 40 Camel
Riders) and having appointed Commanders over the rest
the forces moved out of Buymes on the 9th day on its
way to Ishan and the Baluarah territory, to encounter Syf
bin Hamood and his followers and marching in
perfect confidence, without an thoughts of danger,
being unconscious of the plans laid by Syf bin Hamood
and of the ambuscade intended to intercept them as
the roads were surprized in the difficult passes by
the troops of the Sultan who had ocupied the heights.
These began to engage the Hedgedoes and attacking
them in a body whereon the Lonsemen and Camel
riders could not act fast enough to flight the Hedgedoes 10 Men and of their allies 70 Men, them straingling
3 hours and continuing one hours and 25 Caunds.

Syf bin Mahamed was greatly encharged
by the desertion of his troops and at a loss how to act, for
on one side and disaffection immediately across and
every side. In the first place Syf bin Hamood and
Shuttan bin Syf had become his enemies as also the
Beniou Abboo Khuroybani with their Bedouins
& friendly who formerly acknowledged his
Authority. So Sheremis Saeed bin Tahnoon and the
Beni Was Tribe both Mo-made and Sedentary formerly his
Allies had now became hostile and he was thus deprived
of

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of all resources. Previous to this the people of Buymes
maintained a constant intercourse with Sharjah and
the Ports of Bahrain & Muscat which they were now cut
off as Sheremis from the Coast of Buraimi in consequence
of the enmity of Saeed bin Tahnoon whose forces are
now encamped on their inland marches in the direction of
Jebal Ali. All the tribes of Buraimi were also at his
expectations from Buymes. The Sheikh finding himself
in so serious a dilemma owing to the defections of all
the Tribes and there very few Shahabee troops at his
disposal and considering the great distance of
Hedgedoes and his Sultan unable to take their offensive
Mahamed bin Syf destroyed all the forts and towers
in the immediate vicinity of the forts called
Al Barakah and Shumailah with the exception of the
extensive tower and Wall of Hoodait which command
the Watering places and which he garrisoned with
30 Men of his own family with provisions for four
Months. All the Rice and Dates in Stores at Buymes
he collected into the two forts above mentioned Shumailah
and Al Barakah, making over the former to Abdul Rahman
bin Shakbout al Katib with 70 Men of his own immediate
followers from Hedgedoes and occupying the Sultan himself
with the remainder to the number of 100 Men. The
two Chiefs then addressed letters to Syf and Shuttan
and Saad bin Mohsin respecting the late occurrences in

Buraimi

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Towns, the Inhabitants of the Tribes and their refusal to pay Tributes; also their own Shaikhs concentrating in the Fort and total want of Provision and Provending and the necessity of their sending an Expedition into Buraimi for the purpose of punishing the rebels if they desired to retain possession of the Provinces and realize any tributes and gave 100 Reals to a Man of the Manasir by name Rizk Mushra to convey their letters to Bedaydh. They likewise entrusted similar letters into the hands of two of their own followers and sent them to Shargah with a request to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur to forward them to Bahrein by sea. We suppose that this Chief on the arrival of the Envoys at Shargah addressed letters in the name of Seyd bin Sultan and Saad bin Muthik and Sunbul volunteered his assistance against the rebels and consulting them to their change of Ship proceeded on board a boat proceeding to Bahrein. The Wahabee Agents also despatched Messengers with similar letters for Omman to Seyd and Saad bin Mootlak to Rohain and made likewise to Muscat to forward them also to Bahrein by sea with which request Mr Pelly immediately complied as he has of late been on friendly terms with them.

Sunday 8 Read that Shaikh Sultan has written to Mahomed bin Seyf and Ryajeb to the effect that if any should attempt to attack them he will assist

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assist them with all his forces. Shaikh heard also that Mahomed bin Seyf has seized Hamood bin Sunoor and imprisoned him in Ain Jeah.

Letters arrive to Seyf bin Hamood and Khalan bin Seyf. Upon the defeat of the Wahabee forces the latter proceeded to Muscat to His Highness Syed Sawqueen to solicit provisions and a reinforcement of troops for Shargah that by this time Hamood has assembled all his dependants and has endeavored with the Sheikhs of Ain Sihareyban under the sons of Abubin Hamood and all the tribes of those parts connected with them as well as Sinaid bin Sahweran of Abudhabee in order to prosecute hostilities against Mahomed bin Seyf and his allies and he now only awaits the return of Khalan bin Seyf from Muscat and their approach of Seyd bin Sahweran and his forces towards Buraimee. Sunday Heard that the latter had left Abudhabee with their Guns before mentioned.

Present occasion Head of State a correspondence had been going on between Sheikh Sultan and Sheikh Seyd bin Sahweran one the subject of attacking Mahomed bin Ruttye. When the former saw that the latter had combined with Seyf bin Hamood and Khalan to commence hostilities against this Medydees he sent to the Beduins tribes Beni Kaab, Ghufalah, Al Bhumwatee and Steig to

warn

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[illegible] that Mahomed bin Syf sent Mujeje was
[illegible] on the part of Sujud bin Sultan; that Sujud
was powerfull and would not abandon Shinas; that
he would assuredly despatch a force to punish the
disaffected in which case they would be great sufferers.
Again - Great animosity before existed on the part of
Sheikh Sultan against Sheikh Mubarrows and he
was exciting Sheikh Saeed bin Tahnoon to attack the
latter but when he observed that Saeed bin Tahnoon had
joined the coalitions against Mahomed bin Syf
he secretly sent to Mubarrows to propose an alliance
his object being to prevent Mubarrows from giving
his aid to the coalitions against Mahomed bin Syf.
Sheikh Abdullah bin Rashid is now at Ruselgavine
and keeps up a constant correspondence with Sheikh
Sultan bin Suggur.

These bear Stated Extracts
Signed) S. B. Hennell
Offg Resident &c

Transcription of previous document

Office No 211 of 1848
Cons: No 43 of 1848

To

A. Malet Esq.
Chief Secretary to Government
Bombay

Political Department
Bushire 5th July 1848

Sir,

I have the honor to transmit for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor in Council the accompanying translated Extract of a letter from the Native Agent at Shargah, confirming the particulars of the defeat sustained by the forces of the Wahabee Agent at Brymee, in an attempt to invade the territories of Shaik Syf bin Humood of Sohar in consequence of that Chiefs hesitating to pay the tribute demanded by the former.

2. Moollah Houssin further reports at some length on the present precarious position of the Wahabee Agent, who, unless he be relieved by the advance of a force from Nedgd, is likely to be reduced to great straits. I greatly doubt whether Shaik Sultan bin Suggur will afford him any real aid unless he finds there is a prospect of Shaik Fysul the Wahabee Ameer being able to spare a reinforcement for his agent. I consider however that the best prospect of the latter escaping from the difficulties of his present position lies in the quarrels and misunderstandings which are almost certain to break out between the different tribes at present coalesced against him.

3. I am happy to be able to report for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor in Council, that up to the date of the latest letter received from the Arabian Coast, no acts of piracy had occurred nor any disturbances taken place at sea.

I have etc.

(Signed) S. Hennell

Resident etc.

Enclosure No 1

Translated Extract of a letter from Agent at Shargah to Major Hennell, Resident in the Persian Gulf dated 25th Jumadee ool Sanee 1264, 29th May 1848.

At the present time Sheikh Saeed bin Tahnoon is at Aboothabee employed in equipping guns it being his purpose if he is to be believed to march against Mahomed bin Syf ul Ujajee. It is some time since the Beni Yas troops, horsemen and camel riders, including the Moozareeh and the Bedouins acknowledging his authority, under the command of his brothers Humdan bin Tahnoon and Mahomed bin Humud ul Murrah moved into the interior, and they are now encamped at the watering places opposite to Jibbal Ali, receiving their provisions from Debaie. It is some time too since the sons of Ali bin Humood, Sheikhs of the Naeem al loo Khureyban deputed Rashid bin Humdan to Aboothabee to contract an alliance with Saeed bin Tahnoon and engage on their part to assist him in prosecuting hostilities against Mahomed bin Syf ul Ujajee.

I beg to report the state of affairs with Mahomed bin Syf ul Ujajee the Deputy of Fysul bin Turkee. A very serious collision took place lately between him and Syf bin Humood arising out of the following circumstances. On the 6th May, he sent emissaries to bin Humood to demand tribute in the shape of rice, coffee and hard cash, who, it appears returned for reply that the articles required were not forthcoming as his subjects were greatly impoverished, but, please God, after the lapse of two months he would proceed to comply with his demands. Mahomed bin Syf on receiving this excuse sent emissaries a second time to Syf bin Humood with a letter to the effect that on its receipt he must send without fail 500 bags of rice, 2 bales of coffee, 10 barrels of gunpowder, 5 pigs of lead and 1000 Dollars otherwise, if not despatched within five days, he should consider him a rebel and treat him accordingly. I hear that Syf was much irritated at this message, and wrote back to Ul Ujajee that he must at present expect none of his demands, but if he would consent to postpone their realization until the inhabitants could come to some arrangement and until the period of the collection on the date trees, it was all that was hoped for otherwise, if this could not be conceded, he must act as he thought proper. When Mahomed bin Syf thus dismissed the

emissaries he shrewdly suspected that on receiving their report Ul Ujajee would prepare to coerce him and accordingly laid his plans and sent to the Chiefs of tribes acknowledging his authority settled in the mountains in the neighbourhood of Sohar and in the Batinah territory, such as the Kulameeah, the Mujabeel, the Rissah, the Beni Arur, the Beni Jabir, Al Kureem, Al Suknoot and a branch of the Naeem tribe Alboo Khureyban to inform them of the correspondence that had taken place between him and Mahomed bin Syful Ujajee commenting very forcibly upon the wicked policy of the Nedgdees (Wahabees) and their gross exactions, and urging them to unite cordially with him. These acceded to his proposals and he accordingly in conjunction with them prepared a force of 1000 matchlock men and placed them in ambush in the vallies and on the roads in the mountains through which the Nedgdee forces must pass on their way to Sohar and the Batinah ports. He warned also the remainder of the said tribes to be ready to assemble to give battle and succeeded too in obtaining the co-operation of Khatan bin Syf.

I must now revert to Mahomed bin Syf Ul Ujajee. On the return of his messengers with the reply of Syf bin Humood, disappointed in his demands he became excessively enraged and immediately prepared for hostilities, assembling the tribes under his controul both nomade and sedentary such as the people of Brymee, the Zowahir, Beni Kaab and Fazil bin Shamiee's Bedouin dependants amounting altogether to a very considerable force he selected therefrom about 1000 men, horsemen and camel riders, and placed them under the command of Abdul Rahman bin Ibraheem Ul Katib with 70 men of the Nedgdee troops (30 horsemen and 40 camel riders) and having appointed commanders over the rest the force moved out of Brymee on the 9th May on its way to Sohar and the Batinah territory, to encounter Syf bin Humood and his followers and marching in perfect confidence, without a thought of danger, being unconscious of the plan laid by Syf bin Humood and of the ambuscade intended to intercept them on the road was surprized in the difficult passes by the troops of the latter who had crowned the heights. These began to engage the Nedgdees and attacking them in a body where the horsemen and camel riders could not act put them to flight killing of the Nedgdees 10 men and of their allies 70 men, ham-stringing 3 horses and capturing one horse and 25 camels.

Syf bin Mahomed was greatly embarrassed by the defeat of his troops and at a loss how to act, for animosity and disaffection immediately arose on every side. In the first place Syf bin Humood and Khatan bin Syf had become his enemies as also the Naeem Alboo Khureyban with their Bedouin dependents who

formerly acknowledged his authority. So likewise Saeed bin Tahnoon and the Beni Yas tribe both nomade and sedentary formerly his allies had now become hostile and he was thus deprived of all resources. Previous to this the people of Brymee maintained a constant intercourse with Shinas and the ports of Batinah from which they were now cut off, as likewise from the coast of Oman in consequence of the enmity of Saeed bin Tahnoon whose forces are now encamped in the interior in the direction of Jibul Ali. All the tribes of Oman now aim at his expulsion from Brymee. In short finding himself in so serious a dilemma owing to the defection of all the tribes and the very few Wahabee troops at his disposal and considering the great distance of Nedgd and his utter inability to take the offensive Mahomed bin Syf destroyed all the forts and towers in the immediate vicinity of the Forts called Isbarah and Khunduk with the exception of the extreme tower and that of Neadat which command the watering places and which he garrisoned with 30 men of his own party with provisions for four months. All the rice and dates in store at Brymee he collected into the two forts above mentioned Khunduk and Isbarah making over the former to Abdul Kohman bin Ibraheem al Katib with 70 men of his own immediate followers from Nedgd and occupying the latter himself with the remainder to the number of 100 men. The two chiefs then addressed letters to Fysul bin Turkee and Saad bin Mootluk reporting the late occurrences in Oman, the alienation of the tribes and their refusal to pay tribute; also their own straitened condition in the forts and total want of power and pointing out the necessity of their sending an expedition into Oman for the purpose of punishing the rebels if they desired to retain possession of the province and realize any tributes, and gave 100 Reals to a man of the Monasir by name Bin Musha to convey their letters to Nedgd. They likewise entrusted similar letters into the hands of two of their own followers and sent them to Shargah with a request to Shaik Sultan bin Suggur to forward them to Bahrein by sea. It appears that this Chief on the arrival of the emissaries at Shargah addressed letters to the same effect to Fysul bin Turkee and Saad bin Mutluk and further volunteered his assistance against the rebels and committing them to their charge shipped them on board a boat proceeding to Bahrein. The Wahabee Agents also despatched messengers with similar letters for Ameer Fysul and Saad bin Mootluk to Debaie and wrote likewise to Muktoom to forward them on to Bahrein by sea with which request Muktoom immediately complied as he has of late been on friendly terms with them.

I understand that Sheikh Sultan has written to Mahomed bin Syf ul Ujajee to the effect that if any should venture to attack him he will assist him with all his forces. I have heard also that Mahomed bin Syf has seized Humud bin Suroor and imprisoned him in the fort.

I return now to Syf bin Humood and Khatan bin Syf. After the defeat of the Wahabee force the latter proceeded to Muscat to His Highness Syed Soweynee to solicit provisions and a reinforcement of troops for, I hear that Syf bin Humood has assembled all his dependants and has coalesced with the Naeem Alboo Khureyban under the sons of Ali bin Humood, and all the tribes of those parts connected with them as well as Saeed bin Tahnoon of Aboothabee in order to prosecute hostilities against Mahomed bin Syf and his allies and he now only awaits the return of Khatan bin Syf from Muscat and the approach of Saeed bin Tahnoon and his forces towards Brymee. I understand the latter has left Aboothabee with the guns before mentioned.

I must mention that of late a correspondence had been going on between Sheikh Sultan and Sheikh Saeed bin Tahnoon on the subject of attacking Muktoom bin Butye. When the former saw that the latter had coalesced with Syf bin Humood and Khatan to commence hostilities against the Nedgdees he sent to the Bedouin tribes Beni Kaab, Ghuflah, Al Khuwatir and Huij to warn them that Mahomed bin Syf ul Ujajee was here on the part of Fysul bin Turkee, that Fysul was powerful and would not abandon them, that he would assuredly despatch a force to punish the disaffected in which case they would be great sufferers. Again, great animosity before existed on the part of Sheikh Sultan against Sheikh Muktoom and he was exciting Sheikh Saeed bin Tahnoon to attack the latter but when he observed that Saeed bin Tahnoon had joined the coalition against Mahomed bin Syf he secretly sent to Muktoom to propose an alliance his object being to prevent Muktoom from giving his aid to the coalition against Mahomed bin Syf. Sheikh Abdullah bin Rashid is now at Amalgavine and keeps up a constant correspondence with Sheikh Sultan bin Suggur.

True translated Extract

(Signed) A. B. Kemball

Assistant Resident etc.

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Office No. 227 of 1848
Cons. No. 47 of 1848

To
A. Malet Esq.re
Chief Secretary to Government
Bombay

Political Department Bushire 17th July 1848

Sir,

Adverting to my despatch to your address No. 43 in that Department, reporting the precarious position in which the Wahabee Agent at Bujeeree had been placed, in consequence of the defeat of his Troops by Shaik Sayd bin Hamood of Sohar, I have now the honor to enclose for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor in Council the accompanying translations of two letters from the Native Agent at Shangah dated the 14th and 21st June respectively, reporting the vigorous prosecution of the Siege of the Fortress of Bujeeree, by Shaik Saeed bin Tahnoon, who has succeeded in capturing the Town called Subbarah, and has reduced the Wahabee Agent to extremities in the remaining Stronghold of Khundusk. 14

2. As I conjectured in my former despatch on this subject, Shaik Sultan bin Sugger has changed his intention of marching to the relief of Bujeeree. I hear

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has however form Beluoies that Saeed Tyeb is making vigorous effort to despatch a strong reinforcement from Medgedi to Buraimi by land under the hope of marching in time to force the Shaikhs of Abouthabee and Sohar to raise the Siege.

3. I am happy to add that up to the 7th June last no cases of irregularities had occurred at Sur.

I have &c.
(Signed) S. Hennell
Resident &c.

Enclosure No. 1.

X Translated Substance of a letter from Agent at Shargah to Major Hennell, Resident in the Persian Gulf. dated 12th Rejeb - 14th June 1848.

A.B. I beg to report that on Shaikh Saeed bin Tahnoon and his forces taking up a position near Bujeeree a party of the Awamir joined him to the number of 200 more. He then sent to the Maoom by his Nunnood and their Allies to invite them to hasten to him for the purpose of prosecuting hostilities against Mahammed bin Ali Ajajee and the Medgedees but previous to their joining him he moved from the ground he then occupied and encamped into the Zowahir Country when the Zowahir tribe tendered their allegiance and allied themselves with

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with him and so likewise the Section of the Zowahirs who were with Seyf bin Ali deserted the latter and went over to Saeed bin Tahnoon. In short Saeed bin Tahnoon and his forces with all the Zowahirs on the 4th May surrounded and attacked Seyf bin Ali in his Fort who had with him very few followers. He fought for one day but receiving no assistance either from Mahamed bin Seyf at Nyajeh or others he resigned his Authority into the hands of Saeed and vacated the Fort. The latter seized all his property as well as horses and Camels and destroyed the Fort. It happened that among the horses were two belonging to Mukhtoum bin Butye in charge with Seyf bin Ali, these he restored to their Master at Debaie. He sent Seyf bin Ali and Ali bin Mahamed to Aboothabee and encamped in the Zowahir Country to await the approach of the Naeem and Seyf bin Humood and proceed with them against the Forts occupied by Mahamed bin Seyf, Abdul Rahman bin Rahab and the Bedydeen.

When this latter saw the preparations making against them with a view to their expulsion from Baynunah and considered their own weak and isolated condition. They were greatly distressed and at a loss how to proceed. They shut themselves up in the Forts with their Horses and Camels and secretly despatched

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despatched letters to the Sheikhs on the Coast, viz. Hamad bin Suggar, Abdullah bin Rashid and Mukhtoum bin Butye urgently soliciting their aid and assistance. For the past four Months the best understanding had existed between the last of these Chiefs and Seyf bin Ali and Mahamed bin Seyf with whom he maintained a constant Correspondence arising out of his overture from Saeed bin Tahnoon, and more amore especially that the latter had gained strength and undertaken an expedition into the Baynunah Country and seized Seyf bin Ali and razed his Fort and had been joined by the Zowahirs and the tribes of Buraim, both Nomade and Sedentary, as also Seyf bin Humood and his dependants, and all had united to prosecute hostilities against the Bedydeen for the purpose of expelling them from Baynunah he was exceedingly annoyed; for Mukhtoum and his supporters know full well that if Saeed bin Tahnoon became powerful and subdues the Baynunah Country and other districts of Buraim, he will assuredly turn those forces against them and if God gives him the victory over them will drive them out of Debaie. He accordingly is using his best exertions to crush the strength of Saeed bin Tahnoon and his allies: He has, I understand, sent a Messenger in a Buggarah to Bojeir with letters for Zyed bin

Turkee

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Sunkeer urging him to despatch troops to reinforce and support Mahammed bin Saif.

Again, formerly between Sultan bin Suggur and Saeed bin Tahnoon a correspondence existed having for its object apparently to instigate hostilities against Mubteen bin Butye, but now reviewing the proceedings of the latter as above mentioned Sheikh Sultan was filled with jealousy and apprehension seeing that Saeed had exercised authority and administered Government only three years and had already acquired such reputation and renown and spread his fame among all the Tribes of Bunaa and that he felt assured if Saeed established himself in the Baymnee Country and the tribes remained subservient to his Authority the greatest injury must accrue to himself. Moreover he thought it good policy to support Mahamed bin Saif for he believed that Zaydul bin Sunkeer would probably shortly send a force into these parts and intervening his influence proceed to retaliation. Sheikh Sultan accordingly holds a meeting with Abdullah bin Mowaydina, the Chief of the Beni Kuttub and the elders of his tribe whom I understand a resolution was come to between them that they should make up matters and ally themselves with Mubteen who had manifested aversion from Seyd bin

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bin Tahnoon and had earnestly desired that some one would aid him in supporting Mahamed bin Saif. He start on the 3rd June Abdullah bin Sultan with some of the Elders of Shargah and Abdullah bin Mowaydina with some of the Elders of the Beni Kuttub proceeded to Debaie and had an interview with Mubteen bin Butye and renewed friendly relations with him. They prosed him to proceed to Shargah to Sultan bin Suggur but he declined and sent with them Majid bin Bukmook who met Sheikh Sultan and it appears an agreement was entered into between them that Sheikh Sultan should assemble his followers and dependants both Nomades and Sedentary and move out to Luzeez as likewise Abdullah bin Rashid and Mubteen bin Butye with their forces on their way to Baymnee that they should first exert themselves to restore peace and good understanding between Saeed bin Tahnoon with their Masters and Mahamed bin Saif but if this were not feasible they should proceed to their aid of the Medgdees. Accordingly on the 5th May Sultan bin Suggur took with him his Son Abdullah and Men of Shargah horsemen and Camel Riders to the number of 70 Men and marched to Luzeez with Abdullah bin Mowaydina and Mubteen also collected his followers to the number of 50 Men and appointed

appointed to command them his Brother Butye bin Butye and Majed bin Dulmook and despatched them to Luzeez in conformity with the agreement between them. On his arrival at Luzeez Sheikh Sultan wrote to Abdullah bin Rashid to join him with his forces as also to the other tribes to the same effect and despatched Messengers with letters from himself to Saeed bin Tahnoon to ascertain his condition and the state of affairs. He wrote to the effect "that the head source of the enmity which "had arisen between him and Mahomed bin Sef "and was anxious to mediate a peace between "them; that he must be aware that Mahomed "bin Suf the Ajajee and those with him in the "Forts were people of Medjed dependants of Bin Saoud "(Sydut) and placed in authority over them and "it was impossible he could desert their cause". Shean that Saeed returned for answer to Sheikh Sultan that "his object in the first instance was "with Suf bin Ali touching the fortifications he "had erected in the Jowasim Country that he had "seized him and destroyed his fort with a view "to check disorder, and with reference to the war "now in progress with the Medjedes that the "Mareem Tribes and people of Brymee as well as "all the people of Buraimi were hostile to the Medjedes and

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"and he was assisting them in their designs; that "now hostilities had broken out between the two "parties Peace could not be brought it about."

When Sheikh Sultan's Messenger returned with this reply and further informed his Master privately that the forces of Saeed bin Tahnoon and the Mareem were very numerous and were prosecuting hostilities with vigour He determined in his own mind to relinquish their March to Bryemee from which he likewise Abdullah bin Rashid and the Bedouin tribes withdrawing his authority with the Ghuflahs, Khawatir, Sunij and others were seriously averse because they feared the Beni Yas and the Mareem tribes. Shean also that Abdullah bin Rashid sent to intimate to Sheikh Sultan that he could not accompany him to Bryemee to support the Medjedees for that many of his Subjects both Bedouins and Citizens professed Lands and Date Groves in the Batinah Districts and that the time of harvest was approaching and should it become known that they had marched to Bryemee Suf bin Hamood would certainly seize and appropriate the products of their lands.

On the 10th of June therefore Sheikh Sultan abandoned the Expedition and returned to Sharjah, and wrote to Saeed bin Tahnoon that he

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he had at first determined to come for the purpose of arranging matters between the parties but when he learned from the tenor of his reply that he did not desire it he had given up his intention; and at the same time I have heard privately, he wrote to Mahomed bin Aly that he had prepared to go to his assistance but could find none of the Chiefs of the coast to support him; encouraging him however to hold out bravely and Please God reinforcements would fortunately arrive from Bedgd.

The latest accounts from Bayonee represent the Bedgdees to be reduced to the greatest extremities. The attacking forces are very numerous and pushed hostilities with vigor. The forts are completely surrounded and there is no chance of the besieged obtaining relief.

True translated Substance
(Signed) A.B. Kemball
Asst. Resident &c.

X

Enclosure No. 2.

Translated Extract from Enclosure (dated 19th Rujub. 27th June) to a letter from Agent at Shargah to Major Hennell, Resident in the Persian Gulf dated 12th Rujub. 14th June 1848

I beg to represent that on the 21st June a Messenger arrived from Bayonee from Humood bin

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bin Sunoor with the intelligence that on the 17th June Saeed bin Tahnoon and the Ghanim tribes together with Aly bin Humood had reduced the fort of Subareh to great extremities. The short news is that Mahomed bin Aly with three men left the fort of Subareh at night and proceeded to the fort of Rhumdah; and in the morning Saeed bin Tahnoon and his party stormed it: they spared the lives of all the people of Bedgd they found therein and captured the fort.

On reaching the fort of Rhumdah Mahomed bin Aly sub Nijaje released Humood bin Sunoor and the latter despatched this Messenger to Ejmaun to announce the glad tidings of his release from confinement and the capture of Subareh with all the property, horses, and Camels it contained, the Bedgdees having taken refuge in Rhumdah where they hold out.

Enclosed is the letter to my address from Sheikh Abdul Azeez bin Rashid Chief of Ejmaun containing this intelligence. I write in haste and will give the details in my next despatch. Both Mushtoom bin Rashid and Sultan bin Saggar are much grieved at the capture of Subareh by the forces under Saeed bin Tahnoon.

True translated Extract
(Signed) A.B. Kemball
Asst. Resident &c.

Transcription of previous document

Office No 227 of 1848
Cons: No 47 of 1848

To

A. Malet Esq.
Chief Secretary to Government
Bombay

Political Department Bushire 17th July 1848

Sir,

Adverting to my despatch to your address No. 43 in this Department, reporting the precarious position in which the Wahabee Agent at Brymee had been placed, in consequence of the defeat of his troops by Shaik Syf bin Humood of Sohar, I have now the honor to enclose for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor in Council the accompanying translations of two letters from the native agent at Shargah dated the 14th and 21st June respectively, reporting the vigorous prosecution of the siege of the fortress of Brymee by Shaik Saeed bin Tahnoon, who has succeeded in capturing the tower called Subareh, and has reduced the Wahabee Agent to extremities in the remaining stronghold of Khunduk.

2. As I conjectured in my former despatch on the subject, Shaik Sultan bin Suggur has changed his intention of marching to the relief of Brymee. I hear however from Bahrain that Ameer Fysul is making a vigorous effort to despatch a strong reinforcement from Nedgd to Oman by land under the hope of reaching in time to force the Shaiks of Aboothabee and Sohar to raise the siege.

3. I am happy to add that up to the 21st June last no cases of irregularities had occurred at sea.

I have etc.

(Signed) S. Hennell
Resident etc.

Enclosure No 1

Translated substance of a letter from Agent at Shargah to Major Hennell, Resident in the Persian Gulf dated 12th Rujub 14th June 1848.

A.C.

I beg to report that on Sheikh Saeed bin Tahnoon and his forces taking up a position near Brymee a party of the Awamir joined him to the number of 200 men. He then sent to the Naeem Syf bin Humood and their allies to invite them to hasten to him for the purpose of prosecuting hostilities against Mahomed bin Syf ul Ujajee and the Nedgdees but previous to their joining him he moved from the ground he then occupied

and marched into the Zowahir country when the Zowahir tribe tendered their allegiance and allied themselves with him and so likewise the section of the Zowahir who were with Syf bin Ali deserted the latter and went over to Saeed bin Tahnoon. In short Saeed bin Tahnoon and his forces with all the Zowahir on the 4th May surrounded and attacked Syf bin Ali in his fort who had with him very few followers. He fought for one day but receiving no assistance either from Mahomed bin Syf ul Ujajee or others he resigned his authority into the hands of Saeed and vacated the fort. The latter seized all his property as well as horses and camels and destroyed the fort. It happened that among the horses were two belonging to Muktoom bin Butye in charge with Syf bin Ali, these he restored to their master at Debaie. He sent Syf bin Ali and Ali bin Mahomed to Aboothabee and encamped in the Zowahir country to await the approach of the Naeem and Syf bin Humood and proceed with them against the forts occupied by Mahomed bin Syf, Abdul Rahman bin Rahib and the Nedgdees.

When the latter saw the preparations making against them with a view to their expulsion from Brymee and considered their own weak and isolated condition, they were greatly distressed and at a loss how to proceed. They shut themselves up in the forts with their horses and camels and secretly despatched letters to the Sheikhs on the coast, viz Sultan bin Suggur, Abdullah bin Rashid and Muktoom bin Butye urgently soliciting their aid and assistance. For the past four months the best understanding had existed between the last of these Chiefs and Syf bin Ali and Mahomed bin Syf with whom he maintained a constant correspondence arising out of his aversion from Saeed bin Tahnoon, and now more especially that the latter had gained strength and undertaken an expedition into the Brymee country and seized Syf bin Ali and rased his fort and had been joined by the Zowahir and the tribes of Oman both nomade and sedentary, as also Syf bin Humood and his dependants, and all had invited to prosecute hostilities against the Nedgdees for the purpose of expelling them from Brymee he was excessively annoyed; for Muktoom and his supporters know full well that if Saeed bin Tahnoon became powerful and subdue the Brymee country and other districts of Oman, he will assuredly turn these forces against them and if God give him the victory over them will drive them out of Debaie. He accordingly is using his best exertions to cripple the strength of Saeed bin Tahnoon and his allies: He has, I understand, sent a messenger in a Buggarah to Gojeir with letters for Fysul bin Turkee urging him to despatch troops to reinforce and support Mahomed bin Syf.

Again, formerly between Sultan bin Suggur and Saeed bin Tahnoon a correspondence existed having for its object apparently to instigate hostilities against Muktoom bin Butye, but now viewing the proceedings of the latter as above mentioned Sheikh Sultan was filled with jealousy and apprehension seeing that Saeed had exercised authority and administered Government only three years and had already acquired such reputation and renown and spread his fame among all the tribes of Oman and that he felt assured if Saeed established himself in the Brymee country and the tribes remained subservient to his authority the greatest injury must accrue to himself. Moreover he thought it good policy to support Mahomed bin Syf for he believed that Fysul bin Turkee would probably shortly send a force into these parts and recovering his influence proceed to retaliation. Sheikh Sultan accordingly held a meeting with Abdullah bin Howeydin, the Chief of the Beni Kuttub and the elders of his tribe when I understand a resolution was come to between them that they should make up matters and ally themselves with Muktoom who had manifested aversion from Syed bin Tahnoon and had earnestly desired that some one would aid him in supporting Mahomed bin Syf. In short on the 3rd June Abdullah bin Sultan with some of the elders of Shargah and Abdullah bin Howeydin with some of the elders of the Beni Kuttub proceeded to Debaie and had an interview with Muktoom bin Butye and renewed friendly relations with him. They pressed him to proceed to Shargah to Sultan bin Suggur but he declined and sent with them Majid bin Dulmook who met Sheikh Sultan and it appears an agreement was entered into between them that Sheikh Sultan should assemble his followers and dependants both nomade and sedentary and move out to Suzeez as likewise Abdullah bin Rashid and Muktoom bin Butye with their forces on their way to Brymee, that they should first exert themselves to restore peace and good understanding between Saeed bin Tahnoon with the Naeem and Mahomed bin Syf but if this were not feasible they should proceed to the aid of the Nedgdees. Accordingly on the 5th May Sultan bin Suggur took with him his son Abdullah and men of Shargah horsemen and camel riders to the number of 70 men and marched to Suzeez with Abdullah bin Howeydin and Muktoom also collected his followers to the number of 50 men and appointed to command them his

brother Butye bin Butye and Majid bin Dulmook and despatched them to Suzeez in conformity with the agreement between them. On his arrival at Suzeez Sheikh Sultan wrote to Abdullah bin Rashid to join him with his forces as also to the other tribes to the same effect and despatched messengers with letters from himself to Saeed bin Tahnoon to ascertain his condition and the state of affairs. He wrote to the effect "that he had heard of the enmity which had arisen between him and Mahomed bin Syf and was anxious to mediate a peace between them; that he must be aware that Mahomed bin Syf Ul Ujajee and those with him in the forts were people of Nedgd dependants of Bin Saood (Fysul) and placed in authority over them and it was impossible he could desert their cause." I hear that Saeed returned for answer to Sheikh Sultan that "his object in the first instance was with Syf bin Ali touching the fortifications he had erected in the Zowahir country that he had seized him and destroyed his fort with a view to check disorder, and with reference to the war now in progress with the Nedgdees that the Naeem tribes and people of Brymee as well as all the people of Oman were hostile to the Nedgdees and he was assisting them in their designs; that now hostilities had broken out between the two parties peace could not be brought about."

When Sheikh Sultan's messenger returned with this reply and further informed his master privately that the forces of Saeed bin Tahnoon and the Naeem were very numerous and were prosecuting hostilities with vigor he determined in his own mind to relinquish the march to Brymee from which likewise Abdullah bin Rashid and the Bedouin tribes acknowledging his authority viz the Ghuflah, Khuwatir, Huij and others were seriously averse because they feared the Beni Yas and the Naeem tribes. I hear also that Abdullah bin Rashid sent to intimate to Sheikh Sultan that he could not accompany him to Brymee to support the Nedgdees for that many of his subjects both Bedouins and citizens possessed lands and date groves in the Batinah districts and that the time of harvest was approaching and should it become known that they had marched to Brymee Syf bin Humood would certainly seize and appropriate the products of their lands.

On the 10th of June therefore Sheikh Sultan abandoned the expedition and returned to Shargah; and wrote to Saeed bin Tahnoon that he had at first determined to come for the purpose of arranging matters between the parties but when he learned from the tenor of his reply that he did not desire it he had given up his intention; and at the same time I have heard privately, he wrote to Mahomed bin Syf that he had prepared to go to his assistance but could find none of the chiefs of the

coast to support him; encouraging him however to hold out bravely and Please God reinforcements would presently arrive from Nedgd.

The latest accounts from Brymee report the Nedgdees to be reduced to the greatest extremities. The attacking forces are very numerous and pushed hostilities with vigor. The forts are completely surrounded and there is no chance of the beseiged obtaining relief.

True translated substance
(Signed) A. B. Kemball
Assist Resident etc.

Enclosure No 2.

Translated extract from enclosure (dated 19th Rujub, 21st June) to a letter from Agent at Shargah to Major Hennell, Resident in the Persian Gulf dated 12th Rujub 14th June 1848

I beg to report that on the 21st June a messenger arrived from Brymee from Humood bin Suroor with the intelligence that on the 17th idem Saeed bin Tahnoon and the Naeem tribe together with Syf bin Humood had reduced the fort of Suhareh to great extremities. In short the news is that Mahomed bin Syf with three men left the fort of Subarah at night and proceeded to the fort of Khunduk; and in the morning Saeed bin Tahnoon and his party stormed it. They spared the lives of all the people of Nedgd they found therein and captured the fort.

On reaching the fort of Khunduk Mahomed bin Syf ul Ujajee released Humood bin Suroor and the latter despatched this messenger to Ejmaun to announce the glad tidings of his release from confinement and the capture of Subareh with all the property, horses, and camels it contained, the Nedgdees having taken refuge in Khunduk where they hold out.

Enclosed is the letter to my address from Sheikh Abdul Azeez bin Rashid Chief of Ejmaun containing this intelligence. I write in haste and will give the details in my next report. Both Muktoom bin Butye and Sultan bin Suggur are much grieved at the capture of Subareh by the forces under Saeed bin Tahnoon.

True translated extract
(Signed) A. B. Kemball
Ass. Resident etc.

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Office No. 254 of 1848
Comd: No. 55 of 1848

To
Chas Malet Esqre
Chief Secretary to Government
Bombay

Political Department Bushire 1st August 1848

Sir,

Adverting to my despatches to your address No. 47 in this Department under date the 17th Ultimo on the subject of the Seige of Bayaneh by the Confederate Chiefs of Sohar and Aboothabee, I have now the honor to transmit for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor in Council, the accompanying translated Substance of a letter from Sheikh Hoosein the Native Agent at Shargah dated the 25th Ultimo, imparting the surrender of the Shargah Garrison to the 20th of that month to the combined Tribes under Sheikh Syf bin Hamood and Sheikh Saeed bin Tahnoon. The only terms granted to the Ujajee and his Nedgdee followers, were permission to proceed to the Sea Coast with their Arms. All the remainder of their property consisting of valuable Horses, Camels &c. fell into the hands of the Victors.

2. By recent intelligence from Bahrein

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Name that the wards of the entrenchments newly forwarded from Medyden had been fortified with the Semmaltime of the Summer. The news of the fall of Bayneen and the retreat of the Medydens from Buraimy may probably put an end altogether to the disposal of the Force in question.

I have &c.
(Signed) J. Brunell
Resident &c.

Enclosure No. 1.

Translated Substance of a Letter from the Agent at Shargah to Major Brunell, Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated 23rd Rejub - 25th June 1818.

N.B. Before communicated to you all that had occurred between Mahammed bin Ayff the Wajee; the defeat of Zyed bin Nasser, on his own side; and Ayff bin Hamood of Sohar with Saeed bin Sultan on the other; that Mahammed bin Ayff on the completion of his relations with Shaem, and their conditions for the prosecution of hostilities against him and the Medydens proceeded with him into the Fort and districts of Bayneen, had divided his force locating one half with himself in the Fort of Shubaneh and the others half with Abdul Rahaman at Hatib in the Fort of Khundeh, where he had confined Hamood bin Nasser; and that this combined tribes had besieged the

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the Fort and commenced the siege: I beg now to report that Mahammed bin Ayff had secured his Horses to the number of forty, and the Camels twenty, as well as all his Mare Camels in a Stables adjoining the Fort, having with them in the Fort abundance of provisions and ammunition to support the garisons for eight Months, there being likewise wells of water in the Fort: The enemy in which the sons of Hamood bin Nasser with their Slaves, and a number of their Bayneen people, Followers of their faction, on the night of the 14th Rejub (16th June) advance in mine up to the lower in situated in front of the Gate of the Fort commanding the Stables and Charging it with powder fired it and threw down the tower when they succeeded in capturing some of the horses and Camels.

The Gate of the Fort was now exposed to view and Saeed bin Sultan was directing upon it the Guns he had brought with him from Abootabee opened their fire. In short when Mahammed bin Ayff and his followers observed this manoeuvre and that the forces of the enemy were increasing, they were seized with excessive fear and he himself with three of his Mares at night fall on the 17th June without the knowledge of any and clandestinely lowered themselves down from the Fort by means of a rope and took refuge with Abdul Rahaman

at

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of Khatib in the fort of Khuneduk. In the morning the Hadgdees garrison of Dubanah missing Mahomed bin Sayf and ascertaining that he had fled to the fort of Khuneduk sent to the Chiefs of the Beanu Saeed bin Tahnoon and Sayf bin Hamood to beg that their lives arms and property might be spared and they would vacate the Fort. Their demand being acceded to they quitted the Fort which was immediately occupied and all it contained of Horses and Camels appropriated by the besiegers who lodged in it a garrison of 50 Men.

When Mahomed bin Sayf reached the Fort of Khuneduk, he released Hamood bin Imoor from confinement and sent him to Saeed bin Tahnoon to ask for quarter for himself and the Hadgdees with him and to be allowed to retain the Horses and Camels and that they would surrender the Fort. On Hamood bin Imoors delivering this Message the Chiefs of the Besieging Forces replied that they would leave them only their arms. On which Mahomed bin Sayf sent Ujajan & and Abdul Rahman sub Khatib with the Hadgdees evacuated the Fort of Khuneduk on the 20th. Inst. when Saeed bin Tahnoon and the Confederate Chiefs took Possession with all it contained the Horses being forty in number. It is reported that Saeed bin Tahnoon selected 8 of the best for himself and distributed

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distributed the remainder among Sayf bin Hamood and the heads of the Beaconi and of the Bedouins. It is understood that Mahomed bin Sayf and his followers are now on their way to Shargah where Sheikh Sultan is to prepare a vessel to convey them over to Bahrein.

After the capture of the Forts of Buraimi by the Confederate Tribes, Sheikh Saeed bin Tahnoon & Chiefs joined all the Guns they found there to the Caravan of the Yaarubis and Sayf bin Hamood & garrisoned them with 1100 of their followers under. Taking all the expences of pay and provisions. I hear that Saeed bin Tahnoon now contemplates a visit to Sohar in company with Sayf bin Hamood but Sheikh Mubarak bin Hamood bin Butaji strongly suspects that he is coming in their directions to attack him. For the last few days accordingly he has not slept nights or day but has been engaged in putting his defences in order and preparing his Guns and Ammunition. He has no confidence in Bin Tahnoon. With regard to his relations with Sheikh Sultan bin Suggur - Outwardly a constant intercourse is kept up between them but Inwardly God knows for a correspondence is also going on between Sheikh Sultan and Sheikh Saeed - I cannot distinguish this false from the true men; as the Chiefs of these

parts

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[illegible] endeavouring each to deceive his neighbour, but are all well acquainted with their dispositions and circumstances.

Affairs are perfectly tranquil at Sea. The people are abroad engaged in diving or on their several vocations, and up to the present time no piracy or irregularity whatever has been committed.

Seven translated Sabstances

(Signed) S. B. Kennball

Offg. Resident &c.

X

Transcription of previous document

Office No 254 of 1848
Cons: No 55 of 1848

To
A. Malet Esq.
Chief Secretary to Government
Bombay

Political Department Bushire 1st August 1848

Sir,

Adverting to my despatch to your address, No 47 in this department under date the 17th ultimo on the subject of the Seige of Brymee by the Confederate Chiefs of Sohar and Aboothabee, I have now the honor to transmit for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor in Council, the accompanying translated substance of a letter from Moollah Houssin the native agent at Shargah dated the 25th June, reporting the surrender of the stronghold above referred to on the 20th of that month to the coalesced tribes under Shaikh Syf bin Humood and Shaik Saeed bin Tahnoon. The only terms granted to Ul Ujajee and his Nedgdee followers, were permission to proceed to the sea coast with their army. All the remainder of their property consisting of valuable horses, camels etc fell into the hands of the victors.

2. By recent intelligence from Bahrein I learn that the march of the contemplated reinforcements from Nedgd has been postponed until the termination of the Summer. The news of the fall of Brymee and the expulsion of the Nedgdees from Oman may probably put an end altogether to the disposal of the force in question.

I have etc.
(Signed) S. Hennell
Resident etc.

Enclosure No 2
Translated substance of a letter from the Agent at Shargah to Major Hennell, Resident in the Persian Gulf dated 23rd Rujub, 25th June 1848.
A.C.

I before communicated to you all that had occurred between Mahomed bin Syf Ul Ujajee, the deputy of Fysul bin Turkee, on the one side, and Syf bin Humood of Sohar with Saeed bin Tahnoon on the other; that Mahomed bin Syf on the rupture of his relations with them, and their coalition for the prosecution of hostilities against him and the Nedgdees present with him in the forts and districts of Brymee, had divided his forces locating one half with himself in the fort

of Subareh and the other half with Abdul Rahman ul Katib in the fort of Khundek, where he had confined Humood bin Suroor, and that the coalesced tribes had beleagurred the fort and commenced the siege. 'I beg now to report that Mahomed bin Syf had secured his horses to the number of forty, and the camels twenty, as well as all his male camels in a stable adjoining the fort, having with him in the fort abundance of provisions and ammunition to support the garrison for eight months, there being likewise wells of water in the fort. The story is that the sons of Humud bin Suroor with their slaves, and a number of the Brymee people, followers of their father, on the night of the 14th Rujub (16th June) drove a mine up to the tower situated in front of the gate of the fort commanding the stable and charging it with powder fired it and threw down the tower when they succeeded in capturing some of the horses and camels.

The gate of the fort was now exposed to view and Saeed bin Tahnoon directing upon it the guns he had brought with him from Aboothabee opened their fire. In short when Mahomed bin Syf and his followers observed this manoeuvre and that the forces of the enemy were increasing, they were seized with excessive fear and he himself with three of his men at nightfall on the 17th June without the knowledge of any one clandestinely lowered themselves down from the fort by means of a rope and took refuge with Abdul Rahman ul Katib in the fort of Khunduk. In the morning the Nedgdee garrison of Subarak, missing Mahomed bin Syf and ascertaining that he had fled to the fort of Khunduk sent to the chiefs of the Naeem Saeed bin Tahnoon and Syf bin Humood to beg that their lives, arms and property might be spared and they would vacate the fort. Their demand being acceded to they quitted the fort which was immediately occupied and all it contained of horses and camels appropriated by the besiegers who lodged in it a garrison of 50 men.

When Mahomed bin Syf reached the fort of Khunduk, he released Humud bin Suroor from confinement and sent him to Saeed bin Tahnoon to ask for quarter for himself and the Nedgdees with him and to be allowed to retain the horses and camels and that they would surrender the fort. On Humud bin Suroor's delivering this message the chiefs of the besieging forces replied that they would leave them only their arms. In short Mahomed bin Syf Ul Ujajee and Abdul Rahman ul Katib with the Nedgdees vacated the fort of Khunduk on the 20th June when Saeed bin Tahnoon and the coalesced chiefs took possession with all it

contained the horses being forty in number. It is reported that Saeed bin Tahnoon selected 8 of the best for himself and distributed the remainder among Syf bin Humood and the heads of the Naeem and of the Bedouins. I understand that Mahomed bin Syf and his followers are now on their way to Shargah where Sheikh Sultan is to prepare a vessel to carry them over to Bahrein.

After the capture of the forts of Brymee by the coalesced tribes, Sheikh Saeed bin Tahnoon transferred all the guns he found there to the country of the Zowahir and Syf bin Humood garrisoned them with 100 of his followers undertaking all the expenses of pay and provisions. I hear that Saeed bin Tahnoon now contemplates a visit to Sohar in company with Syf bin Humood but Sheikh Muktoom bin Butye strongly suspects that he is bound in this direction to attack him. For the last ten days accordingly he has not slept night or day but has been engaged in putting his defences in order and preparing his guns and ammunition. He has no confidence in Bin Tahnoon. With regard to his relations with Sheikh Sultan bin Suggur, outwardly a constant intercourse is kept up between them but inwardly God knows for a correspondence is also going on between Sheikh Sultan and Sheikh Saeed. I cannot distinguish the false from the true men; as the chiefs of these parts are all endeavouring each to deceive his neighbour; but you are well acquainted with their dispositions and circumstances.

Affairs are perfectly tranquil at sea. The people are abroad engaged in diving or on their several vocations, and up to the present time no piracy or irregularity whatever has been committed.

True translated substance

(Signed) A. B. Kemball

Assist Resident etc.

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Office No. 266 of 1848
Cons: No. 60 of 1848

To
A. Malet Esq.re
Chief Secretary to Government
Bombay

Bushire 25th August 1848

Department
Sir,

Herewith I have the honour to forward for the information of His Right Honorable the Governor in Council, this accompanying translation of a Letter from Mookhtar Mansoor the Native Agent at Shargah dated the 12th Ultimo reporting the effect produced on the minds of the Maritime Chiefs of Oman when intelligence reached them of the surrender of the Fortress of Bayneeah to the united Forces of the Shaikhs of Abothabee and Debaye.

2. The success of the late Chiefs above referred to has been received by Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur that Head of the Joasmee Tribe, and Shaikh Mookhtoom Chief of Debaye, with much grief and alarm. The former is apprehensive of new attacks upon his possessions of Ruffha and Khan Sultan on the Pelsian Coast, while the latter has good grounds for believing, that Shaikh Saeed bin Tahnoon will now turn his arms against Debaye. In fact he has already began to display his enmity by carrying

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off 100 Camels belonging to that place under the pretence of their fears, Shaikh Sultan and Shaikh Mookhtoom have apparently entered into a very close and intimate alliance. A proposal was made to the Shaikhs of Amulgavine and Ejmaun to join this confederacy but it was declined by both.

3. Since the above was written, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur has been greatly perplexed how to act in consequence of the Beniyas Chief having sent to remind him of their former mutual engagements for the siege of Debaye and Amulgavine and demanding as a proof of his sincere adherence to them that he should prohibit all intercourse between his Subjects and those of Shaikh Mookhtoom. Dreading an attack upon his possessions while nearly all his people are employed on the Pearl Banks, and their families scattered among the Date Groves inland, he has, with Shaikh Mookhtoom's knowledge and consent, temporized with the Beniyas Chief by assuring him that he has no intentions to swerve from his former Compact and that agreeably to his wish, he has forbidden any communications to be carried on between Shargah and Debaye.

4. If I be assured under present circumstances Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur will never cordially coalesce with Shaikh Saeed bin Tahnoon in the siege of Debaye. The latter has become sufficiently powerful

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[illegible] instructions of their Sheiug Abdul of Bayneen and were he by the capture of their Seamen Town in his establishment principally in the immediate vicinity of Sheikh Sultans principal seat of Shargah he would soon be able to assist his Ally with forces and assistance of his Seamen & be a serious check.

5. From Abdulla Mansfield reports it would appear that although the capitulation of Bayneen and that expulsion of the Hedgdees from Ouman cannot but afford satisfaction to Syed Saeed yet the Conversion of Muscat, His Highness feels by no means elated with the great accession of gain to his own finances which has accrued to Sheikh Sultan from their successes. I have no doubt the feelings of dislike and enmity entertained by His Highness are fully reciprocated by the Chief of Sohar and it will by no means surprise me if before long their sentiments break out into open ruptures.

6. In respecting this completion of Arbuthnot among the Arabian Chiefs inclosed I give me pleasure to be able to state that up to the latest date received from the East accounts of a favourable character have taken place at Sohar. On the Persian Coast the Sheikh of Shenaah had surprised Kenaderie by a band of 300 Abbassees and burnt three Baglas and carried off three Boats but this proceeding does not come within the category of piracies.

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piracies & offences.

I have &c.
(Signed) J. Bennett
Resident &c.

Enclosure No. 1.

Translated Substance of a letter from the Agent at Shargah to Major Bennett, Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated Mocha Shaban 12th July 1845.

Beg to report first with reference to the affairs of Sheikh Sultan bin Saggar. Although he was apprized of the expedition of Seamen, ammunition and assistance of Saeed bin Sultan to Muscat by his Steamers and that Steamer in Oman that both Europeans and Citizens had submitted to them and that they had expelled the Hedgdees from Bayneen and occupied the Port; He was exceedingly grieved for on the first instance he could not believe that they would acquire such great fame and consideration and He suspected and feared greatly that by this Steamer and Khalasi his by sought every means this progression of fame of his dominions such as Sohar Soccatra and Dibba. He therefore wrote to Muktoom bin Buzge to send Mujid bin Rahmah to him to renew friendly establishment and enter into an offensive and defensive alliance. It strikes me that Muktoom and his tribe are anxious for an alliance with Sheikh Sultan for they equally lament the late event

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[illegible] feeling assured that the Confederate Chiefs are [illegible] their affairs at Buraimee will there their forces [illegible]. Meshlooee accordingly sent Majid to [illegible] Shargah on the 28th Rajab (30th June) who met Sheikh Sultan and concluded an alliance. It understood that it was agreed between them that in the event of the Confederate [illegible] with their forces marching against Dobaie Sheikh Sultan should detach a force to cut off Khyma as in anticipation of the arrival of Mahomed bin Sayd his party at Shargah for he felt that if they joined their forces would be necessitated to discharge all their expences and support them with all necessaries as well as respect to convey them to the Port of Bajeira but by his Mahomed and his party to the number of about 150 men arrived at Shargah on the 1st July, Sultan being still there. He assigned them dwellings and a dwelling but Sayd Abdullah bin Sultan to minister to their wants set off himself secretly on the night of the 2nd July for Ras-ul-Khyma. Abdullah fulfilled his pilgrimage to Mecca and on the 8th Shaban having prepared and provisioned a Baglah belonging to Sheikh Sultan embarked them and their property and forwarded them on their way to Bajeira via Bahrein. Mahomed bin Sayd was suffering from severe illness. Of his followers only sixty accompanied him, the remainder

distributing

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distributing themselves on the Coast to the success of the Confederate Chiefs before Buraimee and the expulsion of the Wadydees Sheikh Saeed bin Tahnoon and the Elders of the Maseem Tribes for joined to raise their forts altogether but to this Sayd bin Hamood would not agree and taking upon himself all the expence of their maintenance garrisoned them with the consent of all parties with 50 of his Men of the tribes of Beni Qutaib whom he furnished with provisions - Afterwards Sayd bin Hamood selected with the remainder of his troops for Sohar. Sayd bin Tahnoon took Guns of the Guns belonging to Buraimee and placed them on the Fort of Hilaimee from which he lately ejected Sayd bin Hamood where he is now encamped with his Bedouin Troops engaged in its restoration. He appears but with remains with his Troops at Buraimee during the Summer. He has discharged his Maseem tribes who have proceeded to their homes continuing however subject to his Authority. So likewise the Heads of the Bedouin tribes - the Beni Sultah - Beni Naab - Shifleh - Dhawahir - Duwaneir came to Saeed bin Tahnoon and tendered their allegiance. He directed them to still in their respective Wards of Buraimee under his Authority. Saeed bin Tahnoon about this time ascertaining that the people of Nebaie had 100 of their best riding Camels in the Ras-ul-Khyma district secretly dispatched a mounted party of 20 Men from different tribes to capture them

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[illegible] falling upon them on the 8th Shaban when [illegible] nothing carried them off and conveyed them to Buraimi. Sheikh Mubarak on hearing of this intended foray sent off a party of 80 men mounted on Camels under Hamed bin Aslam and his Brothers Burjes bin Burjes on the same day to intercept the plunderers on their road to Buraimi, who however succeeded in reaching Buraimi. Hamed became partial to Sheikh Mubarak and his tribe that Saeed would use every endeavour to inflict upon them loss and injury and they immediately associated themselves with in fearing their forts and in preparing for hostilities. Mahfooz Sheikh Sultan and Backer to their engagements before mentioned and offered them assistance. A correspondence is carrying on between Sheikh Sultan and Sheikh Saeed but this day commenced a more decisive thing to end with them all, and each hoping to accomplish this end has his views. But the 6th Shaban Saeed despatched from Ruyyan a special Qasid to Ras-ul-Khyma with a letter to Sheikh Sultan to the effect I understand that if you desire the continuance of their alliance on its present footing you must abandon commence hostilities against the people of Debaie and forbid and cut off their intercourse with his territories and deputed his son Shaheen bin Sultan to him that he may more minutely acquainted with the state of their relations. Sheikh Sultan on receiving this

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this Communication was greatly perplexed and knew not what reply to give considering that at this present day the power of Saeed was paramount on land, all the tribes of Oman both Nomade and Sedentary being under his authority and fearing that if he confirmed his engagements with Mubarak and on hostilities breaking out between the latter and Saeed bin Tahnoon afforded him aid Saeed would declare hostilities against Debaie and them against himself and his tribe being extensive and distributed on the inland districts the Bedouin tribes are the first and foremost plunder would obtain the sanction of Saeed to forage his territories and plunder his dependants. He accordingly resolved to return an evasive answer in terms of acquiescence to this effect that their engagements remained unaltered and that he had prohibited all commerce and intercourse between his territories and Debaie. Sheikh sent his answer to Sheikh Saeed with a view to induce him to remain quiet and abstain from hostilities as well as withhold the Bedouins from plundering and injuring his professions until the return of his people now absent on the Pearl Banks and on their voyages as well as those distributed in the interior. On the 8th Shaban Sheikh Sultan sent one of his followers Soleyman bin Shahin to Amulgaima to Abdullah bin Rashid to confer with him touching his relations with Mubarak and the enmity of Sheikh Saeed

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And. Shaw that Sheikh Abdullah informed Soleyman that he had not the power to oppose the Confederates Ships. Third, Because on capturing the Forts of Beyunce they had secured the sympathies of all the tribes, and Lastly, That many of the people of Amulgavine and their relatives being distributed in the Batinah districts he was not quarrel with them for if they should show any enmity on his part they of their Hummood would assuredly oppose his dependants in the Batinah Country. Soleyman on receiving this answer returned to Shargah on the 9th Shaban and the same night secretly took his departure for Debaie without the knowledge of the inhabitants apprehensive lest it should reach the ears of Sheikh Saeed. Consulting Sheikh Muktoom and his Elders he informed them that at Lenah Sheikh Sultan desired the closest Alliance and friendship with them but that he begged them for the present to forbid their tribe from continuing their intercourse with Shargah and he himself instead proclaiming publicly in Shargah that no one should communicate with Debaie, in order that the rumour might spread abroad in the Country that Sheikh Sultan had caused the suspension of all commerce and intercourse on the part of his dependants with Debaie. That they must not allow these circumstances to disturb their minds. Sheikh Muktoom and his Elders replied that they would not oppose the views of Sheikh Sultan.

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Shaig to report with reference to Syed Shahtan bin Sy.d who on the occasion of the late hostilities with the Wahabees proceeded to Muscat to solicit aid and subsidy from His Highness Syed Saeed on behalf of Saeed bin Tahnoon and Sy.d bin Hummood. I understand that on Shahtans arrival at Muscat and on his disclosing the objects of his Mission, His Highness Syed Saeed refused that he was prepared to furnish subsidy and stores but Shaw that at present His Highness contemplates with displeasure the encroachments of the influence of Syed Hummood in Oman and that he told Shahtan to proceed to Oman and if he should gain an opportunity endeavour to frustrate their designs. Shahtan however on reaching Soheer learnt that the Hedgehogs had been expelled from the Fort which had been occupied by the Confederate Chiefs and he therefore returned to Beyunce but did not acquaint the latter with the confidential Communications made to him by His Highness. He informed them only of His Highness readiness to comply with their requisitions for provisions &c. At the present date Shahtan is at Beyunce with Saeed bin Tahnoon. I have heard that he had solicited that Chief to proceed with all his forces and encamp at Sohar where he and Sy.d bin Hummood would then move out with their troops and followers against the territories of Sheikh Sultan viz. Shinas Soweyne and Nibba, and that Saeed bin Tahnoon has promised

to

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
but he desires to see how his negotiations with Sheikh
Mana will issue on the subject of hostilities with Debaie.
True translated substance
Signed J. B. Kemball
Asst. Resident &c

Transcription of previous document

Office No 266 of 1848
Cons: No 60 of 1848

To
A. Malet Esq.
Chief Secretary to Government
Bombay

Political Department Bushire 25th August 1848

Sir,

Herewith I have the honor to forward for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor in Council, the accompanying translated substance of a letter from Moolah Houssin the native agent at Shargah dated the 12th ultimo reporting the effect produced on the minds of the Maritime Chiefs of Oman when intelligence reached them of the surrender of the fortress of Brymee to the united forces of the Shaikhs of Aboothabee and Sohar.

2. The success of the two chiefs above referred to has been viewed by Shaik Sultan bin Suggur the Head of the Joasmee tribe, and Shaik Mukhtoom Chief of Debaie, with mingled disgust and alarm. The former is apprehensive of an attack upon his possessions of Dubba and Khor Fukan on the Batinah coast, while the latter has good grounds for believing that Shaikh Saeed bin Tahnoon will now turn his arms against Debaye. In fact he has already begun to display his enmity by carrying off 100 camels belonging to that place under the presence of their fears, Shaik Sultan and Shaik Muktoom have apparently entered into a very close and intimate alliance. A proposal was made to the Shaikhs of Amulgavine and Ejman to join this confederacy but it was declined by both.

3. In the meanwhile, Shaik Sultan bin Suggur has been greatly perplexed how to act in consequence of the Beniyas chief having sent to remind him of their former mutual engagements for the siege of Debaye and Amulgavine and demanding as a proof of his sincere adherence to them that he should prohibit all intercourse between his subjects and those of Shaik Muktoom. Dreading an attack upon his possessions while nearly all his people are employed on the pearl banks, and their families scattered among the date groves inland, he has, with Shaik Muktoom's knowledge and consent, temporized with the Beniyas Chief by assuring him that he has no intention to swerve from his former compact and that agreeably to his wish, he has forbidden any communication to be carried on between Shargah and Debaye.

4. I feel assured under present circumstances Shaik Sultan bin Suggur will never cordially coalesce with Shaik Saeed bin Tahnoon in the seige of Debaye. The latter has become sufficiently powerful by his reduction of the strong hold of Brymee and were he by the capture of the Joasmee town to establish himself in the immediate vicinity of Shaik Sultan's principal port of Shargah he would soon be able to cripple the force and influence of the Joasmee tribe to a serious extent.

5. From Moollah Houssin's report it would appear that although the capture of Brymee and the expulsion of the Nedgdees from Oman cannot but afford satisfaction to Syed Soweynee the Governor of Muscat, His Highness is by no means equally pleased with the great accession of gain to his own power which has accrued to Shaik Syf bin Humood from their success. I have no doubt the feelings of dislike and enmity entertained by His Highness are fully reciprocated by the Chief of Sohar and it will by no means surpise me if before long their sentiments break out into an open rupture.

6. In reporting this compl(ication) of interests among the Arabian Chiefs inland it gives me pleasure to be able to state that up to the latest dates received from the coast no acts of a piratical character have taken place at sea. On the Persian Coast the Shaik of Charrack has surprised Housseme by a land expedition and burnt three buglas and carried off three boats but this proceeding does not come within the category of piratical offences.

I have etc.

(Signed) S. Hennell
Resident etc.

Enclosure No 1

Translated substance of a letter from the Agent at Shargah to Major Hennell, Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated 10th Shaban, 12th July 1848.

I beg to report first with reference to the affairs of Sheikh Sultan bin Suggur. When he was apprized of the extension of power, reputation and influence of Saeed bin Tahnoon, Syf bin Humood and the Naeem in Oman that both Bedouins and citizens had submitted to them and that they had expelled the Nedgdees from Brymee and occupied the forts, he

was excessively grieved for in the first instance he could not believe that they would acquire such great fame and consideration and he suspected and feared greatly that Syf bin Humood and Kahtan bin Syf might envy him the possession of some of his territories such as Khore Facawn and Dibba. He therefore wrote to Muktoom bin Butye to send Majid bin Dulmuk to him to renew friendly relations and enter into an offensive and defensive alliance. It strikes me that Muktoom and his tribe are anxious for an alliance with Sheikh Sultan for they equally lament the late events feeling assured that the Confederate Chiefs on concluding their affairs at Brymee will turn their forces against them. Muktoom accordingly sent Majid to Shargah on the 28th Rujub (30th June) who met Sheikh Sultan and concluded an alliance. I understand that it was agreed between them that in the event of the Confederate Chiefs with their forces marching against Debaie Sheikh Sultan should support the latter. After this Sheikh Sultan proposed to proceed to Rasul Khyma in anticipation of the arrival of Mahomed bin Syf and his party at Shargah for he felt that if they found him there he would be necessitated to discharge all their expenses and supply them with all necessaries as well as a vessel to convey them to the Port of Gojeir but Syf bin Mahomed and his party to the number of about 150 men arrived at Shargah on the 1st July, Sultan being still there. He assigned them dwellings and directing his son Abdullah bin Sultan to minister to their wants set off himself secretly on the night of the 2nd July for Rasul Khyma. Abdullah fulfilled his father's behests and on the 8th Shaban, having prepared and provisioned a buteel belonging to Sheikh Sultan embarked them and their property and forwarded them on their way to Gojeir via Bahrein. Mahomed bin Syf was suffering from severe illness. Of his followers only sixty accompanied him, the remainder distributing themselves in the towns on the coast. On the success of the Confederate Chiefs before Brymee and the expulsion of the Nedgdees Sheikh Saeed bin Tahnoon and the Elders of the Naeem tribes proposed to rase the forts altogether but to this Syf bin Humood would not agree and taking upon himself all the expense of their maintenance garrisoned them with the consent of all parties with 50 of his men of the tribe of Beni Unir whom he furnished with provisions. Afterwards Syf bin Humood set out with the remainder of his troops for Sohar. Saeed bin Tahnoon took four of the guns belonging to Brymee and placed them in the fort of Khirrees (from which he lately ejected Syf bin Ali Zowahiree) where he is now encamped with his Beniyas troops engaged in its restoration. It appears he will remain with his troops at Brymee during the summer. He has

discharged his Naeem allies who have proceeded to their homes continuing however subject to his authority - so likewise the Heads of the Bedouin tribes, the Beni Kuttub, Beni Kaab, Ghiflah, Khowalir, Suwarnir came to Saeed bin Tahnoon and tendered their allegiance. He directed them to settle in the neighbourhood of Brymee under his authority. Saeed bin Tahnoon about this time ascertaining that the people of Debaie had 100 of their best riding camels in the Rasul Khyma district despatched a mounted party of 20 men from different tribes to capture them who falling upon them on the 2nd Shaban when watering carried them off and conveyed them to Brymee. Sheikh Muktoom on hearing of the intended foray sent off a party of 80 men mounted on camels under Manek bin Aslan and his brother Butye bin Butye on the same day to intercept the plunderers on the road to Brymee who however succeeded in evading them. It now became patent to Sheikh Muktoom and his tribe that Saeed would use every endeavour to inflict upon them loss and injury and they immediately occupied themselves with repairing their forts and in preparing for hostilities. It appears Sheikh Sultan will act up to his engagements before mentioned and afford them assistance. A correspondence is carrying on between Sheikh Sultan and Sheikh Saeed but this I am convinced is mere deceit the one trying to outwit the other, and each hoping to accomplish the end he has in view. On the 6th Shaban Saeed despatched from Brymee a special cossid to Rasul Khyma with a letter to Sheikh Sultan to the effect I understand, that if he desired the continuance of their alliance on its present footing he must at once commence hostilities against the people of Debaie and prohibit and cut off their intercourse with his territories and depute his son, Ibraheem bin Sultan to him that he may make himself acquainted with the state of their relations. Sheikh Sultan on receiving this communication was greatly perplexed and knew not what reply to give considering that at the present day the power of Saeed was paramount on land, all the tribes of Oman both Nomade and sedentary being under his authority and fearing that if he confirmed his engagements with Muktoom and on hostilities breaking out between the latter and Saeed bin Tahnoon afforded him aid Saeed would relinquish hostilities against Debaie and turn against himself and his tribe being extensive and distributed in the inland districts the Bedouin tribes on the look out for plunder would obtain the sanction of Saeed to foray his territories and plunder his dependants. He accordingly resolved to return an evasive answer in terms of acquiesence to the effect that their engagements remained unaltered and that he had prohibited all commerce and intercourse between his territories and Debaie. Such was his answer to Sheikh Saeed with a view to induce him to remain quiet and abstain from hostilities as well as withhold the Bedouins from

plundering and injuring his possessions until the return of his people now absent on the Pearl Banks and on their voyages as well as those distributed in the interior. On the 8th Shaban Sheikh Sultan sent one of his followers Soleyman bin Shahir to Amulgavine to Abdullah bin Rashid to confer with him touching his relations with Muktoom and the enmity of Sheikh Saeed. I hear that Sheikh Abdullah informed Soleyman that he had not the power to oppose the Confederate Chiefs, first, because on capturing the forts of Brymee they had secured the sympathies of all the tribes, and secondly, that many of the people of Amulgavine and their relatives being distributed in the Batinah districts he must not quarrel with them for if they should observe any enmity on his part Syf bin Humood would assuredly oppress his dependants in the Batinah country. Soleyman on receiving this answer returned to Shargah on the 9th Shaban and the same night secretly took his depature for Debaie without the knowledge of the inhabitants apprehensive lest it should reach the ears of Sheikh Saeed. On meeting Sheikh Muktoom and his Elders he informed them that at heart Sheikh Sultan desired the closest alliance and friendship with them but that he begged them for the present to forbid their tribe from continuing their intercourse with Shargah and he purposed likewise proclaiming publicly in Shargah that none should communicate with Debaie in order that the rumour might spread abroad in the country that Sheikh Sultan had caused the suspension of all commerce and intercourse on the part of his dependants with Debaie. That they must not allow these circumstances to disturb their minds. Sheikh Muktoom and his Elders replied that they would not oppose the views of Sheikh Sultan.

I beg to report with reference to Syed Kahtan bin Syf who on the occasion of the late hostilities with the Wahabees proceeded to Muscat to solicit aid and subsidy from His Highness Syed Soweynee in behalf of Saeed bin Tahnoon and Syf bin Humood. I understand that on Kahtan's arrival at Muscat and on his disclosing the objects of his mission, His Highness Syed Soweynee replied that he was prepared to furnish subsidy and stores but I hear that at heart His Highness contemplates with distaste the increase of the influence of Syed Humood in Oman and that he told Khatan to proceed to Sohar and if he should gain an opportunity endeavour to frustrate their designs. Khatan however on reaching Sohar learnt that the Nedgdees had been expelled from the forts which had been occupied by the Confederate Chiefs and he therefore returned to Brymee but did not acquaint the latter with the confidential communication made to him by His Highness. He

informed them only of His Highness's readiness to comply with their requisitions for provisions etc. At the present date Khatan is at Brymee with Saeed bin Tahnoon. I have heard that he has solicited that Chief to proceed with all his forces and encamp at Suzeez whence he and Syf bin Humood would then move out with their troops and followers against the territories of Sheikh Sultan viz Khore Tacawn and Dibba; and that Saeed bin Tahnoon has promised to do so but he desires to see how his negotiations with Sheikh Sultan will issue on the subject of hostilities with Debaie.

True translated substance

(Signed) A. B. Kemball

Assist Resident etc.

Office No 3754 of 1848
Comn: No 90 of 1848

To

H. Walsh Esqre.
Chief Secretary to Government
Bombay

Political Department. Bushire 5th November 1848

Sir,

Herewith I have the honor to forward for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor in Council the accompanying transtated Substance of a letter from Moollah Houseein the Native Agent at Bangah dated the 24th September reporting the particulars of the confederacy forming among the Tribes of Oman at the instigation of Sheik Sultan bon Suggur, for the purpose of expelling the troops of Sheik Saeed bon Tahnoon the Beniyas Chief from his recently acquired possession of Bouymee. I am happy to add, that Moollah Houseein reports the continued tranquillity of the Persian Gulf and the absence

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absence of any disorders at Sea

I entertain a great doubt whether Sayf bin Hamood, the Son of the Chief of Sohar will cordially join in the confederacy organized by the Seasmee Chief now that it is evident, the object of the latter is not alone the diminution of the influence and power of Sheik Saeed bin Sahmoon of Abothabee, but also the re-establishment of the Wahabee ascendancy in Nedjd. The multifarious inroads made by the Wahabee Agents Ebn Nijjee a few years back into the vicinity of Sohar, and the cruelties there committed by the Nedjdee Troops, must be still in the recollections of the Chief of the ravaged Districts, and will naturally dispose him to afford his aid in ridding the Wahabee in Imam

3 Sheik Saeed bin Sahmoon appears to display bold intelligence and energy in the preparations making by him to meet the coming storm. According to reports from Bahrein the Nedjd Expedition left Lahsah on the 25th October under the command of two well known leaders — Moollah bin Bassul, and Saeed bin Moollah. The armed of the Force is stated to be 1100 Camel Men, 200 Horse and a number of Bedouin Infantry. My own opinion however is, that this greatly exaggerated, and I am by no means certain that it has actually quitted Lahsah, as the information was derived from Mahomed bin Shahbee (the confidential Secretary of Sheik Sultan bin Suggur) whose

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whose statements cannot be relied upon.

I have &c.

(Signed) H. Kemball

Resident &c.

Enclosure No. 4

Translated Substance of a letter from Moollah Hussein Agent at Shargah to Major Kemball Resident in the Persian Gulf dated 25th Shawal 24th September 1848

H.C. With reference to Saeed bin Sahmoon and his relations with the Nuaeem Tribes, the Boothbee cognate tho sons of Abi bin Hamood and their descendents as also with Rashid bin Hameyd of Ejman bin Ajeeran Chief of Ejman bin and Sayf bin Hamood — I beg to report that Sheik Sultan bin Suggur secretly intrigues and succeeded in creating a division between the two parties and a correspondence was opened by him in conjunction with the latter with Sayf bin Sheik inviting him to send his Forces into these parts and that they would co-operate with them in the recovery of the Forts of Buraimee from the former. Saeed bin Sahmoon suspecting the confederation though ignorant of the correspondence and fearing the effects of their machinations and designs with a view to expel his followers from Buraimee and to possess themselves of the Forts against the arrival of the Wahabee Expedition from Nedjd put himself on his Guard and removing the followers of Sayf bin Hamood provisioned the Forts and garrisoned them

with

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with a portion of his own Tribe Beniqyas and Zowahir and dispatched as his Deputy there Hamad bon Sarour ul Shamisee to conduct their defence. He likewise commanded all the Bedouin Tribes at present acknowledging his authority, such as the Beni Kuttieb, ul Ghuffalah, ul Muraimir, and ul Munasir to assemble and take up a position at Khubtoor between Aboothabee and Braymee and set them at liberty to pray and surrender the districts of Sheikh Sultan bon Sugger and Saif bon Humood and he himself with 300 of his Aldens on the 4th September returned to Aboothabee where he despatched his cousin Mahomed bon Saif with 200 mounted horsemen and Camel Riders of the Beniqyas belonging to Aboothabee and the Mooyanch to bring the families of the inhabitants into the town from their summer locations at Mushtel ul Ghuffalah which was accordingly done. Whereupon the Aldens of the Mareem ul Bookhoorayban the sons of Ali bon Humood heard of the measures taking by Saeed bon Tahnoon they proceeded to Dohar to visit Saif bon Humood and invite him to join them in hostilities against the Beniqyas Chief: As far as I can learn Saif would not accede to their proposal but returned for answer that he had not the means and was not in a position to proceed to hostilities against Saeed bon Tahnoon as having captured the Forts of Bmynee. He exercised authority over all the tribes of Omaan, and further that it was not apparent to him what intentions or objects were entertained

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stationed by the Nedgdees and against whom directed, and that the sons of Ali bon Humood on receiving this reply suspended their proceedings but Saif bon Humood and the Mareem Chiefs ul Bookhoorayban and Rashid bon Humeyd ul Ghuffaree addressed letters to Shyuk bon Zuntieu urging him to hasten the march of his Forces into Omaan and they would aid them in the recapture of the Forts of Bmynee from Saeed bon Tahnoon and they send their letters to Sheikh Sultan bon Sugger for transmission to Nedgd by way of Bahreein.

The troops stationed by Saeed bon Tahnoon at Khubtoor distributed themselves in ambush along the caravan roads between Rasul Khymah and Sharjah and Abdoollah bon Rowaydan Chief of the Beni Kuttieb and Fazil bin Mahomed Chief of the Mareem al bon Shamis taking with them of their Tribes about 150 men started some days since from Khubtoor for the territories of Saif bon Humood.

On his arrival at Aboothabee Saeed bon Tahnoon despatched a letter to me expressing his desire that I should visit him at Aboothabee to hold a personal communication. I replied that I was at present engaged but that if Commodore Castle visited the Coast or any of the Captains of the Government Cruizers I would then certainly visit him to learn his views and wishes. My letter I gave into the hands of a man of Sharjah bound direct for Aboothabee but it happening at this time

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some that the authorities of Shargah interdicted their subjects from all intercourse with Aboothabee and hearing that the people of the latter place clandestinely held communication with Boo Aoyle I forwarded it by that route with a view to obtain intelligence from Aboothabee up to the prescribed date I have received no answer from Saeed bem Tahnoon but I learn from other quarters that he sent his cousin Mahomed bem Sayf to the Elders of the Mo. nasir and Mowaraki Tribes residing at Liwa and that they have come to Aboothabee to visit him and have entered into a close alliance with him: As far as I can ascertain they have engaged to remove with their families from Liwa and settle at Jaffrah between Aboothabee and Bunyunee that in the events of the Forces of Sayed bem Turkee invading these parts they with the Tribe of the Beniyas may engage them before they reach Bunyunee With regard to the relations of Mahdoom bem Buttye with Saeed bem Tahnoon I beg to report that ostensibly the greatest enmity exists between them but the forces of Saeed bem Tahnoon employed in foraying the territories of Sheik Sultan bem Suggur never plunder the people of Debaye which argues the absence of animosity between them. With reference to Abdoollah bem Rashid and Saeed bem Tahnoon they interchange letters and there exists a perfect good understanding between them The troops of the latter in land in no way molest the

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the districts of the former

It is reported that Saeed bem Tahnoon intends leaving Aboothabee on the 6th October with all his Bedowin followers horsemen and Camel Riders for the neighbourhood of Bunyunee in order to oppose the advance of the Wahabee forces on that place. I understand that he has sent three men of the Monasir to Tahsah by land to spy the proceedings and movements of Sayed bem Turkee and on the expedition moving towards Omam to return immediately with the intelligence

On the 22nd September Saleh bem Suggur returned to Shargah from Bahreim whether the object of his proceeding is already known to you He remained there a number of days occupied in the transmission of correspondence with Sayed bem Toorkee the despatch of messengers and in reporting intelligence and information to his Brother Sultan bem Suggur to Mahdoom bem Buttye and the other Chiefs of Omam During his stay on the island he used every endeavour to induce the Chiefs of Bahreim to break with Saeed bem Tahnoon and prohibit his subjects from intercourse with Bahreim I understand the Bahreim Chiefs would not listen to his suggestions and he failed completely to effect any of his objects with them On starting for Bahreim Sheik Saleh took with him one of the best riding Camels a mare and a sword which he presented to the Chiefs but on return they gave him only a mare He awaited

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enabled them so only the receipt of replies from Sheyed bon Sultan to his Brother Sheik Sultan, to Muckteem bon Buttye and the other Chiefs of Oman and on their receipt quitted the island. He now invites the Sheiks of Bahreim to the same extent that he before praised them.

With reference to the differences which to have occurred between Saeed bon Salmeen and Seyf bon Hamood I beg to report that their primary cause was Sheik Sultan bon Sugger's intercourse and intrigues with the Mucaum Ali bon Khuzeyfam the sons of Ali bon Hamood which had the effect of alienating them from him as stated aforesaid that Seyf bon Hamood inclined to the side of the latter. and in the next place the jealousy of His Highness Seyed Sowaynee for the capture of Bragmee by Saeed bon Salmeen and Seyf bon Hamood at the latters being first in possession of the Forts His Highness being averse to the increase of power and influence as well as reputation which accrued to him thereform. Accordingly His Highness wrote to Saeed bon Salmeen informing him that he understood the holders of Bragmee, dependents of Seyf bon Hamood as well as Seyf himself and the sons of Ali bon Hamood had opened a correspondence with Sheik Sultan bon Sugger and at heard were favorable to the cause of the Wahabees and without doubt on their arrival on these parts would deliver over the Forts to them and deprive him of all control over them. that if he sought his

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his (His Highness's) aid and support he must remove the garrison of Seyf bon Hamood from the Forts, hold them himself and retain by His Highness of them being in his own possession. On receiving this communication Saeed bon Salmeen conformed to the wishes of His Highness by ejecting the dependents of Seyf bon Hamood from the Forts and garrisoning them with men of his own tribe.

Until by the grace of God and most owing to the presence of the British Government and the tranquillity of the Government Bussorah Perfect tranquillity prevails at Sea and the people are distributed abroad in search of their livelihood with pursuing their vocation on the Pearl Banks, and no piracy or irregularity of any kind has occurred.

True Abstract of the Substance
Signed H B Kemball
Assistt Resident &c.

Transcription of previous document

Office No 375 of 1848
Cons: No 90 of 1848

To

H. Malet Esq.
Chief Secretary to Government
Bombay

Political Department Bushire 6th November 1848

Sir,

Herewith I have the honor to forward for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor in Council the accompanying translated substance of a letter from Moollah Houssein, the Native Agent at Shargah, dated the 24th September reporting the particulars of the confederacy forming among the Tribes of Oman at the instigation of Sheik Sultan bin Sugger for the purpose of expelling the troops of Sheikh Saeed bin Tahnoon, the Beniyas Chief from his recently acquired possession of Brymee. I am happy to add, that Moollah Houssein reports the continued tranquillity of the Persian Gulf and the absence of any disorders at sea.

2. I entertain great doubts whether Syf bin Humood, the son of the Chief of Sohar will cordially join in the confederacy organized by the Joasmee Chief now that it is evident, the object of the latter is not alone the diminution of the influence and power of Sheik Saeed bin Tahnoon of Aboothabee, but also the re-establishment of the Wahabee ascendancy in Nedgd. The ruthless inroad made by the Wahabee Agent Ul Ujajee a few years back into the vicinity of Sohar, and the cruelties then committed by the Nedgdee Troops, must be still in the recollection of the chief of the ravaged districts, and will naturally disincline him to afford his aid in relocating the Wahabees in Oman.

3. Sheikh Saeed ben Tahnoon appears to display both intelligence and energy in the preparations making by him to meet the coming storm. According to reports from Bahrein the Nedgd expedition left Lahsah on the 25th October under the command of two well known leaders, Mootluk bin Buttal and Saeed ben Mootluk. The amount of the force is stated to be 1,400 camel men, 200 horse and a number of Bedouin infantry. My own opinion however is, that this is greatly exaggerated, and I am by no means certain that it has actually quitted Lahsah, as the information was derived from Mahomed ben Chebybee (the confidential secretary of Sheikh Sultan ben Sugger) whose statements cannot be relied upon.

I have etc.

(Signed) S. Hennell
Resident etc.

Enclosure No 1

Translated Substance of a letter from Moollah Houssein Agent at Shargah to Major Hennell, Resident in the Persian Gulf dated 25th Shaval, 24th September 1848.

A.C.

With reference to Saeed bin Tahnoon and his relations with the Naeem tribes, Al boo Khoreyban, the sons of Ali ben Humood and their dependants as also with Rashid ben Humeyd ul-Ghafiri Chief of Ghubeen and Syf bin Humood, I beg to report that Sheikh Sultan ben Sugger set on foot intrigues and succeeded in creating a division between the two parties and a correspondence was opened by him in conjunction with the latter with Fysul bin Turkee inviting him to send his forces into these parts and that they would cooperate with them in the recovery of the forts of Brymee from the former. Saeed bin Tahnoon, suspecting the confederation, though ignorant of the correspondence and fearing the effects of their machinations and designs with a view to expel his followers from Brymee and to possess themselves of the forts against the arrival of the Wahabee expedition from Nedgd put himself on his guard and removing the followers of Syf ben Humood, provisioned the forts and garrisoned them with a portion of his own tribe Beniyas and Zowahir and appointed as his deputy there Humad bin Suroor ul Shamisee to conduct their defence. He likewise commanded all the Bedouin tribes at present acknowledging his authority such as the Beni Kuttub, ul Ghiflah, ul Awamir, and ul Muzareeh to assemble and take up a position at Khutm between Aboothabee and Brymee and set them at liberty to foray and plunder the districts of Sheiks Sultan ben Sugger and Syf bin Humood and he himself with 30 of his Elders on the 4th September returned to Aboothabee thence he despatched his cousin Mahomed bin Syf with 200 men, horsemen and camel riders of the Beniyas belonging to Aboothabee and the Moozareeh to bring the families of the inhabitants into the town from their summer locations at Mukeel ul Zuffrah which was accordingly done. When the Elders of the Naeem Albookhureyban the sons of Ali ben Humood heard of the measures taken by Saeed bin Tahnoon they proceeded to Sohar to visit Syf bin Humood and invite him to join them in hostilities against the Beniyas Chief. As far as I can learn Syf would not accede to their proposal but returned for answer "that he had not the means and was not in a position to proceed to hostilities against Saeed ben Tahnoon as having captured the forts of Brymee, he exercised authority over all the

tribes of Oman; and further that it was not apparent to him what intentions or objects were entertained by the Nedgdees and against whom directed", and that the sons of Ali bin Humood on receiving this reply suspended their proceedings but Syf bin Humood and the Naeem chiefs Al bookhureyban and Rashid ben Humeyd ul Ghafiree addressed letters to Fysul bin Turkee urging him to hasten the march of his forces into Oman and they would aid them in the recapture of the forts of Brymee from Saeed bin Tahnoon and they sent their letters to Sheik Sultan ben Sugger for transmission to Nedgd by way of Bahrein.

The troops stationed by Saeed bin Tahnoon at Khutm distributed themselves in ambush along the caravan roads between Rusul Khymah and Shargah and Abdoollah ben Howeydan Chief of the Beni Kuttub and Fazil bin Mahomed Chief of the Naeem al boo Shamis taking with them of their tribes about 150 men started some days since from Khutm for the territories of Syf ben Humood.

On his arrival at Aboothabee Saeed bin Tahnoon despatched a letter to me expressing his desire that I should visit him at Aboothabee to hold a personal communication. I replied that I was at present engaged but that if Commodore Carless visited the coast or any of the Captains of the Government cruizers I would then certainly visit him to learn his views and wishes. My letter I gave into the hands of a man of Shargah, bound direct for Aboothabee but it happening at this time that the authorities of Shargah interdicted their subjects from all intercourse with Aboothabee and hearing that the people of the latter place clandestinely held communication with Boo Heyle I forwarded it by that route with a view to obtain intelligence from Aboothabee. Up to the present date I have received no answer from Saeed bin Tahnoon but I hear from other quarters that he sent his cousin Mahomed ben Sayf to the Elders of the Moonasir and Moozareeh tribes residing at Liwa and that they have come to Aboothabee to visit him and have entered into a close alliance with him. As far as I can ascertain they have engaged to remove with their families from Liwa and settle at Zaffrah between Aboothabee and Brymee that in the event of the forces of Fysul ben Turkee invading these parts they with the tribe of the Beniyas may engaged them before they reach Brymee. With regard to the relations of Muktoom ben Butye with Saeed ben Tahnoon, I beg to report that ostensibly the greatest enmity exists between them but the forces of Saeed ben Tahnoon employed in foraying the territories of Sheik Sultan ben Sugger never plunder the people of Debaye which argues the absence of animosity between them. With reference to Abdoollah ben Rashid and Saeed ben Tahnoon they interchange letters and there exists a perfect good understanding between them. The troops of the latter in land in no way molest the districts of the former.

It is reported that Saeed ben Tahnoon intends leaving Aboothabee on the 6th October with all his Bedouin followers, horsemen and camel riders for the neighbourhood of Brymee in order to oppose the advance of the Wahabee forces on that place. I understand that he has sent three men of the Monasir to Lahsah by land to spy the proceedings and movements of Fysul bin Turkee and on the expedition moving towards Oman to return immediately with the intelligence.

On the 22nd September Saleh ben Sugger returned to Shargah from Bahrein whither the object of his proceeding is already known to you. He remained there a number of days occupied in the transmission of correspondence with Fysul bin Turkee, the despatch of messengers and in reporting intelligence and information to his brother Sultan ben Sugger to Muktoom ben Butye and the other Chiefs of Oman. During his stay on the island he used every endeavour to induce the Chiefs of Bahrein to break with Saeed ben Tahnoon and prohibit his subjects from intercourse with Bahrein. I understand the Bahrein Chiefs would not listen to his suggestions and he failed completely to effect any of his objects with them. On starting for Bahrein Sheik Saleh took with him one of the best riding camels, a mare and a sword which he presented to the Chiefs but in return they gave him only a mare. He awaited therefore only the receipt of replies from Fysul bin Turkee to his brother, Sheik Sultan to Muktoom ben Butye and the other Chiefs of Oman and on their receipt quitted the island. He now reviles the Sheiks of Bahrein to the same extent that he before praised them.

With reference to the differences which have occurred between Saeed ben Tahnoon and Syf ben Humood, I beg to report that their primary cause was Sheik Sultan ben Sugger's interventions and intrigues with the Naeem Al boo Khureyban, the sons of Ali ben Humood, which had the effect of alienating them from him as Saeed observed that Syf ben Humood inclined to the side of the latter and in the next place the jealousy of His Highness Syed Soweynee (on the capture of Brymee by Saeed ben Tahnoon and Syf ben Humood) at the latters being put in possession of the forts His Highness being averse to the increase of power and influence as well as reputation which accrued to him therefrom. Accordingly His Highness wrote to Saeed ben Tahnoon informing him that he understood the holders of Brymee, dependents of Syf ben Humood as well as Syf himself and the sons of Ali ben Humood had opened a correspondence with Sheik Sultan ben Sugger and at heart were favorable to

the cause of the Nedgdees and without doubt on their arrival in these parts would deliver over the forts to them and deprive him of all control over them, that if he sought his (His Highness') aid and support he must remove the garrison of Syf ben Humood from the forts, hold them himself and satisfy His Highness of their being in his own possession. On receiving this communication Saeed ben Tahnoon conformed to the wishes of His Highness by ejecting the dependents of Syf ben Humood from the forts and garrisoning them with men of his own tribe.

First by the Grace of God and next owing to the presence of the British Government and the Cruizing of the Government vessels perfect tranquillity prevails at sea and the people are distributed abroad in search of their livelihood and pursuing their vocation on the pearl banks; and no piracy or irregularity of any kind has occurred.

True Translated Substance

(Signed) H. B. Kemball

Assist. Resident etc.

2.19
The re-establishment of Wahhabi naib Sa'ad b. Mutlaq at Buraimi and the proposal to rebuild 'Udaid, 1849–1850

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ANNEX B, No. 14

Lt.-Col. S. Hennell, Political Resident, Persian Gulf, to the Government of Bombay, October 11, 1849

Office N°. 303 of 1849
Cons: N°. 69 of 1849 [p. 418].

To,
A Malet Esq^re
Chief Secretary to Government
Bombay

Political Department Bushire 11^th October 1849

Sir,

Adverting to the latter part of my letter to Commodore Porter N° 225 under date the 6^th August which formed an enclosure in my despatch to your address N° 56 Political Department dated the 27^th Idem I have now the honor to transmit for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor in Council, the accompanying Copy of a communication dated the 2^nd Instant from the Commodore, acquainting me with the details of his late Cruize on the Arabian Coast

2 I have much satisfaction in reporting that up to the middle of September the Persian Gulf was enjoying a state of tranquillity and that no piracies had been committed—One or two petty quarrels had occurred but of no consequence whatever [p. 419].

3 No material change has taken place in the relations of the several Chiefs on the Arabian Coast with each other—Sheik Sultan ben Sugger has been unable to carry into effect his projected expedition for the recovery of Khor Fakawn from HH. the Imam, principally owing to the obstacles thrown in his way by Saad ben Mootluk, the Wahabee Agent at Brymee, and the intrigues of Sheik Muktoom of Debaye, The former was unwilling to come to an open rupture with the Muscat Government, so long as any hope existed of the payment of the annual Tribute, and he possesses moreover but little influence over the Bedowin Tribes in his neighbourhood, who are not favorably disposed towards him, and who dread reprisals on the part of the Beniyas Chief of Aboothabee should they foray the Imam's territories

4 The present position of Saad ben Mootluk is described as being far from satisfactory—The positive refusal of H.H. Syed Soweynee to pay the zukat, has greatly embarrassed him, as the small sums he is able to collect from other Tribes are by no means sufficient to defray the current expences of the Nedgdee Garrison of Brymee, which at the same time is too weak to enable him to take efficient measures for recruiting his resources by enforcing the payment of the arrears of Tribute due from various quarters [p. 420].

5 It would appear to be the policy of the Muscat Government to endeavour to detach Sheik Mukhtoom of Debaye from his intimate alliance with the Wahabee Agent at Brymee and Sheik Sultan ben Sugger—With this view advances have been made to him both by H.H. Syed Soweynee and Sheik Saeed ben Tahnoon of Aboothabee—Although receiving their overtures with much apparent cordiality still, Mukhtoom is too astute to fall altogether into their plans—On the contrary by his advice Saad bin Mootluk has despatched a confidential Agent to Nedgd, urgently pressing Ameer Fysul, to despatch a reinforcement of Troops to Brymee

6 At Aboothabee everything appears to be quiet. Sheik Saeed has proceeded to Shinas and Muscat, to meet Syfben Kahtan and H.H. Syed Soweynee, no doubt for the purpose of arranging an effective support to each other, in meeting the demands of the Wahabees for the payment of Tribute—The Beniyas Chief has lately addressed a letter to me complaining of the seizure of one of his subjects in Shargah by the Governor of that place, who forcibly took from him 400 Tomans which had just been paid by a Lingah merchant for Pearls—Although the proceeding of Sheik Abdullah ben Sultan is little better than open robbery, still as [p. 421].

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the Aboothabee man landed in the Joasmee Port against the advice of our Agent Moollah Houssein and the transaction has no connexion with the Sea I have not considered it as one calling for our interference

7 In Bahrein the Huwajeer Tribe appear still to give much annoyance to the inhabitants while their irregular conduct is not discountenanced by Sheik Mahomed ben Khuleefa as it ought to be—In a communication dated the 26th September the Bahrein Agent reports the arrest of Sheik Mahomed ben Saeed Guwara, by orders of the Uttoobee Chief, on suspicion of conspiring with some of the Huwajeer Tribe against the life of the latter—The individual referred to, was one of the influential Inhabitants of Bahrein who had seceded from that Island, but lately went back at the same time as Sheik Mahomed ben Yoosoof—His return to his native place was entirely spontaneous, without interference on my part, for although I was desirous of smoothing the misunderstanding between Sheik Yoosoof and the Uttoobee Sheik, I had by no means so favorable an opinion of the Boo Guwara Chief, as to induce me to indicate a reconciliation between himself and Sheik Mahomed ben Khuleefa—He took advantage however of the opening made for the return of his countryman to arrange his own affairs with his Superior the Sheik of Bahrein I have since learnt that he has been set at liberty [p. 422].

I have &ca

(signed) S. Hennell

Resident &ca

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ANNEX B, No. 15

Moollah Hussein, Agent at Sharjah, to Lt.-Col. S. Hennell, Political Resident, Persian Gulf, January 11, 1850[1]

I regret to report that Sheik Mukhtoom of Debaye is now busily engaged in fomenting quarrels and disturbances—On the 1st instant he arrived at Shargah and proposed to Sheik Sultan ben Suggur and Saad ben Mootluk[2], to assemble their forces and having moved out to the Watering places above Debaye there to collect all the Bedouins who were under their authority At the same time he (Mukhtoom) would join them with his men—By this means they would prevent Sheik Saeed ben Tahnoon and the Beniyas from quitting Aboothabee—This proposal was not approved of by Saad ben Mootluk for the reason, that he had no means of paying and subsisting Troops, & moreover the greater part of his followers had left him. At this time he has only 30 men in Shargah, and 50 in Brymee—He therefore replied that these Countries belonged to Ameer Fysul, who if he wished to keep them would send a Force for that purpose In short Mukhtoom's proposal was rejected by all parties and he returned to Debaye A few days ago the Pilgrims belonging to these parts returned from Mecca, I hear they brought letters from the Wahabee Ameer to the different Maritime Chiefs, to the effect, that he would shortly follow these communications himself to the Gutter Coast for the purpose of rebuilding Adeed, and the despatch of a Force to Oman He further intimated his expectation that on his arrival in that Quarter, all the Maritime Sheiks would wait upon him there for the purpose of arranging their several affairs—He also sent to Sheik Sultan an order for 1,000 Bags of Dates upon the Governor of Kateef—All the Chiefs who are well disposed towards the Nedgdee Ruler were greatly rejoiced on the receipt of these letters and Sheik Sultan immediately despatched his Buteel to Kateef in order to receive the Dates—I before reported to you that Sheik Mukhtoom ben Butye had despatched a messenger to Ameer Fysul strongly urging him to rebuild Adeed if he wished to establish himself on the Coast, or to preserve Oman, as that Port[3] was equally well suited for Sea or land—that if Adeed were once re-established many of the Inhabitants of Aboothabee would certainly congregate there and also proceed to Debaye—by this means the Beniyas' Capital would be ruined—In my opinion should Adeed fall into the hands of the Nedjdee, all kinds of piracies and irregularities will be committed at Sea—the power of the Wahabees over the Ports on the Arabian Coast will be greatly increased—and Adeed will become a refuge and home for all the bad characters in the Gulf—They will plunder at Sea and find an asylum there—It is therefore advisable that steps should be taken to nip the project in the bud, otherwise it will involve great trouble and expense to afford a remedy I hear that the Muscat Govt has sent some Cavalry to Shinas and that a brisk correspondence is kept up with Sheik Saeed ben Tahnoon—This Chief having been informed that one of his people had secretly prepared a boat with a quantity of Dates and Rice intending to start at night for the backwaters near Adeed, he sent and seized every thing [*sic*] on board the vessel in question and burnt her —He then embarked several dying asses and sent some of his people with orders to throw them into the Wells at Adeed and afterwards fill them up I hear that he intends to proceed inland with all his forces—Should he do so Sheik Sultan, Sheik Mukhtoom and Saad ben Mutluk will also do the same. [p. 16]. [p. 17]. [p. 18].

True Translated Substance

(signed) S. Hennell

Resident &ca

[*Explanatory Note.*—Adeed = 'Udaid.]

(1) Enclosure in P.R.P.G. No. 11 of January 31, 1850 to Bombay.
(2) *Mootluk* followed by *to assemble*, which is struck through.
(3) *part* struck through, *Port* interlined.

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ANNEX B, No. 16

Lt.-Col. S. Hennell, Political Resident, Persian Gulf, to Government of Bombay, December 21, 1850

[p. 257]. Office N° 490 of 1850
Cons: N° 129 of 1850

From
Lieutenant Colonel Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf
To,
A. Malet Esq^re^
Chief Secretary to Government
Bombay

Political Department Bushire 21^st^ December 1850

Sir,

I have the honor to report for the information of the Right Honble the Governor in Council that in a letter dated the 17^th^ November last the Native Agent at Shargah reports that the members of the Naeem Tribe had, in conjunction with Sheik Sultan ben Suggur of Rasel Khymah and Sheik Saeed ben Tahnoon of Aboothabee succeeded in compelling the Nedgdee Garrison of Brymee to evacuate that Fort, which is now in the possession of the Naeem.

[p. 258]. 2 It is reported from Bahrein that the Shereef of Mecca has farmed the Province of Nedgd from the Port for 60,000 Tomans a year, and that in consequence of this circumstance the Wahabee Chief Ameer Fysul had renounced his intention of sending another expedition into Oman.

I have &^ca^
(signed) S. Hennell
Resident &^ca^

2.20
Relations of Shaikh Sa'id b. Tahnun of Abu Dhabi with Muscat, 1850–1852

To preserve the connection of the British relations with the Sohar and Muskat Governments, and for a right understanding of the subject before us, it is necessary that we should, ere plunging into the thick of the conflict that at this time occurred, step back a little, and watch the risings of jealousy that so shortly led to a rupture.

The reconciliation effected between His Highness the Imaum and Syud Humood bin Azan by the Resident, in 1839, promised for a length of time to keep firm and stable; but the imbecility of His Highness' representative, Syud Soweynee, the utter want of decision and courage displayed by him during his late struggle with the Wahabees, the little or no support he proffered when the Sohar Chief desired to withstand the invaders, and sought his assistance,—all these things contributed to alienate Syud Humood bin Azan, and drove him to disregard his should-be ally, and look for aid from others.

It is mentioned in the early part of this narrative, that on the occasion of the Sohar Chief entering into a confederacy with a number of tribes against the Wahabees, he transferred his inland fortresses to the charge and holding of the Muttowas. This measure gave much offence to His Excellency Syud Soweynee, and greatly excited his fears: he looked upon the proceeding as one full of danger to himself, and forming but the commencement of a series of frauds;—he thought his kinsman was aspiring to the Imaumship. The instalment of the Muttowas was shortly followed by the direct interference of Humood bin Azan with the affairs of His Highness. He wrote to a number of tribes, desiring them to associate themselves with his interests, and to forsake their allegiance to the Imaum. This increased the apprehensions of the Muskat Governor, and led him to pour forth his tale of grievances to the Resident. The Sohar Chief was called upon to afford explanation of his conduct, and received warning that any acts of aggression by him upon the Imaum's dominions would be viewed in a most serious light by the British Government. Syud Humood's reply was highly characteristic, and portrayed the feelings he held towards the Muskat authorities. He denied the accusation wherewith he was charged, and assured the Resident that Syud Soweynee's appeals should never be attended to, for he was weak and fanciful as a child, and incapable of discerning good from evil!

Presently, however, at the time when Syud Humood had been deprived of power by his son, we find the integrity of the Sohar

MUSKAT.

Government placed in jeopardy, by the impolitic measure of leaving the defence of its forts to a foreign and powerful tribe. The Muttowas, a warlike and ambitious race, took advantage of every opportunity to strengthen themselves in their present position, and by degrees succeeded in usurping all authority. They proclaimed themselves the lawful possessors of the Sohar forts, and contrived, by a combination of rare dexterity and force, to eject therefrom Syf bin Humood, then chief of the place; they also seized upon Syud Ghes, brother of Syud Humood, and to prevent all chance of either regaining his lost possessions, they cast them both into prison.

Syud Syf after a while effected his escape, and calling in Shaikh Kahtan bin Syf, the Shinas Governor, to his assistance, made a vigorous and sudden attack upon Sohar, expelled the Muttowas, and re-established himself in authority. This authority was not, however, to remain with him long. The father, ever jealous of the son, resolved to destroy him, and hired the confidential servant of his master to carry into execution his base and treacherous purpose: Syud Syf was assassinated in his bed, and the murderer resumed his position.

Such was the posture of affairs in Sohar when Syud Soweynee appeared off Shinas in his frigate the *Fyz Allum*. The immediate object of his visit was to act in concert with Syud bin Tahnoon, the Aboothabee Chief (with whom His Excellency was now in close alliance), against Syud bin Mootluk, the Chief of the Wahabees. He also found his presence necessary in that quarter to counteract the plans of the Joasmees, who were mediating an attack upon His Highness' forts of Shinas, Khore Fukaun, and Ghulla.

On arrival, His Excellency expressed a desire to hold an interview with Syud Humood bin Azan, for the purpose of renewing his friendly relations with that chief, and restoring to their original footing the terms of the treaty concluded between Syud Saeed and himself. The Sohar Chief cheerfully responded to this apparently generous appeal, and hastened to wait upon His Excellency. Their first interview was held at a place called Mudwal, situate between Sohar and Shinas, and was shortly followed by another at Shinas itself, on which latter occasion, so little did Syud Humood suspect His Excellency of treachery, so convinced was he of the sincerity of his professed motives, that he alighted at Shinas unattended by escort, without retinue,—his only attendants consisted of one confidential servant, and other followers to the number of ten;—this, too, at a time when His Excellency had come in a ship equipped for war,—when a land force destined to co-operate with the Aboothabee Chief against Brymee had arrived on the spot.

Let us now proceed to relate the result of the meeting,—let us learn

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with what generosity and faithfulness His Excellency was led to respond to the advances of his unsuspecting guest.

After receiving a visit from Syud Humood bin Azan, it was proposed that they should proceed inland on a pleasure excursion, whereby they could enjoy change of air and scene, and also freely discuss any matters that had to be arranged between them. They did so. Much cordiality was evinced on either side, and perfect concord had existed on every subject, until His Excellency expressed a hope that the Sohar Chief would join Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon and himself in the proposed expedition against Brymee. On this point, however, Syud Humood was not to be moved; no words, no arguments could induce him to waver: he had but one reply,—he could not, he would not, join His Excellency; he was in strict alliance with the Al Boo Khureyban, and they were averse to the project;—he could not, he would not, assist in the expedition.

This unexpected display of stubbornness on the part of his guest greatly incensed His Excellency, and led him to commit a breach of faith and hospitality rarely equalled, I believe, in Arab history. He determined to make his guest a captive; and at Shinas he caused him to be seized, bound, and conveyed to the frigate in chains. He then issued orders for the immediate march of the land forces upon Sohar, and himself proceeded thither by sea. On the arrival of the troops before the fort, Syud Ghes (brother of Syud Humood) was called upon to surrender: he sent for reply a charged salute from his batteries. The fort was invested both by land and by sea. Syud Ghes applied to Shaikh Sultan for succour, and engaged, in the event of being freed from his present difficulties, to pay him a yearly tribute not less in amount than that he had hitherto paid to the Wahabees. He also promised to co-operate with him against Shinas, and the other forts of His Highness on the Batinah Coast.

Such an appeal was not likely to be disregarded by the Joasmee, whose grasping and ever calculating spirit perceived at a glance what a golden harvest was in store; for not only did he feel that Syud Ghes was purchasing help by an acknowledgment of his own subserviency, but he also entertained rich ideas of personal aggrandisement in the direction of Batinah. The Sohar Chief's terms were speedily closed with, and troops were despatched to his immediate assistance. In the mean time Syud Soweynee, as was his custom, had met with naught but reverses: his troops had been defeated by a handful of the Sohar garrison, who sallied forth from their defences; the Al Saeed and other tribes refused to espouse his cause; the Joasmee succours were daily expected;—in fact, there seemed no chance of success. His Excellency therefore raised the siege, and returned to

Muskat. Syud Ghes now hastened to join the force of Shaikh Sultan, and on his arrival, the combined armies laid siege to Shinas. The resistance offered by Shaikh Kahtan bin Syf was stout and obstinate,—he well sustained his reputation for courage and valour; and had Syud Soweynee ably supported him, he might have been spared the pain of surrender. His munitions, however, ran out, ineffectual attempts were made to introduce fresh supplies, and on

A. D. 1850.

the 10th May 1850 Shinas was compelled to surrender. Khore Fukaun shared the same fate, after a siege of two days; Ghulla had already fallen; and thus, in an incredibly short space of time, did the whole of the Batinah Coast, from Merya to Cape Musseldom, fall into the hands of the Joasmee Chief and Syud Ghes bin Azan.

The season of the pearl fishery was now at hand, and all parties became anxious for a temporary cessation of hostilities. The troops of Shaikh Sultan therefore returned to Ras-ool-Khyma, and through the mediation of the Al Saeed was a four months' truce effected between Syud Soweynee and his kinsman Syud Ghes bin Azan.

Let us now revert to the prisoner, Syud Humood bin Azan, and inquire how he fared in his dungeon. The treatment he experienced at the hands of Syud Soweynee was of a very severe character: he was loaded with chains, and confined in a place of heat unbearable; no liberty, no comforts, no freedom from restraint, was accorded him; health gave way, and nature quickly sank under such cruel usage.

When the news of his brother's death reached Syed Ghes, his fiery temper became inflamed with exceeding rage: he burned for revenge; and eagerly sought for a victim whereon to vent his fury. He sought not in vain: the brave and courageous Shaikh Kahtan bin Syf was caught intriguing, cast into prison, and doomed to perish.

Such were the scenes of bloodshed and murder that clouded the annals of Muskat history,—such the bitter fruit of Syud Soweynee's policy: nor was there any prospect of better days to come.

The Resident had exhausted every argument, and done all in his power to effect a mediation between the furious rivals,—he had even proceeded to Muskat in person, and striven to reconcile them; but such rivals were not to be reconciled. What then should be done? Were the contending parties to be permitted to plunge anew into all the horrors of a fierce and bloody warfare? Was the British Government to remain a passive observer of injuries inflicted upon their old and stedfast ally the Imaum, at a time too when he was far away? To a certain extent they were. The British Government ever refrained from active interference with the inland affairs of the Arab Tribes, and much as they grieved at the present effusion of blood, they viewed with too much

pain and sorrow the injustice and wrongs committed by Syud Soweynee, to dream of supporting his cause. They did not, however, forsake His Highness in the hour of distress: they counselled his immediate return to his disturbed possessions; they animadverted with the greatest delicacy upon the conduct of his son and representative; they pointed out the course that appeared most fitting for His Highness to pursue;—they offered, in fact, every moral support in their power. His Highness gave heed to the friendly warning, and repaired with haste to Muskat. The well known character of Syud Saeed for moderation and justice gave every room for hope that matters might once more be restored to peace and quietness.

Syud Ghes was however called upon to restore the forts he had lately seized with the assistance of his ally Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, on the Batinah Coast. He refused, and hostilities were at once commenced. His Highness proceeded to Khaboora, with two ships and a number of Soor boats, having previously despatched a force by land under the command of Syud Soweynee, to invest the place.

The campaign opened in September 1851, and began auspiciously

A. D. 1851.

enough for the cause of His Highness: Kasbeeah fell without a struggle; Khaboora was taken after a bombardment of two days' duration; and other preparations were in course, when His Highness effected a meeting with Sultan bin Suggur, and induced him to abandon the cause of the Sohar Chief.

Deserted by the Joasmees, opposed by the combined forces of Syud Saeed and the Shaikh of Debaye,* Syud Ghes stood but little chance of success. He turned, however, to bay, with much display of fierceness, and strove to meet his opponents single-handed. They proved too strong for him: Shinas fell an easy prey to the allied armies, and Syud Ghes was compelled to surrender. Sohar was handed over to His Highness; Rastag and Hebee remained in possession of Syud Ghes, who also received from the Muskat Government a pension of 200 dollars per mensem,—a poor indemnity indeed for all the wrongs he had suffered.

In the month of May 1852 occurred the loss of the British ship

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Centaur off Ras-ool-Hud, in the country of the Beni Boo Ali. She ran ashore in a thick fog at the hour of midnight, close to a place called Al Khubba, and no efforts of the crew could succeed in getting her off.

At daylight on the following morning, the Arabs, perceiving the helpless condition she was in, poured down in shoals upon her, and plundered her of the whole of her valuable cargo, which consisted of 1,600 chests of indigo, besides rice, sugar, and other goods, valued in the

* The British Agent at Shargah reports in one of his letters that "the Shaikh of Debaye proceeded to Muskat with 500 men, in nineteen vessels."

aggregate at ten or eleven lakhs of rupees. The crew, overpowered by numbers, left the vessel, and proceeded to Muskat in three Native boats that were hired for the purpose from the people of Soor. Every possible exertion was made by the Resident and other political officers to recover the plundered property, but so scattered had it become, and so far inland had it probably travelled, that there remained but little chance of success. The vessel was destroyed by the Arabs.

The disorders of the Muskat Government, that had been appeased by the arrival of His Highness Syud Saeed, and the measures he adopted, were merely suspended for a time. It was not likely, indeed, that the line of conduct pursued by His Highness, however well it succeeded in humbling the pride of the Sohar Chief, and wresting from him the possessions he had so lately acquired, should tend to restore order of a permanent character.

Towards the close of the year 1852, His Highness Syud Saeed left Muskat, and returned to Zanzibar, and his African possessions. His departure was the signal for revolt: fresh disturbances arose; signs of disaffection were freely manifested by the tribes in Batinah, and the whole of His Highness' dominions was in a blaze with dissensions. At this conjuncture, too, the advancing steps of the Wahabee Chief were heard thundering once more in the distance. He came in the character of arbiter and redresser of wrongs suffered by his children (the Shaikhs) in Oman. He took up his position at Brymee, and summoned the chiefs to attend him. The force despatched on this occasion was so unusually large, and entrusted to the command of so influential a person,—that person being no less than a son of the great Ameer himself,—that all the tribes, struck with awe, hastened to meet its commander, and seemed to vie with each other in acts of submission and homage towards him. The maritime chiefs, too, repaired with haste to pay their addresses, and to relate their tales of woe.

Scarcely had Abdoolla bin Fysul arrived, ere he sent forth demands for the immediate cession of Sohar, and the payment of tribute so large in amount that it was plain he sought but a pretext, in the refusal that must of necessity follow, to attack and lay waste the districts of Batinah. The Sohar Chief, it cannot be doubted, added fuel to the flame, by recounting with fiery eloquence the wrongs he had suffered, the indignities that were heaped on his ill-fated brother. A blow, it was manifest, was about to be aimed at His Highness' dominions, that would imperil their safety, and endanger their integrity. The aspect of affairs was gloomy indeed, and had it not been for the opportune presence of the Resident on the Arabian Coast, and the steps he adopted to stay the storm, coupled with the noble stand of Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon in support of His Highness, matters would have proved most

truly serious; for not only was His Highness threatened with ruin by the confederacy in league against him, but great fears also existed lest a renewal of the Maritime Truce, about to expire, should not be effected ere hostilities commenced. The Resident had proceeded to the coast for the express purpose of arranging a firm and lasting peace among the Arab Tribes, and now so engrossed was their attention with the designs of the Wahabees, that not one of their number found himself either able or willing to return to his post. It seemed highly probable, therefore, that unless the crisis had passed ere the coming month of June, either His Highness would fall a prey to his enemies, and maritime disorder in every shape and form arise, or else the British representative must act, on his own responsibility, with a degree of coercion entirely opposed to the rules of British policy.

Such was the position of affairs when the Resident reached the Coast of Arabia,—a position, it must be admitted, highly difficult and embarrassing. He at once addressed a letter of strong remonstrance to Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, charging him in the name of the British Government to abstain from intriguing, and desiring him to return to his seat, to meet the British representative, who awaited his coming. Syud Soweynee was likewise apprised of his presence, and his intention, if dangers thickened, to repair to Muskat in person, for the purpose of assisting him. To Abdoolla bin Fysul was conveyed the extreme surprise of the Resident that any circumstances whatsoever should induce him to prevent the Shaikhs from obeying his call. These measures, backed by the presence of a vessel of war sent to cruise on the Arabian Coast, together with the decided tone of opposition adopted by Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, tended greatly to restrain the Wahabees. His Excellency hastened to Sohar, placed the fort in a state of defence, and assumed a hostile attitude.

After some display of hesitation, the plan of attacking Batinah was abandoned, and a series of negotiations entered upon, which ended in a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, between Syud Soweynee and Abdoolla bin Fysul, whereby the Muskat Government agreed to pay to the Wahabee Ameer an annual tribute of 12,000 crowns, besides arrears to the extent of 60,000 crowns, and the usual supply of provisions and stores. The Wahabee likewise pledged himself to assist His Excellency in every hour of difficulty; and the boundaries of the dominions of either remained as heretofore.

Matters remained in this condition for a length of time, when fresh difficulties presented themselves. So strong was the ill-feeling of the tribes of Batinah towards Syud Soweynee, that they nearly one and all refused to disburse one farthing of tribute. Disturbances raged on every side: the Wahabee

A. D. 1853.

commenced calling aloud for tribute, and threatened an invasion should it not be speedily paid to him. His Excellency referred Abdoolla bin Fysul to the terms of the treaty, and called upon him to bring back the rebels to allegiance. He did so, though with reluctance, and in the month of December 1853 the tribes became reconciled to His Excellency, and an amicable arrangement was concluded between himself and Abdoolla bin Fysul.

The slave trade

2.21
Measures adopted for the suppression of the slave trade in the Gulf, 1820–1844

SLAVE TRADE.

PAPER

RELATIVE TO THE

MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT,

BETWEEN THE YEARS 1820 AND 1844,

FOR EFFECTING THE

SUPPRESSION OF THE SLAVE TRADE IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

PREPARED, IN OCTOBER 1844, BY

LIEUTENANT A. B. KEMBALL,

RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

TO WHICH ARE APPENDED,

Copies of the Engagements entered into

WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT,

BETWEEN THE YEARS 1822 AND 1851,

BY HIS HIGHNESS THE IMAUM OF MUSKAT, THE ARAB CHIEFS OF THE PERSIAN GULF, AND THE GOVERNMENT OF PERSIA,

FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF THE ABOVE OBJECT.

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The first obligation imposed upon the Arab Chieftains in the Persian Gulf, with reference to the Traffic in Slaves, was the provision forming Article IX. of the General Treaty of 1820.* The words are "The carrying off of slaves, men, women, and children, from the Coasts of Africa or elsewhere, and the transporting them in vessels, is plunder and piracy, and the friendly Arabs shall do nothing of this nature."

This Article has ever been understood and held as forbidding only the carrying off of men, women, and children as slaves, and the transporting them in vessels, when so carried off, although the words may be said to bear the same comprehensive sense of forbidding the carrying off of slaves, and the transporting of slaves, however procured, in vessels; but even this most extended acceptation cannot be construed into forbidding the purchase of slaves, and the transport of them overland, unless indeed the last clause, which provides that the friendly Arabs shall do nothing of this nature, embraces everything. The Arabic sentence bears precisely the same meaning, and is liable to the same opposite constructions.

It would be manifestly unjust to enforce this Article, imposing the same punishment on dealing in slaves as on piracy, whilst at the same time the Imaum of Muskat, the Turks, the Persians, and all the Arabs not included in this Treaty, are allowed to carry on the trade. The effect, moreover, would be only to benefit the latter, by throwing the trade into their hands.

The following observations upon this subject, made by Captain McLeod, Resident in the Gulf in 1823, hold good to the present day:—

"But in whatever sense the words of the Treaty may be understood by either party, I am convinced that our utmost endeavours to abolish the Slave Trade amongst the parties to the Treaty will be ineffectual as long as the other powers of the Gulf persist in it. We may, perhaps, put a stop to the carrying off of slaves, but their purchase and transport

* Vide pages 73 to 80 of this Selection.

we never can prevent: the slaves will be disguised and concealed in a thousand ways, so that it will be impossible for us to detect them; and I doubt whether more harm than good might not be done to the cause of humanity by stopping boats, and searching them for slaves, because it would in all cases occasion such disgust and offence as would involve a great risk of a renewal of hostilities.

"I do not believe that any of the parties to the Treaty do carry off slaves,* all those they possess being purchased at Muskat and other places. But at all events it would be difficult, even in the former case, to detect them,—in the latter next to impossible; and with all our efforts we shall find it impracticable to put a stop to a traffic which is sanctioned by their religion and by immemorial custom, unless it were relinquished by the common consent of the *whole* of the Chiefs of this Gulf."

Finally, the Bombay Government thus declared, in its letter No. 393, dated 26th March 1823†:—

"The Article relating to the Slave Trade does certainly not bear the construction that has hitherto been put on it. It evidently only alludes to descents made on the Coast of Africa for the purpose of making slaves. This is justly declared to be plunder and piracy,—terms which it would have been an abuse of language to apply to any trade, however detestable, as long as it was peacefully conducted. In this sense the Article must be understood, but every infringement of it, when clearly established, must be resented as a case of piracy would be."

On the 29th August 1822 a Treaty‡ was concluded with His Highness the Imaum of Muskat by Captain Moresby, of His Majesty's ship *Menai*, under the instructions of the Government of the Isle of France.

A letter was received from His Highness the Imaum of Muskat at Zanzibar in July 1837, complaining of the aggressions committed by

* The Joasmees have been accused of stealing and carrying off slaves from the African Coast, but the crime was not proven. They are nevertheless supposed to have been frequently guilty of it.

† Again, the opinion of the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council, as conveyed in the 9th paragraph of a letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, dated 22nd March 1841:—"That with regard to those chieftains who entered into engagements with Sir W. G. Keir in 1820, it would not be prudent or right abruptly, and until by friendly communications a sufficient ground shall have been laid for such a course, to declare all trading in slaves to be piracy and plunder, and to attempt to enforce Article IX. according to the English version of the Treaty, which indeed has been found not to correspond with the native wording; and considering that it has not in consequence been acted upon for the last twenty years, the force of that Article must be considered as in a great measure suspended."

Suffice it to say, that not one single seizure has been made under its provisions, although twenty-four years have elapsed since the date of its formation, and the trade continues to flourish.

‡ A copy of which is annexed.

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the subjects of Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur upon the inhabitants of that coast. Although it was not considered expedient to throw any obstacles in the way of the intercourse so long carried on by the Joasmees with the Coast of Africa, yet it was intimated to His Highness, in reply, that he was fully justified in taking such measures as he considered best adapted to protect his subjects from aggressions of the nature complained of.

A few days subsequent to the receipt of the above, a statement was made to the Resident by an individual named Abdoolla bin Iwuz (professing to be a person of some rank from the African Coast), regarding the alleged outrageous proceedings of the crews of some Joasmee boats, in having carried off two hundred and thirty-three young girls, under the pretence of marriage, and subsequently disposed of them as slaves upon their return to the Gulf. On the Joasmee Agent, who happened at the time to be at Bushire, being summoned, and Article IX. of Sir W. G. Keir's Treaty with the pacificated Arabs brought to his notice, he denounced the complainant's statement as an unqualified falsehood. He did not mean to deny the fact of slaves having been brought up from the Coast of Berbera, but declared that they had been regularly purchased from two tribes in that neighbourhood, at war with each other, who were in the habit of selling all the prisoners that fell into their hands. He further denounced Abdoolla bin Iwuz as an impostor, without any letters or credentials, who would have returned to Muskat without lodging any complaint had Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur been willing to make him a small present. Although, notwithstanding the inquiries which were immediately instituted, no proofs could be established to bring the charge home to the Joasmees, who were either innocent of the offence, or had found means of concealing the truth from the Government Agent, yet the case had its effect, inasmuch as it opened a wide field for investigation into the nature and extent of the traffic in slaves, and led to some discoveries which were duly taken advantage of.

The result of this inquiry led to the belief that the Somalees, from whom a great part of the supply appeared to be drawn, were a free people (according to Mahomedan law), and could not become slaves without violence. The conclusion to be drawn therefrom was, that those conveyed to the Persian Gulf must either be kidnapped or purchased while prisoners of war,—a practice to which, even among the generality of Mahomedans, a degree of turpitude attached, which, if argued and insisted upon, would tend materially to diminish and circumscribe the trade.

With a view to prevent the recurrence of such a case as that which formed the subject of Abdoolla bin Iwuz's complaint, Shaikh Sultan bin

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Suggur, Rashid bin Humeed, Muktoom bin Butye, and Khaleefa bin Shakboot, the Chiefs of Ejman, Debaye, and Aboothabee, were induced to enter into and sign an Article of an Agreement, dated 17th April 1838, conceding to our cruisers the right of searching and detaining vessels upon the high seas in all cases where their crews might be suspected of having been engaged in the kidnapping of slaves, and at the same time to admit the further right of seizing and confiscating them in case the suspicion proved to be well founded.

Up to this time (A. D. 1838) vessels engaged in the Slave Trade were (according to the Treaty concluded by Captain Moresby, of His Majesty's ship *Menai*, with His Highness the Imaum, on the 29th August 1822) liable only to seizure if found "to the eastward of a line drawn from Cape Delgado passing east of Socotra, and on to Diu Head, the western point of the Gulf of Cambay"; but as a further advance toward circumscribing the field for the prosecution of the Slave Trade in these quarters, and diminishing the number of marts for the sale and purchase of human beings, the Resident, in July 1839, succeeded in engaging the Maritime Arab Chiefs, viz. Sultan bin Suggur, of Ras-ool-Khyma, Khaleefa bin Shakboot, of Aboothabee, Muktoom bin Butye, of Debaye, and Abdoolla bin Rashid, of Amulgavine, to accede to the wishes of the British Government, by attaching their seals and signatures to a new engagement,* Article I. of which gave to our vessels the right of search beyond a line drawn from Cape Delgado, passing two degrees seaward of the island of Socotra, to Pussem, on the Mukran Coast; Article II. rendered vessels belonging to the above chiefs, or their subjects, found with slaves on board beyond the limits specified, liable to seizure and confiscation; and Article III. made the sale of Somalees an act of piracy.

To this engagement, which modified and formed an addition of three new Articles to the Treaty concluded by Captain Moresby in 1822, the Imaum was induced to become a party in December of the same year. Under the sanction of Government, it was subsequently intimated to the several chiefs subscribing to the treaties, that instructions had been issued to the British Political Agent at Muskat, that on all occasions where suspicion might arise of any of their vessels touching at Muskat having Somalees on board, he should without delay obtain the sanction

* The warmest commendation of the Honorable the Governor in Council was communicated to the Resident, Captain Hennell, for his valuable exertions in obtaining such extensive concessions, whereby Government had it in its power effectually to exclude this nefarious trade on the long line of coast extending from Bombay to Cape Paperia. A very considerable traffic in slaves had long been known to have been carried on, more particularly from Africa, with the Portuguese settlement of Diu, with the port of Mandvee in Kutch, and with those in Sind.

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of His Highness the Imaum for an immediate inquiry into the facts of the case; and in the event of the suspicion proving well founded, make an application to His Highness to lay an embargo upon such vessels, until a reference could be made either to the Persian Gulf Residency, or to the Government.

A. D. 1837-38.

The practicability of inducing His Highness the Imaum of Muskat, and the Arab Chiefs in the Gulf, to prohibit and abolish the traffic in slaves altogether, was at one time brought under consideration, but the following arguments and facts, urged at the time, proved the utter inutility of so partial a measure:—

That in the first place it would be impracticable to induce His Highness the Imaum of Muskat and the Arab Chiefs in the Gulf to put to an end the traffic in slaves without such a large pecuniary sacrifice being made on the part of the British Government as would most likely be considered altogether inexpedient; and in the second place, that were such a sacrifice made, the humane and philanthropic objects of the Right Honorable the Governor in Council would still be defeated by further impediments and difficulties, for which no remedy could probably be found.

Article IX. of Sir W. G. Keir's Treaty of 1820, as before mentioned, had never been held binding to the fullest import of which it could bear the application.

Since that date a period of seventeen years had passed over without the question having been agitated, and thus the several parties concerned had acquired a sort of prescriptive right, never questioned by the Government, to consider that Article IX. was inserted solely with the view of guarding against the forcible carrying away of individuals for the purpose of selling them as slaves, and not meant to prohibit altogether a traffic which is not only in accordance with the letter and spirit of their religion, but which long continuance and custom have rendered almost indispensable to their domestic comfort.

Assuming, however, that Article IX. of the Treaty of 1820 bears the interpretation best suited to our views and policy, and that our right to act upon it, although allowed to lie so long in abeyance, is nevertheless liable to be called into operation whenever we may consider it expedient to do so, still it must be borne in recollection that even on the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf alone, neither His Highness the Imaum, nor the Chiefs of Sohar, Kateef, or Koweit, are parties to this Treaty, and therefore their consent to a total prohibition of the traffic in our fellow-creatures could only be obtained by means of negotiation, and the offer of such advantages as would in their estimation compensate for the loss they sustained, in the surrender of a practice uniting

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both profit and convenience. A great proportion of the revenue of His Highness the Imaum is drawn from this source, and he is said to have declared, that in consequence of his having allowed himself to enter into the agreement with Captain Moresby, of the Royal Navy, engaging to prohibit the Slave Trade with European Powers within certain limits, he has sustained a diminution on his revenue to the extent of 100,000 crowns, and that he is resolute in his determination not to afford any further concession upon this point. But even admitting that, either through our influence, or the payment of an annual pecuniary compensation, the parties alluded to consented to enter into an engagement for the total suppression of the Slave Trade, it is to be feared that the attainment of the humane objects contemplated by the Government would be still as distant as before. The reason for entertaining this opinion is, that the only effect of the prohibition, if it could be enforced in the ports on the Arabian side of the Gulf, would be to throw the whole of this infamous traffic into the hands of the inhabitants of Bussora and Mohumrah (subjects of the Ottoman Porte), and those of Bushire, Congoon, Aseeloo, and Lingah, the principal seaports of Persia. It is unnecessary to observe, that in the present state of our relations with both these Governments* no interdiction of the traffic in question could be carried into effect, unless under the express sanction of their respective authorities. Taking, however, into consideration, that the sale and purchase of slaves is not only permitted by the tenets of their faith, but that the discontinuance would greatly abridge what habit and custom have led their subjects to value as a domestic convenience, for some time at least it is hopeless to look for such a sanction being afforded. In addition to these impediments, there exists the probability that were the inhabitants in the Gulf to relinquish the traffic at present carried on in slaves, the place of their vessels would be immediately occupied by those from the Red Sea, the Coasts of Mukran, Sind, &c. &c. It may at the same time be reasonably anticipated, that even those powers whose consent to our views may be exacted or purchased will exhibit little more than a nominal adherence to their engagements, unless compelled to do so by our own maritime force. This, however, would involve the necessity of greatly augmenting the number of the vessels of war employed in those seas, and in all probability be attended with the constant risk of entangling us in disputes with the local Governments dependent on Persia, Turkey, and Egypt.

As the inhabitants of Koweit, Bussora, Congoon, Aseeloo, and

* Since this Paper was written, the Persian Government has entered into a Convention with the British Government, authorising the search and seizure, by British men of war and by vessels of the Indian Navy, of Persian vessels suspected of being engaged in the Slave Trade. A copy of this Convention is annexed.—*Editor.*

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Lingah carry on the traffic in question to a considerable extent, and as these ports are subject to the authority of the Turkish and Persian Governments, it would be useless attempting to enter into any negotiations affecting this branch of their commerce, unless through our Ministers at the Courts of Constantinople and Tehran.

The following review of our powers by the foregoing treaties, which form the only restrictions to the Slave Trade, will prove how little calculated these are, from being so very partially directed, to suppress or even check the Slave Trade in these quarters, although they should have the fullest effect in excluding it from the entire shores of India, including the newly acquired possessions. The Restrictive Slave Trade Line from Delgado to Pussem leaves a track or road sufficiently large for the safe and convenient navigation of the vessels engaged in the traffic; and circumstances of distress, or other unavoidable cause, moreover, exempt the vessel* found beyond it from the penalties laid down by the Treaty. This line, too, affects only the boats of Muskat, and the ports situated between Ras-ool-Khyma and Aboothabee inclusive. Those of the ports on the Coast of Persia and Turkey, such as Lingah, Congoon, Aseeloo, Koweit, and Bussora, are bound by no engagements whatever, or restricted to no particular limits.

The agreement concluded in April 1838, although it provides against kidnapping on the part of those chiefs subscribing, or their subjects, does not in the letter preclude them from purchasing slaves from others who have kidnapped them, and the difficulties which on the one hand offer to the cruisers in making the distinction, and discovering the actual men-stealers, and on the other the facilities to the latter in escaping detection (for a very large portion of the slaves have been kidnapped—that is, as prisoners of war, have been sold by those into whose hands they have fallen), may be conceived.

Article III. of the Treaty of 1839 precluded the parties subscribing from the sale or purchase of Somalees *in toto*,† that tribe, from profess-

* No cruisers have hitherto been ever assigned to watch the boundary line laid down in Article II., nor, in consequence, also, has any seizure been yet made under its provisions. In any case of seizure, however, another obstacle would appear to present itself to the legal infliction of the penalty specified, in the great difficulty of establishing by proof, such as would be required in a court of law, that the slaves, men, women, and children, are intended for sale, in order to subvert the statement of the commander or owner that such are their own, or the wives, concubines, or personal attendants, male or female, of the other free men on board, or that the males are slaves employed in the navigation of the vessel, and forming a part of its crew.

† In cases where, from insurmountable difficulties and lengthened delays, little hopes exist of obtaining the surrender of the vessels or persons of those who have been convicted of embarking or selling Somalee slaves, it was recommended "that the excuse urged by their chief of the absence of the delinquents should not be admitted, but that he should be held responsible

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ing the faith of Islam, being, according to Mahomedan law, considered Hoor, or free, in contradistinction to Negroes or Abyssinians, who came under the denomination of Abud, or bondsmen. The proportion of the former to the two latter is perhaps as one to one hundred, and these are probably kidnapped or purchased as prisoners of war. There is, however, much doubt whether in actual fact any great degree of moral guilt is considered to attach to Musulmans engaging in this traffic. The discovery of an individual of the Somalee Tribe, even when in possession of one of the chiefs subscribing to this agreement, or his subjects, and his consequent restoration to liberty, must be necessarily very rare, and to be accomplished only in spots within the sphere of immediate surveillance and supervision of our Native Agents. With a view to give a more full effect, however, to these restrictions, such as they are, valuable suggestions, as hereafter extracted* from the Records of the Residency, have from time to time been made, having for their object also the eventual and total suppression of the nefarious traffic.

In all the negotiations which have hitherto been entered into with His Highness the Imaum and the independent Maritime Chieftains of the Arabian Coast, the main object in view has been in the first place wholly to exclude this hateful traffic from all places subject to, or dependent upon, the British Government; and in the next to narrow as much as possible the facilities of carrying it on within those limits which have hitherto been recognised by us as legitimate in all our intercourse with them. The free and unmolested traffic in slaves between the Imaum's possessions on the African Coast and the ports in the Persian Gulf, within the restrictive line, has always been contended

for their act; and, in the event of his persisting in a refusal to produce them, liable to the infliction of a fine of twice the market value of the unhappy individual who has been dragged away into slavery, in direct violation of a solemn agreement. To such a plan, however, there exists the difficulty regarding the disposal of the fine when paid"; and it was at the same time suggested "that it might, provided no legal objection interposed, be applied to the purchase and liberation from slavery of such Somalees as their present owners in different parts of the Gulf might be disposed to part with." But it may be questioned whether such an arrangement, while it served to check the traffic in Somalees, among those subscribing to the agreement, would not tend to encourage it among those not parties to the same. A better plan, therefore, would appear to offer itself for the disposal of the fine alluded to, when recovered, in the payment of the amount into the hands of the individual liberated, on his return to his native country, as a compensation for the temporary loss of his liberty, and the hardships and inconvenience he has suffered. "The only other alternative, excepting a prohibition against all or any of the vessels of the offending chief or his subjects proceeding to the Coast of Africa on any pretext whatsoever, would be to seize the Buggalows belonging to individuals once proved guilty of bringing up Somalee slaves to the Gulf, wherever they might thereafter be found. His Highness the Imaum would probably gladly interdict their visiting Zanzibar and other places belonging to himself in the vicinity, and would give our ships authority to seize such vessels as might infringe this prohibition."

* Vide page 646 *et seq.*

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for by all the members of the several treaties which have been entered into touching this trade; therefore no interference with the native vessels in the Gulf having slaves on board existed on our part, excepting in cases where it could be proved that these had been kidnapped by the crews, or their carrying Somalees for sale. The difficulty attending the production of proof touching the former exception (unless by the aid of qualified Agents at Zanzibar, and on the African Coast) is fully admitted; but there is no possibility of passing an individual of the Somalee Tribe for a Negro, and therefore a thorough search of the vessel suspected of having any on board must always tend to their discovery.

Little prospect exists of persuading the Arabian Chiefs to resign of their own accord a practice consonant to their social and religious habits, and at the same time uniting profit with convenience. So long as the Shaikhs on the coast are satisfied they are not likely to incur a positive injury or loss from us, in consequence of their continuing the existing traffic in slaves, they will not consent to any arrangements having in view its abolition; but were a declaration on the part of the British Government made, intimating its being considered expedient and right that the purchase and sale of human beings by the independent Maritime Chiefs of Arabia should cease after a certain period, and that any infractions of such a prohibition would be punished, it would probably be submitted to without opposition, although rather as an act of authority it were useless to attempt to oppose or contend against than from any conviction of the justice or propriety of the demand.

Next to such a measure as the above, a great check, if not a total stop might be put to the traffic in slaves, on the part of the independent chiefs on the Arabian Coast of this Gulf, were advantage to be taken of the declaration made by His Highness the Imaum regarding the irregular proceedings of the Joasmees on their coasts, to obtain from His Highness a notification prohibiting these boats from visiting his African possessions on any pretext whatever, and giving authority to our vessels of war to seize any such boats found cruising within the limits of his territories. So far as it can be ascertained, the only places where slaves can be procured are within such limits, and on the coast of Berbera. As the inhabitants of the latter country are Somalees, all vessels belonging to most of the Arabian Shaikhs of this Gulf are liable to seizure if found with one individual of the latter description on board. But that part of the Gulf of Aden and Zanzibar are only visited by native vessels from this Gulf at certain seasons of the year (from November to May), and therefore arrangements might be made by the political authority at the former port for the due surveillance of the Berbera Coast. Were it plainly notified to the independent Maritime Arabian Chiefs that His Highness the Imaum had interdicted their

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vessels from visiting his possessions in Africa, and that the British Government was prepared to enforce such an interdict by the seizure of all boats attempting to break through or evade it, it would certainly check to a great extent the traffic in human flesh, so far as they were concerned, as the price of slaves in the Muskat market is probably too high to allow of their being exported from that port for sale in the Persian Gulf at a remunerating profit.

It ought not, however, to be concealed that such a measure as the one suggested would be very restricted in its operation, and afford but a small mitigation to the general trade in slaves in the Persian Gulf. The total number of native vessels belonging to the independent Arabian Chiefs visiting Zanzibar and the Arabian Coast does not exceed eight, a number which cannot carry one-seventh part of the slaves said to be annually disposed of at Bussora and in the other ports of this sea.* The traffic in question is principally carried on by the boats belonging to Soor and other places between Ras-ool-Hud and Muskat, subject to His Highness the Imaum, and which of course, as well as all Persian and Turkish vessels, would be quite unrestricted by any measure of

* *Extract of a Letter from Colonel Robertson to Government, No. 35 P. D., dated 4th March* 1842.—"Captain Hennell's plan for enlisting the Imaum in our attempt to hinder the Arab Chiefs from trading in slaves appears to me to be merely calculated to throw the trade into the Imaum's hands.

"To put down the Slave Trade, therefore, it is useless to check the carriers of one-seventh part of the trade, while the carriers of the other six-sevenths are not checked. It is obvious, indeed, that such a check would only transfer the other seventh to the hands and enterprise of other persons, and that the trade itself would not be checked. Whatever measure, therefore, we adopt, to put down this trade, ought to have a general application and bearing. A check on one individual, and not on all traders, should be deemed no check at all. But to obtain a right for stopping all traders through treaties and negotiations would be an endless task, and in many cases one that is altogether impossible. I am decidedly of opinion, therefore, that the shortest and simplest form of check we shall ever be able to impose is to obtain possession of the seaports, or line of Coast of Africa, whence the slaves are exported, and to prevent the arrival there of slaves from the interior, or the sale of them. Such a position would be but little expensive, I think, in comparison to the system of search at sea, and in harbours (even of African harbours), and would enable us, without a single treaty with any of the rulers of the Arabian Coast and Persian Gulf, to put down the whole traffic through its present channel.

"How such a command of the African ports is to be acquired I am unable to say. Possibly it may be deemed impracticable; but if it is not, it presents, in my estimation, the most effectual method of carrying our point.

"Lord Palmerston's offer to the Imaum of Muskat of £2,000 a year for three years appears to me to be totally inadequate to cover the losses which that chieftain would sustain by the abolition of the Slave Trade; for almost all his subjects are slaves, and he sells as well as exports them to Arabia and the Persian Gulf. We should therefore consider the whole value of his subjects annually sold by him, and not merely the custom duties of his ports, exacted from other slave dealers, if we adopt a pecuniary principle of remuneration for inducing him to abandon his Slave Trade."

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the nature of that suggested to be employed in the case of those Shaikhs who have treaties on the subject with us; so that while the Muskat, Turkish, and Persian Ports remain open markets for slaves, the diminution which we may perhaps succeed in effecting on the Arabian side of the Gulf will be most likely met by a nearly corresponding addition to the traffic of the places above alluded to.

Were it, however, possible to obtain from the Turkish and Persian Governments a prohibition to the sale of slaves in the several ports belonging to them in the Persian Gulf and river Euphrates, and at the same time to receive authority for our vessels of war to enforce such an interdict, I should entertain every hope, with the aid of an efficient squadron, of seeing the Slave Trade in this quarter completely suppressed in the course of a very few years.

EXTRACTS FROM THE RECORDS OF THE RESIDENCY AT BUSHIRE.

Slaves imported into Persia, through the southern ports, are of two kinds,—the Somalee, or African from the Coast of Zanzibar, the territory principally of the Imaum of Muskat; and Hubshee, or Abyssinian, from the shores of the Red Sea, Judda, Hodeida, Mocha, &c.

Slaves are but rarely kidnapped by the crews of the boats in which they are shipped for exportation, or indeed by the merchants themselves immediately on the coast, but by people employed for that purpose in the interior. A proportion are prisoners made in the petty wars between hostile tribes, and sold by them into slavery.

Muskat and Soor are the principal primary ports to which slaves, from whencesoever shipped, whether Zanzibar or the Red Sea, are brought, and whence they are eventually carried into Turkey, Persia, Sind, the Arab States, and even our own territories on the Western Coast of India. The boats conveying them make coasting voyages, selling individuals of their live cargo at the several ports at which they may touch. Of the above countries, Turkey consumes by far the greater proportion, Bussora and Bagdad being the largest marts.

No vessels proceed direct to Zanzibar from any of the Persian ports, with the exception of Lingah, whence three or four boats are annually despatched, each returning with about seventy slaves.

The season for the Gulf traffic in slaves is included between the 1st July and the 1st Nôvember.

At Bushire and the other Persian ports there are no particular spots allotted for slave markets, nor day fixed for the sale. On the arrival of a boat, the owner takes the slaves, or a number of them, forming his

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cargo, to a hired dwelling, where they are sold privately, or to a Karavanserai, where they are publicly exposed for sale. Should the market happen to be overstocked, or the owner find any obstacle to the expeditious disposal of his property, they are re-shipped, and conveyed to Mohumrah or Bussora, or even to Bagdad, at either of which places they are pretty certain of finding a ready sale.

The treatment of the African slaves is at no time either severe or cruel. During the sea voyage they are not bound, or kept under particular restraint. Rice, dates, and fish in sufficient quantities form their food, and a coarse cloth round the middle of the body constitutes their only clothing.

From the moment of their purchase at their eventual destination, however, their condition is materially improved, and, considered in the light of valuable property, liable to loss from sickness or death, they are comfortably provided for, and amply fed by their masters. They in return work hard, willingly, and well, and are apparently happy and contented.

Mules are furnished for their conveyance when purchased for re-sale in the interior. The males are employed in all hard and out-door work; the females in cooking and other domestic, but menial duties, and but very rarely as concubines, except among the poorer and lower classes.

The Hubshee slaves of either sex are at all times much cared for, well clothed, and well fed, and treated by their masters with almost equal attention with the members of their own families.

The males are early sent to school, and, having learnt to read and write, are employed in the performance of house duties as Peish Khidmuts, &c., and not unfrequently, if intelligent, in the most trustworthy situations, as supercargoes of vessels, stewards, and superintendents. The females are most generally retained as concubines, or employed as attendants in the Harem, in bringing Kaleeoons, and other light duties. The honesty and intelligence of the Hubshee slaves are almost proverbial.

Nubian and Hubshee eunuchs are rare, of very great price, and only purchased for the service of the king, nobles, and very rich merchants.

Boys are made eunuchs previous to their embarkation, and it is reported that in consequence of the ignorance of the operators, and the cruel mode of operation, of ten thus mutilated one only on an average survives.

The following statement of the number annually imported and sold in the Persian ports is the result of inquiries made at Bushire :—

	Africans.	Abyssinians.
At Bushire	250	25
At Lingah	350	15
At Congoon	150	10
At Bunder Abbas	300	20

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And allowing an importation of one hundred, or one hundred and fifty of the former, and ten of the latter, to Asceloo and the other numerous small ports, would give a total of one thousand one hundred and fifty and eighty respectively annually *imported into Persia* through the ports in the Gulf; but this by no means forms the whole number that find their way into the interior of that country. The large number of pilgrims that proceed annually to Mecca and Kerbelah return with slaves, averaging rich and poor one to each pilgrim.

An estimate of the number of slaves conveyed annually to Koweit, Bussora, and Mohumrah may be pretty accurately formed from the following abstract statement, derived from a register which was kept during a portion of one season at Karrack, during the period that island was occupied by the British Troops:—

Abstract Statement, showing the number of Boats belonging to particular Ports, which arrived at Karrack in August, September, and October 1841, *having Slaves on board.*

Number of Vessels belonging to each Port.	Greatest Number in one Boat.	Least Number in one Boat.	Number of Slaves.			Average of Slaves per Boat.	Remarks.
			Males.	Females.	Total.		
6 to Koweit	40	5	38	65	103	17	Of these boats, there were five bound for Koweit (or Grane), and 112 (or all the rest) for Bussora. The boats in general appear to have set out from the ports to which they belong.
36 to Soor	28	2	212	143	355	10	
16 to Muskat	42	1	92	74	166	10½	
1 to Island of Hamrah	12	12	2	10	12	12	
2 to Khaboora	5	2	6	1	7	3½	
6 to Sohar	44	4	33	54	87	14½	
20 to Lingah	27	1	72	122	194	9¾	
1 to Muharag	40	40	20	20	40	40	
1 to Charrak	23	23	6	17	23	23	
15 to Ras-ool-Khyma	26	1	62	81	143	9½	
1 to Aboothabee	1	1	..	1	1	1	
1 to Bahrein	1	1	..	1	1	1	
1 to Mogoo	1	1	1	1	2	1	
1 to Kishm	2	2	..	2	2	2	
2 to Yemen	11	11	6	5	11	11	
1 to Amulgavine	2	2	2	..	2	2	
111 boats	....	....	552	597	1,151	..	
6 other places	....	....	26	42	68	22½	
117	44	1	578	639	1,217	10½	

The aggregate here may be fairly increased by one-half on account of the lapse of a portion of the season before the register was commenced, and on account of boats conveying slaves which probably proceeded direct to their destination without touching at Karrack, and would thus amount to 1,828.

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Supposing that the trade in slaves with the ports on the Arabian Coast since 1831, when an estimate was made by Major Wilson, then Resident, has not materially altered, we shall have, in addition to the above,—300 slaves to Bahrein; 30 to Ras-ool-Khyma; and supposing 100 more to the ports of Debaye, Amulgavine, Ejman, and Aboothabee; total 430; making a grand total of 3,488 annually received in Persia, and five or six small towns of Arabia only.

Large as this number may appear, it is allowed, with regret, that if any error has been made it has been on the side of detraction, and not of exaggeration; and it must be further remembered, that it does not include the slaves brought to Muskat for sale on the spot, or for exportation, as before stated, to the ports of Sind, and even India.

The improved means of gaining information, and the greater earnestness with which the attention of the British Political Agent has been directed to the traffic in slaves, would account for the apparent increase in the number of individuals now annually imported when compared with estimates of former years.

Of African slaves imported, the number of males bears a pretty equal proportion to that of the females.

Of Hubshees, the greater number are females, in the proportion, perhaps, of two to one.

Price of Africans at Zanzibar.

Boys from seven to ten years of age	7 to 15 dollars.
Ditto ten to twenty ditto	15 to 30 „
Full grown men	17 to 20 „

The females are somewhat more valued than the males: a good stout lass will sell for 35 or 40 dollars. The profit on the above at Muskat is twenty per cent., and at Bussora and Bushire never less than fifty per cent.

The Hubshee females are much prized for their beauty, and symmetry of figure; their value from 60 to 200 dollars, or indeed to any amount. The males also are much valued; their price from 50 to 150 dollars, and upwards.

The slaves of either sex, whether Hubshee or African, of an age exceeding twenty years, on their first sale, are of less comparative value, from their being at that mature age less tractable, and taking less kindly to the language, religion, and customs of their masters.

A tax, amounting to about half a dollar, is levied upon every slave at the ports of Bussora, Bushire, Lingah, Bunder Abbas, and Muskat.

While every attempt is being made to confine and suppress the Slave Trade in these and all other foreign quarters, it is worthy of remark, that notwithstanding every precaution, and the risk of severe punishment,

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the traffic in slaves is being carried on, although to a very limited extent, on our shores: Negroes and Abyssinians are imported into India, and Indian boys and females exported in return for the latter. An adequate estimate may be formed from the accompanying statement, showing those only which have within the last three or four years been discovered and restored to home and liberty at one port alone (Muskat), through the exertions of our late very intelligent Agent, the Jew Khojah Reuben.*

In the month of February 1841, the Government of Bombay directed that a strict investigation should be made, with a view to ascertain the correctness of a report which had reached the Home Government, that vessels belonging to His Highness the Imaum of Muskat were in the habit of bringing Negro slaves from Africa for sale at Bombay, and of taking back Hindoo females for the same purpose at Zanzibar.

The following is the result of the first inquiries, in the words of the Resident, Captain Hennell:—

"It is with much regret that I have ascertained, from the statement made by Khojah Reuben, that there is but too much reason to believe that the reports made to Her Majesty's Government are not without foundation. I must, however, still report my firm conviction that His Highness the Imaum is not in the slightest degree aware that such a nefarious traffic is carried on by his vessels.

* May-June 1839.—An Indian girl recovered from slavery. She had been purchased, then five years old, at Mangalore, five years previous, by Abdoolla bin Khaleefa, an inhabitant of Ras-ool-Khyma, from Saeed, the servant of Syud Jaffer, a Dullal or broker of that place. On his arrival at Muskat, dreading the consequences of this proceeding, he voluntarily gave her up to the Native Agent there. The owner of the Buteel in which she had been brought at the same time entered a protest of his entire ignorance of the circumstances under which the child had been embarked in his vessel. She was returned to the place of her nativity in 1841.

An Indian girl liberated by the Native Agent after she had been publicly sold in the slave market at Muskat.

January-February 1842.—Through the laudable exertions of Khojah Reuben, the Native Agent at Muskat, two Indian girls were liberated from slavery, and subsequently restored to their homes. The one had been decoyed and kidnapped, and quietly embarked from Calcutta; the other, from Mangalore, had been sold or given away by her stepmother.

February 1843.—Another Indian girl released from slavery at Muskat. Belonging, as she did, to the Imaum's sister, the Native Agent was compelled to pay her value, but did so under a protest. The money was subsequently recovered.

May 1843.—An Indian girl was recovered by the Shaikh of Bunder Abbas from some Persian pilgrims on their way into the interior. She was sent to the charge of the Native Agent at Muskat, who forwarded her to the Presidency.

June 1843.—Four Indians were discovered to be in slavery at Muskat; nor was it until the lapse of an entire year that their liberation could be effected, notwithstanding repeated remonstrances addressed to Syud Soweynee, the Governor. The peremptory orders issued by his father, His Highness the Imaum, at the representation of the British Government, had at length the desired effect.

July 1843.—A Malabarce woman released from slavery, and sent to Bombay.

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"So far as I can learn, the manner in which slaves are introduced into our Indian possessions is by the males being classed on board the Arab vessels on which they are embarked as part of the crew, while the females are passed off as their wives. As a large portion of the crew of native boats is frequently composed of Negroes, it must of course be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for any examining officer to ascertain whether the Africans on board are *bonâ fide* seamen, or brought for sale. I am told, moreover, that so little repuguance is in general entertained by the Negroes themselves to be sold out of the vessels bringing them, that both males and females readily join in the deception, and, if interrogated, seldom if ever fail to corroborate the statement of the Nakhoda or commander as to their composing part of the equipage of the vessel or boat.

"It was at the same time admitted that great difficulty was experienced in kidnapping and embarking Indians; that few only were obtained annually, and these only by stealth.

"The Agent further stated that a great number of Negro and Abyssinian slaves were yearly landed in Bombay, the females being dressed up as men; while others, he asserted, were passed through the guards by means of bribes.

"The purchasers of such slaves are said to be generally from Lucknow and the Deccan.

"The country craft which trade between the Gulf and Bombay and the Malabar Coast almost all touch at the principal ports within the Gulf, and at Muskat and Soor, either to take in water or goods, before they strike across the Arabian and Indian Seas. Some of these belong no doubt to chiefs with whom we have treaties; but by far the greater number of this description of boats on that line are the property of horse-dealers and other merchants of Bussora, Koweit (or Grane), Bushire, Bahrein, and other smaller places on these shores, and of Bombay, &c.

"The temptation presented to these traders of taking a few slaves to India is very obvious, for the risk, at present at least, is next to nothing. The market being shut, the contraband importation of slaves must yield something, though but little beyond the usual profit, to those who venture on it. The facility with which slaves can be purchased in Lingah, Kishm, Muskat, Soor, and other ports, and secretly conveyed on board, is not greater than that with which they can be landed on the coast of India. There is no effective arrangement in operation for searching such vessels as carry these slaves, either at sea by our cruisers, or on arriving at Bombay or elsewhere; and even if a very expensive establishment were maintained at sea, and in all the bays and landing-places along the whole coast of Western India, for inspect-

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ing large boats, and every little boat which touches the shore, means would still be found, and an agency kept at work, to defeat, with considerable success, these endeavours."

In June of the year 1841, the *Kheleeya Kussum*, a native ship, under British colours, whose owner, Iwuz bin Humzan, was on board, arrived at Muskat from Mocha, and the Persian passengers landed forty-five male and female slaves.

The owner, on the circumstance being discovered and brought to his notice, lost no time in substituting the flag and register of His Highness the Imaum for those of the British Government, from a consciousness, probably, that he had rendered himself and vessel subject to heavy penalties, for his infraction of the regulations existing in Great Britain and her dependencies against the Slave Trade. No further steps were taken in the matter, further than that His Highness the Imaum withdrew the protection of his flag at the request of the British Government. The owner, upon this, after incurring much loss from detention, and constantly under dread of impending punishment, adopted the Mocha colours, obtained from the Shereef, and eventually sold his vessel.

This was probably not the first case, nor has it been the last, in which the protection and character of the British flag have been made subservient to the interests of slave-owners; nor can ignorance of the rules and regulations of Government with reference to the Slave Trade be fairly urged as an excuse by the owners and commanders for becoming parties to such nefarious transactions.

It may with confidence be asserted that, with very few exceptions, ships under British colours, owned by natives of India, or naturalised subjects, commanded by European officers, and having an Arab or native supercargo, carry a certain proportion of slaves, not perhaps intended for sale, but as the concubines or personal attendants of the latter; further, that a certain proportion of the crews of Buggalows carrying the British pass and colours, trading between India and the ports of the Persian Gulf, are slaves. It is needless to remark the facility with which a few destined for sale at Bombay or elsewhere could be entered on board as sailors, and the difficulty of making the distinction, unless the individuals would themselves come forward and assert their natural rights.

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ENGAGEMENTS ENTERED INTO BY HIS HIGHNESS THE IMAUM OF MUSKAT WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE SLAVE TRADE.

Articles of an Engagement proposed under date the 29th August 1822 *by Captain* Fairfax Moresby, *commanding His Britannic Majesty's ship* Menai, *to His Highness the* Imaum of Muskat, *for the Prevention of the Slave Trade.*

Article I.

The Imaum to agree that all external traffic in slaves shall cease and be abolished for ever from his dominions and dependencies.

Article II.

The Imaum to agree that all vessels carrying the flag of His Highness, or belonging to or navigated by his subjects, found or convicted of being engaged in the traffic of slaves to other places than his dominions, shall be considered as pirates, and confiscated; the owners, captain, and officers, shall be treated as pirates, and have their goods and property forfeited to the Imaum.

Article III.

That all other persons serving on board such vessels as seamen, or in any capacity, who shall not give information of such unlawful transactions to the Imaum or his governors, within three months after the period of the termination of the voyage, shall be punished by fine, imprisonment, and corporal infliction.

Article IV.

His Highness engages to appoint at such places as His Majesty the King of Great Britain may wish, habitations for the residence of Consuls,

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Agents, and others charged with the suppression of the Slave Trade by English subjects; such Consuls, Agents, or others, are to receive the assistance, on application, of His Highness the Imaum, or his Lieutenant Governor, or others, for the apprehension and detention of all English subjects who may attempt the traffic.

ARTICLE V.

That no individual may plead ignorance of the limit within which the Slave Trade is confined, the Imaum to agree that all vessels under His Highness' flag, commanded or owned by any of his subjects, found trading in slaves to the southward of the parallel of Cape Delgado, His Highness' most southern possession in Africa, or to the eastward of a line drawn from that cape, past the east point of the Isle Socotra, on to the Persian shore, shall be liable to seizure and confiscation by any of His Britannic Majesty's cruisers, or officers of customs, or others deputed by any of His Britannic Majesty's governors, and dealt with the same as if such ship or vessel seized was navigated under the English flag.

ARTICLE VI.

His Highness the Imaum must engage to publish, in all the dominions and dependencies of his Government, the present Treaty, and to consider it equally binding on them all; and finally to agree that the Treaty is to be forwarded without loss of time to His Highness the Imaum; nevertheless the Treaty is to be carried into full effect from the present date.

(Signed) FAIRFAX MORESBY,
Captain, His Majesty's Ship *Menai*.

Muskat, 29*th August* 1822.

Translation of an Arabic Paper prepared by His Highness the IMAUM OF MUSKAT, *and signed and sealed by His Highness on the 7th September* 1822, *purporting to contain, on the one side, the substance of each of the above Requisitions made on His Highness by Captain* MORESBY, *and on the other, His Highness' Assent to the same.*

Requisitions made on His Highness the IMAUM OF MUSKAT, *by Captain* MORESBY, *of His Majesty's ship* Menai, *Commissioner, vested with full powers by His Excellency Sir* ROBERT FARQUHAR, *Bart., Governor of the Island of Mauritius.*

ARTICLE I.

That you (the Imaum of Muskat) do instruct all the governors and authorities throughout your dominions to prohibit the sale of slaves by your subjects to Christians of every description.

ARTICLE II.

That you do issue orders to all your officers throughout your dominions, as well in Zanzibar as in other places, that if they discover the owners of any Arab vessels buying slaves for the Christian market, they do take possession of such vessels, with whatever they may contain, and send them to you (the Imaum), with their commanders and crews, for punishment.

ARTICLE III.

That it be made imperative upon the crews of all ships that shall clandestinely transport slaves to Christian countries, to give, on their return to the Arab port whence they set sail, information of such traffic to the governor or authority at that port, that he may punish the commanders of such ships; also, that on failing to give this information, they (the crews) shall themselves suffer punishment.

ARTICLE IV.

That you give me a written

Answers under His Highness the IMAUM OF MUSKAT'S *Hand and Seal, to the Requisitions made by Captain* MORESBY, *of His Majesty's ship* Menai, *Commissioner, &c.*

I.

I did write last season to all my officers, positively prohibiting the sale of slaves to any Christian nation, and I will repeat those orders.

II.

I will send orders to all the officers throughout my dominions, that if they find (the owners of) any Arab vessels buying slaves for sale in Christian countries, they must take possession of all such vessels, and inflict punishment on the commanders (owners) thereof, even though they be bound for Madagascar.

III.

I will instruct my officers, and publish generally, such instructions throughout my dominions, that the crews of any vessels carrying slaves for sale in Christian countries be enjoined on their return to the Arab port to give information to the authority at such port, that he may punish the commanders, and that if they come to be detected in concealing such information, they (the crews) shall themselves suffer punishment.

IV.

The authority you require, per-

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authority from yourself, addressed to the Governor of Zanzibar, and all other your governors in that quarter, that they do permit us (the British) to appoint on our own part an Agent at every such place in those countries as we shall see fit, and that they do allow such Agents a place of residence, in order that we (they) may have intelligence of all vessels that may be found conveying slaves to Christian countries.

ARTICLE V.

That you give us a written authority from yourself, permitting us to seize all vessels that we may find laden with slaves for sale in Christian countries, after the expiration of four months from the date of such permission.

ARTICLE VI.

That you do instruct all your governors, that on the sailing of all vessels from their ports, a statement in writing shall be given to the commander, certifying what port they have left, and whither they are bound, in order that if our ships meet such vessels laden with slaves bound for Christian countries, and unfurnished with such written statement, they (British ships) may seize them; such ships, if found within the line of Madagascar and in the seas adjacent to Zanzibar and Lamoch, to be carried into Muskat for punishment there, but all vessels found beyond Madagascar, and in the seas of the Isle of France, shall be taken possession

mitting the settlement of an Agent on your part in Zanzibar and the neighbouring parts, for the purpose of having intelligence and watching the traffic in slaves with Christian nations, is granted, and I now give it to Captain Moresby.

V.

The authority you have required, permitting (to you) after the expiration of four months, the seizure of all vessels laden with slaves bound for Christian countries, is hereby granted to Captain Moresby.

VI.

I will write to my governors regarding the statement to be given in writing to all ships departing on a voyage, certifying from what port they have come, and whither they are bound, and you may seize every vessel you may fall in with beyond Madagascar, and in the sea of Mauritius, after four months from the date of the permission contained in the answer to Requisition V., above acceded to, and you may carry in to me for my disposal any ship you may meet even on this side (the Isle of France), provided she have not the written statement required from the governor of the port whence she sailed.

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of by them (British ships) after four months from the date of the permission required in the preceding requisition (V.).

(Signed) SYUD SAEED.

Seal of His Highness the Imaum of Muskat.

Dated 7th September 1822.

(True translation)

(Signed) WM. SIMSON,

Deputy Persian Secretary to Government.

Additional Requisition made by Captain MORESBY *on His Highness the* IMAUM OF MUSKAT, *on the 8th September* 1822, *and agreed to by His Highness on the 10th of the same month.*

Additional Requisition by Captain MORESBY.

That it may be understood in the most comprehensive manner where Arab ships are liable to seizure by His Majesty the King of England's cruisers, after the expiration of four months, the Imaum to authorise that the King of England's cruisers finding Arab ships with slaves on board to the eastward of a line drawn from Cape Delgado, passing (60) sixty miles east of Socotra, on to Diu Head, forming the western point of the Gulf of Cambay (unless driven by stress of weather), shall be seized and treated by His Majesty's cruisers in the same manner as if they were under the English flag.

Seal of Captain Moresby.

Answer by His Highness the IMAUM.

I permit to the Captains of His Majesty the King of England's cruisers, to seize vessels to the eastward of the line drawn by Captain Moresby, but confine the permission to the King of England's cruisers, and not the Company's.

(Signed) SYUD SAEED.

Seal of His Highness the Imaum of Muskat.

(Signed) F. MORESBY,

Captain, His Majesty's Ship *Menai*.

10th September 1822.

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Translation of a Letter without date, but addressed in September 1822 *by His Highness the* Imaum of Muskat *to His Excellency Sir* Robert T. Farquhar, *Governor of the Isle of France.*

If any ships belonging to my people carry slaves to Christian countries, I have fully permitted you to order your vessels to seize any Arab vessels having a cargo of slaves beyond Madagascar, after four months after date of this letter.

Translation of a Letter addressed on the same occasion by His Highness the Imaum of Muskat *to the* Governor of Zanzibar, *&c.*

Whoever receives this letter at Zanzibar, at Quiloa, or any parts within my dominion, it is to let you know, that I have permitted my friends the English to keep an Agent in any part of my country they may choose, and you are to give a house to the English Agent, and wherever he may stay you are to pay him great respect, and no one must refuse to receive the Agent.

On the 17th December 1839, *His Highness the* Imaum of Muskat *consented to the three following Articles being added to the foregoing Treaty for the Suppression of the Slave Trade, concluded by His Highness with Captain* Moresby *in September* 1822.

I agree that the following Articles be added to the above Treaty, concluded by Captain Moresby on the aforesaid date.

Article I.

That the Government cruisers, whenever they may meet vessels belonging to my subjects beyond a direct line drawn from Cape Delgado, passing two degrees seaward of the island of Socotra, and ending at Pussem, and shall suspect that such vessel is engaged in the Slave Trade, the said cruisers are permitted to detain and search it.

Article II.

Should it on examination be found that any vessel belonging to my subjects is carrying slaves, whether men, women, or children, for sale, beyond the aforesaid line, then the Government cruisers shall seize and confiscate such vessel and her cargo. But if the said vessel shall pass beyond the aforesaid line, owing to stress of weather, or other case of necessity, not under control, then she shall not be seized.

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Article III.

As the selling of males and females, whether grown up or young, who are "Hoor," or free, is contrary to the Mahomedan religion, and whereas the Somalees are included in the "Hoor," or free, I do hereby agree that the sale of males and females, whether young or old, of the Somalee Tribe, shall be considered as piracy, and that four months from this date, all those of my people convicted of being concerned in such an act shall be punished as pirates.

Dated 10th Shuwal 1255 A. H. *(corresponding with the 17th December* 1839 A. D.).

Seal of His Highness the Imaum of Muskat.

(True translation)

(Signed) S. Hennell,
Resident, Persian Gulf.

Memorandum.—*Under date the 18th August* 1845, *His Highness the* Imaum of Muskat *addressed the following letter to Captain* Hamerton, *relative to an omission which had been discovered to exist in Article IV.* of the Arabic version of the Treaty concluded by His Highness with Captain* Moresby *in September* 1822.

A. C.

Your excellent letter has reached, and your friend understood its contents. You say that you have received a letter from the mighty Government, containing orders to you to bring to our notice that in Article IV. of the Treaty we concluded with Captain Moresby in the year 1822, it is mentioned in the English version that it is incumbent on us, and our heirs and governors, to assist in apprehending English subjects engaged in the Slave Trade, but that such is not mentioned in the Arabic version (translation) of the Treaty. My friend, not considering it necessary to alter the Treaty, nevertheless we consider it is incumbent on us, our heirs, and governors, that we should assist to apprehend English subjects who may be engaged in the Slave Trade.

Therefore, whoever shall be accredited from the Government, and

* Vide page 655 of this Selection.

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require assistance from us, shall receive it accordingly. Whatever you may require, let us know ; and peace on you.

Dated 4th Shaban 1261 A. H. *(corresponding with the 18th August* 1845 A. D.).

(Signed) SYUD SAEED.

(True translation)

(Signed) A. HAMERTON, Captain,
Her Majesty's Consul, and Honorable Company's Agent
in the Dominions of the Imaum of Muskat.

Further Agreement concluded at Zanzibar with His Highness the* IMAUM OF MUSKAT, *on the 2nd October* 1845, *by Captain* ATKINS HAMERTON, *of the 15th Regiment Bombay N. I., on behalf of Her Britannic Majesty, for the Suppression, from and after the 1st January* 1847, *of the Exportation of Slaves from His Highness' African Dominions.*

Agreement between Her Majesty the QUEEN OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND, *and His Highness* SYUD SAEED *bin* SULTAN, *the Sultan of Muskat, for the termination of the export of Slaves from the African Dominions of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat.*

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, being earnestly desirous that the export of slaves from the African dominions of His Highness the Sultan of Muskat should cease, and His Highness the Sultan of Muskat, in deference to the wishes of Her Majesty and of the British nation, and in furtherance of the dictates of humanity which have heretofore induced him to enter into Engagements with Great Britain to restrict the export of slaves from his dominions, being willing to put an end to that trade, and Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and His Highness the Sultan of Muskat having resolved to record with due form and solemnity this further restriction of the export of slaves, and Her Majesty having given due authority to Captain Hamerton, her representative at the Court of the Sultan of Muskat, to conclude an Agreement with His Highness accordingly, His Highness Syud Saeed bin Sultan, for himself, his heirs and successors, and Captain Hamerton,

* Under date the 5th September 1848 an Act was passed by the British Parliament, for giving effect to the provisions of this Agreement. A copy of this Act (Cap. CXXVIII. Anno Undecimo et Duodecimo Victoriæ Reginæ) is annexed.—*Editor.*

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on behalf of the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, her heirs and successors, have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles :—

ARTICLE I.

His Highness the Sultan of Muskat hereby engages to prohibit, under the severest penalties, the export of slaves from his African dominions, and to issue orders to his officers to prevent and suppress such trade.

ARTICLE II.

His Highness the Sultan of Muskat further engages to prohibit, under the severest penalties, the importation of slaves from any part of Africa into his possessions in Asia; and to use his utmost influence with all the Chiefs of Arabia, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf, in like manner to prevent the introduction of slaves from Africa into their respective territories.

ARTICLE III.

His Highness the Sultan of Muskat grants to the ships of Her Majesty's Navy, as well as to those of the East India Company, permission to seize and confiscate any vessels, the property of His Highness or of his subjects, carrying on Slave Trade, excepting only such as are engaged in the transport of slaves from one port to another of his own dominions in Africa, between the port of Lamoo to the north, and its dependencies, the northern limit of which is the north point of Kaghoo Island, in 1° 57′ (one degree and fifty-seven minutes) south latitude, and the port of Keelwa to the south, and its dependencies, the southern limit of which is the Souga Munara, or Pagoda Point, in 9° 2′ (nine degrees and two minutes) south latitude, including the islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, and Monfea.

ARTICLE IV.

This Agreement to commence and have effect from the 1st day of January 1847 (one thousand eight hundred and forty-seven) of the year of Christ, and the 15th day of the month of Mohurum 1263 (twelve hundred and sixty-three) of the Hijree.

Done at Zanzibar, this 2nd (second) day of October 1845 *(one thousand eight hundred and forty-five) of the year of Christ, and 29th day of Rumzan* 1261 *(twelve hundred and sixty-one) of the Hijree.*

(Signed) SYUD SAEED.

Seal of His Highness the Imaum of Muskat.

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On behalf of Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, her heirs and successors.

(Signed) ATKINS HAMERTON,
Captain.

Seal of Captain Hamerton.

ANNO UNDECIMO ET DUODECIMO VICTORIÆ REGINÆ. CAP. CXXVIII.

An Act for carrying into effect the Agreement between* HER MAJESTY *and the* IMAUM OF MUSKAT, *for the more effectual Suppression of the Slave Trade.* [5th September 1848.]

WHEREAS *on the second day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty-five, an Agreement was concluded and signed at Zanzibar, between Captain* ATKINS HAMERTON, *of Her Majesty's Royal Navy,† on behalf of Her Majesty the* QUEEN OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND, *and his Highness* SYUD SAEED *bin* SULTAN, *the Imaum of Muskat, whereby it was agreed as follows:—*

ARTICLE I.

His Highness the Sultan of Muskat hereby engages to prohibit, under the severest penalties, the export of slaves from his African dominions, and to issue orders to his officers to prevent and suppress such trade.

ARTICLE II.

His Highness the Sultan of Muskat further engages to prohibit, under the severest penalties, the importation of slaves from any part of Africa into his possessions in Asia, and to use his utmost influence with all the Chiefs of Arabia, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf, in like manner to prevent the introduction of slaves from Africa into their respective territories.

ARTICLE III.

His Highness the Sultan of Muskat grants to the ships of Her Majesty's Navy, as well as those of the East India Company, permission to seize and confiscate any vessels, the property of His Highness or of

* Instructions to the Commanders of the Honorable East India Company's ships, for carrying into execution the provisions of this Act, will be found at the end of this Selection.—*Editor.*

† *For* "Her Majesty's Royal Navy," *read* "15th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry."—*Editor.*

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his subjects, carrying on Slave Trade, excepting such only as are engaged in the transport of slaves from one port to another of his own dominions in Africa, between the port of Lamoo to the north, and its dependencies, the northern limit of which is the north point of Kaghoo Island, in 1° 57′ south latitude, and the port of Keelwa to the south, and its dependencies, the southern limit of which is the Souga Munara, or Pagoda Point, in 9° 2′ south latitude, including the islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, and Monfea.

ARTICLE IV.

This Agreement to commence and have effect from the first day of January, one thousand eight hundred and forty-seven of the year of Christ, and the fifteenth day of the month of Mohurum, one thousand two hundred and sixty-three of the Hijree.

Done at Zanzibar, this second day of October, one thousand eight hundred and forty-five of the year of Christ, and twenty-ninth day of Rumzan, one thousand two hundred and sixty-one of the Hijree.

(Signed) SYUD SAEED bin SULTAN,
Imaum of Muskat.

(Signed) ATKINS HAMERTON, Captain,
On behalf of Her Majesty the QUEEN OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND, Her Heirs and Successors.

And whereas it is expedient and necessary that effectual provision should be made for carrying into execution the provisions of the said Agreement:—

Power to Commanders of Ships of War and of the East India Company to visit Vessels belonging to Subjects of the Imaum of Muskat, within certain limits, suspected of being engaged in the Slave Trade.

I. Be it therefore enacted by the Queen's most excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, That it shall be lawful for the commanders and other officers of Her Majesty's ships of war, or of the East India Company, to visit, and detain in any seas, except within the limits exempted by the terms of Article III. of the said Agreement, any merchant vessel belonging to the subjects of the Imaum of Muskat, which shall upon reasonable grounds be suspected of being engaged in the export of slaves from the African dominions of the Imaum of Muskat, or the importation of slaves from any part of Africa into his possessions in Asia, excepting such only as are engaged in the transport of slaves from one port to another of his own dominions in Africa, between the port of Lamoo to the north, and its dependencies,

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the northern limit of which is the north point of Kaghoo Island, in 1° 57′ south latitude, and the port of Keelwa to the south, and its dependencies, the southern limit of which is the Souga Munara, or Pagoda Point, in 9° 2′ south latitude, including the islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, and Monfea, or any vessel fitted out for that purpose, and to send or carry away such vessel, together with its master, sailors, passengers, slaves, and cargo, for the purpose of such vessel being brought to adjudication as hereinafter mentioned.

As to the Trial of Vessels engaged in the Slave Trade.

II. And be it enacted, That it shall be lawful for the High Court of Admiralty of England, and for all Courts of Vice-Admiralty in any dominions of Her Majesty beyond the seas, including those Courts of Vice-Admiralty within the territories under the Government of the East India Company, to take cognisance of and try any such vessel which shall be detained or captured for the violation of the said Agreement, and to condemn any such vessel to Her Majesty, and adjudge as to the slaves found therein, in like manner, and under such and the like rules and regulations as are contained in any Act or Acts of Parliament in force in relation to the suppression of the Slave Trade by British-owned ships, as fully as if all the powers and provisions contained in such Acts were re-enacted in this Act as to such High Court of Admiralty or Courts of Vice-Admiralty.

Persons giving false Evidence deemed guilty of Perjury.

III. And be it enacted, That every person who shall wilfully and corruptly give false evidence in any examination or deposition had, or affidavit taken in, any proceeding under the said Agreement, or under this Act, shall be deemed guilty of perjury, and being thereof convicted, shall be subject and liable to all the punishments, pains and penalties to which persons convicted of wilful and corrupt perjury are liable; and every such person may be tried for any such perjury, either in the place where the offence was committed, or in any colony or settlement of Her Majesty near thereto in which there is a Court of competent jurisdiction to try any such offence, or in Her Majesty's Court of Queen's Bench in England; and that in case of any prosecution for such offence in Her Majesty's said Court of Queen's Bench, the venue may be laid in the county of Middlesex.

Pendency of Suits to be a Bar to any Proceedings instituted for the recovery of the Vessels detained.

IV. And be it enacted, That the pendency of any suit or proceeding instituted for the condemnation or restitution of any ship or cargo, or slaves, taken, seized, or detained by virtue of the said Agreement, or the final adjudication, condemnation, or judgment or determination thereupon, may be pleaded in bar, or given in evidence under the general issue, and shall be deemed in any Court whatever to

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be a complete bar in any action, suit, or proceeding, whether instituted by any person or persons for the recovery of any such ship, vessel, or cargo, or of any damage or for any injury sustained thereby, or by the persons on board the same, in consequence of any capture, seizure, or detention, or anything done under or in pursuance of the provisions of the said Agreement.

Vessels condemned to be sold for Her Majesty's Service, or broken up.

V. And be it enacted, That any ship or vessel which shall be condemned as aforesaid may be taken into Her Majesty's Service, upon payment of such sum as the Lord High Admiral or the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty shall deem a proper price for the same; or, if not so taken, shall be broken up and demolished, and the materials thereof shall be publicly sold in separate parts, and the proceeds thereof shall be paid to such person or persons as the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury may appoint to receive the same.

Captors of Vessels shall, after the same are condemned, be entitled to the proceeds belonging to Her Majesty.

VI. And be it enacted, That where any ship or vessel employed or engaged in such illicit traffic in slaves, in violation of the said Agreement, shall be seized by any ship or vessel belonging to Her Majesty or the East India Company, and afterwards condemned, there shall be paid to the captors the net proceeds to which Her Majesty is entitled, the same to be distributed in the manner hereinafter directed for the distribution of bounties on slaves taken on board the said vessels.

A Bounty of 5*l.* for every Slave found on board of Vessels seized and condemned.

VII. And be it enacted, That there shall be paid to the commanders, officers, and crews of Her Majesty's ships, or the commanders, officers, and crews of the ships of the East India Company, a bounty of five pounds for every man, woman, and child slave seized and found on board any ship or vessel taken and condemned in pursuance of the provisions of the said Agreement and of this Act; such bounty to be issued and paid by order from the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, and to be distributed to and amongst the captors aforesaid, in such manner and proportions as Her Majesty shall think fit to order by any Order in Council, made or to be made, or by any Proclamation for that purpose.

A Bounty to be paid on Tonnage of Slave Ships captured and demolished.

VIII. And be it enacted, That where any ship or vessel which shall have been seized and condemned under the provisions of the said Agreement shall have been or shall be demolished, and the materials thereof publicly sold in separate parts, as well as her cargo, there shall be paid to the commanders, officers, and crews of Her Majesty's ships, or of

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those of the East India Company, in addition to the amount of the proceeds of such sale, as hereinbefore mentioned, a further bounty on the tonnage of such ship or vessel at the rate of thirty shillings for every ton of such tonnage.

IX. And be it enacted, That where any ship or vessel having no slaves on board shall have been seized and condemned under the provisions of the said Agreement, there shall be paid to the commanders, officers, and crews of Her Majesty's ships, or of those of the East India Company, an additional bounty upon the tonnage of such ship or vessel, at the rate of four pounds for every ton; and the tonnage of all such vessels shall be ascertained according to the mode of ascertaining the admeasurement of British vessels, either by the principal officer of the customs at the port where the vessel may be at the time of condemnation, or in default thereof by the best evidence which can be obtained: Provided always, that in every case in which any ship or vessel shall be seized with slaves on board, in which the bounty calculated upon the number of slaves shall be less than the bounty calculated upon the tonnage, the commanders of Her Majesty's ships, or of those of the East India Company, making the seizure, may elect to take the bounty calculated according to tonnage, instead of the bounty which would be payable upon the number of slaves on board.

Where no Slaves are on board a Ship seized and condemned, an additional Bounty to be paid on Tonnage.

X. And be it enacted, That all bounties payable under this Act shall be paid out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland to the commanders, officers, and crews of Her Majesty's ships, and of the ships of the East India Company, and such bounties shall be issued and paid by order from the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury.

Bounties to be paid out of the Consolidated Fund.

XI. And be it enacted, That the said bounty, as also all bounties payable under any of the Acts for the abolition or suppression of the Slave Trade, shall not hereafter be charged with Treasury fees or Exchequer fees of any description.

Bounties not liable to payment of Fees.

XII. Provided always, and be it enacted, That in order to entitle the captors to receive the said bounty money, the tonnage of the ship or vessel so seized and condemned shall be proved to the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, by producing a copy, duly certified, of the sentence or decree of condemnation, or by such documentary or other evidence as they may deem satisfactory.

Captors entitled to Bounty to give proof of Tonnage.

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XIII. Provided always, and be it enacted, That in order to entitle the captors to receive the said bounty money on slaves, the number of men, women, and children so taken, delivered over, and condemned, shall be proved to the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, by producing a copy, duly certified, of the sentence or decree of condemnation, and also a certificate under the hand of the proper officer or officers, military or civil, who may be appointed to receive such slaves.

Copy of Sentence of Condemnation to be produced to the Treasury.

XIV. And be it enacted, That where any slaves, or persons treated as slaves, shall be seized on board any ship or vessel taken and condemned in pursuance of the said Agreement and of this Act, but who shall not have been delivered over in consequence of death, sickness, or other inevitable circumstance, it shall be lawful for the said Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, if to their discretion it shall seem meet, to direct payment of one moiety of the bounty which would have been due in each case respectively if the said slaves had been delivered over.

In certain cases Treasury may order one Moiety of the Bounty to be paid.

XV. Provided also, and be it enacted, That any party or parties claiming any benefit by way of bounty under the provisions of this Act, or of any share of the proceeds of any vessel confiscated in pursuance of the provisions of the aforesaid Agreement, may resort to the High Court of Admiralty for the purpose of obtaining the judgment of the said Court in that behalf; and that it shall be lawful for the Judge of the said High Court of Admiralty to determine thereon, and also to hear and determine any question of joint capture which may arise upon any seizure made in pursuance of this Act, and also to enforce any decrees or sentences of the said Vice-Admiralty Courts relating to any such seizure.

Parties claiming benefit under this Act may resort to the Court of Admiralty.

XVI. And be it enacted, That all the provisions, rules, regulations, forfeitures, and penalties respecting the delivery by Prize Agents of accounts for examination, and distribution of prize-money, and the accounting for and paying over the proceeds of prize, and the per-centage due thereon to Greenwich Hospital, shall be extended to all bounties and proceeds to be distributed under the provisions of this Act to the officers and crews of any of Her Majesty's ships and vessels of war.

Regulations and Penalties to which Prize Agents are liable extended to Bounties, &c. under this Act.

XVII. And be it enacted, That where any ship or vessel belonging, in whole or in part, to subjects of the Imaum of Muskat, shall have been detained and brought to adjudication by any officers of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, or of

Treasury may order payment of Costs awarded for Vessels detained, but not condemned.

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those of the East India Company, and the said ship shall be restored by sentence of the Court, it shall be lawful for the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, by warrant signed by any three or more of them, to direct payment to be made out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, of any costs or damages which may be duly awarded: Provided always, that nothing herein contained shall exempt such officer from his liability to make good the payments so made when lawfully called upon, either by the parties interested therein or by order of the said Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury.

Treasury may repay to the Seizor of any Vessel not condemned the expenses incurred by him.

XVIII. And be it enacted, That when any seizure shall be made by any of the commanders, officers, and crews of Her Majesty's ships, or of those of the East India Company, and judgment shall be given against the seizor, or when such seizure shall be relinquished by him, it shall be lawful for the said Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, if to their discretion it shall seem meet, by warrant, signed by any three or more of them, to direct payment to be made out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, of such costs and expenses as the seizor may have incurred in respect of such seizure, or any proportional part thereof.

ENGAGEMENTS ENTERED INTO BY THE ARAB CHIEFS OF THE PERSIAN GULF, WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE SLAVE TRADE.—1838 to 1847.

Agreement with Shaikh Sultan *bin* Suggur, *Chief of Ras-ool-Khyma, ceding to British Cruisers the right of searching his Vessels upon the high seas, when suspected of having Slaves on board; and also ceding the right of Seizure and Confiscation, in the event of the suspicion being proved to be well founded.*

In the event of vessels connected with my ports, or belonging to my subjects, coming under the suspicion of being employed in the carrying off (literally "stealing") and embarkation of slaves, men, women, or children, I, Sultan bin Suggur, Shaikh of the Joasmee Tribe, do hereby agree to their being detained and searched, whenever and wherever they may be fallen in with on the seas, by the cruisers of the British Government; and further, that upon its being ascertained that the

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crews have carried off (literally "stolen") and embarked slaves, their vessels shall be liable to seizure and confiscation by the aforesaid cruisers.

Dated Shargah, 17th April 1838 A. D. *(corresponding with the 22nd Mohurum,* A. H. 1254, *Mahomedan Era).*

The (Seal) of Sultan bin Suggur.

(True translation)
(Signed) S. Hennell,
Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Agreement for the Suppression of the Slave Trade in the Persian Gulf, entered into by Shaikh Sultan *bin* Suggur, *Chief of Ras-ool-Khyma, dated off Ras-ool-Khyma, 3rd July* 1839.

I, Sultan bin Suggur, Shaikh of the Joasmee Tribe, do hereby declare that I bind and pledge myself to the British Government, in the following engagements:—

Article I.

That the Government cruisers, whenever they may meet any vessel belonging to myself, or my subjects, beyond a direct line drawn from Cape Delgado, passing two degrees seaward of the island of Socotra, and ending at Cape Guadel, and shall suspect that such vessel is engaged in the Slave Trade, the said cruisers are permitted to detain and search it.

Article II.

Should it on examination be proved that any vessel belonging to myself or my subjects is carrying slaves, whether men, women, or children, for sale, beyond the aforesaid line, then the Government cruisers shall seize and confiscate such vessel and her cargo. But if the aforesaid vessel shall pass beyond the aforesaid line owing to stress of weather, or other case of necessity not under control, then she shall not be seized.

Article III.

As the selling of males and females, whether grown up or young, who are "Hoor," or free, is contrary to the Mahomedan religion, and whereas the Somalee Tribe is included in the "Hoor," or free, I, Sultan bin Suggur, do hereby agree, that the sale of males and females, whether young or old, of the Somalee Tribe, shall be considered as piracy;

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and that after four months from this date, all those of my people convicted of being concerned in such an act shall be punished the same as pirates.

Seal of (L. S.) Sultan bin Suggur.

(True translation)
(Signed) S. Hennell,
Resident in the Persian Gulf.

A similar Agreement to the above was entered into by Shaikh Khaleefa bin Shakboot on the 1st July 1839; and by Shaikh Muktoom of Debaye, and Shaikh Abdoolla bin Rashid of Amulgavine, on the 2nd of the same month.

(Signed) S. Hennell,
Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Translation of an Engagement entered into by* Shaikh Sultan *bin* Suggur, *Chief of Ras-ool-Khyma and Shargah, for the Abolition of the African Slave Trade in his Ports.—Dated the* 30*th April* 1847.

It having been intimated to me by Major Hennell, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, that certain Conventions have lately been entered into by His Highness the Imaum of Muskat, and other powers, with the British Government, for the purpose of preventing the exportation of slaves from the African Coast and elsewhere; and it having moreover been explained to me, that in order to the full attainment of the objects contemplated by the aforesaid Conventions, the concurrence and co-operation of the chiefs of the several ports situated on the Arabian Coast of the Persian Gulf are required: accordingly I, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, Chief of the Joasmee Tribe, with a view to strengthen the bonds of friendship existing between me and the British Government, do hereby engage to prohibit the exportation of slaves from the Coast of Africa and elsewhere, on board of my vessels, and those belonging to my subjects or dependents; such prohibition to take effect from the 1st day of Mohurum 1264 A. H. (or 10th December 1847 A. D.).

And I do further consent, that whenever the cruisers of the British Government fall in with any of my vessels, or those belonging to my subjects or dependents, suspected of being engaged in the Slave Trade,

* On the 1st August 1849, an Act for carrying into effect the provisions of this Engagement was passed by the British Parliament. A copy of this Act (12° and 13° Victoriæ, Cap. LXXXIV.) is annexed.—*Editor.*

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they may detain and search them; and in case of their finding that any of the vessels aforesaid have violated this Engagement, by the exportation of slaves from the Coast of Africa or elsewhere, upon any pretext whatever, they (the Government cruisers) shall seize and confiscate the same.

Dated this 14*th day of Jumadee-ool-Awul* 1263 A. H. (*or* 30*th day of April* 1847 A. D.).

(True translation)
(Signed) S. Hennell,
Resident in the Persian Gulf.

L. S.

Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur.

The five following Maritime Arab Chiefs entered into engagements precisely similar to the above, on the dates mentioned opposite their respective names:—

1, Shaikh Muktoom, of Debaye, on the 30th April 1847.
2, Shaikh Abdool Azeez, of Ejman, on the 1st May 1847.
3, Shaikh Abdoolla bin Rashid, of Amulgavine, do.
4, Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, of Aboothabee, on the 3rd May 1847.
5, Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa, of Bahrein, on the 8th May 1847.

(Signed) S. Hennell,
Resident in the Persian Gulf.

12°· & 13°· VICTORIÆ.

CAP. LXXXIV.

An Act for carrying into effect Engagements between Her Majesty *and certain* Arabian Chiefs *in the Persian Gulf, for the more effectual Suppression of the Slave Trade.*

[1st August 1849.]

Whereas, *on the thirtieth day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty-seven, an Engagement was concluded between Major* S. Hennell, *the Resident in the Persian Gulf, on behalf of Her Majesty the* Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, *and* Sultan *bin* Suggur, *Shaikh of Ras-ool-Khyma and Shargah, in the Persian Gulf, the Chief of the Joasmee Arabs, whereby it was agreed as follows:—*

"I, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, Chief of the Joasmee Tribe, with a view

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to strengthen the bonds of friendship existing between me and the British Government, do hereby engage to prohibit the exportation of slaves from the Coasts of Africa and elsewhere on board of my vessels, and those belonging to my subjects or dependents; such prohibition to take effect from the 1st day of Mohurum 1264 A. H. (or 10th December 1847 A. D.).

"And I do further consent, that whenever the cruisers of the British Government fall in with any of my vessels, or those belonging to my subjects or dependents, suspected of being engaged in the Slave Trade, they may detain and search them; and in case of their finding that any of the vessels aforesaid have violated this Engagement, by the exportation of slaves from the Coasts of Africa or elsewhere, upon any pretext whatsoever, they (the Government cruisers) shall seize and confiscate the same."

And whereas, on the said thirtieth day of April, one thousand eight hundred and forty-seven, an Engagement was also concluded between Major S. Hennell, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and Muktoom bin Butye, Shaikh of Debaye, whereby it was agreed as follows:—

"I, Muktoom bin Butye, Shaikh of Debaye, with the view to strengthen the bonds of friendship existing between me and the British Government, do hereby engage to prohibit the exportation of slaves from the Coasts of Africa and elsewhere on board of my vessels, and those belonging to my subjects or dependents; such prohibition to take effect from the 1st day of Mohurum 1264 A. H. (or 10th December 1847 A. D.).

"And I do further consent, that whenever the cruisers of the British Government fall in with any of my vessels, or those belonging to my subjects or dependents, suspected of being engaged in the Slave Trade, they may detain and search them; and in case of their finding that any of the vessels aforesaid have violated this Engagement, by the exportation of slaves from the Coasts of Africa or elsewhere, upon any pretext whatsoever, they (the Government cruisers) shall seize and confiscate the same."

And whereas, on the first day of May, in the said year one thousand eight hundred and forty-seven, an Engagement was also concluded between the said Major S. Hennell, on behalf of Her Majesty, and Abdool Azeez bin Rashid, Shaikh of Ejman, whereby it was agreed as follows:—

"I, Abdool Azeez bin Rashid, Shaikh of Ejman, with the view to strengthen the bonds of friendship existing between me and the British Government, do hereby engage to prohibit the exportation of slaves from the Coasts of Africa and elsewhere on board of my vessels, and those

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belonging to my subjects or dependents; such prohibition to take effect from the 1st day of Mohurum 1264 A. H. (or 10th December 1847 A. D.).

"And I do further consent, that whenever the cruisers of the British Government fall in with any of my vessels, or those belonging to my subjects or dependents, suspected of being engaged in the Slave Trade, they may detain and search them; and in case of their finding that any of the vessels aforesaid have violated this Engagement, by the exportation of slaves from the Coasts of Africa or elsewhere, upon any pretext whatsoever, they (the Government cruisers) shall seize and confiscate the same."

And whereas, on the said first day of May, an Engagement was concluded by the said Major S. Hennell, on behalf of Her Majesty, and Shaikh Abdoolla bin Rashid, Shaikh of Amulgavine, whereby it was agreed as follows:—

"I, Abdoolla bin Rashid, Shaikh of Amulgavine, with a view to strengthen the bonds of friendship existing between me and the British Government, do hereby engage to prohibit the exportation of slaves from the Coasts of Africa and elsewhere on board of my vessels, and those belonging to my subjects or dependents; such prohibition to take effect from the first day of Mohurum 1264 A. H. (or 10th December 1847 A. D.).

"And I do further consent, that whenever the cruisers of the British Government fall in with any of my vessels, or those belonging to my subjects or dependents, suspected of being engaged in the Slave Trade, they may detain and search them; and in case of their finding that any of the vessels aforesaid have violated this Engagement, by the exportation of slaves from the Coasts of Africa or elsewhere, upon any pretext whatsoever, they (the Government cruisers) shall seize and confiscate the same."

And whereas, on the third day of May, in the said year one thousand eight hundred and forty-seven, an Engagement was concluded by the said Major S. Hennell, on behalf of Her Majesty, and Shaikh Syud bin Tahnoon, Chief of Aboothabee, whereby it was agreed as follows:—

"I, Syud bin Tahnoon, Shaikh of the Beniyas, Chief of Aboothabee, with a view to strengthen the bonds of friendship existing between me and the British Government, do hereby engage to prohibit the exportation of slaves from the Coasts of Africa and elsewhere on board of my vessels, and those belonging to my subjects or dependents; such prohibition to take effect from the 1st day of Mohurum 1264 A. H. (or 10th December 1847 A. D.).

"And I do further consent, that whenever the cruisers of the British Government fall in with any of my vessels, or those belonging to my

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subjects or dependents, suspected of being engaged in the Slave Trade, they may detain and search them; and in case of their finding that any of the vessels aforesaid have violated this Engagement, by the exportation of slaves from the Coasts of Africa or elsewhere, upon any pretext whatsoever, they (the Government cruisers) shall seize and confiscate the same."

And whereas, on the eighth day of May, in the said year one thousand eight hundred and forty-seven, an Engagement was concluded by the said Major S. Hennell, on behalf of Her Majesty, and Shaikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa bin Suleman, Chief of Bahrein, whereby it was agreed as follows:—

"I, Mahomed bin Khaleefa bin Suleman, Chief of Bahrein, with the view to strengthen the bonds of friendship existing between me and the British Government, do hereby engage to prohibit the exportation of slaves from the Coasts of Africa and elsewhere on board of my vessels, and those belonging to my subjects or dependents; such prohibition to take effect from the 1st day of Mohurum 1264 A. H. (or 10th December 1847 A. D.).

"And I do further consent, that whenever the cruisers of the British Government fall in with any of my vessels, or those belonging to my subjects or dependents, suspected of being engaged in the Slave Trade, they may detain and search them; and in case of their finding that any of the vessels aforesaid have violated this Engagement, by the exportation of slaves from the Coasts of Africa or elsewhere, upon any pretext whatsoever, they (the Government cruisers) shall seize and confiscate the same."

And whereas it is expedient that effectual provision should be made for carrying into execution the provisions of the said several Agreements: Be it therefore enacted, by the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, That it shall be lawful for the commanders and other officers of Her Majesty's ships of war, or of the East India Company, to visit and detain in any seas any vessel belonging to either of the said respective Chiefs, Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, Chief of the Joasmee Tribe, Muktoom bin Butye, Shaikh of Debaye, Abdool Azeez bin Rashid, Shaikh of Ejman, Abdoolla bin Rashid, Shaikh of Amulgavine, Syud bin Tahnoon, Shaikh of the Beniyas, Chief of Aboothabee, Mahomed bin Khaleefa bin Suleman, Chief of Bahrein, or to any of their subjects or dependents, which shall, upon reasonable grounds, be suspected of being engaged in the traffic in slaves, or having been fitted out for that purpose, and to send or carry away such vessel, together with its master, sailors, passengers, slaves, and cargo, for the

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purpose of such vessel being brought to adjudication as hereinafter mentioned.

II. And be it enacted, That it shall be lawful for the High Court of Admiralty of England, and for all Courts of Vice-Admiralty in any dominions of Her Majesty beyond the seas, including those Courts of Vice-Admiralty within the territories under the Government of the East India Company, to take cognisance of, and try any such vessel which shall be detained or captured for the violation of the said Agreements, and to condenm any such vessel to Her Majesty, and adjudge as to the slaves found therein in like manner, and under such and the like rules and regulations as are contained in any Act or Acts of Parliament in force in relation to the suppression of the Slave Trade by British-owned ships, as fully as if all the powers and provisions contained in such Acts were re-enacted in this Act as to such High Court of Admiralty or Courts of Vice-Admiralty.

III. And be it enacted, That every person who shall wilfully and corruptly give false evidence in any examination or deposition had or affidavit taken in any proceeding under the said Engagements or this Act, shall be deemed guilty of perjury, and, being thereof convicted, shall be subject and liable to all the punishments, pains and penalties to which persons convicted of wilful and corrupt perjury are liable; and every such person may be tried for any such perjury, either in the place where the offence was committed, or in any colony or settlement of Her Majesty near thereto in which there is a Court of competent jurisdiction to try any such offence, or in Her Majesty's Court of Queen's Bench of England; and that in case of any prosecution for such offence in Her Majesty's said Court of Queen's Bench, the venue may be laid in the County of Middlesex.

IV. And be it enacted, That the pendency of any suit or proceeding instituted for the condemnation or restitution of any ship or cargo, or slaves, taken, seized, or detained by virtue of the said Agreements, or the final adjudication, condemnation, or judgment or determination thereupon, may be pleaded in bar or given in evidence under the general issue, and shall be deemed in any Court whatever to be a complete bar in any action, suit, or proceeding, whether instituted by any person or persons for the recovery of any such ship, vessel, or cargo, or of any damage, or for any injury sustained thereby, or by the persons on board the same, in consequence of any capture, seizure, or detention, or anything done under or in pursuance of the provisions of the said Agreements.

V. And be it enacted, That any ship or vessel which shall be condemned as aforesaid may be taken into Her Majesty's Service, upon payment of such sum as the Lord High Admiral or the Lords

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Commissioners of the Admiralty shall deem a proper price for the same; or, if not so taken, shall be broken up and demolished, and the materials thereof shall be publicly sold in separate parts, and the proceeds thereof shall be paid to such person or persons as the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury may appoint to receive the same.

VI. And be it enacted, That where any ship or vessel employed or engaged in such illicit traffic in slaves, in violation of the said Agreements, shall be seized by any ship or vessel belonging to Her Majesty or the East India Company, and afterwards condemned, there shall be paid to the captors the net proceeds to which Her Majesty is entitled, the same to be distributed in the manner hereinafter directed for the distribution of bounties on slaves taken on board the said vessels.

VII. And be it enacted, That there shall be paid to the commander, officers, and crews of Her Majesty's ships, or the commander, officers, and crews of the ships of the East India Company, a bounty of five pounds for every man, woman, and child slave seized and found on board any ship or vessel taken and condemned in pursuance of the provisions of the said Agreements and of this Act, such bounty to be issued and paid by order from the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, and to be distributed to and amongst the captors aforesaid, in such manner and proportions as Her Majesty shall think fit to order by any Order in Council made or to be made, or by any Proclamation for that purpose.

VIII. And be it enacted, That where any ship or vessel which shall have been seized and condemned under the provisions of the said Agreements shall have been or shall be demolished, and the materials thereof publicly sold in separate parts, as well as her cargo, there shall be paid to the commanders, officers, and crews of Her Majesty's ships, or of those of the East India Company, in addition to the amount of the proceeds of such sale as hereinbefore mentioned, a further bounty on the tonnage of such ship or vessel at the rate of thirty shillings for every ton of such tonnage.

IX. And be it enacted, That where any ship or vessel having no slaves on board shall have been seized and condemned under the provisions of the said Agreements, there shall be paid to the commanders, officers, and crews of Her Majesty's ships, or of those of the East India Company, an additional bounty upon the tonnage of such ship or vessel at the rate of four pounds for every ton; and the tonnage of all such vessels shall be ascertained according to the mode of ascertaining the admeasurement of British vessels, either by the principal officer of the customs at the port where the vessel may be at the time of condemnation, or in default thereof by the best evidence which can be obtained: Provided always, that in every case in which any ship or vessel shall

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be seized with slaves on board in which the bounty calculated upon the number of slaves shall be less than the bounty calculated upon the tonnage, the commanders of Her Majesty's ships, or of those of the East India Company, making the seizure, may elect to take the bounty calculated according to tonnage, instead of the bounty which would be payable upon the number of slaves on board.

X. And be it enacted, That all bounties payable under this Act shall be paid out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, to the commanders, officers, and crews of Her Majesty's ships, and of the ships of the East India Company, and such bounties shall be issued and paid by order from the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury.

XI. And be it enacted, That the said bounty, as also all bounties payable under any of the Acts for the abolition or suppression of the Slave Trade, shall not hereafter be charged with Treasury fees or Exchequer fees of any description.

XII. Provided always, and be it enacted, That in order to entitle the captors to receive the said bounty money, the tonnage of the ship or vessel so seized and condemned shall be proved to the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, by producing a copy, duly certified, of the sentence or decree of condemnation, or by such documentary or other evidence as they may deem satisfactory.

XIII. Provided always, and be it enacted, That in order to entitle the captors to receive the said bounty money on slaves, the number of men, women, and children so taken, delivered over, and condemned, shall be proved to the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury by producing a copy, duly certified, of the sentence or decree of condemnation, and also a certificate under the hand of the proper officer or officers, military or civil, who may be appointed to receive such slaves.

XIV. And be it enacted, That where any slaves, or persons treated as slaves, shall be seized on board any ship or vessel taken and condemned in pursuance of the said Agreements, and of this Act, but who shall not have been delivered over in consequence of death, sickness, or other inevitable circumstance, it shall be lawful for the said Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, if to their discretion it shall seem meet, to direct payment of one moiety of the bounty which would have been due in each case respectively, if the said slaves had been delivered over.

XV. Provided also, and be it enacted, That any party or parties claiming any benefit by way of bounty under the provisions of this Act, or of any share of the proceeds of any vessel confiscated in pursuance of the provisions of the aforesaid Agreements, may resort to the High Court of Admiralty for the purpose of obtaining the judgment of the

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said Court in that behalf, and that it shall be lawful for the Judge of the said High Court of Admiralty to determine thereon, and also to hear and determine any question of joint capture which may arise upon any seizure made in pursuance of this Act, and also to enforce any decrees or sentences of the said Vice-Admiralty Courts relating to any such seizure.

XVI. And be it enacted, That all the provisions, rules, regulations, forfeitures, and penalties respecting the delivery by Prize Agents of accounts for examination, and the distribution of prize-money, and the accounting for and paying over the proceeds of prize and the percentage due thereon to Greenwich Hospital, shall be extended to all bounties and proceeds to be distributed, under the provisions of this Act, to the officers and crews of any of Her Majesty's ships and vessels of war.

XVII. And be it enacted, That where any ship or vessel belonging in whole or in part to the beforementioned chiefs, or their subjects or dependents, shall have been detained and brought to adjudication by any officers of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, or of those of the East India Company, and the said ship shall be restored by sentence of the Court, it shall be lawful for the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, by warrant signed by any two or more of them, to direct payment to be made out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, of any costs or damages which may be duly awarded: Provided always, that nothing herein contained shall exempt such officer from his liability to make good the payments so made, when lawfully called upon, either by the parties interested therein, or by order of the said Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury.

XVIII. And be it enacted, that when seizure shall be made by any of the commanders, officers, and crews of Her Majesty's ships, or of those of the East India Company, and judgment shall be given against the seizor, or when such seizure shall be relinquished by him, it shall be lawful for the said Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, if to their discretion it shall seem meet, by warrant signed by any two or more of them, to direct payment to be made out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland of such costs and expenses as the seizor may have incurred in respect of such seizure, or any proportional part thereof.

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Instructions to Commanders of the Honorable East India Company's Ships, for carrying into execution the Provisions of the Act of XI. and XII. Victoriæ, Cap.* 128, *entitled "An Act for carrying into Effect the Agreement between Her Majesty and the Imaum of Muskat, for the more effectual Suppression of the Slave Trade"; also for carrying into execution the Provisions of the Act† of XII. and XIII. Victoriæ, Cap.* 84, *entitled "An Act for carrying into effect Engagements between Her Majesty and certain Arabian Chiefs in the Persian Gulf, for the more effectual Suppression of the Slave Trade."‡*

I. You are required to make yourselves fully acquainted with the different provisions of these Acts of Parliament, and to guide yourselves accordingly by them in all your acts, when you meet or fall in with any vessels belonging to the Imaum of Muskat, or any of his subjects, or with vessels belonging to any or either of the Arabian Chiefs therein named, engaged in the Slave Trade, or fitted out for the purpose, contrary to the provisions of these Acts.

II. Your attention is to be directed to Article III. of the Agreement with the Imaum dated 2nd October 1845, as set out in the Act.

III. And also to the provisions of the 1st Section of these Acts, which empower the commanders of the ships of war of the East India Company to visit vessels belonging to the subjects of the Imaum, within the limits therein specified, suspected of being engaged in the Slave Trade, and also to visit vessels belonging to the chiefs, or the subjects of the chiefs named in Act XII. and XIII. Victoriæ, Cap. 84.

IV. You will visit and detain, in any seas, except within the limits exempted by the terms of Article III. of the said Agreement contained in Act XI. and XII. Victoriæ, Cap. 128, any merchant vessel belonging to the subjects of the Imaum of Muskat, which shall, upon reasonable grounds, be suspected of being engaged in the export of slaves from the African dominions of the Imaum of Muskat, or the importation of slaves from any part of Africa into his possessions in Asia, excepting such only as are engaged in the transport of slaves from one port to another of his own dominions in Africa, between the port of Lamoo to the north, and its dependencies, the northern limit of which is the north point of Kaghoo Island, in 1° 57′ south latitude, and the port of Keelwa to the south, and its dependencies, the southern limit of which is the Souga Munara, or Pagoda Point, in 9° 2′ south latitude, including the Islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, and Monfea, or any vessel fitted out for that pur-

* Vide pages 662 to 668 of this Selection. † Vide pages 671 to 678 of ditto.
‡ These Acts are dated the 5th September 1848 and the 1st August 1849.

SLAVE TRADE.

pose, and to send or carry away such vessel, together with its master, sailors, passengers, slaves, and cargo, for the purpose of such vessel being brought to adjudication, as in the Act mentioned.

V. On detaining any vessel visited by you under the aforesaid provisions and instructions, you will take possession of the ship's papers, making a list thereof according to Form No. I., and certifying the same by your signature.

VI. You will also draw out a declaration according to Form No. II., stating the circumstances attending the capture, and mentioning the date when, and the place where it was made, and you will certify the same by your signature.

VII. In sending or carrying away such vessel, with its master, sailors, passengers, slaves, and cargo, for the purpose of adjudication, you will do so without delay, and send or carry her with them to the nearest port or place where a British Court of Vice-Admiralty may be established, and, on your arrival at such port or place, you shall duly report your arrival, and deliver up to the proper authorities there the vessel, with its master, sailors, passengers, slaves, and cargo, to be dealt with according to law, and you shall abide such further instructions on the subject as shall be given you.

VIII. The officer in charge of the slave vessel is, at the same time of delivering up the vessel to the proper authorities, to deliver also the ship's papers, and certificates thereof, and the captor's declaration of capture.

IX. The circumstances attending the seizure of any vessel under these Acts of Parliament must be fully reported to the officer under whose orders you are serving, and a duplicate of the report must be sent, at the earliest opportunity, to the Commander in Chief of the Indian Navy at Bombay.

Given under my hand, at Bombay, this day of

Commodore,
Commander in Chief I. N.

FORM No. I.

Certificate containing a List of Papers to be made out in duplicate, one copy to be delivered to the Master of a detained Vessel, as soon as possible after seizure, the other to be delivered to the Court before which the Vessel is taken for adjudication.

I, the undersigned holding the rank of
in the Indian Navy, and commanding the H. C. ship

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do hereby certify that on the day of
being in latitude and longitude
of Greenwich, I seized the whereof
is Tindal, and that she had on board, at time of capture,
slaves, namely—

If no Slaves be on board, state the fact.

Males.....
Females.....
Total ....

Here specify and describe the papers found on board, according to number.

I further certify that the papers which I have numbered, 1 to inclusive, are the whole of the documents, letters, and writings seized on board, which are hereunder specified and described, namely—

No. 1,
2,
3, &c.

Signed by me the day of

Commanding H. C. ship

FORM No. II.

Declaration to be made by the Commander of the H. C. Ship at the time of seizure, and delivered to the Court before which the Vessel is taken for adjudication.

I, the undersigned holding the rank of
in the Indian Navy, and commanding the H. C. ship
duly authorised by the Act of Parliament dated the
for the suppression of the Slave Trade, do hereby declare, that on the
day of being in latitude and
longitude of Greenwich, I seized the
whereof is Tindal, for having violated the said
and I further declare that the vessel had on board,
at the time of seizure, a crew of persons, passengers, and
slaves, as follows—

Males.....
Females.....
Total ....

Here insert any particulars worthy of notice, as to the state in which the Vessel was found, and any facts as to the circumstances or causes of seizure.

And I do also declare that I found this vessel in the following state :

Given under my hand this day of

Commanding H. C. ship

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SOHAR.

Engagement entered into by Syud Suif *bin* Humood, *Chief of Sohar, for the Abolition of the Slave Trade at his Ports, dated the 22nd May* 1849.

Article I.

It having been intimated to me by Major Hennell, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, that certain Conventions have lately been entered into by the Ottoman Porte, and other Powers, with the British Government, for the purpose of preventing the exportation of Slaves from the Coast of Africa and elsewhere; and it having moreover been explained to me, that in order to the full attainment of the objects contemplated by the aforesaid Conventions, the concurrence and co-operation of the chiefs of the several ports situated on the Arabian Coast of the Persian Gulf are required: accordingly I, Syud Suif bin Humood, Chief of Sohar, with a view to strengthen the bonds of friendship existing between me and the British Government, do hereby engage to prohibit the exportation of slaves from the Coasts of Africa and elsewhere, on board of my vessels, and those belonging to my subjects or dependents; such prohibition to take effect from the 29th Rujub 1265 (or the 21st June 1849, A. D.).

Article II.

And I do further consent, that whenever the cruisers of the British Government fall in with any of my vessels, or those belonging to my subjects or dependents, suspected of being engaged in the Slave Trade, they may detain and search them, and in case of their finding that any of the vessels aforesaid have violated the engagement, by the exportation of slaves from the Coasts of Africa or elsewhere, upon any pretext whatever, they (the Government cruisers) shall seize and confiscate the same.

Dated this 20th day of Jumadee-ool-Akhur 1265 A. H. *(or 22nd day of May* 1849 A. D.).

L. S. (Signed) Syud Suif bin Humood.

(True translation)
(Signed) S. Hennell,
Resident, &c.

SLAVE TRADE.

ENGAGEMENTS ENTERED INTO BY THE PERSIAN WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, FOR PREVENTING THE IMPORTATION BY SEA OF SLAVES INTO PERSIAN PORTS.

Letter from* Hajee Mirza Aghasee *to Lieutenant Colonel* Farrant, *Her Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at the Court of Tehran, dated June 12th,* 1848.

Your communication regarding Negroes has been received, and its contents fully understood.

With a view to the request made by you, my sincere and esteemed friend, and solely on account of the sincere friendship and good feelings I entertain towards you, I did not consider it proper to withhold or delay the fulfilment of your desire, and exerted my endeavours to preserve the existing friendship between the two exalted Governments of Persia and England, by laying your request in detail at a most fortunate time before His Majesty &c. &c. the Shah (may his dominion and sovereignty be everlasting!).

An imperative order has been issued, which evinces the exceedingly great favour entertained towards you, my honoured friend, by his Majesty &c. &c. the Shah, which it is evident will always increase. The importation of slaves by sea alone is forbidden, and imperative orders will be issued to the Governors of Fars and Arabia, that hereafter strict probibition should be observed that no Negroes should be either imported or exported, except by land.

This affair, in fulfilment of the request of that esteemed friend, has, thank God, been concluded through the countless favour of His Majesty &c. &c. &c. the Shah, towards you, and by my exertions.

But the Persian Ministers, in equal proportion, require that, by the true friendship of the Ministers of the British Government, when they make a request it will also be acceded to.

Translated by
(Signed) Joseph Reed.

* Note.—This communication was addressed to Lieutenant Colonel Farrant, under the authority of an autograph letter from His Majesty Mahomed Shah, the late Shah of Persia, to Hajee Mirza Aghasee, dated the 12th June 1848.

SLAVE TRADE.

Firman issued by His Majesty the Shah of Persia *to* Hoosen Khan, *Governor of Fars, dated the* 12*th June* 1848.

To the high in rank, the pillar of nobility, &c. &c., Hoosen Khan, the Controller of the State affairs, and Governor of Fars, who has been exalted and supported by the distinguished favours of His Majesty &c. &c. the Shah, be it known,—

That it is a long time since that a request for the abolition of the importation of Negroes by sea was made on the part of the Ministers of the British Government to the Ministers and authorities of this kingdom, but their request during this long period has not obtained an answer or (our) consent.

But in consequence of the favour entertained by our august sovereignty &c. &c. towards the high in rank, the sincere well-wisher of the State, the chosen among Christian nobles, &c. &c., Colonel Farrant, Chargé d'Affaires of the English Government, on account of his respectful conduct and manner of proceeding which have been made manifest, and purely for the regard we entertain for him, we have accepted and complied with his request, and we have ordained that henceforward that high in rank shall warn all merchants and persons passing to and fro to discontinue to bring Negroes by sea, and that they shall not export or import Negroes except by land, which is by no means forbidden. That high in rank will be held responsible for the fulfilment of the orders contained in this communication.

Written in the month of Rujub 1264.

Translated by
(Signed) Joseph Reed.

Firman issued by His Majesty the Shah of Persia *to* Mirza Nubee Khan, *Governor of Ispahan and Persian Arabia, dated* 12*th June* 1848.

To the high in rank, the superior of Generals, the esteemed of the Sovereign, Mirza Nubee Khan, Chief of the Civil Law Court, and Governor of Ispahan and Arabia, who has been honoured by the favour of the pure mind of the King of Kings, be it known: That at this time the high in rank, the noble and exalted, possessed of dignity, the pillar of Christian nobles, the cream of the great ruler of Christendom, the undoubted well-wisher of the State, Colonel Farrant, Chargé d'Affaires

SLAVE TRADE.

of the exalted English Government, who enjoys the unbounded favour of His Majesty the Shah, whose resplendent mind is desirous to gratify him, made a friendly request on the part of the Ministers of that exalted Government to the Ministers of His Majesty the Shah, &c. &c., that with a view to preserve the existing friendship between the two exalted States, a decree should be issued from the source of magnificence (the Shah), that hereafter the importation of the Negro tribes by sea should be forbidden, and this traffic be abolished.

In consequence of this, it is ordered and ordained that, that high in rank, after perusing this Firman, which is equal to a decree of fate, it will be incumbent on him to issue positive and strict injunctions to the whole of the dealers in slaves who trade by sea, that henceforth by sea alone the importation and exportation of Negroes into the Persian dominions is entirely forbidden, but not by land. Not a single individual will be permitted to bring Negroes by sea without being subjected to severe punishment.

That high in rank must in this matter give peremptory orders throughout his Government, and not be remiss.

Written in the month of Rujub 1264 *(June* 1848).

Memorandum.—These Firmans were confirmed by His Majesty the present Shah of Persia, after his accession to the throne.

Agreement with the Persian Government, concluded, in August 1851, *by Lieutenant Colonel* Sheil, *Her Britannic Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary at the Court of Tehran, for the search and seizure of Persian Vessels suspected of being engaged in the Slave Trade; approved by Her Majesty's Government in the month of October* 1851.

Convention concluded between Colonel Sheil *and* Ameer-e-Nizam, *for the detention and search of Persian Vessels by British and East India Company's Cruisers.*

The Persian Government agrees that the ships of war of the British Government and of the East India Company shall, in order to prevent the chance of Negro slaves, male and female, being imported, be permitted for the period of eleven years to search Persian merchant vessels in the manner detailed in this document, with the exception of Persian Government vessels, not being vessels the property of merchants, or the

SLAVE TRADE.

property of Persian subjects,—with those Government vessels there is to be no interference whatever. The Persian Government agrees that in no manner whatever shall any Negro slaves be imported in the vessels of the Persian Government.

The Agreement is this:—

I. That in giving this permission to search mercantile vessels, and those of subjects, the search shall from the first to the last be effected with the co-operation, intervention, and knowledge of Persian officers, who are to be on board vessels of the English Government.

II. The merchant vessels shall not be detained longer than is necessary to effect the search for slaves. If slaves should be found in any of those vessels, the British authorities are to take possession of them, and to carry them away, without detaining or causing them (that is the people of the ship importing slaves) any other damage besides that of depriving them of the slaves. The vessel itself in which the slaves have been imported shall, by the co-operation and knowledge of the officers of the Persian Government, who are on board of the British cruisers, be delivered to the authorities of the Persian ports, who are there on the part of the Persian Government; and the authorities of this (the Persian) Government are to punish and fine, in a manner suitable to the crime he has committed, the owner of that slaving vessel who has acted in contravention of the commands of His Majesty the King of Persia, by importing slaves.

The British ships of war are not in any manner to interfere with the Persian trading vessels without the co-operation of the Persian Government officers; but the Persian Government officers must not on their part be remiss in the duty committed to them.

This Convention is to be in force for a period of eleven years, and after these eleven years have expired, and the stipulated period has elapsed, if the Persian vessels shall be interfered with, for even a single day beyond the eleven years, it will be opposed to the course of friendship with the Persian Government, and to the maintenance of her rights, and this Government will make a demand for satisfaction.

If the slaves who have been heretofore in Persia, and are now there, should, from the present date, and henceforward, wish to proceed by sea on a pilgrimage to Mecca, or to India, or travel by sea, they must, with the knowledge of the British Resident in Bushire, procure a passport from the officer at the head of the Persian Passport Office in Bushire, and no exception shall hereafter be taken to any slave holding a passport. The passport (regulation) obtained with the knowledge of the British Resident at Bushire is, like the other stipulations written above, to be for a period of eleven years.

This agreement of the right of search, and the appointment of the

SLAVE TRADE.

Persian Government officers to be on board the British cruisers, will come in force on the 1st of Rubee-ool-Awul 1268 (January 1st, 1852).

From the date of this document, to the above date, there is no right of search.

The Articles written in this document have from first to last been agreed to by both parties, and confirmed by the Ministers of both Governments, and nothing is to be done in contravention thereof.

Written in the month of Shuwal 1267 (*August* 1851).

Done in duplicate, signed, and sealed by MEERZA TUKEE KHAN.

AMEER-E-NIZAM, of the Persian Government. Dated as above.

JUSTIN SHEIL,
Her Britannic Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary at the Court of Persia.

2.22
The case of the Somali slave girls, 1837–1838

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Extract Bombay Political
Consultation 7th March 1838.
From Captain S Hennell
Acting Resident in the P.G.
To
J. P. Willoughby Esquire
Secretary to Government.
Dated 16th January 1838.

f. 998.

Sir,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 2,303 in this Department under date the 9th instant, upon the subject of the alleged abduction of a number of girls from the Coast of Berbera by the Jaadmees, as reported by me in a former communication, and at the same time conveying the desire of the Right Honble the Governor in Council, that I should submit my opinion as to the practicability or otherwise of inducing His Highness the Imam of Muscat and the Arab Chiefs in the Gulf to prohibit the traffic in Slaves altogether.—

2. In reply I have the honor to report for the information of the Right Honble the Governor in Council, that not having

having yet received any answers to the enquiries I directed to be instituted by the Agents at Bharyan and Muscat into the truth or falsehood of the allegations made by Boushoomed bin Suweiy[d] the professed Bushuna Agent[,] regarding the proceedings of the Joasmees on the African Coast, it is not in my power at present to afford the Government satisfactory information upon that point, I trust however that upon my arrival at Muscat, when returning to Bushire, I shall be enabled to make a full report upon the subject.-

3 With reference to the latter part of your Communication, it is with much diffidence I shall for the information of the Right Honble the Governor in Council, Mad after much and deliberate consideration of the question, am reluctantly led to the conclusion, that in the first place, it would be impracticable to induce His Highness the Imaum of Muscat, and the Arab chiefs in the Gulf, to put an end to the traffic in Slaves without such a large pecuniary sacrifice being made on the part of the British Government, as would most likely be

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be considered altogether inexpedient, and in the second place, that, were such a sacrifice made the humane and philanthropic objects of the Right Honble the Governor in Council would still be defeated by further impediments and difficulties, for which I fear no remedy could be found.-

4 Of the chiefs in the Persian Gulf, with whom[,] unless as a matter of expediency alone[,] we could assume to ourselves any right to interfere directly in the question of the Slave Trade, the only ones are those who are members of the General Treaty negociated in 1820 by Major General Sir W.G. Keir, namely the Joasmee, Bennyas and Mahrattee Chiefs. The 9th Article in this document declares "The carrying off[,] (viz) plundering of Slaves, men, women and children from the Coasts of Africa or elsewhere, and the "transporting[,] viz embarking them in "Vessels is plunder and piracy, and the "friendly Arabs shall do nothing of this "nature[,] viz shall not agree to this thing[.]

This

This declaration, however strongly the English translation may appear expressed was considered so ambiguous, that it was not acted upon by the British officer who was appointed to the superintendence of our political relations in the Gulf, shortly after the Treaty had been signed by the respective chiefs before referred to. Since that date a period of seventeen years has passed over without the question having been agitated, and thus the several parties concerned have acquired a sort of prescriptive right to consider that the ninth article was inserted solely with the view of guarding against the forcible carrying away of individuals for the purpose of selling them as slaves, and not meant to prohibit altogether a traffic which is not only in accordance with the letter and spirit of their religion, but which long continuance and custom have rendered almost indispensable to their domestic comfort.

5th

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5th. Assuming however, that the ninth article of the document before referred to, bears the interpretation best suited to our views and policy, and that our right to act upon it although allowed to lie so long in abeyance is nevertheless liable to be called into operation whenever we may consider it expedient to do so, it must be borne in recollection, that were we the exclusive possessors of the Persian Gulf alone, neither the Rights of the Imaum nor the Chiefs of Soor Keshm or Kismee are parties to this Treaty and therefore their consent to a total prohibition of the traffic in our fellow Creatures could only be obtained by means of negotiations, and the offer of such advantages as would in their estimation compensate for the loss they sustained in the surrender of a practice unviding both profit and convenience. Malicious mischief, that great proportion of

of the income of His Highness the
Imaum is drawn from this source and
I understand he has declared, that
in consequence of his having allowed
himself to enter into the agreement
with Captain Moresby of the Royal
Navy, engageing to prohibit the Slave
Trade with European Powers, within
limits, he has sustained a diminution
in his Revenues to the extent of one
hundred thousand Crowns, and that
he is resolved in this determination
and to afford any further Concessions
upon this point. But even admitting
that either through our influence, or the
payment of an annual pecuniary
Compensation, the parties alluded to
Consented to enter into an engagement
for the total suppression of the Slave
Trade I fear that the attainment of
the humane objects contemplated
by the Government would be still
as distant as before, my reason
for

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for entertaining this opinion is
that the effect of the prohibition if it
could be enforced on the Ports on the
Arabian Side of the Gulf, would be
to throw the whole of this profanous
traffic into the hands of the Sultan
Subjects of Bussorah and Muchumrah
Subjects of the Persian Ports and
those of Bushire, Cajoor, Asulee and
Jungeh, the principal Sea Ports of Persia
It is unnecessary to observe, that in
the present State of our relations with
both these Governments that no
interdiction of the traffic in question
could be carried into effect unless
under the approbation of their
respective authorities. Taking however
into Consideration that the Sale and
purchase of Slaves is not only
permitted by the tenets of their
Faith, but that the discontinuance
would greatly abridge what habit
and Custom have led their subjects
to

to value as a domestic convenience I venture to think that for some time at least it is hopeless to look for such a sanction being afforded. In addition to these impediments I may also advert to the probability that were the Inhabitants in the Gulf to relinquish the traffic at present carried on in Slaves, the Crews of their Vessels would immediately be occupied by those from the Red Sea the Coast of Mekran Scinde &c. &c. It may at the same time be reasonably anticipated that even those Powers whose Consent to our Views may be exacted or purchased will exhibit little more than a nominal adherence to their engagements unless Compelled to do so by our own Maritime Force. This however would involve the necessity of greatly augmenting the number of Vessels of War employed in those Seas and in all probability

be

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be attended with the constant risk of entangling us in disputes with the Local Governments dependent upon Persia, Turkey and Egypt.

6 I cannot conclude my observations without adverting to the opinion held upon this subject by the late Captain Macleod, when Resident in the Persian Gulf, and as these are in a great measure corroborative of my own views, I now respectfully submit an extract from a dispatch, addressed by that Officer to the Government dated the 27th February 1873. After alluding to the wording of the ninth article of our Treaty with the respective Arab Chiefs Macleod continues as follows.

"But in whatever sense the words of the treaty may be understood by either party, I am convinced that our utmost endeavours to abolish the Slave Trade amongst the parties to the Treaty will

will be unaffected as long as the
other powers of the Gulf persist in it
we may perhaps put a stop to the
Carrying off of Slaves, but their purchase
and transport we can never prevent
the Slaves will be disguised and con-
-cealed in a thousand ways, so that
it will be impossible for us to detect
them and I doubt whether more harm
than good might not be done to the
Cause of humanity by stopping boats
and searching them for Slaves, because
it would in all Cases occasion such
disgust and offences as would involve
a great risk of a Renewal of hostilities"

"I do not believe that any of
the parties to the Treaty do carry
off Slaves, all those they possess being
purchased at Muscat and other
places, but at all events it would
be difficult even in the former case
to detect them, in the latter next to
impossible and with all our efforts
we

† The Slaves are generally brought direct from the African Coast S.H.

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we shall find it impracticable to put
a stop to a traffic which is sanctioned
by their religion and by immemorial
Custom, unless it were relinquished by the
Common Consent of the whole of the Chiefs
of the Gulf"

"Convinced as I am of the inef-
-ficiency of this article of the Treaty which
has not yet been acted upon and of
the dangers of attempting to carry it
into effect, I am compelled with much
reluctance to recommend that it
should not be enforced except in very
glaring cases or at least that its sense
should be considered as confined to
the Carrying off of Slaves, and not
including their purchase or transport

† It is gratifying to humanity
to know, that Slaves are not only
extremely well treated and protected
by their Arab Masters, but that they
even enjoy a very considerable degree
of power and influence. I remarked
that

My own personal observation fully confirms this statement S.H.

that they were every where the sleekest and best fed men, and that they seemed happy and comfortable. I must not however omit to mention an exception which occurred at Bahrein where two slaves sought refuge on board the Vernada from the cruelty as they said, of their Masters. they were not however received and as we had no means of ascertaining the merits of the case much as it is to be desired, that this horrid traffic should be abandoned throughout the world we must I fear confess that the cruel treatment of slaves has been the reproach rather of European than of Eastern nations.

Bombay 16th January } (Signed) I Bennett
Acting Resident in the Persian Gulf

Minute

&c &c
&c

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Minute by the Right Honble the Governor
Concurred in by the Honble Mr Farish -
dated 17th February 1838 -

I fear we must relinquish the hope of putting an end to this execrable traffic in the Gulf. We can only beg Captain Bennett to oppose, as far as he can any case of enormity that falls within his notice -

On the particular subject which gave rise to this correspondence, Captain Bennett will owes us a communication, but I expect little from it -

17th February 1838 - (Sigd) R Grant.
I Farish

Minute by the Honble Mr Farish dated 18th February 1838 -

Captain Bennett will no doubt take all occasions of expressing to the Arab Chiefs, the detestation with which we behold in the slave trade the unoffending inhabitants of any Country forcibly taken from their homes and separated for ever from Parents &
Connexions

Connexions and people and Carried off to be sold as Slaves to Strangers in a distant Land.-

24th February 1838 - /Signed/ J. Jarvis

No 415 of 1838.

From J. P. Willoughby Esquire
Secretary to Government ...

To,

The Resident in the Persian Gulf

Dated 6th March 1838.

Sir,

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 11th Ultimo, on the subject of the alleged abduction of a number of Girls from the Coast of Berbera, by the Joasmees and stating your sentiments as to the practicability of inducing His Highness the Imaum of Muscat and the Arab Chiefs in the Gulf to prohibit the traffic in Slaves altogether, and to Communicate to you the following observations and

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and instructions thereon.-

2. Although the Governor in Council entertains little hope of putting an end to this execrable traffic in the Gulf, yet he desires me to request that you will, as far as may be in your power, oppose any case of enormity that falls within your notice, and that you will on all occasions express to the Arab Chiefs the detestation with which the British Government beholds the Slave trade, the unoffending inhabitants of any Country forcibly torn from their Homes and separated for ever from Parents, Connexions and people, Carried off to be sold as Slaves to strangers in a distant land.-

3. The Governor in Council awaits your further report on the subject as stated in my letter of the 9th December last.-

Bombay Castle
6th March 1838.

I have the honor to be Sir
Your Obedt
/Sig'd/ J. P. Willoughby
Secy to Govt

Transcription of previous document

Extract Bombay Political
Consultation 7th March 1838

From Captain S. Hennell
Acting Resident in the Persian Gulf
To
J. P. Willoughby Esquire
Secretary to Government
Dated 10th January 1838

Sir,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No 2303 in this Department under date the 9th ultimo, upon the subject of the alleged abduction of a number of girls from the Coast of Burburra by the Joasmees (as reported by me in a former communication) and at the same time conveying the desire of the Right Honble the Governor in Council, that I should submit my opinion as to the practicability or otherwise of inducing His Highness the Imam of Muscat and the Arab Chiefs in the Gulf to prohibit the traffic in slaves altogether.

2. In reply I have the honor to report for the information of the Right Honble the Governor in Council, that not having yet received any answers to the enquiries I directed to be instituted by the Agents at Shargah and Muscat, into the truth or falsehood of the allegations made by Mahomed bin Iwwuz (the professed Barburra Agent) regarding the proceedings of the Joasmees on the African Coast, it is not in my power at present to afford the Government satisfactory information upon that point. I trust however that upon my arrival at Muscat, when returning to Bushire, I shall be enabled to make a full report upon the subject.

3. With reference to the latter part of your communication, it is with much difidence I state for the information of the Right Honble the Governor in Council that after much and deliberate consideration of the question, I am reluctantly led to the conclusion, that in the first place, it would be impracticable to induce His Highness the Imaum of Muscat, and the Arab Chiefs in the Gulf, to put an end to the traffic in slaves without such a large pecuniary sacrifice being made on the part of the British Government, as would most likely be considered altogether inexpedient and in the second place, that, were such a sacrifice made the humane and philanthropic objects of the Right Honble the Governor in Council would still be defeated by further impediments and difficulties, for which I fear no remedy could be found.

4. Of the chiefs in the Persian Gulf with whom (unless as a matter of expediency alone) we could assume to ourselves any right to interfere directly in the question of the Home Trade, the only ones are those who are members of the General Treaty negotiated in 1820 by Major General Sir W. G. Kier, namely the Joasmee, Beniyas and Uttoobee Shaiks. The 9th Article in this document declares "The carrying off (lit^{y} plundering) of slaves, men, women and children from the coasts of Africa or else where, and the transporting (lit^{y} embarking) them in vessels is plunder and piracy, and the friendly Arabs shall do nothing of this nature (lit^{y} shall not agree to this thing)". This declaration, however strongly the English translation may appear expressed, was considered so ambiguous that it was not acted upon by the British officer who was appointed to the superintendence of our political relations in the Gulf, shortly after the Treaty had been signed by the respective chiefs before-referred to. Since that date a period of seventeen years has passed over without the question having been agitated and thus the several parties concerned have acquired a sort of prescriptive right to consider that the ninth article was inserted solely with the view of guarding against the forcible carrying away if individuals for the purpose of selling them as slaves, and not meant to prohibit altogether a traffic which is not only in accordance with the letter and spirit of their religion, but which long continuance and custom have rendered almost indispensable to their domestic comfort.

5. Assuming however that the ninth article of the document before referred to bears the interpretation best suited to our views and policy, and that our right to act upon it although allowed to be so long in abeyance is nevertheless liable to be called into operation whenever we may consider it expedient to do so still it must be borne in recollection that even on the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf alone, neither His Highness the Imam nor the Chiefs of Sohar, Kateef or Koweet are parties to this Treaty and therefore their consent to a total prohibition of the traffic in our fellow creatures could only be obtained by means of negotiation, and the offer of such advantages as would in their estimation compensate for the loss they sustained in the surrender of a practice uniting both profit and convenience. I believe myself, that a great proportion of the income of His Highness the Imam is drawn from this source and I understand he has declared that in consequence of his having allowed himself to enter into the agreement with Captain Morresby of the Royal Navy, engaging to prohibit the slave trade with European Powers,

within limits, he has sustained a diminution in his revenues to the extent of one hundred thousand Crowns and that he is resolute in his determination not to afford any further concessions upon this point. But even admitting that either through our influence, or the payment of an annual pecuniary compensation, the parties alluded to consented to enter into an engagement for the total suppression of the slave trade, I fear that the attainment of the humane objects contemplated by the Government would be still as distant as before. My reason for entertaining this opinion is that the effect of the prohibition if it could be enforced in the Ports on the Arabian side of the Gulf, would be to throw the whole of this nefarious traffic into the hands of the inhabitants of Bussorah and Muhumrah (subjects of the Ottoman Porte) and those of Bushire, Coqoon, Aseeloo and Lingah, the principal sea ports of Persia. It is unnecessary to observe that in the present state of our relations with both these Governments that no interdiction of the traffic in question could be carried into effect unless under the express sanction of their respective authorities. Taking however into consideration that the sale and purchase of slaves is not only permitted by the tenets of their Faith, but that the discontinuance would greatly abridge what habit and custom have led their subjects to value as a domestic convenience, I venture to think that for some time at least it is hopeless to look for such a sanction being afforded. In addition to these impediments I may also advert to the probability that were the inhabitants in the Gulf to relinquish the traffic at present carried on in slaves, the place of their vessels would be immediately occupied by those from the Red Sea, the Coast of Mekran, Scinde &c. It may at the same time be reasonably anticipated that even those powers whose consent to our views may be exacted or purchased will exhibit little more than a nominal adherence to their engagements unless compelled to do so by our own Maritime Force. This however would involve the necessity of greatly augmenting the number of vessels of war employed in these seas and in all probability be attended with the constant risk of entangling us in disputes with the local Governments dependent upon Persia, Turkey and Egypt.

6. I cannot conclude my observations without adverting to the opinion held upon this subject by the late Captain Macleod, when Resident in the Persian Gulf, and as these are in a great measure corroborative of my own views I now respectfully submit an extract from a dispatch, addressed by that Officer to the Government dated the 27th February 1823. After alluding to the wording of the Ninth Article of

our Treaty with the pacificated Arabs, Captain Macleod continues as follows:-

"But in whatever sense the words of the treaty may be understood by either party, I am convinced that our utmost endeavours to abolish the slave trade amongst the parties to the Treaty will be ineffectual as long as the other powers of the Gulf persist in it we may perhaps put a stop to the carrying off of slaves, but their purchase and transport we can never prevent. The slaves will be disguised and concealed in a thousand ways, so that it will be impossible for us to detect them and I doubt whether more harm than good might not be done to the cause of humanity by stopping boats and searching them for slaves, because it would in all cases occasion such disgust and offence as would involve a great risk of a renewal of hostilities.

I do not believe that any of the parties to the Treaty do carry off slaves, (the slaves are quietly brought direct from the African Coast) all those they possess being purchased at Muscat and other places, but at all events it would be difficult even in the former case to detect them, in the latter next to impossible and with all our effects we shall find it impracticable to put a stop to a traffic which is sanctioned by their religion and by immemorial Custom, unless it were relinquished by the common consent of the whole of the Chiefs of the Gulf.

Convinced as I am of the inefficiency of this article of the Treaty which has not yet been acted upon and of the dangers of attempting to carry it into effect, I am compelled with much reluctance to recommend that it should not be enforced except in very glaring cases or at least that its sense should be considered as confined to the carrying off of slaves, and not including their purchase or transport.

*My own personal observation fully confirms this statement. S.H.

*It is gratifying to humanity to know, that slaves are not only extremely well treated and protected by their Arab masters, but that they even enjoy a very considerable degree of power and influence. I remarked that they were every where the stoutest and best fed men, and that they seemed happy and comfortable. I must not however omit to mention an exception which occurred at Bahrein where two slaves sought refuge on board the "Ternate" from the cruelty as they said, of their master. They were not however received and we had no means of ascertaining the merits of the case much as it is to be desired, that this horrid traffic should be abandoned throughout the world. We must I fear confess that the cruel treatment of slaves has been the reproach rather of European than of Eastern Nations."

I have the honor to be
(Signed) S. Hennell
Acting Resident in the
Persian Gulf

Bombay)
)
10th January)

Minute by the Right Honble the Governor concurred in by the Honble Mr Farish dated 17th February 1838.

I fear we must relinquish the hope of putting an end to this execrable traffic in the Gulf. We can only beg Captain Hennell to oppose as far as he can any case of enormity that falls within his notice.

On the particular subject which gave rise to this correspondence, Captain Hennell still owes us a communication, but I expect little from it.

17th February 1838. (Signed) R. Grant
I. Farish

Minute by the Honble Mr Farish dated 24th February 1838

Captain Hennell will no doubt take all occasions of expressing to the Arab Chiefs, the detestation with which we behold in the slave trade the unoffending inhabitants of any country forcibly taken from their homes and separated for ever from parents, connexions and people and carried off to be sold as slaves to strangers in a distant land.

24th February 1838 (Signed) I. Farish

No 415 of 1838

From J. P. Willoughby Esquire
Secretary to Government

To
The Resident in the Persian Gulf
Dated 6th March 1838

Sir,

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 10th ultimo, on the subject of the alleged abduction of a number of girls from the Coast of Burbura, by the Joasmees and stating your sentiments as to the practicability of inducing His Highness the Imaum of Muscat and the Arab Chiefs in the Gulf to prohibit the traffic in slaves altogether, and to communicate to you the following observations and instructions thereon:

2. Although the Governor in Council entertains little hope of putting an end to this execrable traffic in the Gulf, yet he desires me to request that you will, as far as may be in your power, oppose any case of enormity that falls within

your notice; and that you will on all occasions express to the Arab Chiefs the detestation with which the British Government behold in the slave trade the unoffending inhabitants of any country forcibly taken from their homes and separated for ever from parents, connexions and people, and carried off to be sold as slaves to strangers in a distant land.

3. The Governor in Council awaits your further report on the subject as stated in my letter of the 9th December last.

Bombay Castle
6th March 1838

I have the honor to be
(Signed) J. P. Willoughby
Secry to Govt.

2.23
Agreements on slave trade concluded with Shaikhs Sultan b. Saqr, Khalifah b. Shakhbut, Maktum b. Buti, Rashid b. Hamad and ʻAbdullah b. Rashid, 1838–1839

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Extract Bombay Political

Consultation 11 July 1838.

From Captain S. Hennell

Offg Resident in the Pn. Gulf

1: 3330

To

J. P. Willoughby Esqre.

Secretary to Government

Dated 28th. April 1838

Sir,

With reference to my letters No. 1 your address under date the 24th September 1837, and 10th January 1838, both on this department, I have the honor to report for the information of the Right Honble the Governor in Council that the information which my enquiries have elicited during my recent visits to Muscat and the Arabian Coast, touching the Complaint of a person named Abdulla bin Nuwy of the Abduction of a number of Girls from the Coast of Barbara all tends to confirm the Opinion expressed by Mr Mackenzie in the 2nd 3rd 4th

and

and 5th Paragraphs of his dispatch No 6 Political Department dated the 28th February 1839.-

2nd. Although unable to bring any positive or direct proof against the Subjects of Hazil Sultan bin Saggar Hill Sam inclined to concur in the general opinion entertained in the Gulf, that instances of free persons being kidnapped and brought away for Sale from the Coast of Barbarah do sometimes occur among the Joasmees Therefore considered it my duty to introduce the subject on the occasion of the interviews held with their Chief on the 17th Instant. After touching generally upon the Complaint preferred against his subjects by Abdoollah bin Swaz last year, I reproved in the strongest possible terms, the indignation felt by the Government, on learning that such an infamous and nefarious practice had been carried on although

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although so expressly forbidden by the 9th article of the Treaty subscribed by the independent Arabian Chiefs claims of the Gulf. The Sheikh after a general denial of the accusation and affirming that the subjects of His Highness the Imaum and those of Kaweet were the individuals principally concerned in this traffic, endeavoured to convince me that he was fully impressed with the wickedness and enormity of such proceedings and went on to say, that to prevent the possibility of any of his people participating in them he had despatched his Confidential Meerza to Zanzibar for the purpose of entering into arrangements with His Highness the Imaum of Muscat to the effect, that in future no Vessels from the Joasmee Ports should be permitted to visit the African coast without carrying a special written authority from himself that

that upon the arrival of such Vessels in any of the possessions of the Imaum His Highness or his Lieutenants should assign a proper place for the residence of their Crews during their stay and further, that upon their return to the Gulf, the Nakhoda of each Boat would be required to produce a written document under the seal of His Highness certifying that his Crew had conducted themselves with peace and quietness, and that none of his people had been guilty of stealing or surreptitiously carrying away slaves either by force or fraud. The Sheikh added, that to enforce these propositions he had offered the Imaum full Authority to punish to the utmost extent every one of his subjects who might be guilty of this infraction. He replied that this proof of the sincerity of his sentiments was satisfactory and as it was now evident that we

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we had both the same object in view, he could have no objection to afford his Consent to any further arrangements, which might tend to put an end to the atrocious practice complained of. I therefore recommended that he should concede to our Cruisers the right of searching and detaining his Vessels upon the high Seas, in all cases, where their Crews were open to the suspicion of being engaged in the Kidnapping of Slaves, and at the same time to admit the further right of seizing and Confiscating them in case these suspicions proved to be well founded. Upon the Sheikh unhesitatingly expressing his acquiescence I produced the Agreement of which the accompanying is a Copy, after reading this Moonshee read it aloud he affixed his Seal to two Copies one of which he retained himself, and the other is now deposited in the Records of the Residency

3 It will be observed by the Right Honble the Governor in Council

that

that the document above referred to, does not in the slightest degree bind the Government or pledge it to any specific line of policy with reference to the Slave Trade; while it is something gained towards a check and may at a future period, form the basis of more general and comprehensive negotiations for the suppression of this detestable traffic.

4 In doing myself the honor to intimate that a similar agreement to the one above referred to has been signed by Shaik Rashid bin Hameed, Shaik Mukhtoom bin Butye and Shaik Khuleefa bin Shaekhoot the Chiefs of Ejmon, Debaye, and Aboothabee, and expressing a hope that the steps I have taken may be honored by the approval of the Right Honble the Governor in Council.

I have the honor to be
Sir
Your most obedient
humble Servant
(Sd) S. Hennell
Offg Resdt in the Pn Gulf

Residency in the Pn Gulf
Bushire 28th Apl
1838

Extract Bombay Political

Consultation 11th July 1838

From Captain S. Hennell
No 3330 Offg. Resident in the Pn Gulf

To

J. P. Willoughby Esquire
Secretary to Government
Dated 28th April 1838

Sir,

With reference to my letters to your address under date the 24th September 1837, and 10th January 1838, both in this department, I have the honor to report for the information of the Right Honble the Governor in Council that the information which my enquiries have elicited during my recent visits to Muscat and the Arabian Coast, touching the complaint of a person named Abdulla bin Iwaz of the abduction of a number of girls from the Coast of Barbura all tends to confirm the opinion expressed by Mr. Mackenzie in the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th paragraphs of his dispatch No 6 Political Department dated the 28th Febry 1838.

2nd Although unable to bring any positive or direct proof against the subjects of Shaik Sultan bin Suggur, still I am inclined to concur in the general opinion entertained in the Gulf that instances of free persons being kidnapped and brought away for sale from the coast of Barbura do sometimes occur among the Joasmees. I therefore considered it my duty to introduce the subject on the occasion of the interview held with their Chief on the 17th instant. After touching generally upon the complaint preferred against his subjects by Abdoollah bin Iwaz last year, I expressed in the strongest possible terms, the indignation felt by the Government, on learning that such an infamous and nefarious practice had been carried on although so expressly forbidden by the 9th Article of the Treaty subscribed by the independent Arabian Chieftains of the Gulf. The Shaik after a general denial of the accusation and affirming that the subjects of His Highness the Imaum and those of Koweet, were the individuals principally concerned in this traffic, endeavoured to convince me that he was fully impressed with the wickedness and enormity of such proceedings and went on to say,

that to prevent the possibility of any of his people participating in them he had despatched his confidential Meerza to Zanzibar for the purpose of entering into arrangements with His Highness the Imaum of Muscat to the effect that in future no vessels from the Joasmee Ports should be permitted to visit the African Coast without carrying a special written authority from himself, that upon the arrival of such vessels in any of the possessions of the Imaum, His Highness or his locum tenets, should assign a fixed place for the residence of their crews during their stay and further, that upon their return to the Gulf, the Nakhoda of each boat would be required to produce a written document under the seal of His Highness certifying that his crews had conducted themselves with peace and quietness, and that none of his people had been guilty of stealing or surreptitiously carrying away slaves either by force or fraud. The Shaik added, that to enforce these propositions he had offered the Imaum full authority to punish to the utmost extent every one of his subjects who might be guilty of their infraction. I replied that this proof of the sincerity of his sentiments was satisfactory and as it was now evident that we had both the same object in view, he could have no objection to afford his consent to any further arrangements, which might tend to put an end to the atrocious practice complained of. I therefore recommended that he should concede to our Cruisers the right of searching and detaining his vessels upon the high seas, in all cases, where their crews were open to the suspicion of being engaged in the kidnapping of slaves, and at the same time to admit the further right of seizing and confiscating them in case these suspicions proved to be well founded. Upon the Shaik unhesitatingly expressing his acquiescence I produced the agreement (of which, the accompanying is a copy). After making his moonshee read it aloud he affixed his seal to two copies, one of which he retained himself, and the other is now deposited in the records of the Residency.

3. It will be observed by the Right Honble the Governor in Council that the document above referred to, does not in the slightest degree bind the Government or pledge it to any specific line of policy with reference to the Slave Trade. While it is something gained towards a check and may at a future period, form the basis of more general and comprehensive negotiations for the suppression of this detestable traffic.

4. In doing myself the honor to intimate that a similar agreement to the one above referred to has been signed by Shaik Rashid bin Humeed, Shaik Mukhtoom bin Butye and Shaik Khuleefa bin Shackboot, the Chiefs of Ejman, Debaye and Aboothabee, and expressing a hope that the steps I have taken may be honored by the approval of the Right Hcnble the Governor in Council.

Residency in the)
Pn. Gulf)
) I have the honor to be
Bushire, 28th Apl 1838)

(Signed) S. Hennell
Offg Resid in the Pn Gulf

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Article of Agreement entered into by Shaick Sultan bin Suggur - dated Shargah the 22nd Muharrum A.H. 1254 or 17th April A.D. 1838 -

In the event of Vessels connected with my Ports, or belonging to my Subjects Coming under the Suspicion of being employed in the Carrying off (Literally Stealing) and embarkation of Slaves men women or Children, I Sultan bin Suggur Shaick of the Joasmee Tribe, do hereby agree to their being detained and searched whenever, and wherever, they may be fallen in with on the Seas by the Cruisers of the British Government, and further that upon its being ascertained that the Crews have Carryed off (Literally "Stolen") and embarked Slaves their Vessels shall be liable to Seizure and Confiscation by the aforesaid Cruizers.

Sealed (L.S.)

by Sultan bin Suggur

True Copy

(Sigd) S. Hennell

Offg Resid in the Pn Gulf

Transcription of previous document

Article of Agreement entered into by Shaik Sultan bin Suggur dated Shargah the 22nd Muhurrum A.H. 1254 or 17th April A.D. 1838.

In the event of vessels connected with my ports, or belonging to my subjects, coming under the suspicion of being employed in the carrying off (literally stealing) and embarkation of slaves, men women or children, I Sultan bin Suggur, Shaik of Joasmee Tribe, do hereby agree to their being detained and searched whenever, and wherever, they may be fallen in with on the seas by the Cruizers of the British Government, and further that upon its being ascertained that the crews have carried off (literally "stolen") and embarked slaves their vessels shall be liable to seizure and confiscation by the aforesaid Cruizers.

Sealed L.S.

by Sultan bin Suggur

True Copy

(Signed) S. Hennell
Offg Resid in the Pn Gulf

N°1346 of 1838

Pol¹ Department

From L. R. Reid Esquire

Acting Chief Secretary to Govt,

To,

The Officiating Resident in the Pers¹ Gulf

Dated 11th July 1838

Sir,

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 28th April last N°15 with its enclosure on the subject of kidnapping slaves from the Coast of Berbera by the Joasmees, and to inform you that the Right Honble the Governor in Council highly approves of your having entered into an agreement with the Chief of the tribe for permitting our Cruizers to search and detain his Vessels upon the high seas in all cases where their Crews are open to the suspicion of being engaged in the Kidnapping of Slaves, and to Confiscate such Vessels in case such suspicions are

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are proved to be well founded -

2 The Governor in Council further instructs me to request that you will still act according to the Instructions of Government Conveyed to you in Mr Secretary Willoughby's letter dated the 6th of April last on the subject of the slave trade carried on at the Ports in the Persian Gulf -

I have the honor to be

Bombay Castle 11th July 1838

Sd/ L. R. Reid

Acting Chief Secy to Govt,

Transcription of previous document

No 1346 of 1838
Poll. Department

From L. R. Reid Esquire
Acting Chief Secretary to Govt.

To
The Officiating Resident in the Pn Gulf
Dated 11th July 1838

Sir

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 28th April last No 15 with its enclosure on the subject of kidnapping slaves from the Coast of Burburra by the Joasmees, and to inform you that the Right Honble the Governor in Council highly approves of your having entered into an agreement with the Chief of the tribe for permitting our Cruizers to search and detain his vessels upon the high seas in all cases where their crews are open to the suspicion of being engaged in the kidnapping of slaves, and to confiscate such vessels in case such suspicions are ~~are~~ proved to be well founded.

2. The Governor in Council further instructs me to request that you will still act according to the instructions of Government conveyed to you in Mr Secretary Willoughby's letter dated the 16th of April last on the subject of the slave trade carried on at the Ports in the Persian Gulf.

Bombay Castle
11th July 1838

I have the honor to be
(Signed) L. R. Reid
Actg Chief Secry to Govt.

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Extract Bombay Political
Consultation 23d October 1839

No 4610

From Brom Captain J. Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf

To
D. C. Willoughby Esquire
Sec.y to Government
Bombay

Dated 19th July 1839.

Sir

I have the honor to acknowledge your letter No 2378 in this Department under date the 12th Inst. on the subject of the Slave Trade carried on in the Gulf of Persia

2. According to the [illegible] of your communication I beg respectfully to observe, that on entering into the remark regarding the disgraceful traffic in Slaves now being carried on in many Ports of consequence in the Persian Gulf & Soldiers [illegible] a motive amount to imply that the protection secured to the Negroes of the Coast of Barbara under the treaty with Sir Wm Grant Kier excluded the City Islands &c by force of that treaty equally the act of piracy of Kidnapping a Negro from Barbara and [illegible]

I proceed to treat as such

3rd The Honble the Governor in Council may be with confidence assured of my gladly availing myself of every opening which may offer, to use my utmost exertions in the restriction and suppression of the traffic so opposed to all the best feelings of humanity. A great advance would be made in this important object if the Imam were persuaded to extend the line beyond which the Vessels of His Highness engaged in the slave trade, are liable to seizure from Ras Aboo to Cape Isaadel on the coast of Mahran. I have long been looking for the return of His Highness to Muscat in order to have an opportunity of personally communicating with him upon the subject, but judging from the manner in which his return has been procrastinated it would almost appear as if Syed Said were determined not to revisit his Arabian territories although it is again currently reported he intends shortly to do so. I found during my late visit to Muscat that it was perfectly useless discussing any questions of this nature with the Regency of that place, as they always answered that they could not act in any affair except under the Special authority and sanction

of His Highness the Imam

4th With regard to the Piratical Arabian Chiefs, I have much satisfaction in enclosing the accompanying Arabic copies, and a translation of Engagements which have been entered into by Shaikh Khuleefa of Abo Thabi Shaikh Nuhhyan of Debay Shaikh Abdoollah of Amulgawain, and Shaikh Sultan of Rasel Khyma. The first articles of these engagements gives over Vessels the right of search beyond a line drawn from Ras Dolyaee to Cape Isaadel, the second renders any vessel belonging to the above Chiefs found with Slaves on board beyond the limits specified liable to seizure and confiscation the third enacts the sale of slaves to be out of practice.

5th The restrictive Laws and other remedial measures suggested by me in my letter of the 3rd September 1838 have been agreed to by the principal Arabian Chiefs of the Gulf. And with these measures I was obliged to remain satisfied for the present, as with reference to the intrigues now carrying on among them by the Emissaries of Khoorshid Pasha I was prepared to use no politic to press them further

there upon a Subject that at all times &c
approaches with Suspicion and reluctance

I have the honor to be
Sir
Your Most obed.t Servant.
Sig.d — J. Hunt C
(Resident in the Persian
Gulf

Residency in the
Persian Gulf
Ramalkeigh July
1839

Minute by the Right Hon.ble the Governor
Sanctioned to by the Board dated 21st October
the Resident's proceedings may
be entirely approved

We should embrace the first
favorable opportunity of sanctioning the
Imaum of Muscat to extend the limits of
prohibition of the Slave trade by his Sub-
jects

The Engagements entered into by the
Maritime Arab Chiefs are very satisfactory
and the requisite information should be com-
municated to the Superintendant of the Indian
Navy, in order that he may issue instructions
to the several Officers Commanding Vessels of
War

Copy of this letter should be sent to
the Governor General with a Suggestion that
the aforesaid treaty should be published in
the Govt. Gazette of this Presidency

Copy also should be sent to the
Resd.t,

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Right Hon.ble Court of Directors by an early opportunity

Sig.d J. R. Carnac
" J. Farish.
" G. H. Anderson

Translation of an agreement entered into by Shaik Sultan bin Suggur Chief of Rasel Khymah dated off Rasel Khymah 3d July 1839

I Sultan bin Suggur Shaik of the Joasmee Tribe do hereby declare, publish and pledge myself to the British Government as the following engagements

First — That the Joasmee Ships whenever they may meet any Vessel belonging to myself or any subjects beyond a chain line drawn from Cape Bragada fifty two degrees seaward of the Island of Seweira and ending at Cape Mandel, and shall suspect that such Vessel is engaged in the slave trade the said Ships are permitted to detain or search it.

2 — Should it on examination be proved that any Vessel belonging to myself or any subjects is carrying Slaves whether men, women or Children for sale beyond the aforesaid

aforesaid line from the Port Company shall
seize and confiscate such vessel and her Cargo
But if the aforesaid vessel shall pass beyond
the aforesaid line owing to stress of weather
or other case of necessity such case shall
then be enquired

3rd In the selling of Slaves
and Females whether grown up or young
who are Slaves or Free is contrary to the
Mahomedan Religion and whereas these
Somaulee Tribe is included in the Imaum
of Muscat Syd Sultan bin Saqoor do hereby
agree that the sale of Males and Females
whether young or old of the Somaulee Tribe
shall be considered as piracy and that
after six months of this date all those of
any people connected or being concerned
in such an act shall be punished the same
as pirates

Seal of Syd Sultan bin Saqoor

True Translation
Sd/ J Hamill
Resident in the Persian
Gulf

Note A similar Agreement
to the above was entered into by Shaik
Khuleefa

No. 10

Khuleefa bin Shahbeet on the 1st July
1839 and by Shaik Nasir Khaleefa of Debaye
and Shaik Abdoolah bin Rashid of Ras
Jarcan on the 2d of the same Month

Mau (Seal)
Sd/ J Hamill
Resident in the
Persian Gulf

12 From Lieut. Wm. Bayd Esquire
Secy to Government

To
The Resident in the Persian Gulf
Dated 2nd Oct 1839

Sir

I have directed by the Honble
the Govr in Council to acknowledge the
receipt of your letter, with Enclosures, dated
the 19th July last. He has also to request
that you will be pleased to embrace the first
favorable opportunity of conveying to His
Highness the Imaum of Muscat, the orders
the issue of prohibitions of the slave trade
by his Subjects from Ras Read to Ras Jeen
Quadil on the Coast of Mekran.

2d The engagements entered into by the
principal Maritime Arabian Chiefs regard
ing Slave Trade are considered by the Govern
ment

in Council highly satisfactory and he is pleased to approve the whole of your proceedings unreserved.

3d (The Superintendant of the Indian Navy has been requested to issue the necessary instructions to the Officers Commanding the Bombay Government's Vessels of war on the subject of the Articles of the Engagement above awarded to

(B Castle.)
21st Oct 1839)

(Signed) W.H. Boyd
Secy to Govt

Transcription of previous document

EXTRACT BOMBAY POLITICAL

No 4610 Consultation 23rd October 1839

From

Captain S. Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf

To

J. P. Willoughby Esquire
Secty to Government
Bombay

Dated 19th July 1839

Sir,

I have the honor to acknowledge your letter No 2378 in this Department under date the 12th Decr. last upon the subject of the slave trade carried on in the Gulf of Persia.

2. Adverting to the 2nd paragraph of your communication, I beg respectfully to observe, that in noticing Mr Mackenzie's remark regarding a disgraceful traffic in young women being carried on in every Port of consequence in the Persian Gulf, I did not for a moment mean to imply that the protection secured to the negroes of the Coast of Barbara under the treaty with Sir William Grant Keir excluded in the Abyssinians the carrying away a native of Abyssinia by force is by that treaty equally an act of piracy as kidnapping a negro from Barbara and would if proved be treated as such.

3. The Honble the Governor in Council may rely with confidence upon my gladly availing myself of every opening which may offer to use my utmost exertions in the restriction and suppression of a traffic so opposed to all the best feelings of humanity. A great advance would be made in this important object if the Imam were persuaded to extend the line beyond which the vessels of His Highness engaged in the slave trade are liable to seizure from Din Head to Cape Guadel in the Coast of Mekran. I have long been looking for the return of His Highness to Muscat in order to have an opportunity of personally communicating with him upon the subject, but judging from the manner in which his return has been procrastinated it would almost appear as if Syed Said were determined not to revisit his Arabian territories, although it is again currently reported, he intends shortly to do so. I found during my late visit to Muscat that it was perfectly useless discussing any questions of this nature with the Regency of that place, as they always gave out that they could not act in any affair excepting under the special authority and sanction of His Highness the Imam.

4. With regard to the Maritime Arabian Chiefs, I have much satisfaction in enclosing the accompanying Arabic copies, and a translation of engagements which have been entered into by Shaik Khuleefa of Aboothabee, Shaik Mukhootum of Debay, Shaik Abdoollah of Amulgaveen, and Shaik Sultan of Rasel Khyma. The first articles of these engagements gives our vessels the right of search beyond a line drawn from Cape Delgado to Cape Guadel. The second renders any vessel belonging to the above chiefs found with slaves on board beyond the limits specified liable to seizure and confiscation. The third makes the sale of Soomalees an act of piracy.

5. The restrictive line and other remedial measures suggested by me in my letter of the 3rd September 1838 have thus been agreed to by the principal Arabian Chiefs of the Gulf, and with these concessions I was obliged to remain satisfied for the present as with reference to the intrigues now carrying on among them by the emissaries of Khorshid Pasha it appeared to me impolitic to press them further upon a subject they at all times approach with suspicion and reluctance.

Residency in the
Persian Gulf
19th July 1839

I have the honor to be
Sir
Your Most Obed. Servant

(Signed) S. Hennell
Resident in the Persian
Gulf

Minute by the Honble the Governor subscribed to by the Board dated 21st October.

The Resident's proceedings may be entirely approved.

He should embrace the first favourable opportunity of inducing the Imaum of Muscat to extend the line of prohibition of the slave trade by his subjects.

The engagements entered into by the Maritime Arab Chiefs are very satisfactory and the requisite information should be communicated to the Superintendant of the Indian Navy, in order that he may issue instructions to the several officers commanding vessels of war.

Copy of this letter should be sent to the Governor General with a suggestion that the aforesaid treaty should be published in the Govt. Gazette of this presidency.

Copy also should be sent to the Honble Court of Directors by an early opportunity.

(Signed) J. R. Carnac
O. J. Farish
G. Anderson

Translation of an agreement entered into by Shaik Sultan bin Suggur, Chief of Rasel Khymah dated off Rasel Khymah 3rd July 1839.

I Sultan bin Suggur, Shaik of the Joasmee Tribe, do hereby declare that I bind and pledge myself to the British Government in the following engagements:

FIRST - That the Government Cruizers whenever they may meet any vessel belonging to myself or my subjects beyond a straight line drawn from Cape Delgado passing two degrees seaward of the island of Socatra and ending at Cape Guadel, and shall suspect that such vessel is engaged in the slave trade the said cruizers are permitted to detain or search it.

2. Should it on examination be proved that any vessel belonging to myself or my subjects is carrying slaves whether men, women or children for sale beyond the aforesaid line then the Govt. Cruizers shall seize and confiscate said vessel and her cargo. But if the aforesaid vessel shall pass beyond the aforesaid line owing to stress of whether or other case of necessity not under control then it shall not be seized.

3. As the selling of males and females whether grown up or young who are "Hoor" or free is contrary to the Mahomedan Religion and whereas the Soomalee Tribe is included in the "Ahrar" or Free, I Sultan ben Suggur do hereby agree that the sale of males and females whether young or old of the Soomallee Tribe shall be considered a piracy and that after 4 months of this date all those of my people convicted of being concerned in such an act shall be punished the same as pirates.

Seal of L.S. Sultan bin Suggur

True Translation
(Signed) S. Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf

Note: A similar Agreement to the above was entered into by Shaik Khuleefa bin Shakhboot on the 1st July 1839 and by Shaik Mukhtoom of Debaye and Shaik Abdoolah bin Rashid of Amulgaveen on the 2nd of the same month.

True Copy
(Signed) S. Hennell
Resident in the
Persian Gulf

From W. S. Boyd Esquire
Secy to Government

To

The Resident in the Persian Gulf
Dated 21st Oct 1839.

Sir

I am directed by the Honble the Govr in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, with enclosures dated the 19th July last No 60 and to request that you will be pleased to embrace the first favorable opportunity of inducing His Highness the Imaum of Muscat, to extend the line of prohibition of the slave trade by his subjects from Din Head to Cape Guadel on the Coast of Mekran.

2. The engagements entered into by the principal Maritime Arabian Chiefs regarding slave trade are considered by the Governor in Council highly satisfactory and he is pleased to approve the whole of your proceedings now reported.

3. The Superintendant of the Indian Navy has been requested to issue the necessary instructions to the Officers Commanding the Honble Company's vessels of war on the subject of the Articles of the Engagements above adverted to.

I have the honor etc.

B Castle
21st Oct 1839

(Signed) W. S. Boyd
Secy to Govt.

2.24
Memorandum on the slave trade in the Gulf, 1835–1840

131.

Memorandum by the Political Secretary
dated 10th April 1840.—

The consequence of a seizure of Slaves effected at Porebunder towards the end of 1835, the attention of the Bombay Government was directed to the fact, that an extensive slave trade was carried on between the Ports in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, and those of Kattiyawar and Cutch. A discussion ensued respecting the best mode of effectually suppressing this nefarious traffic.—

2 On the 30th October 1837 the Resident in the Persian Gulf, was instructed to endeavour to prevail on His Highness the Imaum of Muscat to extend the provisions of the Treaty concluded by Captain Moresby, so as to include the Provinces of Kattiyawar and Cutch, and to obtain permission from His Highness to search vessels fitted out from his ports, suspected

suspected of being engaged in the slave
trade.—

3 Captain Moresby's treaty
dated the 29th August 1822, merely prohibited
the slave trade by subjects of the Imaum
if found, "to the eastward of a line drawn
"from Cape Delgardo, passing east of Socotra
"on to Dien-head the western point of
"the Gulf of Combay".—

4 On the same occasion,
the Resident was instructed to endeavour
to conclude similar engagements with the
other Arabian Chiefs of the Persian Gulf.—

5 On the 19th July 1839,
Captain Hennell reported that the Arab
Chiefs noted in the margin, had entered
into an engagement of these articles,
prohibitory of the slave trade. By the
first, the right of search is confined to
our vessels beyond a line drawn from
the Cape Delgardo to Cape Guadel, in
Mukran.

† 1 Shaik Khuleefa of Abookhubee
2 Shaik Abookhoom; Debay
3 Shaik Abdoolla; Amulgaveen
4 Shaik Sultan; Rasel-Khyma

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Mukram. By the second, vessels found
beyond those limits with slaves on board,
are declared liable to seizure and confisca-
tion. By the third, the sale of Gomalees
is declared an act of piracy.—

6 These engagements have
been published in the Government Gazette
and orders issued to the Superintendent
of the Indian Navy for their enforce-
ment by the officers of the Indian Navy.

7 On the 21st October 1839,
the Resident was again requested to
embrace the first opportunity of inducing
the Imaum of Muscat to extend the
line of prohibition of the slave trade
by his subjects, from Cape Head to
Cape Guadul on the Coast of Mukran.

8 In the mean time Captain
Cogan was sent by her Majesty's Govern-
ment to conclude a Treaty with the
Imaum of Muscat, according to a
printed

printed draft furnished for his guidance.
In his letter forwarding copy of a Treaty
entered into by the Imaum, Captain † dated 12th July 1839.
Cogan observes: "The abolition of slavery
in His Highness' dominions which is
a subject of much solicitude with Her
Majesty's Government, has only been
advanced by the more formal confirma- † vide art. XV. the Treaty
=tion of the Treaty of 1822 and with
permission for the ships and vessels of
the East India Company to give
force and effect to its stipulations, which
had previously been interdicted." In the
same letter this officer states it to be
his opinion "that there are serious
"difficulties in obtaining further con-
"cessions from the Govern-
"ment of Muscat, unless we tender some
"pecuniary equivalent, supported by
"naval protection against the neigh-
"bouring Mahomedan powers interested
"in the countenance of the slave trade."—

Under

733

Under these circumstances
it is highly satisfactory to observe from
Captain Hennell's report of the 17th Decem-
-ber last that he has succeeded in
obtaining much more extensive concessions
from the Imaum than those obtain-
-ed by Captain Cogan. His Highness
has in fact acceded to the wishes of
this Government, by authorizing the
"right" of search, and extending the
"boundary line laid down in Captain
"Moresby's Treaty from Diew Head to
"Pipsee, the eastern extremity of the
"territories of His Highness on the Coast
"of Mekran, thus including the Coasts
"of Kattywar Cutch, Kurachee, and upwards
"of four degrees westward, in the limits,
"within which the subjects of Muscat
"are forbidden to carry on the slave
"trade".—

10 I cannot more strongly
point

out the great advance, which with proper care and vigilance, may now be made in suppressing the Slave trade, than by noticing the fact mentioned in one of Captain Outram's recent despatches, that no less than between seven and eight hundred slaves are annually imported &c. &c. at Kurachee in Sinde. —

11 The Honorable Board's consideration is requested to the 2d and following paragraphs of the Resident's letter of the 19th December last. The only way in which the evils therein noticed can be checked, appears to be, to leave His Highness the Imaum free to adopt such measures as he may deem expedient. —

In

137

12 On a subsequent letter dated the 10th February 1840, Captain Hennell explains, that the new boundary line is made to terminate at Capes Cutchee instead of Guadel, "the Imaum having objected to the latter place as being situated within his possessions on the Mekrahan Coast". The distance between the two Capes however is stated to be only 70 miles. —

13 The new Treaty should perhaps at once be published in the Government Gazette and the Superintendent of the Indian Navy be directed to adopt effectual measures for its enforcement. The Political agents in Kattywar, Cutch and Lower Sinde should also be informed of the extension of the boundary line, so as to include the Ports and Coasts within their jurisdiction

jurisdiction. Captain Hennell's proceedings will doubtless receive the warm commendations of Government, and it may perhaps be deemed advisable to address His Highness the Imaum of Muscat in suitable terms, when the opportunity might be taken of sending presents of equal value to those recently received from Muscat. Finally, to the Government & their proceedings may be reported, ofs. India and the Home authorities. —

10th April 1840 } (Signed) J. P. Willoughby
Secretary to Government

2.25
Agreement on the abolition of the African slave trade, 1847

№ 705

Bombay Castle 21st July 1847 Secret Consultation 29

Office № 1711 of 1847
Cons. № 4 of 1847
Secret Department

№ 705 From, Major Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf

To, A. Malet Esquire
Secretary to Government
Bombay

Bushire 11th May 1847

Sir,

Adverting to my despatch to your address, № 1 in this Department dated the 7th ultimo, intimating my intention under the circumstances therein stated, of endeavouring to obtain from the Arabian Chiefs in the Persian Gulf, an Official avowal of the relations at present subsisting between them and the British Government, in respect to the Slave Trade, it is with sincere gratification I have the honor to report for the information of the Honorable the Governor in Council, that I have succeeded in persuading the several Chiefs notified in the Margin, to enter into each a separate Engagement, binding himself to prohibit altogether the importation of Slaves from the African Coast or elsewhere, on board his Vessels and those of his subjects, and moreover giving full authority to our Cruisers, not only to detain and examine all such Vessels suspected of being engaged in the Slave Trade, but likewise to seize and confiscate them should they be found violating the terms of the Engagement now entered into. Being in fact equivalent to the total abolition of this nefarious traffic, on the part of themselves, and their

Sheikh Sultan bin Sugger Chief of Ras el Khyma and Shargah
Sheikh Abdoolah bin Rashid Chief of Umm ul Qaiwain
Sheikh Ajeez bin Rashid Chief of Ajman
Sheikh Mubtaroo bin Belitzy Chief of Debaye
Sheikh Zaid bin Sultan Chief of Abothabee
Sheikh Mahomed bin Khaleefa Chief of Bahrein

No 705 Cons.

Bombay Castle 21st July 1847 Secret Cons: 28

their dependents.

2. Enclosure No 1 is a copy and translation of this important Document as executed by Sheik Sultan bin Suggur the Chief of the Joasmee Tribes. All those authenticated by the other Sheikhs, are, with the exception of dates and names, exact transcripts of the one now forwarded.

3. It would be needless to trouble the Government with a detail of the arguments used by me in bringing about this desirable arrangement, suffice it to say they were of a strictly persuasive character. I am aware these new obligations have been entered into by the Arab Chiefs unwillingly, but their reluctance was overcome, partly by a desire to mark their deference for the views and wishes of the British Government, and partly by the impression, that these engagements would form additional guarantees for the maintenance of their independence. It was however urged, that it would be unjust to make such Vessels as had already proceeded to the African Coast this season, liable to the penalties of a mere post facto law, and I therefore consented that its provisions should not come into operation before the commencement of the new year of the Hejira 1264, or the 10th Dec[r] next. I had the less objection to fixing this period, as in all probability several months must elapse before I can be honored by the receipt of the approval of Government to the result of these negociations, and its sanction received for the issue of the necessary instructions, for carrying the new arrangements into effect.

4. I beg to remark, that till the present time, the Chief of Bahrein has been no party to the several Engagements entered into by the maritime Sheikhs regarding the Slave Trade, subsequently to the General Treaty of 1820. From these circumstances, and from his

Known

No 705 Cons.

Bombay Castle 21st July 1847 Secret Cons: 28

Known proud and high character of the present ruler of that Island I hardly hoped to be able to induce him to follow the examples of the others, I met however with less difficulty than I anticipated, & although he hesitated for some time, and made many provisos explaine the general clauses fully, I am inclined to attribute the comparatively little opposition he made to becoming a party to the arrangements to the alarm which the pretensions advanced by the Ottoman Porte (communicated in a separate despatch) have inspired him.

5. In consenting to the total abolition of the hitherto lucrative Traffic in Slaves the maritime Sheikhs have unquestionably made no small sacrifice both of their interests and prejudices. I would therefore respectfully suggest for the consideration of the Honorable the Governor in Council, whether the occasion be not of sufficient importance to call for an acknowledgement direct from the Government in the shape of a letter to each of the parties subscribing the engagement accompanied by an appropriate present to mark its sense of the sincerity proof now offered of their desire to be guided by its views, and to cultivate its friendship and good will. In case it is Honor in Council should see fit to receive this suggestion favorably, I have taken the liberty of annexing a list of such articles of Presents, as I have reason to think would be considered acceptable. The Gifts made by me in my late visit were only those usually presented on the occasion of the annual Tour.

Residency in the Persian Gulf
Bushire 11th May 1847.

I have the honor to be &c
(Signed) S. Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf

Translation of an Engagement entered into by Sheikh Sultan bin Suggur Chief of Ras-el-Khymah and Shargah for the abolition of the African

№ 705 Cont.

Bombay Castle 21st July 1847 Secret Cons: 2 D.

African Slave Trade in his Port on—

It having been intimated to me by Major Stennell, the Resident in the Persian Gulph, that certain communications have lately been entered by His Highness the Imaum of Muscat, and other Powers with the British Government, for the purpose of preventing the exportation of Slaves from the African coast and elsewhere, and it having moreover been explained to me, that in order to the full attainment of the objects contemplated by the aforesaid communications the concurrence and cooperation of the Chiefs of the several Ports situated on the Arabian Coast of the Persian Gulf are required— Accordingly I Sheik Sultan ben Suggur, Chief of the Joasmee Tribe, with a view to strengthen the Bonds of Friendship existing between me and the British Government, do hereby engage — to prohibit the exportation of Slaves from the Coasts of Africa, and elsewhere, on board of my Vessels, and those belonging to my Subjects or Dependents. Such — Prohibition to take effect from the 1st day of Muharrum 1264 A.H. (or 10th December 1847 A.D.)—

And I do further consent, that whenever the Cruizers of the British Government, fall in with any of my Vessels or those belonging to my Subjects or Dependents, suspected of being engaged in the Slave Trade, they may detain and search them, and in case of their finding, that any of the Vessels aforesaid, have violated this Engagement, by the exportation of Slaves from the Coast of Africa, or elsewhere, upon any pretext whatever, they (the Government Cruizers) shall seize and confiscate the same

Dated this 11th day of Jumadee-ool ewwul 1263 A.H. or 29th day of April 1847 A.D.

Captain Political Resident Persian Gulf

True Translation
(Signed) S. Stennell
Resident &c.

L.S.

Sheik Sultan's Engagement is dated 11th Jumadee-ool-ewwul 1263 or 29th April 1847.—

Debaye

Sheik Ahmed Arjee's Engagement is dated 15th Jumadee-ool ewwul 1263 or 1st May 1847.—

Ejmain

Sheik Abdoollah ben Rashid's Engagement is dated 15th Jumadee-ool ewwul 1263 or 1st May 1847

Ajmanee

Sheik Saeed ben Tahnoon's Engagement is dated 17th Jumadee-ool ewwul 1263 or 3rd May 1847

Aboothabee

Sheik Mahomed ben Kulleefa's Engagement is dated 22d Jumadee-ool ewwul 1263 or 8th May 1847

Bahreen

True Copy
(Signed) A.B. Kemball
Assistant Resident Persian Gulf

List of Articles suitable as Presents to the maritime Arabian Chiefs on the occasion of their abolition of the Slave Trade.—

Sheik

№ 705 Cont.

Bombay Castle 21st July 1847 Secret Cons: 2 D.



No 705@6

Bombay Castle 21st July 1847 Secret Cons: 28

Sheik Sultan ben Suggur

A Cashmere Shawl either red or white with border about Rupees 150

A Spanish fullsized Strong Gold Hunting Watch 250

A Telescope ..... 30 — 1,80

Sheik Saeed ben Tahnoon

The same as above 1,80

Sheik Abdoollah ben Rashid

A double barrel Gun with Flint Locks 200

A Shawl as above ..... 100 — 300

Sheik Azeez ben Rashid

A Shawl as above 100

A good fullsized Silver Hunting Watch ..... 150 — 250

Sheik Muktoom ben Butye

A Shawl } as above 100

A Watch. } ..... 150 — 250

Sheik Mahomed ben Khuleefa

The same as Sheik Sultan ben Suggur 1,80

Resident in the Persian Gulf Bushire 11th May 1847

(Signed) H. Hennell

Resident in the Persian Gulf

Minute by the Honorable the Governor dated 26th June 1847 No 706

At the I have no doubt that the minds of the Arabian Chiefs in the Gulph have been influenced by political motives in yielding ready compliance with the wishes of the British Government for the attainment of their co-operation towards the important object of preventing the exportation of of Slaves from Africa, I certainly think that we ought not to neglect such means of encouraging them in a strict adherence to the spirit of their present engagements as are proposed by Major Hennell, I would therefore address letters to them in suitable terms, and provide him to the full with presents such as he has applied for.

(Signed) G. Clerk

Copies by Purshotum D. Ex. Secy & Dy Secy

Transcription of previous document

Bombay Castle 21st July 1847 Secret Consultation 201

Office No 174 of 1847
Corrs: No 4 of 1847

No 705 Secret Department

From

Major Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf

To

A. Malet Esquire
Secretary to Government
Bombay

Bushire 11th May 1847

Sirs,

Adverting to my despatch to your address, No 1 in this Department dated the 7th ultimo, intimating my intention, under the circumstances therein stated, of endeavouring to obtain from the Arabian Chiefs in the Persian Gulf, a modification of the relations at present subsisting between them and the British Government, in respect to the Slave Trade, it is with sincere gratification I have the honor to report for the information of the Honorable the Governor in Council, that I have succeeded in persuading the several Chiefs notified in the margin, to enter, each into a separate engagement, binding himself to prohibit altogether the importation of slaves from the African Coast or elsewhere, on board his vessels and those of his subjects, and moreover giving full authority to our Cruizers, not only to detain and examine all such vessels suspected of being engaged in the Slave Trade, but likewise to seize and confiscate them should they be found violating the terms of the Engagement now entered into. Being in fact equivalent to the total abolition of this nefarious traffic, on the part of themselves, and their dependents.

Sheikh Sultan bin Suggur Chief of Rasel Khymah and Shargah
Sheikh Abdoollah ben Rashid Chief of Amulgavine
Sheikh Azeez ben Rashid Chief of Ajmaun
Sheikh Muktoom ben Butye Chief of Debaye
Sheikh Saeed ben Tahnoon Chief of Aboothabee
Sheikh Mahomed ben Khuleefa Chief of Bahrein

2. Enclosure No 1 is a copy and translation of this important document as executed by Sheik Sultan ben Suggur the Chief of the Joasmee Tribe. All those authenticated by the other Sheikhs, are, with the exception of dates and names, exact transcript of the one now forwarded.

3. It would be needless to trouble the Government with a detail of the arguments used by me in bringing about this desirable arrangement. Suffice it to say they were of a strictly persuasive character. I am aware these new obligations

have been entered into by the Arab Chiefs unwillingly, but their reluctance was overcome, partly by a desire to mark their deference for the views and wishes of the British Government, and partly by the impression, that these engagements would form additional guarantees for the maintenance of their independence. It was however urged, that it would be unjust to make such vessels as had already proceeded to the African Coast this season, liable to the penalties of an "ex post facto" law, and I therefore consented that its provisions should not come into operation before the commencement of the new year of the Hijira 1264, or the 10th Dec. next, I had the less objection to fixing this period, as in all probability several months must elapse before I can be honored by the receipt of the approval of Government to the result of these negociations, and its sanction received for the issue of the necessary instructions, for carrying the new arrangements into effect.

4. I beg to remark, that till the present time, the Chief of Bahrein has been no party to the several Engagements entered into by the Maritime Sheiks regarding the Slave Trade, subsequently to the General Treaty of 1820. From these circumstances, and from the known proud and haughty character of the present ruler of that island, I hardly hoped to be able to induce him to follow the example of the others. I met however with less difficulty than I anticipated, although he hesitated for some time and made my Moonshee explain the several clauses fully. I am inclined to attribute the comparatively little opposition he made to becoming a party to the arrangements to the alarm which the pretensions advanced by the Ottoman Porte (communicated in a separate despatch) have inspired him.

5. In consenting to the total abolition of the hitherto lucrative traffic in slaves the Maritime Sheiks have unquestionably made no small sacrifice both of their interests and prejudices. I would therefore respectfully suggest for the consideration of the Honorable the Governor in Council, whether the occasion be not of sufficient importance to call for an acknowledgement direct from the Government, in the shape of a letter to each of the parties subscribing the engagement, accompanied by an appropriate present to mark its sense of the sincere proof now offered of their desire to be guided by its views, and to cultivate its friendship and good will. In case His Honor in Council should see fit to receive this suggestion favorably, I have taken the liberty of annexing a list of such articles of

presents, as I have reason to think would be considered acceptable. The gifts made by me in my late visit were only those usually presented on the occasion of the annual tours.

Residency in the Persian Gulf)
Bushire 11th May 1847)

I have the honor to be etc
(Signed) S. Hennell
Resident in the Persian Gulf

Translation of an Engagement entered into by Sheik Sultan ben Suggur, Chief of Ras-el-Khymah and Shargah, for the abolition of the African Slave Trade in his Ports.

It having been intimated to me by Major Hennell, the Resident in the Persian Gulf that certain conventions have lately been entered by His Highness the Imam of Muscat, and other Powers, with the British Government, for the purpose of preventing the exportation of slaves from the African Coast and elsewhere, and it having moreover been explained to me, that in order to the full attainment of the objects contemplated by the aforesaid conventions, the concurrence and cooperation of the Chiefs of the several Ports situated on the Arabian Coast of the Persian Gulf are required - accordingly, I Sheik Sultan ben Suggur, Chief of the Joasmee Tribe, with a view to strengthen the bonds of friendship existing between me and the British Government, do hereby engage to prohibit the exportation of slaves from the coasts of Africa, and elsewhere, on board of my vessels, and those belonging to my subjects, or dependents, such prohibition to take effect from the 1st day of Mohurrum 1264 A.H. (or 10th December 1847 A.D.)

And I do further consent, that whenever the cruisers of the British Government, fall in with any of my vessels, or those belonging to my subjects or dependents, suspected of being engaged in the Slave Trade, they may detain and search them, and in case of their finding that any of the vessels aforesaid have violated this engagement, by the exportation of slaves from the Coasts of Africa, or elsewhere, upon any pretext whatever, they (the Government cruisers) shall seize and confiscate the same.

Dated this 14th day of Jumadee-ool uwul 1263 A.H.
or 30th day of April 1847 A.D.

True Translation L.S.
(Signed) S. Hennell Sheik Sultan bin
Resident etc. Suggur

Debaye Sheik Muktoom's Engagement is detail 14th Jumadee ool-Uwwul 1263 or 30th April 1847.

Ejman Sheik Abdool Azeez's Engagement is dated 15th Jumadee-ool Uwwul 1263 or 1st May 1847.

Amulgavine Sheik Abdoollah ben Rashid's Engagement is dated 15th Jumadee-ool Uwwul 1263 or 1st May 1847

Aboothabee Sheik Saeed ben Tahnoon's Engagement is dated 17th Jumadee-ool Uwwul 1263 or 3rd May 1847

Bahrein Sheik Mahomed bin Kuleefa's Engagement is dated 22nd Jumadee-ool Uwwul 1263 or 8th May 1847

True Copy
(Signed) A. B. Kemball
Assistant Resident Persian Gulf

List of Articles suitable as presents to the Maritime Arabian Sheiks on the occasion of their abolition of the Slave Trade

Sheik Sultan ben Suggur

A Cashmere shawl either red or white with border about	Rupees 150	
A plain full sized strong gold hunting watch	250	
A Telescope	30	
		430

Sheik Saeed ben Tahnoon

The same as above	430

Sheik Abdoollah ben Rashid's

A double barrel gun with flint lock	200	
1 Shawl as above	100	
		300

Sheik Azeez ben Rashid

A Shawl as above	100	
A good full sized silver hunting watch	150	
		250

Sheik Muktoom ben Butye

A Shawl)		100	
) as above			
A Watch)		150	
			250

Sheik Mahomed ben Khuleefa

The same as Sheik Sultan ben Suggur	430

Residency in the Persian Gulf Bushire
11th May 1847
(Signed) S. Hennell

Resident in the Persian Gulf No 706

Minute by the Honorable the Governor dated 26th June 1847

Altho I have no doubt that the minds of the Arabian Chiefs in the Gulph have been influenced by political motives in yielding ready compliance with the wishes of the British Government for the attainment of their cooperation towards the important object of preventing the exportation of slaves from Africa, I certainly think that we ought not to neglect such means of encouraging them in a strict adherence to the spirit of their present engagements as are proposed by Major Hennell. I would therefore address letters to them in suitable terms, and provide him to the full with presents such as he has applied for.

(Signed) G. Clerk

(٩)

المعاهدة الشيخ سلطان بن صقر شيخ راس الخيمه و الشارجه في ترك المعاملة الرقيق سنه ١٨٤٧

ـ بسم الله ـ

بملاحظة ما انّ جناب عاليجاه ذي الشوكة و الاجلال الاجل الافخم ميجر هنّل صاحب باليوز خليج فارس اخبرنا ان بهذ الايّام قد جرى بعض المعاهدات فيما بين الدولة العلية الانكليسة و جناب الافخم السيد السّعيد امام بندر مسقط و غيره من الدول في توقيف حمل و نقل العبيد من سواحل برّ افريقية و غيرها و ايضاً اتضح لنا ان موافقة مشايخ سواحل برّ العرب من خليج الفارس و اعانتهم لا نجاز تمام مطلب تلك المعاهدة المزبورة ضرورة لازمة فلاجل ذالك انا يا سلطان ابن صقر شيخ القواسم لاستحكام روابط الاتحاد الكائن في مابيني و بين جناب حضرة السركار ذي الشوكة و الاقتدار الا نقريز الافخم اتعهد و التزم على نفسي ان امنع جميع اخشابي و اخشاب رعاياى و المتعلقين على من حمل و نقل العبيد من سواحل برّ افريقية وغيرها و ابتداء المنع من غرة شهر محرم سنه ١٢٦٤ مطابق عاشر دنمبر سنه ١٨٤٧ ثم انقبّل ايضاً متى ما لاقت المراكب الدولة العلية الانكليسيه اخشابي و اخشاب رعاياي و المتعلقين علي و يظنون بهم انهم مشغولين في تجارة العبيد ان يعطلوهم و يفتشوهم ففي الحالة التي يجدون احدى الاخشاب المزبورة مخالفة

(١٠)

للمعاهدة المذكورة في حمل العبيد من سواحل برّ الافريقية و غيرها بايّ عذر و سبب يقبضوها و يضبطوها جرى ذالك فى ١٤ شهر جمادي الاول سنه ١٢٦٤ مطابق ثلاثين اپريل سنه ١٨٤٧م ـ

ابن راشد
سلطان ابن صقر

شيخ مكتوم بن بطي شيخ دبي امضى معاهدةً موافقاً لذلك فى ١٤ شهر جمادي الاول سنه ١٢٦٣ ـ

شيخ عبد العزيز بن راشد شيخ عجمان امضى معاهدة موافقاً لذالك فى ١٥ شهر جمادي الاول سنه ١٢٦٣ ـ

شيخ عبدالله بن راشد حاكم ام القيوين امضى معاهدة موافقاً لذالك فى ١٥ شهر جمادي الاول سنه ١٢٦٣

شيخ سعيد بن طحنون شيخ بني ياس حاكم بوظبي امضى معاهدة موافقاً لذالك فى ١٧ شهر جمادي الاول ـ سنه ١٢٦٣

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RECORDS OF THE EMIRATES 1820–1958

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1835–1853

EDITOR
PENELOPE TUSON

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